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Abstract 
This thesis investigates three hypotheses in relation to the cognitive explanation of normal and 
problematic gambling behaviour. The "strong cognitive hypothesis" takes the view that i f 
cognitive processes alone account for different levels of play, then the order of the events 
experienced during a task may be a good predictor of the levels of play. Four large scale 
experiments are presented focusing on the Illusion of Control, particularly the order effects 
originally observed by Langer and Roth (1975). Drawing on Hogarth and Einhom's (1992) 
belief adjustment model an adjusted methodology is employed making the paradigm resemble 
the real gambling decision making task more closely. The results of the Illusion of Control 
experiments suggest that the strong cognitive hypothesis can account for gambling in general, 
but there is no consistent support in favour of its role in explaining differential levels of play. 
Three questiormaire studies are then presented investigating the two alternative hypotheses 
assessed in this thesis. The "weak cognitive hypothesis" stipulates that an additional individual 
differences element is necessary to supplement the strong cognitive hypothesis in order to 
explain differential levels of gambling behaviour. Individual differences in the level of 
everyday general dissociation, the enjoyment and engagement in two forms of processing 
(Rational or Experiential, Epstein 1990), and in the extent to which heuristics and biases are 
used when making decisions are investigated. Factor analysis for the heuristics and biases 
investigation, particularly in relation to the understanding of the principle of randomness, 
reveals some evidence for the weak cogmtive hypothesis. Strongest evidence emerges in 
relation to the "integrative hypothesis" which stipulates that cognitive factors and processes are 
only important in relation to and interaction with other variables. The questioimaire studies 
investigate the role of erroneous beliefs and their relationship with the dissociation experienced 
within the gambling task. Using Structural Equation Modelling techniques, the results lead 
towards the generation of a new model of differential levels of gambling and the causal links 
between these variables and the loss of control are discussed. 
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Gambling involves staking money on an uncertain event in the hope of wmning 
more money at the risk of losing the money staked. The core feature of all gambling forms 
is that the expected outcome of each gamble is less than the money staked. If this were not 
so businesses in the gambling industry would not be making such colossal profits. 
Typically about 60% of the revenue from the sale of lottery tickets, for example, is returned 
in prizes (Walker 1992). Thus the expected value of a lottery ticket costing one pound 
sterling is typically only about 60 pence and the probability of wiiming anything at all is 
often extremely low, e.g. the chance of success for the jackpot in the U K National Lottery 
is 1 in 14 million. People however still gamble on such games, as well as the many other 
forms of gambling. The economic utility of gambling is therefore clearly negative. In 
objective terms, gambling should never take place i f wirming money is the primary (or 
only) motivation. This suggests that the motivation for gambling may not be purely 
economic and has led to a range of explanations for the behaviour. 
A n alternative explanation for why people continue to take part in activities in 
which negative return is the norm, is that they may believe that they are likely to win. 
There is ample evidence in the literature to suggest that subjectively speaking, people can 
develop the umrealistic expectation of monetary gain. This expectation needs to be 
explained. The cognitive perspective on gambling assumes that the utility of gambles is 
sometimes misperceived, and sets out to clarify the processes involved. The main aim of 
the thesis is to investigate the cognitive approach, particularly to evaluate whether the 
cognitive approach alone can offer a complete explanation for both gambling and problem 
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gambling (the distinction will be discussed below), or whether other perspectives need to 
be considered alongside this approach to explain these phenomena. 
Before reviewing and evaluating the cognitive perspective, this introductory chapter 
first sets out to present the context in which the present research programme is set and to 
present and discuss some other plausible theories. Rather than exhaustively revievraig all 
possible theories on the nature of gambling behaviour, four of the main recent and popular 
perspectives wil l be examined. The theoretical perspectives considered are those of arousal 
theory, personality theory, the behavioural perspective, and the cognitive approach. After 
these alternative theoretical perspectives have been examined, this chapter wil l then set up 
the rationale and framework for the experimental work that was conducted for this thesis. 
1.2. Context 
Gambling is a common activity in most coimtries of the world. Walker (1992) 
estimates that 80% of the population in industrialised Western societies take part in some 
form of gambling activity. 
Ladouceur (1991) reported that 88% of the adults in Quebec played the lotteries, hi 
Germany, Hand (1992) claimed that 60% of the population played one form of lotto, and 
10% actively played slot machines (Buhringer and Konstanty, 1992). These rates of 
gambling are reflected in the increase in overall amount spent in the gambling industry by 
punters. Christiansen (1993) reported that in the U S A over a period of only 18 years from 
1974 to 1992 expenditure rose from $17.4 billion to $329.9 billion, an mcrease 
considerably greater than inflation. 
This suggests that gambling activities are not restricted solely to any particular 
group in society or financial status, be it the rich who may have plenty of money to spare or 
the poor in an attempt to strike it lucky. 
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If the activity is just so very normal and so many people take part then why should 
there be such interest in researching.the factors that lead, to the initiation and maintenance 
of the behaviour? The answer to this is two-fold. Firstly, the processes resulting in 
behaviours with a mean negative expected return are worthy of investigation in their own 
right. The second reason lies in the fact that the consequences of continued gambling 
behaviour can be very broad and very devastating for those who earn the label 
"Pathological Gambler". Caldwell, Yoimg, Dickerson and McMillen (1988) provide an 
encompassing definition of the pathological gambler. According to these authors, a 
pathological gambler is a gambler who: gambles once a week or more often, has lost more 
than can be afforded six or more times, has lost more than was plarmed on four of the last 
five sessions, usually chases losses, gets into debt, and who has tried, without success, to 
stop gambling. In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association formally recognised 
pathological gambling as a disorder of impulse control (A.P.A., 1980) and it has remained 
within the diagnostic manuals since then, e.g. DSMIV (A.P.A., 1994). 
Hraba and Lee (1996) surveyed the gambling behaviour of 459 men and 552 
women. They defined problem gambling as having lost control over ones' gambling 
behaviour in relation to the consequences from it. They observed that men and women did 
not differ with respect to the incidence of problem gambling. Although men took part in a 
wider number of forms, the two sexes did not differ in terms of the amoimt and time spent 
or the firequency at which they gambled on their respective forms. 
Lesieur and Blume (1991) interviewed 50 female pathological gamblers recruited 
from various Gamblers Anonymous centres across the US and reported that the prmcipal 
features of their pathology were loss of control, emotional dependence and interference 
with normal functioning. Another related characteristic included a chronic and progressive 
failure to resist impulses to gamble which had personal, familial and vocational 
consequences. 
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Rosenthal (1992) viewed pathological gambling as a progressive disorder 
characterised by a continuous or periodic loss of control and related it in this respect to 
alcoholism or substance dependence. He specified four phases in the career of a 
pathological gambler. The first stage is that of wiiming followed by a period of losing, 
which in turn leads to desperation followed by helplessness. Other research also report an 
early win experience as important in the development of a gamblmg pathology (e.g. Custer 
and Milt, 1985). 
Estimates for the prevalence of pathological gambling range fiom 0.25% 
(Dickerson and Hinchy 1988) to 2.8% (Volberg and Steadman 1988) of the adult 
population. Comparisons across countries suggest that the highest levels of involvement in 
gambling (Haig, 1985) and the highest levels of problems generated by gambling 
(Dickerson, 1993) are to be found in Australia, and possibly in the Far East as well; 
although gambling is widespread in many other countries throughout the world. 
There are two important points to note regarding this. Firstly, it is clear that 
gambling is a very common activity. Secondly, it is also clear that a large number of 
individuals go on to lose control of their gambling behaviour. Both of these situations, 
normal and problem gambling, require explanation. 
1.3. Theory and gambling paradox 
There are two problems that need to be addressed by theories of gambling. Firstly, 
as Wagenaar (1988) explains, the biggest paradox of gambling is that the activity exists at 
all, and that so many people engage in it without taking on board the negative expected 
outcome. A theory therefore needs to offer an account of why people gamble and continue 
to gamble. Secondly, what is also in need of an explanation is why some people continue 
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to excessive and problematic levels, losing control over their gambling behaviour, despite 
regular feedback about the infrequent wins and the regular losses. 
The reasons why people begin to gamble in the first place have been widely 
researched (see Walker 1985, Brenner and Brenner 1987, Arrow 1970 and Sullivan 1972, 
for examples). It is unportant to recognise that gambling is itself not a unitary activity; 
gambling occurs in many forms and contexts. The social and structural differences 
between the various forms are large. The intensity at which the activities are played also 
varies dramatically from the occasional lottery ticket purchase to as much as the 
commitment of all available time and resources. These two extremes for example would 
undoubtedly have little in conunon with each other and are obviously at opposite ends of 
the "normal" to "compulsive" gambling continuum. Dickerson (1993) argues that, although 
not making them explicit, there may be different psychological processes that cause 
impaired contiol in different forms of gambling. He concludes that to assume that the 
same psychological models wil l explain impaured control in all forms of gambling is "not 
only naive, but also runs the risk of not fiilly exploitmg the significant differences between 
different forms to develop a far richer and informative vem of research" (page 243). 
Several differences across gambling forms are very apparent. The time delay 
between the choice of a particular gamble to the point at which the outcome is known 
(hence when feedback is received concerning tbie win or loss of that gamble) varies widely 
fiom a few seconds in the case of scratch card and fioiit machine gambling, to a week or 
more with the purchase of a lottery ticket for example, and even longer still with some sorts 
of event. There is also a luck versus skill dimension on which the gambling activities can 
vary. The extent to which someone can use their knowledge and ability playing roulette, for 
example, is minimal. However there is a certain degree of skill associated with other forms 
such as poker and horse racing. 
Furthermore the characteristics of a compulsive gambler who is compulsive on one 
particular gambling form, may be very different to another compulsive gambler who takes 

part in another activity. Comish (1978) additionally argued that the aspects of gambling 
which determine the choice of gambling form can be distinguished from those in which the 
chosen form is actually used. 
With these cautionary points in mind, we can consider why a gambler continues 
with a behaviour which is clearly not in his or her best interests. The persistence of playing 
throughout long series of systematic losses has been explained in many ways. 
Early psychoanalytic approaches to gamblmg made the assumption that problem 
gamblers were developmentally predisposed to gambling. The mechanisms underlying 
these predispositions have varied from, for example, masturbation (Freud, 1928) and the 
self-destructive Death Instinct (Freud, 1917), to oral fixation, (Maze, 1987). 
Hess and Diller (1969) and Vickrey (1945) have argued that gamblers value the 
money that they expect to win more highly than the money they have aheady lost, and that 
gambling is in this respect is therefore rational. Devereaux (1968) argued that gamblmg is a 
form of entertaimnent for which gamblers are prepared to pay. There have also been 
suggestions that psychological motives play a role such as a need for conflict resolution 
(Devereaux 1968), a need for competition and aggression (Thomas 1901, Zola 1963), and a 
need for self-punishment in neurotic people (Bergler, 1957). 
More recently, these kinds of approach have persisted focusing on individual 
differences in sensation seeking and achievement motivation, and in some cases underlying 
neurobiological mechanisms have been proposed, (Carlton and Manowitz, 1987). Four of 
the most popular current explanations for gambling behaviour and continued gambling 
behaviour are the arousal perspective, individual differences perspective, the behavioural 
perspective and the cognitive perspective. Here each of these perspectives are considered in 
tum. 
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1.3.1. Arousal Theory, Heart Rate 
Gamblers often report that excitement is the main reason for why they gamble, e.g. 
Anderson and Brown (1984) and Coventry and Brown (1993). Arousal theories of 
gambling assume that the primary motivation for gambling is the excitement that the 
activity engenders. Excitement in the literature has been measured usmg both objective 
physiological (e.g. heart rate, Leary and Dickerson 1985, Coventry and Norman 1997, 
Anderson and Brown 1984) and subjective non-physiological measures, (e.g. Coventry and 
Constable 1999, Griffiths 1995). A number of studies have shown that gambling is 
associated with arousal increases across a range of forms. 
Anderson and Brown (1984) found gamblers betting on blackjack in both a real and 
laboratory setting, and observed significant heart rate increases for those in the real casino 
environment. The within-participant comparisons revealed that all gamblers showed a 
higher heart rate increase in the real situation (up to 58 beats per minute) in comparison to 
the artificial laboratory settmg that was used. 
Coventry and Norman (1997) measured heart rate increases in a sample of off-
course horse racing gamblers before, during and after the gambling process, and observed 
significant correlations between the frequency of gambling, the number of forms taken part 
in, and heart rate increases at the end of the task. 
Griffiths (1995) found, on the basis of self-report measures, that regular and 
pathological gamblers experienced significantly higher rates of excitement during gambling 
than did non-regular players. However, subjective measures of arousal have been foimd not 
to be correlated with objective heart rate measures, e.g. Coventry and Constable (1999), 
and their useflilness should therefore be questioned, hi the Griffiths study for example, 
participants could have simply been trying to find a reason that would rationalise their 
gambling activities, i.e. that at least the activity was exciting. 
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There are problems associated with the use of heart rate as the objective measure of 
arousal. As Coventry and Norman point out (1997) heart rate has been observed to 
fluctuate greatly as a function of motor activity, relaxation and acclimatisation to the 
experimental conditions, (Obrist, 1981; Smith, Guyton, Maimmg and White, 1976). Even 
gentle movements can increase heart rate from baselines. Lynch, Schuri & D'Aima (1976) 
observed significant changes in heart rate with both isometric hand and foot exercises, 
whilst Fahrenberg, Foerster and Wilmers (1993) observed increases following handgrip 
movements and even free speech. Generally in the literature baseline heart rates from 
which later comparisons were made were taken during a period of relaxation prior to the 
participants' involvement with the gambling task or when the participants were stationary. 
The fact that most gambling activities, and those involved in the literature, involve some 
form of motor activity, suggests that the observed results may have been confounded 
simply due to the mcreased physical movement following the start of the activity, and not 
necessarily due to the "exciting" nature of the task. 
Coventry and Norman (1997) rectified this potential problem by measuring baseline 
heart rates whilst walking and still observed elevated heart rates during the gambling 
episodes as compared to baselmes. Therefore, even with the methodological concems 
raised, there is much evidence that gambling forms are arousing. 
Levels of arousal have in addition been argued to be differentiated between high 
and low frequency gamblers, and therefore offered as an explanation for varying levels of 
continued play. Dickerson and Adcock (1987) and Brown (1986) argued that the more 
regular gamblers become more aroused whilst gambling as compared to low frequency 
players. 
Although there is ample evidence to affirm that arousal is associated with gambling 
and across a variety of forms, the evidence to suggest that high frequency gamblers get 
more aroused than low-frequency gamblers is somewhat equivocal. Leary and Dickerson 
(1985) did observe significantly increased heart rates for their high fiequency gambling 
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group, whilst gambling on poker machines. However, although Coventry and Norman 
(1997) observed significant heart rate differences during the different phases of the 
gambling process, no differences were found between high and low frequency gamblers or 
between gamblers who chased or did not chase their losses, even vnth their methodology in 
which they controlled for the reported effects of motor activity. Although the gamblers 
were objectively excited during the off course betting, differences in arousal changes could 
not accoimt for the different levels of gambling behaviour reported: by the participants. 
Griffiths (1993) monitored heart rates of finit machine gamblers in regular and non-regular 
players. Although again both groups heart rates did increase (an average 22 beats per 
minute) during the gambling episodes, there were no differences in this arousal measure 
between regular and non-regular gamblers. Dickerson, Hinchy, England, Fabre and 
Cunningham (1992) also found no differences between high and low frequency gamblers in 
their measurements of heart rate during play. 
"While arousal seems important for some gambling forms, it seems unlikely that 
arousal theories can explain levels of gambling on their own. One possibility that has been 
considered is that arousal theories, in combmation with an individual differences 
dimension may offer a means of predictmg differences between gamblers gambling at 
different levels. One such plausible approach is that of Zuckerman's Sensation Seeking 
theory (1979), which is considered in the following section. 
1.3.2. Personality Theory, Sensation Seeking 
hidividual difference type approaches have assumed that the reason why some 
people continue to gamble has something to do with certain personality characteristics that 
the individual gambler holds. It should be noted however that as the majority of people 
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gamble, these mdividual difference type approaches seem unlikely to offer a suitable 
explanation for normal gambling. 
Of all the personality dimensions available, Zuckerman's biologically based theory 
of Sensation Seeking offers one of the most direct applications to gambling behaviour. 
Zuckerman (1979) defined sensation seekers as people with the need for high states of 
arousal. He originally predicted that gamblers should be high sensation seekers, and that 
the reason that they gamble would be to satisfy their need for arousal, and that higher 
frequency gamblers would score higher on the Sensation Seeking scale than lower 
firequency players. 
The behavioural expressions of sensation seeking have been found in various kinds 
of risk-taking behaviours such as driving habits, health, financial activities, alcohol and 
drug use, sexual behaviour, and sports, (Zuckerman 1994), and Sensation Seeking scores 
have been found to correlate highly and significantly with, for example, Eysencks 
extroversion and psychoticism super factors. 
The Sensation Seeldng Scale (SSS, Zuckerman, 1979) has received wide interest ui 
investigating the role of arousal in continued involvement in gambling activities and its 
relationship to the level of risk adopted by gambling individuals. 
Waters and Kirk (1968) investigated the relationship between gambling and 
sensation seeking in a gambling situation (outcome prediction fiom drawing a card fiom a 
deck of cards) in which there were varying degrees of risk takmg possible, by offermg 
different probabilities of success. High sensation seekers tended to opt for the riskier 
outcome; to opt for the lower probability of wiiming in which the potential payoff was 
higher. 
Wong and Carducci (1991) observed that in their undergraduate population, high 
sensation seekers displayed greater risk-taking tendencies in everyday financial matters 
than low sensation seekers, and that this difference existed within both gender groups. 
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Kuley and Jacobs (1988) observed that their high fiequency gamblers (in their 
problem gambling group) scored significantly higher than the low frequency social 
gamblers on their total sensation seeking scores and specifically on the Boredom 
Susceptibility, Experience Seeking and Disinhibition subscales of the SSS. 
Wolfgang (1988) examined the relation of gender and sensation seeking in respect 
of undergraduates ratings of past, present and expected fiiture participation in leisure 
activities that usually involve money. Expected fiiture gambling ratings were associated 
with two of the subscales on the sensation seeking scale, those of disinhibition and 
boredom susceptibility. The authors even went so far as to suggest that these personality 
factors were more influential than early experience or sex-role socialisation in determining 
an interest in gambling. Men also reported significantly more past and present leisure 
gambling than women, although this difference did not exist vwth respect to fiiture 
expected gambling. 
AUcock and Grace (1988) investigated pathological gamblers with respect to their 
sensation seeking and impulsivity. Compared to their non-patient control group, 
pathological gamblers did not differ on either measure. In comparison to other addictions, 
their drug addict group scored significantly higher and their alcoholic group significantly 
lower than both the pathological gamblers and the non-patient groups on the sensation 
seeking scores, whilst the only difference in impulsivity scores were those of the drug 
addicts which were significantly higher than all other groups. The authors suggested that 
the classification of pathological gambling as a disorder of impulse control should be 
reconsidered. 
Steinberg, Kosten and Rounsaville (1992) investigated the relationship between 
gambling activities and sensation seeking among a group of cocaine abusers. They 
observed significant positive relationships between sensation seeking scores and gambling 
frequency. High frequency gamblers scored significantly higher on the SSS than their low 
fiequency counterparts. However, the generalisability of these results to the gambling 
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population as a whole should be made with caution, considering that gambling for these 
participants was not their only addiction. 
There has however been substantial empirical support against the relationship 
between the SSS scores and gambling frequency, e.g. Dickerson, Wjalker, England, and 
Hinchy (1990). 
Dickerson, Hinchy and Fabre (1987) observed that male bettors scored significantly 
lower on the SSS than existing population norms; Coventry and Brown (1993) reported 
identical results, hi both studies, their off-course betting gamblers scored lower than both 
non-gamblers and general population norms. These two studies clearly did not support 
Zuckerman's hypothesis that high frequency gamblers are high sensation seekers. 
However it should be noted that within the Dickerson et al (1987) results, they did 
report a weak but significant relationship between the SSS subscales (particularly the 
Boredom Susceptibility subscale) and the level of betting involvement. The authors argued 
tiiat tlie relationship between boredom susceptibility and arousal may be a predisposmg 
route to eventual problematic gambling. 
Blaszczynski, Wilson, and McConaghy (1986) investigated the hypothesis that 
arousal associated with gambling was related to a general sensation seeking personality 
0 
trait. Pathological gamblers were found to have elevated psychoticism, neuroticism and 
state and trait anxiety scores, but the hypothesis was not confirmed. Again, pathological 
gamblers scored significantly lower than the general population norms. They argued that 
these gamblers were not necessarily sensation seekers but that avoidance of noxious 
physiological states or dysphoric mood, in conjunction with a behaviour completion 
mechanism was a major factor in explaining persistence in gambling. One variable that will 
be considered in some depth later in the thesis is the extent to which someone has a 
tendency to seek out a dissociative experience, in which they could be using the gambling 
situation as an escape fiom their otherwise stiessfiil or unsatisfying life. 
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What appears a problem with these theories is that they seem to be unable to 
distinguish alone between an individual who stops gambling (or continues at non-problem 
levels), and an individual who goes on to develop a problem. So although arousal may be 
important for continued play, it does not appear a sufficient explanation, particularly as not 
all gambling forms are arousing. Sensation Seeking as an additional measure also seems 
unlikely as a predictor of levels of play. 
1.3.3. Behavioural Perspective 
A different view of persistent gambling, and one that has been aroimd for some 
time, is that of the behavioural perspective. For example, Dickerson (1993) and Dickerson, 
Hinchy, Cunningham and Legg-England, (1991, 1992) have suggested that poker-machine 
gamblmg may be a schedule-based behaviour. According to this behavioural view, 
persistent gambling can be explained in terms of the powerfiil reinforcing effects of 
intermittent schedules, (Ferster and Skiimer, 1957; Skinner 1953) and the sensitivity of 
behaviom to stimuli in the gambling enviromnent, (Delfabbro and Winefield, 1998). 
Behavioural perspectives also acknowledge the remforcmg effects that arousal can have on 
the individual, Dickerson (1977,1979,1984) and Saunders (1981). For instance, Anderson 
and Brown (1984) and Leary and Dickerson's (1985) view that increased risk taking is a 
necessary step once the task becomes familiar as greater risk is requhed to obtain the same 
degree of physiological arousal, can also be explained by the behavioural perspective in 
terms of the process of habimation. 
One common finding within this research paradigm is that small wins appear to 
increase betting behaviom:, whilst large wins appear to decrease them, (Dickerson et al 
1992, Delfrabbro et al 1998). Griffiths (1999) and Reid (1986) stress also the importance of 
non-monetary reinforcement, such as the "near-miss". Near-misses can be described as 
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failures that are close to being successful. Right up to when the final outcome of the 
gamble is known, the individual could be increasmgly close to wirming. One obvious 
example of this is when the chosen horse in a particular race, is beaten past the post by a 
matter of inches. A l l the learned associations, normally associated with a win are apparent, 
(increased arousal, expectation of monetary gain, etc) right up to the last second before the 
race is over. The behavioural perspective argues therefore that near misses can also act as 
reinforcements for the behaviour. 
The concept that behaviom can become sensitive to gambling events relinquishes to 
some extent the role of the gambler, in that as the reinforcement for gambling becomes 
associated with certain events, it becomes a leamed behaviour and therefore increasingly 
dictated by factors external to the gambler. This view allows for explanations without 
reference to intemal biological processes, personality differences, genetic predispositions 
or traditional addiction theories, all of which have often proved xmsatisfactory in 
distinguishing problem gamblers from those who would be defined as "normal" gamblers, 
those who manage their gamblmg behaviour (Dickerson, 1984, 1989, 1993; Walker, 1992, 
Delfabbro etal 1998). 
However, there are problems associated with this view as well, as the main 
common finding can be re-interpreted within other perspectives. As Walker (1992) points 
out, another explanation (and a cognitive one) for the decrease in response rates (betting 
behaviour) following large wms would be that the gambler believes in the gamblers fallacy. 
If this is the case, then the gambler would believe that because of the large win, another 
win is less likely in the near fiiture, and so in the very short term betting tails off 
Some methodological concems regarding, for example the Dickerson et al (1992) 
study have also been raised (e.g. Walker 1992, Delfabbro et al 1998). One concern relates 
to the elicitation of participants' expectancies about the likelihood of success on the 
following trial. This measurement was only extracted following large wuis, and hence this 
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momentary distraction could have been enough to take the attention away from the task at 
hand, and almost re-set the individuals gambling activity. 
Taking the methodological concems into account, Delfabbro and Winefield re­
visited the phenomenon and observed similar findings to the original Dickerson et al 
(1992) paper. In poker machine play, larger remforcements appeared to dismpt ongoing 
behaviour; after a large win gamblers would tend to pause their gambling and do 
something else for a brief period. It also confirmed that the behaviour of regular players 
was more habitual or stereotyped than that of occasional players. The interesting point 
regarding this stody was that there was no apparent evidence that players betting behaviour 
increased as a result of variations in reinforcement as would be predicted by operant 
conditioning theories (Skirmer, 1953). 
1.3.4. Cognitive Perspective 
Among the competing explanations for heavy involvement in gambling, the 
cognitive perspective is gaining increasmg support (Walker, 1992). As Wagenaar (1988) 
argued it is not the case that gamblers are a limited group of people who have less than 
optimal reasoning strategies. He argued that gamblers are "motivated by a way of 
reasoning, not by defects of personality, education or social enviromnent" (Wagenaar 1988, 
page 3). 
Although the behavioural approach is of value it is also important to look at how 
the gambler understands and interprets the extemal events that the gambler experiences. 
Essentially then, rmlike the behavioural approach, the cognitive perspective assiunes that 
gamblers are actively involved with the task, hence an investigation of the decision making 
involved is also of importance. There is evidence that the strategies used whilst gambling 
are non-optimal, and often erroneous. For example, Gaboury and Ladouceur (1989) 
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observed that regardless of people's initial perceptions of the game, participants still 
produced more irrational verbaUsations than rational ones when 'thinking aloud' during 
play. Furthermore there is evidence that the lypes of decision strategies used by gamblers 
do change over time. Scolaris and Brown (1988) for example, report that compulsive 
gamblers used more bizarre and exotic cognitive distortions than those which are reported 
below which tend to be common to everybody (Wagenaar, 1988). Chapter 4 wil l discuss 
and investigate the role of what are now corrnnonly known as erroneous perceptions or 
fallacious beliefs. 
However, despite the recognition that the beliefs and decision making strategies the 
gambler employs are important components of the explanation of gambling behaviour, the 
cognitive perspective currently lacks a specification of the processes involved. One of the 
main aims of this thesis is to begin to do this. 
Wagenaar developed a theory of gambling behaviour in terms of comparing what 
normative decision theory would predict gamblers to do and what they actually do. He 
argued that non-gamblers, gamblers and pathological gamblers all have reasoning strategies 
that result in less than optimal decisions and behaviour. 
He argues that normative decision theory can not adequately account for a 
gambler's behaviour. Normative decision theory decisions are modelled as choices among 
alternatives. According to the theory, the expectancy rela.ted to a choice alternative consists 
of two elements which are combmed. These are the utility of that alternative and an 
estimated probability that this utility will arise. If one equates the utility of a gambling 
decision v^th the expected monetary value then it is clear that the theory would predict no 
gambling in the first place, as the expected utility would then be negative. Although 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) attempts to accovmt for the gambling 
paradox by introducing the concept of a non-linear curve of money and a non-linear 
relationship between objective and subjective probabilities, Wagenaar argues there are 
problems associated with it. Prospect Theory postulates that people overestimate small 
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probabilities. The reasons for this come from the suggestion that people adopt or exclude 
past experience when estimating their chances of success, and then make their judgements 
based on alternative reference frames. This perspective accounts well for the fact that 
people tend to bet more on long shots on the last race (e.g. McGlothin, 1956), because from 
the reference point of having lost money, a small additional risk could result in the 
recouping of the days losses. However, it makes no predictions as to when and how many 
previous outcomes would be included when developing the reference frame from which to 
make a decision. It also fails to explain sufficiently why people- do not adjust their 
overestimation of small probabilities following the prolonged experience of systematic 
losses. Wagenaar instead argues that gamblers appear to make decisions with the use of 
heuristics and biases. 
Heuristics and biases are strategies which we have developed to use in everyday 
reasoning, which are selected on a basis of similarity between the actual situation and 
previous situations in which a strategy worked out well. Although their place in everyday 
situations is often relevant and helpftil, when the situation and its outcome is determined 
piurely by chance (as in the majority of gambling activities) the use of these heuristics can 
lead to decisions, and hence behaviours, which are non-optimal. 
Wagenaar (1988) stresses however, that gamblers do not gamble because they have 
a more comprehensive repertoire of heuristics, but rather "because they select heuristics at 
the wrong occasions" (p.116-117). Chapter 2 investigates the Illusion of Control heuristic, 
an expectancy of success inappropriately higher than the objective probability would 
warrant (Langer 1983). Other cognitive distortions include such distortions in which 
gamblers attribute their past successes to themselves; additionally that they beheve that 
they hold certain skills which can increase the chance of fiiture success. 
Illusory correlations are another example of false beliefs which arise when people 
believe that two or more events covary when in fact they do not. Henslin (1967) reports a 
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good example of this in that craps players were observed to roll the dice softly i f they 
wanted low numbers and harder i f they wanted high nvunbers. 
Heuristics and biases are most associated with the work of Kahneman and Tversky 
(see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982 for a review.) Wagenaar (1988) reports 16 
heuristics and biases which he argues "are ripe for misapplication in gambling 
environments" (Coventry, in press). These are presented in Table 1.1 below. 
As Wagenaar (1988) himself argues, there are weaknesses to the heuristic and 
biases approach. Firstly the conditions which evoke the use of the various strategies are 
not well specified. Secondly they are not mutually exclusive; a behaviour could be argued 
to be the result of more than one heuristic. In addition, explanations by the matching of a 
particular behaviour to a particular heuristic are mostly post-hoc (Wagenaar 1988). 
Furthermore certain heuristics and biases would predict opposing behaviours. For example, 
the availability heuristic, which refers to ease with which specific instances can be recalled 
from memory, predicts that a gambler would continue to bet on the same outcome, (e.g. red 
in roulette) i f it has just been successfiil. The gambler would also increase bet size when 
winning is the more available outcome, and would decrease the bets placed after a run of 
losses. In contrast, the representativeness heuristic, which specifies that people expect 
small numbers to be representative of population parameters, predicts that i f a bet has been 
successfiil, then the gambler wil l choose an alternative prediction (e.g. black), so that the 
frequencies will even out. This heuristic predicts that after wirming, bet size would 
decrease, as losing appears to be the more likely outcome, and vice-versa. 
18 
Table 1.1. Heuristics and Biases cited by WaRenaar ("19881 
Availability 
Problem Framing 
Confirmation Bias 
Fixation on Absolute Frequency 
Information Bias 
Illusory Correlation 
Inconsistency of Processing. 
Non-linear Extrapolation 
Reliance on Habits 
Representativeness 
Justifiability 
Reduction of Complexity 
Illusion of Control 
Biased Learning Structures 
Flexible Attribution 
Hindsight Bias 
Ease at which specific instances can be recalled from memory 
affects judgements of frequency 
Outcomes are evaluated as deviations from reference points or 
levels of aspirations. This can interact with the way people 
evaluate outcomes that are "framed" as losses or gains. 
Seeking information that is consistent with one's beliefs and 
discounting disconfirming information 
Cue used to judge strength of predictive relations is observed 
frequency rather than observed relative frequency. Information 
on "non-occurrences" of an event is often unavailable and 
frequently ignored when available. 
Concrete information (i.e. vivid, or based on 
experience/incidents) dominates abstract information (e.g. 
summaries, statistical base rates, etc.) 
The belief that two variables co-vary when in fact they do not. 
Inability to apply a consistent judgmental strategy over a 
repetitive set of cases. 
Inability to exfrapolate growth processes (e.g. exponential) and 
tendency to underestimate joint probabilities of several events. 
Choosing an alternative because it has been previously 
satisfactory. 
Judging the likelihood of an event by estimating the degree of 
similarity of the class of events of which it is supposed to be an 
exemplar. 
A "processing" rule can be used if the individual finds a 
rationale to "justify" it. 
When complex decision problems are reduced to simple ones 
before a decision can be made. 
Activity concerning an uncertain outcome can by itself induce 
in a person feelings of confrol over the uncertain event. 
When observed outcomes yield incomplete information 
concerning predictive relationships. 
The tendency to atfribute successes to one's own skill and 
failures to other influences. 
In refrospect, people are not "surprised" about what has 
happened in the past. They can easily find plausible 
explanations. 
Acknowledging these problems with this approach, it is still the case that the 
heuristics do have the effect of reducing the uncertainty from the gamblers perspective, and 
can therefore form part of the reason why the gambler continues, as the individual can 
believe that there is more personal ability to predict the outcomes than is objectively 
possible. A fiirther presentation and discussion of the he.uristics and bias approach occms 
in Chapter 5, along with an investigation of the use of certaui heuristics and biases. 
A subtly different approach to decision making during gambling to that of 
heuristics and biases has been outlmed by Coventry (in press). Rather than select from a 
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wide range of non-context specific heuristics and biases (as Wagenaar has suggested), 
Coventry has argued that decision making during gambling unfolds in the specific 
gambling domain as the gambler gains experience interacting with the specific gambling 
form played. Furthermore, the strategies themselves are only understandable within the 
specific gamblmg context. 
hi everyday life, one needs to act on the information that is given, even i f there is 
no, or limited, knowledge as to the adequacy of the information. Evidential theories of 
decision making and reasoning (e.g. Cohen, 1979), would predict that people base their 
gambling choices on the past information that is available to them in the specific domam. 
Therefore future decision making is determined by past experience on the task. 
There are several lines of evidence for evidential theories. Confidence and risk 
taking have been shown to increase with exposure to gambling activities, e.g. Ladouceur, 
Tourigny and Mayrand (1985), Ladouceur, Mayrand and Tourigny (1987), Breen and Frank 
(1993) and Peterson and Pitz (1988). The evidential perspective would explam this 
increase in confidence and risk taking by noting the fact that as time and the number of 
trials have increased, so too has the amount of information available on which to base 
predictions. Ladouceur, Dube, Giroux, Legendre and Gaudet (1995) and Ladouceur, 
Paquet, Lachance and Dube (1997) also provide evidence that gamblers make use of past 
information. They foimd that participants were prepared to pay a proportion of their 
pajanent for taking part, so that they could see what the previous outcomes on the coin 
flipping trials had been. This suggests that they were therefore unable to apply the principle 
of independence between events as they were under the belief that knowledge of previous 
outcomes would improve their performance in predicting subsequent outcomes of tossing 
the coin. The Ladouceur team believe that this lack of ability to apply the independence of 
events underpins gambling at both normal and excessive levels of play. Additionally they 
argue that the beliefs gamblers have, as recorded through the think-aloud method (reviewed 
ui Chapter 4), are related to this core error. 
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The erroneous strategies and verbalisations may be due to. the result of either 
conscious or unconscious processing. Coventry (in press) argues that a dual process theory 
of decision making can be applied to gambling decisions and imports Reber's (19.86) 
distinction between two types of learning. Implicit learning refers to how one develops 
intuitive knowledge about the underlying structure of the complex stimulus enviromnent. 
This process is unconscious and results in obtaining abstract knowledge about the world. In 
contrast explicit learning and processes are conscious and non-automatic. Coventry (in 
press) proposes that both systems are applicable, but that gambling decision making is 
dominated by the implicit system. This suggests that the erroneous perceptions that are 
verbalised throughout the gambling experience may only be conscious (explicit) reflections 
and descriptions of what has occurred during the task. Hence these verbalisations are likely 
merely to be post-hoc rationalisations, rather than represent the actual beliefs that the 
individual holds about the task. If the explicit system was the dominant one, then the 
gambler would reduce or inhibit their own gambling behaviour as losing is the most 
frequent event overall. 
The distinction between implicit and expUcit processing maps onto the distinction 
between Evans' (1993) two types of rationality, labelled Rationalityi and Rationalitya. 
These two notions of rationality were provided whilst reviewing the approaches to the 
psychology of decision making and reasoning. Rationalityi refers to the rationality of 
purpose, in that people act in a way to realise the achievement of their goals. Whereas 
Rationality2 refers to the rationality of process whereby people reason in a way which 
conforms to an appropriate normative system such as formal logic. Hence erroneous 
strategies used by gamblers would be defined as hrational by the definition of rationality2, 
but would, however, not be irrational xmder the description of rationality]. This is because 
these strategies can be viewed as part of their goal achievement of, for example, illusory 
control, viewing themselves to be better at the task than chance would determine, and to 
enjoy the experience. A view of gambling compatible with this description of rationality 
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would arise from the fact that people are simply applying the decision making process they 
use in everyday life, when all the information is rarely available, to the situation at hand; 
the gambling enviromnent. 
The perspective that the implicit dominates the explicit system gives rise to the 
possibility that anyone could become a problem gambler, given that they were unfortunate 
enough to have experienced a particular sequence of events. 
1.4. An Overview of the Thesis 
The adequacy of any theory can be judged by its ability to accoimt for both normal 
gambling, and also problem or pathological gambling. It appears that none of the theories 
raised so far have been able to account alone for both of these. They have been unable as 
yet to distmguish between those who manage to control their gamblmg, and those who 
continue to problematic (and out of control) levels. 
Essentially there are three hypotheses which this thesis investigates. The first is 
whether the cognitive perspective alone can offer an account of both why people gamble in 
the first place, considering the negative expected return, and why some people continue 
despite systematic losses to a point where their gambUng becomes problematic. This 
hypothesis can be labelled the "strong cognitive hypothesis" in that the cognitive 
perspective is complete and not needy of integration with other constructs as an 
explanation of the phenomena. This perspective takes the view that the cognitive, processes 
involved vdthin a task are thie result of the experience of the events that occur within the 
task. If it is the case that cognitive processes alone account for the different levels of play, 
then the order of the events experienced during a task may be good predictors of the levels 
of play. 
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A suitable starting point then is to investigate the nature of the Illusion of Control. 
The Illusion of Control work tackles the hypothesis that the experience of early wins may 
be central and crucial to the explanation of continued play. In addition to addressing some 
methodological concems regarding the Illusion of Control paradigm. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
also present the case that gambling activities can be viewed as decision making tasks. It 
argues that the research to date has ignored a vital element to the structure of the research 
paradigms, that restrict their resemblance to the real gambHng situation and task. A revised 
methodology is introduced and three tasks with different outcome probabilities are 
reported. The effects of perceiving these tasks as decision making ones and utilising this 
methodology are investigated. 
Chapter 3 also investigates the existence of any imderlying differences in the way 
that people respond when dealing vwth either a computer based task (as in Chapter 2) or a 
manual prediction task. The methodology employed in the previous chapter is re-employed 
here with the simplest of prediction tasks, that of predicting the outcome of flips of a coin. 
Comparisons are made therefore between the highest win probability computer task (0.5) 
and the manual coin task (also with a win probability of 0.5). This comparison addresses 
the issue of ecological validity of utilising computer presentation of the Illusion of Control 
paradigm in relation to more physical (and manual) presentations. 
The results of the Illusion of Control studies suggest there is little evidence for the 
strong cognitive hypothesis in the explanation of differential levels of gambling behaviour. 
The remainder of the thesis considers two other hypotheses. The second hypothesis could 
be labelled the "weak cognitive hypothesis" in that an additional individual difference 
element is necessary as a supplement to strong cognitive hypothesis in order to explain 
differential levels of gamblmg behaviour. Chapters 4 and 5 examine two types of 
individual difference measures in relation to varying levels of gambling behaviour. 
Chapter 4 investigates the role of individual differences ui processing style, in the extent to 
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which people enjoy and engage in the two forms of processing labelled "Rational" or 
"Experiential", Epstein (1990). 
Chapter 5 investigates the possibility that there are differences in the extent to 
which gamblers exhibit heuristics and biases when making decisions. Hence it investigates 
the degrees of bias held by gamblers gambling at varying degrees of frequency; and looks 
at whether high frequency gamblers are more prone to the use of heuristics and influenced 
more readily by biases than low frequency players. Furthermore, i f this is the case, it was 
investigated whether high frequency gamblers are affected by these more in the gambling 
situation specifically, or whether they make use of them more readily generally (even ui 
non-gambling contexts). In other words, do high frequency gamblers exhibit the same 
biases outside of the gambling context? The results of a further study are reported and 
discussed with these questions in mind. 
Griffiths (1994) argues that a singular cognitive theory is unlikely to accoimt for the 
observed phenomena. It has been acknowledged in the so called 'socio-cognitive' theory 
of gambling (e.g. Walker 1992) that there are a whole range of variables that need to be 
included in any sufficient explanation of gambling. However, as yet there has been little 
evidence for specific models of how these other variables interact with each other, a 
position which the present thesis aims to correct. 
The third hypothesis mvestigated in the thesis is the "integrative hypothesis" in 
which although cognitive factors and processes are deemed important, they are only 
important in relation to and interaction with other variables. Additionally then. Chapters 4 
and 5 investigate the role of erroneous beliefs and introduce the concept of dissociation and 
how the two concepts may interact with loss of control. In Chapter 4 a questioimahe study 
was devised to investigate these issues in relation to gambling behaviour. A series of 
models are proposed that could account for the inter-correlations between the variables 
measured. A factor analysis and Structural Equation Modelling procedure was used to 
investigate the model that fits the data most appropriately. Chapter 5 also investigates the 
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issue of whether or not high frequency gamblers hold more erroneous beliefs, become more 
dissociated and hence lose control more readily. 
These last two experimental chapters report studies which involve samples of 
participants drawn from populations other than solely undergraduate students. Hence these 
studies bridge the gap to higher frequency gamblers, some recruited from the general 
population, others from within gambling estabUshments. 
A general discussion of the cognitive perspective and the research findings from the 
programme of work follows in Chapter 6, along with fiiture research recommendations. 
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2. Chapter 2: The Illusion of Control 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the "strong cognitive hypothesis" in that the effects that 
wins and losses have on people's decision making dining the task are investigated. The 
chapter first provides a short history of the Illusion of Control concept in relation to 
gambling and how it has been offered as a possible explanation for why some people 
continue to gamble in the face of systematic losses. 
This is then followed by a closer examination of the methodologies used to assess 
the Illusion of Control within the gambhng literature, where a number of concerns are 
presented. These concems are then amplified by the presentation and application of 
Hogarth and Einhom's (1992) behef adjustment model (fiom within the information 
integration literature). The Illusion of Control paradigm is then revisited and viewed in 
light of the belief revision model, where the rationale for a series of experiments is 
presented. Three experiments then follow, followed by a combined analysis and general 
discussion section. 
2.2. The Illusion of Control 
The Illusion of Control, an elaborated heuristic model, was proposed by Ellen 
Langer, (1975, 1983). In games involving only skill, the outcome is dependent upon the 
action taken by the person involved. Hence in these situations it is valid for people to 
attribute their successes and failures to their own performance. When the outcome is 
response independent, as in games of chance, people often wrongly attribute the successes 
to themselves, as we want to see ourselves to be in control of the things that go on around 
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us, (Lefcourt 1973). Likewise, in games of skill, people often attribute their failures to 
factors other than themselves. 
What Langer (1975) showed was that in bringing characteristics of skill games, 
such as competition, choice, involvement and familiarity, into games where the outcomes 
are based solely on chance (without these characteristics objectively influencing the 
outcome) participants saw the games as more controllable, and had therefore developed an 
'Illusion of Control' (loC). She defined this as an: 
'expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective 
probability would warrant'. 
In addition to the order effects using the Langer and Roth (1975) paradigm which 
wil l be discussed shortly, other aspects of Langer's Illusion of Control have been 
researched in separate studies and have replicated her results. Ladouceur and Mayrand 
(1987) investigated the role of involvement in the level of risk taking adopted by 
participants. Even when objectively it makes no difference who actually spins the ball on 
the roulette table, participants who spun the ball themselves bet significantly more than 
participants who bet on the outcome when the "dealer" spun the ball. What was also of 
interest with the results of this study, was that the timing of the bet placing, another factor 
that objectively does not alter the chances of success, affected risk taking. Bets placed 
once the ball had dropped (with the outcome hidden) were significantly less than bets 
placed while the ball was still in motion. It appeared that participants were imder the 
impression that they had more chance of success, and therefore took greater risks, when the 
ball was still spinning. Once the outcome had been decided, even though they could not 
see it, they were less confident that their number had come up. 
Familiarity with the task and its role in risk taking changes has also been studied. 
Ladouceur and Mayrand (1984) compared the behaviour of regular and occasional players 
under a roulette task. Increased exposure to the task resulted in the occasional players 
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betting increasingly more such that by the end of the 30 trial session, they were bettmg 
similar amounts to the regular players in the study. 
Blascovitch, Veach and Ginsburg (1973) observed that blackjack players in the 
laboratory bet more dming the second session of play than during the first session, and that -
within each session their level of risk uicreased. The Illusion of Control here relates to the 
fact that wifti skill activities, familiarity with the task can improve one's performance. 
However, in chance determined games, practice can not make perfect and hence a persons' 
confidence rationally should not rise simply due to increased exposure to the activity. 
Ladouceur, Mayrand and Tourigny (1987) reported that all participants gambling in their 
laboratory roulette task gambled more cautiously at the start of the study than they did at 
the end of the study. They also noted that the increase in risk for the occasional player 
group was fairly rapid throughout the first session, slowing in subsequent sessions, but still 
reaching the same level as that of regular players by the fourth session. 
Increased exposure leading to increased risk taking has many implications for our 
understanding of the psychology of gambling and more specifically for the identification of 
the factors responsible for the acquisition of gambling habits. Participants may not be 
consciously aware that they bet more as the number of trials they have experienced 
increases. It might be that they become more liberal with their bet placing, overcommg 
initial inhibitions which restrict their bet size, (Ladouceur et al, 1987). It may also be that 
they become more confident in their ability to perform at the task, having created a 
perception of illusory control. If one is to assume that the major motivation for gambling 
is for potential financial gain, which the cognitive perspective does, then one would expect 
bet size to increase in fine with subjective confidence in the chosen outcome. 
Due to the notion that we are motivated to control the events that occur around us 
(Lefcourt, 1973) we seek out opportunities where we can have contiol. In the gambling 
situation irrational beUefs act as.stiategies to control or predict the outcome successfiiUy, in 
order that the participant can win the current trial. If a particular strategy is rewarded with 
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a win, the belief is reinforced. If a loss occurs, it can still have the effect of reinforcing the 
beUef for the following trial. For example, i f the behef is that due to the series of Reds on 
the roulette wheel, a Black number is more likely, a Black number can easily become 
"more likely" when the subsequent outcome is Red again, with the participant sunply 
discounting the loss as bad luck. Additionally, as the hindsight bias account would predict, 
after the outcome is known, the participant would be more confident in their ability to 
predict that outcome than they would have been prior to receiving the win. Such biases 
wil l be addressed in the penultimate chapter. These post-hoc rationaUsations, rational or 
irrational, may contribute to continued play. 
While unrealistic estimates of performance are bound to play a role in the 
explanation of gambling, it could be that the order of events experienced during gambling 
may lead to differential levels of the illusion of control, and hence differential levels of 
fiiture estimates of success and future play. 
Langer and Roth (1975) demonstrated that the sequence of outcomes, whether 
positive or negative sequences could also influence and magnify the induction of the loC. 
They asked participants to predict the outcome of 30 tosses of a coin, but they rigged the 
outcome such that the participant either won or lost each particular trial. They therefore 
had three conditions across which participants won and lost in different orders. 
Participants in the Descending sequence won predominantiy in the first half of these trials, 
the Ascending sequence participants won predominantly in the second half, and in the 
Random sequence, participants' wins were distributed randomly throughout the trials. A l l 
participants won at a chance rate, such that they all had 15 correct predictions. Figure 2.1 
displays the precise sequences used. 
At the end of these trials participants were asked questions to assess whether the 
task was perceived as chance or skill determined. A primacy effect was observed in that 
participants who had had early wins perceived themselves to be more skilful, gave greater 
success predictions over future trials, and remembered significantly more wins than the 
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Figure 2.1. Sequences used by Langer and Roth (igySI 
Descendmg W W W L W W W L W L L W W W L L W L L W L W L L L W L L L L W 
Ascending W L L L L W L L L W L W L L W L L W W W L L W L W W W L W W W W 
Random L W W L L W L L W L L W L W W W L W L W L W W L W L W L W L L W 
where " W " denotes a win, and " L " denotes a loss. 
participants who experienced the other two sequences. This smdy suggests, in line with 
the strong cognitive hypothesis, that the sequence of wins and losses alone may predict 
future levels of play. Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence (e.g. Custer and Mil t 1985) 
that an early win experience is associated With the development of problem gambling. 
This order effect is robust, having been replicated many times within the gambling 
and the loC literature, e.g. Coventry and Norman (1998), Reid (1986), Ladouceur, 
Tourigny and Mayrand (1985), Wolfgang, Zenker and Viscusi (1984). A minority of 
studies have argued that the lack of significant differences observed between their 
sequences, demonstrates that the effect is less robust than previously thought. However, 
these can be re-evaluated. Breen and Frank (1993) for example, manipulated the number 
of wins across their conditions (heavy win and heavy loss sequences) but failed to control 
for the order of these wins; the order of wins was randomly determined and duplicated for 
each participant. The fact that differential illusory control failed to appear demonstrates 
more precisely the fact that the position of wins is a more important factor than merely the 
number of wins in the sequence. 
Ladouceur and Mayrand (1984) found that participants in their early win sequence 
were more accurate than other participants, rather than having an exaggerated perception 
of success. Early win participants were therefore predicting rates of success closer to the 
objective rate of success determined by the nature of the task, in comparison to late win 
participants who predicted less than the objective rate of success. However, there is no 
other plausible reason for why these participants should predict any higher rates of success 
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than participants in the other sequences. This therefore still stresses the importance of 
previous win sequence in people's confidence about fiitine success. 
Done and Coventry (in press) investigated whether an induced illusion of control, 
using a similar paradigm to that of Langer and Roth (1975), could transfer to another task 
when the participant switches between activities. FoUoviing experience of a computer 
presented coin prediction task, participants who had experienced early wins carried their 
illusion of control over to the second task, that of a computer presented roulette task. 
Transfer effects were observed in that participants who had won predominantly early on 
with the coin tossmg task, thought they had won significantly more trials on the roulette 
task, than those who had won predominantly at the end of the coin prediction task. This 
demonstrated that an early win experience on one task could affect people's confidence on 
another task, even when the probabilities of success on the two tasks were different. 
In summary therefore, the Illusion of Control as assessed with the standard 
paradigm has been replicated many times within the literature. The experience of 
predominantly early wins has tended to lead to exaggerated perceptions of future success, 
even on the chance determined task which have been utilised. It wil l be argued however 
that the paradigm that has been used may not be so relevant to the gambling experience 
itself as the Illusion of Control research to date would seem to suggest. This argument 
stems from the perspective taken that gamblmg activities, can and should be, viewed as 
decision making tasks in which the participant accumulates new information as time goes 
on. 
2.3. Belief Revision, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) 
Before every new trial, people taking part in a gambling activity must make a 
decision both about which outcome they want to place their bet on, and how much money 
they wish to risk on that particular outcome. As such, these activities involve people 
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continuously revising their stakes. The decision about choice of bet size that players have 
to make is related to how confident they are in their choice of predicted outcome. If one is 
to assume that gamblers are at least somewhat motivated by potential monetary gain, then 
in order to maximise gains and minimise (or replenish) losses one would expect players to 
wager a higher amoimt on trials in which they are confident in their outcome prediction, 
and a lesser amount for trials m which they are unconfident. As such gambling can be 
viewed as belief revision tasks, in which new information is accumulated as time goes on 
which can have a direct effect on people's confidence and hence the size of one's bet on a 
particular trial, as the two are likely to be correlated which was confirmed in a brief pilot 
study \ 
This chapter however wil l attempt to address how new information, in terms of 
both precise recent outcomes and wins and losses, can affect people's beliefs and levels of 
certainty about the next or future trials. The information integration and belief revision 
literatures should therefore be considered to draw on the knowledge obtained within these 
fields. 
Within the belief revision literature there has been controversy over whether 
primacy or recency effects obtain following the manipulation of the order ui which 
information is presented. Asch (1946) for example, presented participants with three 
positive and three negative adjectives (or vice versa) that described an imaginary person. 
Following receipt of this description, participants were instructed to write a character 
description of the imaginary person. What resulted was that participants who had received 
the positive adjectives before the negative, wrote more favourable summaries of the person 
^ A small questionnaire pilot study was carried out with 14 participants to investigate this 
assumption. Participants were asked to respond to 16 items. 8 of the items presented a range of potential 
gambles, the probability of success on whicli varied from 0.050 to 0.833. Participants were asked how much 
of £100 they had been given they would bet for each of the items. The other 8 comparable items municked 
the odds of success, but asked participants how confident they would be m predicting the outcome of the 
gamble. The responses to the bet size items were correlated with the responses to the confidence items. The 
resulting Pearson Product-Moment correlation was sfrong and positive, r=0.443 and significant, p<0.001. 
This confirmed the assumption that bet size is correlated with confidence. See Appendix 2 for the items. 
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than those who were presented with the negative items first. The primacy effect has been 
demonstrated in many domains and different explanations have been offered for these 
primacy effects. 
Asch (1946) explained his primacy effects in terms of the initial information setting 
up the direction of belief that changes the interpretation of subsequent information. Hence 
with respect to the gambling literature people's perceptions of long term success and how 
good they feel at the task, extending Asch's argument to the Illusion of Control concept, 
the late losses (following the early wins) are interpreted as less important and have less 
unpact on the established direction than when the same losses occur early on, hence 
establishing the direction themselves. 
Anderson's (1981) 'attention decrement' perspective when applied to the Illusion 
of Control, would account for the primacy effect reported by Langer and Roth (1975) as 
mainly due to less attention being paid to successive items of evidence. Hence the early 
win participants would be more confident during the early stages as they appear to be 
winning a higher proportion of the time. For these participants the later high proportion of 
losses has less of an effect on confidence simply due to their position in the sequence. 
Likewise, the late wins inherent viith the Ascending sequence would not be sufficient to 
pull people's confidence back up fiom the effects of the early losses as less attention would 
be given to these trials. 
Anotiier hypothesis, the "natural presumption hypothesis" (Hogarth and Einhom, 
1992), accounts for primacy effects in terms of participants' perceiving the order of 
presented stimuli as predetermined and therefore representing the importaiice of each unit 
of information. However, in the current paradigm, as in gambling activities per se, each 
unit of information, whether it be win-loss or precise outcome (e.g. Red or Black) in 
nature, is determined by chance. Therefore this hypothesis can not be validly applied to 
the gambling situation. 
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Although not a strong hypothesis within the gambling context, it has been shown 
(e.g. Shubin 1977, Custer and Milt 1985) that an early win experience is associated with 
the development of problem gambling, hence early information may be treated by 
gamblers as more important, whether they are conscious of this or not. 
The controversy within the belief revision literature, however, arises when one 
considers research conducted by, for example, Stewart (1965). He used essentially the 
same materials and design, as those used by Asch, and observed that participants character 
descriptions were most influenced by the most recent mformation they received, hence 
demonstrating a recency effect. 
The only difference between the Asch and Stewart methodologies was the 
frequency of measurement; Stewart elicited responses followmg presentation of each unit 
of information, whereas Asch elicited responses only once all the information had been 
given to the participants. What becomes clear, even from these early studies, is that the 
conditions under which primacy or recency effects obtain depend upon the precise 
conditions and procedures which are employed within the belief-revision paradigm. 
Hogarth and Einhom (1992) go a long way m attempting to specify the precise 
conditions under which one can expect primacy or recency effects. One important 
distinction made relevant to the current work is that of their predictions for the occurrence 
of primacy and recency effects with respect to whether the task involves eliciting 
responses throughout a task (what they term a Step by Step response mode), or whether the 
participant accumulates all the information that is to be presented before providing a 
response (an End-of-Sequence response mode). 
Hogarth and Einhom propose that whenever a Step by Step (SbS) response mode is 
used, it is reasonable to assume that people must use an SbS process when integrating the 
information. They fiirther propose that an End-of-Sequence (EoS) response mode, as used 
in previous loC studies, may or may not invoke an EoS process. By appealing to the well-
established notion of cognitive limitations, they assumed that people wil l use an EoS 
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process in the presence of an EoS response mode i f this does not exceed their processing 
abilities. However, with more complex and longer tasks, they wil l adopt an SbS process. 
Based on a task analysis of previous studies they proposed that the response mode 
makes a difference in the case of short, simple tasks, in which EoS induces primacy, SbS 
induces recency. They also conclude that primacy seems to obtain when tasks are simple 
but long (and this is independent of response mode), and that recency is associated with 
more complex tasks (also independent of response mode). 
In the Kght of then conclusions, one should revisit the initial work conducted by 
Langer and Roth (1975), and view their work with these notions in mind when studying the 
methodology employed. The relevance of their conclusions for the current work vidll also 
then become clear. 
2.4. Langer and Roth (1975) Revisited 
A few potential problems need to be raised with the methodology employed in 
studies such as that of Langer and Roth (1975). Fhstly, the method used for controlling the 
outcome of each flip of the coin was by showing the outcome of the flip only when it 
resulted in the predetermined win sequence being adhered to. Hence, participants only saw 
the outcome on 50% of the trials. If participants were only allowed to see the outcome of 
the toss of the coin when it suited the predetermined win and loss sequence, participants 
may have started questioning the randomness of the outcomes. With no explanation given 
for why they would only see the outcome on 50% of the trials, this would seem likely. To 
overcome this the coin tossing experiment described in the follpvwing chapter made use of a 
double-sided Head and a double-sided Tail coin which were secretly switched (if 
necessary) before each flip took place, so that the participant could see every outcome of 
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the flip of the coin. The second concern with the methodology relates to the frequency of 
measurement. 
In the Illusion of Control stodies, measurements have only been taken once at the 
end of all trials. A potential alternative to the early win explanation of the exaggerated 
success rate predictions may be related to the late losses that are experienced by early-win 
participants just prior to being asked the loC measures. Participants may have felt that in 
order to win at a chance rate, as one would expect with a coin flipping task, they were due 
a higher proportion of wins over future trials to balance out the nmnber of losses recently 
experienced. The third point to note is that only long-term measures were elicited. Short-
term confidence may also be effected by the win sequence experienced. 
One method of overcoming both of these two latter points is to elicit short-term 
confidence measurements throughout the task. In addition to sorting out which 
explanation most accurately accounts for the loC observed, this technique increases the 
similarity between the paradigm and gambling activities themselves, as the latter involve 
participants continuously modifying their stake. Note that confidence was observed to be 
highly correlated with bet size in the pilot smdy. 
Coventry and Norman (1998) utiUsed the above technique of eliciting short term 
confidence ratings prior to each predetermined trial. Although the distinction between 
short and longer term forecasting was not the mam focus of their smdy, there were some 
interestmg differences arising between the measures elicited. At the end of all trials, there 
were no significant differences between sequences on the short term confidence measure, 
but the effects observed previously by Langer and Roth were replicated with respect to the 
longer term confidence measure, as with the other loC measures elicited only at the end of 
all trials. Early v^n subjects predicted significantly higher rates of success over the 
following 100 trials, than both the other two sequences. What needs to be established is 
whether or not this discrepancy between measures, was due to the different fiequency of 
elicitation, or something inherent within the measures themselves. 
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One final note to make regarding the loC research is that with the majority of 
studies in this field, generally only male participants have been used, (e.g. Langer and Roth 
1975, Wolfgang et al 1984). Other studies do not make the gender of then participants 
explicit, (e.g. Ladouceur et al 1984), or i f they do, they either have xmequal niunbers of 
males and females, (e.g. Ladouceur et al 1991) or make no mention of any differences 
between the sexes in their responses, (e.g. Ladouceur and Mayrand 1984, Letarte et al 
1986.) One possible assumption (though not explicit) being made v^th these smdies is that 
male and female participants are unlikely to respond in different ways to the experience of 
wins and losses. However, investigating sex effects is an important step such that the 
validity of this assumption can be evaluated. 
Blascovitch et al (1973) believed that individuals playing in a group risked more in 
order to achieve stams. That social norm may not be the same for women as for men; 
Ladouceur et al (1985) did not find that participants playing in a group bet more. The 
difference between the two smdies lay primarily in the samples used. Ladouceur et al used 
both males and females whereas Blascovitch used only males. The use of female 
participants in the Ladouceur smdy may have therefore masked the effect of playing in a 
group. This adds fiulher support for motivation to investigate potential differences 
between the way the two sexes interact with the task and respond to the outcomes. 
The implications that the Hogarth and Emhom predictions have on the current 
research are very apparent. In the loC smdies that follow, fiequency of measurement was 
manipulated so that responses were either eUcited on a SbS or an EoS basis. In accordance 
with the predictions made by Hogarth and Einhom, it was hypothesised that there would be 
a recency effect observed with the SbS measure, and a primacy with the EoS. Within the 
current paradigm there are also other loC measures which are elicited that are not involved 
in this manipulation, and as such are only asked at the end of all tiials, similar to those 
utilised by Langer and Roth (1975). What needs to be clarified is whether the exaggerated 
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expectations of success are indeed due to the early wins as previously reported, and 
whether the loC develops ruider varying frequencies of measurement. What also needs to 
be clarified is whether or not there is any differential effect of previous vnn sequence on 
short or longer-term confidence measures. Confidence may be related to bet size and the 
longer term Next 100 measure related to how quickly a gambler would return to the 
gambling enviromnent, but are the two measures affected similarly by both the sequence of 
wins and losses and by the frequency at which tiiey are measured? Hogarth and Einhom 
made no reference to what effect employmg both forms of response mode within the same 
task would have on the occurrence of prunacy or recency effects. The EoS measure may or 
may not be affected by the presence of the SbS measure taken throughout the sequence. 
This manipulation may also generahse to responses to questions in the battery elicited at 
the end of the task, e.g. memory of past success and how good people think they are at the 
chance task. 
It was hypothesised that the early win sequence would induce a greater illusion of 
control than the late and random win sequence, but that this illusion of control induced 
would be dependent upon both the measure used to assess it, and the frequency of that 
measurement. 
For the EoS measures, i.e. those measures not continuously elicited throughout the 
task, it was hypothesised that a primacy effect would obtain, hence replicating the findings 
of Langer and Roth (1975) in terms of their questions asked. 
With the SbS measures (either short or longer-term confidence) a recency effect 
would obtain, in that participants, due to bemg asked to continuously revise their beliefs 
about their confidence and probability of success, would have paid more attention to the 
most recent outcomes when evaluating their confidence in comparison to the former trial, 
in line with predictions made and replicated by Hogarth and Emhom (1992). 
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The final aim of the following three experiments was to investigate the validity of 
the assumption that males and females respond sraiilarly to the experience of wins and 
losses. 
2.5. Overview of Methodology used in Experiments 1, 2 
and 3 
Due to the fact that the methodology for the following three experiments was 
essentially identical, this particular section provides an overview of both the task that was 
used for the smdies, and the procedure by which each experiment was undertaken. 
The task and methodology employed for each smdy were identical to each other in 
every respect other than the percentage of wms and losses experienced by the participant. 
In all smdies participants won at a chance rate over the 32 tiials, the precise number of 
wins therefore being dependent upon the number of available outcomes. For Experiment 1, 
participants could choose fiom two possible outcomes and so won 16 out of the 32 tiials, 
hence wiiming 50% of the time. Experiment 2 was characterised by offering four possible 
outcome options so here the participant won 8 out of the 32 tiials, with a win rate therefore 
of 25%. The final probability manipulation arose in Experiment 3 where participants were 
offered 8 outcome options to choose fiom; ui this experiment they won 4 out of the 32 
trials. 
The positions of the wins and losses were contioUed so that three specific win 
sequences could be employed. These were the Descending, Ascending and Random 
sequences. In the Descending sequence, participants experienced an early win sequence, 
in which they won predominantiy in the first half of the trials, wmning the majority (a 
minimum of 68% across the three Experiments) of then due wms in the first half of the 
sequence. They therefore lost predominantly in the latter half of the trials. The Ascending 
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sequence participants experienced the reverse of the Descending sequence, hence they lost 
predominantly in the first half of the trials, but began winning progressively more as they 
approached the end of the sequence. The Random sequence had its vans and losses spread 
out throughout the trials in a random fashion. The same random sequence was employed 
for all participants in this sequence. The precise order of wins and losses for each of the 
experiments can be seen imder their relevant methodology sections. 
So that the task itself could be kept constant across the experiments, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of any potential differences in responses being due to a change of 
task characteristics, a task had to be designed in which the proportion of wuis and losses 
could be manipulated, whilst keeping everything else equal. As highlighted within the 
discussion of Langer and Roth's methodology, one concem raised was that the way in 
which the outcomes were controlled could well have left the participants suspicious as to 
the randonmess of the outcomes. Alongside this concem there was the fact that as the 
number of available outcomes increases fiom Experiment 1 to Experiment 3, so does the 
complexity of controlling these outcomes in a manual based task. Any methodology 
utilised to control the outcomes wiMi an increasing number of available outcomes in a 
manual task would at best be messy and at worst would reduce participants' confidence in 
the trials being determined purely by chance. 
To overcome these concems a computer task was designed. It was then 
commissioned to be written on a consultancy basis by Dr Nick Outram, of the Centre for 
Intelligent Systems, University of Plymouth. 
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The turtles were programmed to move in a random direction for a random distance, 
but with a small weighting such that they tended to move towards the .perimeter. The 
program was designed such that i f the participant was due for a win on a particular trial, 
and had predicted that the Red Turtle would win the next race, all the other Turtles in the 
race other than the Red would be restricted from leaving the circle, thereby restricted from 
crossing the "finishing line". 
The mrtles could move in any direction and could also reboimd before touching the 
winning line and travel in an alternative direction, hence allowing for near-misses to arise. 
Near-misses occurred at random intervals across all conditions. Their movement therefore 
made the random motion appearance very realistic. 
After having made their selection of Turtle for the next race, another window 
appeared on the screen asking them either how confident they were that they would win 
the next trial, or how many trials they thought they would win over the next 100 trials. 
They responded to this by typing a number in the input box using the computer's keyboard. 
See Figure 2.4 for an example snap shot. 
Figure 2.4. Example of Window appearnig before the start of each race. 
Please complete Ihis form 
t Pow cpnf iderit J ar.eyo 
••1 
-i 
• - . ; . . . ; , : 1'-, - '- ' 
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The question they were asked depended upon which Response Mode they were 
under. Two Response Modes were utilised. Half of the participants responded to the short 
term confidence measure throughout the trials, on step by step basis, followed by 
responding to the longer term measure of success rate prediction over the next 100 trials, at 
the end of the sequence. Whereas the short term measure was therefore elicited 33 times (a 
baseline was also elicited before any trials had taken place, as was confidence after the 
final win or loss had taken place), the longer term measure was only eUcited once, at the 
end of the sequence. 
The other half of the participants were exposed to the opposite Response Mode, 
such that longer term estimates of success were elicited on a Step by Step (SbS) basis, and 
the shorter term measure on an End of Sequence (EoS) basis. Although this measure was 
taken at the end of all trials, the participant was not informed that the last trial they had just 
experienced was in fact their last trial; that there would not be a further trial. Once they 
had expressed their confidence for the next trial, they were then informed that there would 
then be a series of questions. 
The two Response Modes wil l , from here on, wil l be referred to St/h and Lt/st 
respectively. 
For Experiments 1,2 and 3, both the short term confidence in the next trial and the 
Next 100 predictions were measured on the same 0 to 100 scale. Short term confidence 
ranged from Completely Unconfident (0) to Completely Confident (100). The Next 100 
measure simply reflected how many trials out of the hypothetical next 100 trials the 
participant thought that they would win. 
Once participants had selected their chosen turtle, had responded to the appropriate 
SbS measure, and hit the Enter key on the keyboard, the turtles appeared in the centre of 
the screen, and the race started. The Turtles would then move about the circle in the 
fashion described above, see Figure 2.5 for a mid-race snap-shot. 
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Once a turtle had crossed the "finishing line" (the edge of the circle), the words 
"You Win" or "You Lose" appeared on the screen, see Figure 2.6, dependent upon where 
the participant was in the particular win sequence. After 2 seconds, the participant was 
prompted to click on the "Go" button which then appeared on the screen. On doing so, the 
window offering the same Turtles in the next race appeared in order that the participant 
could make a selection for the new race, followed then again by the presentation of the 
appropriate SbS measure; 
Once all trials had taken place, the prediction and SbS measure for the 33rd trial 
was elicited. However, this trial did not take place. Rather, what followed was the 
elicitation of the appropriate EoS measure, (short term confidence or Next 100 success 
prediction), which was then followed a series of questions including those used in previous 
smdies. These questions fiirther assess the Illusion of Contiol and the participants' memory 
of past success: 
1. 'How many correct predictions do you think you've had on these tiials?' 
2. 'How many trials do you think there have been?' 
3. 'How good do you think you are at predicting these outcomes?' 
4. 'How many trials do you think you would vwn after a lot of practice?' 
5. 'Imagine you were watching your favourite television programme. How many trials do 
you think you would win over the next 100 trials ?' 
6. 'Imagine you are watching someone else doing this task, how many trials do you think 
they would predict correctly over the next 100 trials?' 
The last question addresses the level of involvement issue. The greater the 
difference between participants own predicted Next 100 success rates and answers to this 
question, the greater the participant beHeves that the personal involvement factor can 
46 
influence their chances of success. Having elicited responses to these questions, the 
participants were debriefed, diuring which Participants were asked whether they currently 
gambled or not. 
The British Psychological Society (1992) provide a code of practice governing all 
forms of research v^th human participants. The use of the Psychokinesis cover and the 
predetermining of the outcomes needs some discussion, particularly in relation to ethical 
considerations. 
Participants were informed that the Turtles moved in a random fashion which they 
did. mdeed, all participants won at a rate at which they would have expected to win i f each 
subsequent outcome had been determined purely by chance. However, to reliably assess 
the effect of particular win sequences on people's confidence both throughout and at the 
end of the trials, participants could not be mformed that whether or not they would win on 
a particular trial was predetermined. This was a necessary step to ensure that the positions 
of wins and losses could be controlled for in the investigation of primacy and recency 
effects. This increased the possibility that any differences appearing in responses from 
participants in the different sequences, were due to the sequences themselves, and not 
some other confounding variable. 
The use of the Psychokinesis cover (as a more ethical altemative to the use of 
money) could be construed as a use of deception. Participants could not be informed of the 
real use of the cover; not only to increase involvement but also to increase arousal 
associated with the task. Indeed, Coventry and Norman (1998) found that the use of the 
Psychokinesis methodology produces arousal increases during the task similar to those 
observed during electionic gaming machine tasks. Both these factors represent a level of 
deception not uncommon in the literature. 
Participants were informed of their right to withdraw at any time from the smdy 
without penalty, that all their responses would be tieated with complete confidentiality and 
were fiilly debriefed once they had finished the task. This debriefing included an 
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explanation that whether or not they had won on a particular trial depended upon where 
they were in the predetermined sequence. They were informed,^about the aim of the 
investigation researching the effects of the positions of wins and losses on people's short 
and longer term confidence measures. They were also informed that they had won at a 
chance rate and that because the vdn sequence was predetermined it made no difference 
which Tmtle they had chosen for that particular race. No one expressed concem (neither 
the pilot participants prior to commencmg the smdy or those that are reported wdthin the 
results) over having experienced this level of deception. Furthermore, ethical- clearance 
had been sought and received for each of these smdies from the Faculty of Human 
Sciences Ethical Conunittee, University of Plymouth. 
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2.6. Experiment 1 
2.6.1. Method 
Participants 
60 male and 60 female Undergraduate psychology smdents were recruited one by 
one, and equally distributed to the three sequences, such that there were 20 males and 20 
females in each sequence. 10 males and 10 females in each sequence would therefore 
respond on a St/lt or a Lt/st basis. Participants received a small financial incentive to take 
part, (receipt of which was not dependent upon their performance in the task). 
Materials 
The Turtle task, as described above, was utiUsed with two Turtles in each race. The 
two Turtles that were available to choose between were a Red and a Green Turtle. 
The sequence lasted for 32 trials, out of which the participants won 16. The win sequences 
resembled the ones used by Langer and Roth (1975) although they were adapted slightly to 
allow for 32 rather than 30 trials. This adaptation was necessary so that a constant 1 in 4 
and a 1 in 8 win rate for the Experiments 2 and 3 could be specified. The precise wui 
sequences for each of the sequences in this Experiment are depicted in Table 2.1 below, 
where " W" stands for a win, and "L" for a loss, on that trial. 
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Table 2.1. Sequence of Outcomes for each Sequence. Experiment 1 
Sequence 
Trial Descending AscendinET Random 
1 W W L 
2 W L W 
3 w L W 
4 w L L 
5 L L L 
6 w W W 
7 w L L 
8 w L L 
9 L L W 
10 w W L 
11 L L L 
12 L W • W 
13 W L L 
14 W L W 
15 W W W 
16 L L W 
17 L L L 
18 W W W 
19 L W L 
20 L W W 
21 W L L 
22 L L W 
23 W W W 
24 L L L 
25 L W W 
26 L W L 
27 W W W 
28 L L L 
29 L W W 
30 L W L 
31 L W L 
32 W W W 
Procedure 
Participants were seated near the experimenter, m the same small room, one at a 
time. The procedure followed the common procedure outlined in the overview. 
50 

2.6.1. Results and Discussion of Experiment 1 
Participants were asked at the end of the Experiment whether they currently 
gambled or not. 65 participants reported that they gambled on one form or another, 
whereas 55 reported that they did not gamble at all. These were approximately evenly 
distributed across the three Sequences, see Table 2.2 below for the number of observations 
in each group. 
Table 2.2. Breakdown of Frequencv of Gamblmg and Non-Gamblnig Participants, bv 
Sequence and Sex 
Gambles ? 
Male Female Total 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Descending 11 9 10 10 19 21 
Ascending 9 11 12 8 19 21 
Random 12 8 9 11 17 23 
Totals 32 28 31 29 55 65 
The analysis of the data set was broken up into four sections. Fhstly an analysis of 
baseline values followed by an analysis to evaluate whether an Illusion of Control had been 
induced, and to see how the short term Confidence and the Next 100 measures were 
affected by the two modes of responding. Step by Step (SbS) or End of Sequence (EoS). 
Thirdly, an analysis was conducted to see how the two measures flucmated throughout the 
task following the progressive experience of each of the v m Sequences. This analysis is 
labelled the Step by Step Analysis as it investigates changes in the SbS measures over four 
time periods. 
The fourth stage of the analyses consists of an investigation into the effects of the 
variables on the measures that were not previously uivolved in the firequency of 
measurement mampulation, namely the question battery items. 
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2.6.2.1. Baseline Values 
Participants' responses prior to any trial having taken place, and hence no outcome 
information being available at the point of measurement, v^ere analysed to ensure that there 
were no pre-existing differences in the baseline confidence and Next 100 responses 
between Sequences or between males and females. Participants responded to both scales 
on the 0 to 100 scale. A three-way [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence)x 2(Sex)] analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on baseline responses. Response Mode specified 
which measures were elicited throughout and at the end of the trials which therefore 
stipulated in this analysis whether the baseline value was the short term Confidence or the 
Next 100 measure. The Sequence variable specified which of the Descending, Ascending 
or Random sequences the data referred to. See Appendix 3a for the A N O V A table. 
There was no main effect of Response Mode; prior to the start of the trials there 
was no difference between the two measures of "How confident in next trial" and estimates 
of success over the "Next 100"; F(l,108)=0.14, p=0.709. Also there were no mam effects 
of either Sequence F(2,108)=1.68, p=0.191, or Sex F(l,108)=0.11, p=0.744. 
Any differences that are observed in the following analyses can not be attributed to 
starting values, and one can therefore attribute them to the experience of the task itself 
2.6.2.2. Illusion of Control: Confidence and Next 100 responses at the End 
of the Trials 
In this Experiment, the two measures, that of Confidence in the next trial, and the 
longer term Next 100 predictions, were elicited from participants either throughout the task 
before each trial, or at the end of the sequence only after the final trial. It was of interest to 
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investigate what effect these two Response Modes would have on these two measures at 
the end of the trials. 
If Langer and Roth's (1975) Illusion of Control findings are robust, then one should 
observe exaggerated future success rate predictions (Next 100 measure) at the end of the 
task for those participants in the Descending Sequence as compared to those in the 
Ascending Sequence. It was also of interest to investigate whether the shorter term 
Confidence measure was affected in a similar way. 
If Hogarth and Einhom's (1992) model of belief revision is robust and complete, 
and applicable to the gamblmg scenario, then with respect to the Descenduig Sequence, 
when the Response Mode was St/lt, one would expect elevated Next 100 predictions 
(primacy) and decreased Confidence m next trial response (recency); and when imder the 
Lt/st one would expect elevated short term Confidence (primacy) and decreased Next 100 
predictions (recency), as in the early stages the participants in this sequence won early and 
lost late. 
The reverse would be expected for responses fiom participants in the Ascending 
sequence; elevated Confidence and decreased Next 100 responses under the St/lt Response 
Mode, and elevated Next 100 and decreased Confidence under the Lt/st. 
In sununary, therefore, a four-way A N O V A witii a 2(Response Mode) x 
3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 2(Measure) design, witii tiie alpha level of significance set to 
p<0.05, was conducted to see i f indeed an Illusion of Contiol with respect to people's 
confidence both in the short term and in the longer term was induced, and to see what 
effect utilising a SbS process in conjunction with an EoS response elicitation would have 
on the two measures. See Appendix 3b for the A N O V A table. 
The Between-participant variables used in the current analysis were: Response 
Mode, defined which measure was elicited throughout and which was measured just once 
(at the end of the sequence); Sequence, defined whether the participant experienced the 
Descending, Ascending or Random sequence; and Sex. 
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The Measure (within-participant, two level) variable stipulated whether the data 
referred to the Confidence or the Next 100 measure. For the fhst 60 participants (those 
luider the St/lt), the SbS measure after the final trial was of Confidence whilst the EoS 
measure was the Next 100 success rate predictions. For the second 60 participants (those 
under the Lt/st), the SbS measure was the Next 100, whereas the single EoS measure was 
the short term Confidence. Response Mode was counter-balanced in this way and thereby 
specified which measure was taken with which fiequency. 
A main effect of Measure resulted, F(l,108)=11.40, p=0.001. Confidence in the 
next trial was significantly higher than Next 100 predictions, means of 60.26 and 53.23 
respectively. The two way interaction between Response Mode and Measure would 
provide information on how the two measures were affected by the frequency of 
measurement manipulation, collapsed across the three sequences. This interaction was not 
significant, F(l,108)=0.06, p=0.808. This suggests that whether or not a particular measure 
was elicited throughout made no significant difference to the size of the response at the end 
of the task. Specifically the current data set demonstiated that for the End of Sequence 
measure there is no impact of the frequency of measurement variable. 
Of relevance to the Illusion of Contiol issue, is whether there was a main effect of 
Sequence, or whether this variable mteracted in any significant way with the Response 
Mode and the Measure variables. The lack of Sequence effect F(2,108)=0.01, p=0.941,^ 
demonstiates that collapsed across both measures and Response Modes, the early v^n 
effect had no significant effect on people's responses. Participants winning early on did not 
hold exaggerated beliefs at the end of the tiials. This is in direct contiast to the findings of 
Langer and Roth (1975) who observed elevated responses for those in the early-win 
sequence. It appears additionally that this is the case for both the Confidence and the Next 
100 measures, as the tibree way interaction between the variables Response Mode, 
Sequence and Measure was also not significant, F(2,108)=0.11, p=0.895. 
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Thus with the current methodology, there appears to have been no Illusion of 
Control effect induced with, respect to these measures. This may be due to the Illusion of 
Control effect itself being less robust than previously believed, or it may have something to 
do with the specific methodology utilised. Getting people to respond throughout the task 
on any measure, may have got people to focus more intently on the outcome of local trials, 
hence preventing a primacy effect to occur. However, a recency effect also failed to occur, 
in that by the end of all trials, there were no differences observed between the sequences. 
This suggests that the Illusion of Control is a less robust phenomenon than previously 
thought, specifically that the results obtamed in previous research may have been more of 
an artefact of the methodologies used rather than a true Illusion of Control effect, as the 
current methodology more closely resembles the gambling situation. 
In line with. Hogarth and Einhom's (1992) model, with the SbS measures, no 
primacy effect occurred. However, no recency effect (order effect) occurred either. For the 
current data to fit their model perfectly, both SbS measures should have been higher at the 
end of the trials for participants m the Ascending Sequence (due to vraming late), and 
lower for those in the Descending (due to losing late). Similarly, to fit the model (with 
respect to primacy effects) there would have had to have been elevated responses for the 
EoS measures for those in the Descending Sequence (winning early) and decreased 
responses for those participants in the Ascending Sequence (due to losing early on). 
These results suggest that the belief adjustment model (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992) 
may either have to be adapted, or that their model of information integration is not 
applicable to this form of decision making, to gambling tasks, or to Illusion of Contiol type 
smdies such as the cmrent paradigm. This issue wil l be returned to later in the general 
discussion section. 
Although there were no differences at the end of the task, there may have been 
differences between the measures during the task whilst experiencing the different win 
sequences. The following analysis investigates this, and attempts to shed light on the 
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validity of the altemative possible explanation offered for Langer and Roth's (1975) 
findings with respect to the long term success.rate predictions. 
2.6.2.3. Step by Step Analysis 
One of the concems raised with the Langer and Roth (75) smdy was that of the 
frequency of measurement. In their smdy they only eUcited the longer term Next 100 
success rate predictions and they only took this at the end, once all wiiming and losing had 
taken place. As discussed earlier, one potential explanation for the elevated predictions 
observed may be due to Participants under the Descending sequence feeling that as they 
had lost a lot recently (just prior to measurement), they were due for a series of wins, 
therefore increasing their predictions for the next batch of trials. 
Having utiUsed the current methodology, the validity of this altemative explanation 
and how the two measmes flucmate according to periods of high and low wiiming could be 
investigated. 
In order to investigate how Participants' responses were affected by the particular 
win sequences throughout the trials, then responses to the 32 trials were averaged across 
groups of 8 trials. The trials were averaged in this fashion so that confidence during groups 
of trials during which participants across the sequences won at different local rates could 
be investigated. A four-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 
4(Period) was then conducted. Period, the witihin-participant factor, refers to the group of 
8 trials, namely the first, second, third or fourth block of eight trials. Appendix 3 c presents 
the A N O V A table for this analysis. 
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Figure 2.1. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction Between Sequence and Period for 
the Step bv Step Analysis in Experiment 1 
Sequence 
-o- Descending 
- • - Ascending 
-0- Random 
There was a mam effect of Response Mode, F(l,108)=10.95, p=0.001. Short term 
confidence was significantly higher than the "Next 100" responses, (means of 62.13 and 
51.73 respectively). 
A significant interaction resulted between Sequence and Period, F(6,324)=2.74, 
p=0.013. However, before investigating this interaction fiirther, the issue of sphericity 
needs to be addressed, as the within participants measures for the four periods are likely to 
be correlated with varying stiengths. Mauchly's test for sphericity resulted in a highly 
significant p value (p<0.001), indicating that the A N O V A assumption was not upheld. 
Using a correction for this. Greenhouse Geisser conservative degrees of freedom of 
(2,108), tiie A N O V A did not result m a significant p value, p<0.070 at the 5% level. 
However as it approached significance and this technique is deliberately over-conservative, 
the effect that the Huynh Feldt correction technique had was investigated. With (4, 255) 
degrees of fieedom, the interaction between Sequence and Period was still significant, 
p<0.020. Hence this indicates that there is ample evidence to suggest tiiat the effect is 
actually there, and the origmal (uncorrected) A N O V A test was significant not only because 
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of the iinequal dependence (correlation) between the four tune periods (within 
participants). 
From Figure 2.7 it is clear that the greatest difference arose in the early stages of 
the sequences, but by the end of the sequences these differences between the sequences 
were minimal. Follow up analysis using the LSD method confirmed this. For the first block 
of 8 trials, the Descenduig sequence resulted in significantly higher responses (collapsed 
across both measures) than both the Ascending and Random sequences,.(means of 62.09, 
52.11, and 55.47 respectively). Although there was a slight increase over the next eight, 
trials, the Descending sequence responses subsequently fell throughout the remainder of 
the trials. The difference between the first and the last block of trials was of marginal 
significance, p=0.052, means of 62.09 and 57.74 respectively. 
For the Ascending sequence participants, their average responses stayed relatively 
similar throughout the first three periods, but rose throughout the last; the difference 
between the third and fourth block of trials was of marginal significance, p=0.05013, 
means of 52.05 and 56.43. 
Comparing the responses for the Random and Ascending sequences, the only 
significant difference resulted across the third block of trials, such that the Random 
sequence resulted in significantly higher responses, means of 59.12 and 52.05 respectively. 
Although the Random sequence responses were higher once the task was completed as 
compared to their start points, the responses over the four periods were not significantly 
different to each other. See Table 2.3 below for a summary of the means for the Sequences 
and Periods. 
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Table 2.3. Summary of Means for the Two-wav Interaction between Sequence and Period 
for the Step by Step Analysis m Experunent 1. 
Period 
1 '^8 2"" 8 4^ " 8 
Descending 62.09 62.87 60.23 57.74 
Ascending 52.11 51.96 52.05 56.43 
Random 55.47 54.93 59.11 58.17 
In summary, there were some distinctive differences between the sequences 
following the experience of the wins and losses, whilst the differences within the 
Sequences are much less marked, although show a clear trend in that in blocks where wins 
occmred scores were the highest for that sequence. 
Additionally, the lack of any significant interaction between Response Mode and 
Period suggests that both measures were acting in similar ways to the experience of the 
win sequences. The participants in the early win (Descenduig) sequence were more 
confident and were predictmg higher rates of success throughout the early stages than they 
were towards the later stages. Even though the amount of decrease in the responses 
between the first and last block of eight trials did not quite reach significance, the decrease 
in the repeated measure responses whilst losing a progressively higher proportion of local 
trials was apparent. The reverse was tme for the late win (ascenduig) participants, the 
greatest increase in their responses did not arise until the final period, in which they 
experienced a high local win rate. 
These results can be explained by a Bayesian approach in the sense that people's 
confidence (more specifically, their response to the step by step measure) is directly related 
to the ratio of wins and losses that they have experienced. Hence, by the end of the trials 
when everybody has won the same proportion of trials, participants' responses across the 
three sequences have balanced out. A true recency effect as predicted by the Hogarth and 
Einhom model would have appeared by the Descending sequence participants providing 
significantly higher responses at the end of the trials which did not result. 
59 

It has been claimed in previous research that experience with a task in itself can 
induce greater confidence (e.g. Ladouceur et al 1987). The data from the Random 
sequence participants supports this notion. Throughout the - last half of the trials, 
Participants in the Random sequence were higher with their Confidence and Next 100 
scores than they were throughout the first half, when the task was new to them. This 
increase through experience with the task contributed to the finding that by the end of the 
trials, there were no significant differences between the win sequences. 
In terms of the validity of the possible altemative explanation for Langer and Roth's 
findings one needs to look primarily at responses during the latter trials for Descending 
sequence participants. The fact that these Participants did not increase in confidence 
during the period in which tihiey were losing the most (the latter trials), and generally 
became less confident the more they lost, suggests that the late losses explanation does not 
hold. The most plausible explanation therefore is that their findings, using their 
methodology, are in fact due to the early wins, and not due to tihie late losses. Hence a 
primacy effect of the early outcomes would explain the elevated success rate predictions. 
This conclusion would fit perfectly into the Hogarth and Einhom model from which, as 
discussed earKer, one would predict primacy effects when utiKsing an EoS response mode. 
Their model would also have predicted a recency effect when utilisuig a Step by Step 
elicitation. 
However under the current conditions neither a primacy effect with the EoS 
measure, or a recency effect with the SbS measure at the end of the task resulted. The lack 
of a primacy effect observed here under the current conditions is easier to explain in terms 
of the model. This is primarily because the model does not make any predictions when two 
modes of processing are used within the same task. As argued earlier, gambling tasks can 
be viewed as behef-revision tasks and as such their model would need to be re-addressed 
so that it can provide an account of how the two processing modes would interact to affect 
the existence of primacy and recency effects. The fact that participants had to re-evaluate 
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one measure throughout the task, may have affected (primed) the single measure vi'hen 
elicited at the end. The current methodology vi^ould have drawn participants' attention to 
the importance of local outcomes, rather than the overall series of events. 
While recency effects throughout the task were clearly hi evidence for the SbS 
measures, the lack of a distinctive recency effect at the end of the task was due to later 
trials having the effect of reversing the effect of the early trials. This would be expected 
due to the nature of the sequences and due to the fact that generally confidence is higher 
following a win than following a loss. Thus utiHsing a SbS response mode would seem to 
have focused people's attention on the recent outcomes. The extent of the difference 
between sequences for the SbS measure at the end of the task was restricted due to people 
focusing on the local outcome information. 
2.6.2.4. Battery Items Analysis 
A n analysis was conducted on the question battery items relating to the perception 
of success in the longer-term under various imagined conditions, followed by an analysis 
on the memory questions, using Response Mode, Sequence, and Sex as the independent 
between-participant variables in the analysis. See Appendix 3d for all the A N O V A tables 
for this analysis. 
Longer Term Items 
Firstly an A N O V A was run on the longer-term items. A four-way A N O V A 
[2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 3(Measure)] was carried out, comparing the 
three levels of the withm-participant repeated measure variable; participants' own predicted 
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success rates, their success rates i f distracted, and their perceptions of how many trials 
another person would win. 
The variables of Response Mode, Sequence and Sex had no differential effect on 
the three longer term measures. However, the main effect of Measure was significant, 
p<0.001, F(2,216)=22.26. Follow up analysis using the LSD method revealed that 
Participants thought that someone else would perform significantly worse than themselves, 
(means 48.72 and 53.23) and that they would win significantly fewer trials i f distracted as 
compared to being allowed to concentrate, (means 42.61 and 53.23 respectively). 
Participants responded to the question (Question 6) regarding someone else's predicted 
performance in a fashion that implies that the participants believe that the more 
involvement that one has with the task, the better the success rate would be. This factor 
clearly has no direct influence on the objective probability of success on any particular 
trial, although participants still felt that taking an active role in predicting the outcome on 
this chance task would result in a better success rate than a passive role, when someone 
they knew predicted the outcome. Additionally participants believed that concentration on 
the task was necessary to improve predicting performance. Again, on a chance determined 
task, any degree of concentration would have no positive effect in terms of performance on 
the task. Both of these findings replicate those observed by Langer and Roth (1975). These 
findings seem to suggest that with respect to these particular measures, it appears that 
participants in the early win sequence had developed some degree of an illusion of control. 
A pouit to note however, is that there was no interaction with Sequence, which suggests, as 
there were no apparent order effects in the current smdy for the EoS measures, that this is a 
feature of the task generally. 
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Percentage of Trials 
Secondly a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on people's estimates of the percentage of trials that they thought they had won. 
This percentage was calculated by dividing the number of trials they thought they had won 
(Question 1) by the number of trials that they thought there had been (Question 2), 
expressed as a percentage. 
A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(2,108)=5.94, p=0.004. Descending sequence 
participants thought they had won a significantly higher percentage (59.85%) of the trials 
than the Ascending sequence participants, (mean of 47.84%). The Random sequence 
participants did not differ significantly ftom either of the other two sequences, (mean of 
53.66%). This suggests that the experience of the early trials are important when 
establishing one's perception of how many trials people think they have won, and less 
attention appears to be paid towards the later trials. 
The interaction between Sequence and Sex also reached significance, 
F(2,108)=6.32, p=0.003. See Figure 2.8. From the figure, it appears that males and female 
participants were reacting in sunilar ways to the Ascending and Random sequences, but 
differently when having experienced the Descending sequence. Follow up analysis using 
the LSD method confirmed this - males and females only differed significantly in their 
responses vmder the Descending condition. 
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Figure 2.8. Graph Illustrating the Two-way Interaction between Sequence and Sex for the 
Percentage of Trials" Analysis for Experiment 1 
Participant 
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thought they 
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Random 
Sex 
How Good ? 
Thirdly, a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on perceptions of How Good participants thought they were was then carried 
out. 
The interaction between Response Mode and Sequence was significant, 
F(2,108)=3.91, p=0.023. See Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the "How Good" Analvsis in Experiment 1 
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L S D follow up analysis revealed that there were no differences between the 
responses to the measme when the Next 100 measure was taken throughout. When the 
Confidence measure had been taken throughout, the participants in the Random sequence 
thought they significantly better at the task than those participants m the Descendmg 
between two response modes. 
A main effect of Sex resulted, F(l,108)=20.02, p<0.001. Males thought tiiey were 
significantly better at the task than their female counterparts, means of 52.47 and 39.35 
respectively. A n interaction between Sequence and Sex also resulted, F(2,108)=7.20, 
p=0.001. See Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav interaction between Sequence and Sex for tiie 
"How Good" Analysis in Experiment 1 
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thought they 
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From the figure, in addition to the finding that males responded generally higher 
than females, it is again apparent that the largest difference arose due to the Descending 
sequence. Whereas males and females did not differ following the experience of the 
Ascending or Random sequence, males in the Descending sequence responded with 
significantly higher responses (mean of 59.25) than the female participants in the same 
sequence, (mean of 30.90). 
Whereas Langer and Roth observed differences between their sequences with 
respect to this How Good measure, the current experiment only resulted in significant 
differences for the female participants, and in the opposite dhection. Follow up analysis 
revealed that this was indeed the case. Female participants in the Descending sequence 
thought that they were significantly worse at the task than their counterparts in the other 
two Sequences. 
However, the difference between Descending and Ascending responses on the How 
Good measure for the male participants did approach significance, p=0.071, and in the 
predicted direction. Langer and Roth (1975) reported that they used only male participants. 
66 

By not running female participants through the paradigm, it narrows down the 
generalisability of the results. As has been demonstrated here, male and female 
participants did not respond identically following the experience of the win sequences (on 
this measure). 
The difference may have something to do with the female participants responding 
to this item in relation to the most recent trials, whereas the males might have tended to be 
more susceptible to the primacy effect of the early wins. 
In sununary therefore, the order effect was not replicated within the current 
methodology. At the end of the sequence participants who won predominantly early on in 
the task did not predict significantly higher success rates or were not significantly more 
confident in the next trial, than participants who lost predominantly early on. The Hogarth 
and Binhom model of belief revision would also need to be modified i f it were to be 
applied to the gambling scenario, particularly with respect to predictions that it would 
make when two modes of responding are utilised. 
Although this is the case (that the order effect did not result with respect to the 
short or the long term measures of confidence) both measures (but particularly the longer 
term estimates) were high in absolute terms, suggestiag an exaggerated perception of how 
well people thought they would perform on future tiials. There were finther additional 
signs of an illusion of contiol being developed, but only with respect to measures which 
were not involved in the fiequency of measurement manipulation. Generally participants 
indicated that they thought that someone else would be worse at the prediction task than 
themselves and that i f distiacted, they would also have performed significantly worse than 
i f they were allowed to concentiate. Both these are signs of the Illusion of Contiol; 
however the importance of the early win experience was not relevant for these measures, in 
that this variable did not interact with the sequence variable. This suggests that what ever 
the win sequence the participant was exposed to had no bearing on these measures. 
Specifically however, the win sequence played a significant role in people's memory of 
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past success. Hence although the argument that the early wins may be a precursor to 
continued play with respect to the two former measures was not supported by the current 
data, the data does suggest a primacy effect of the early wins for an exaggerated perception 
of past success. If people base their future judgements on how well they have performed to 
date, and their perceptions of their performance to date can be manipulated by the early 
outcome information, even though an Illusion of Control was not replicated in this study, it 
does confirm that early information is still important. 
In relation to this, from the step by step analysis, it became that clear that the 
largest differences between the vnn sequences occurred m the early stages. Whilst 
winning, descending sequence participants' SbS measures were consistently higher than 
their counterparts in the ascending sequence, who predominantly experienced losses in the 
first stages. The difference between these two sequences reduced as the trials continued 
and the participants wui rate equalled out. This was the case for the short term confidence 
measure, which one would expect, but also for the longer term "Next 100" measure. 
There appeared to be some differences in the way males and females respond to the 
experience of the three sequences, and hence to the experience of a win or a loss. This 
stresses the importance of controUmg for any sex effects that may arise when conducting 
research of this kind. Later in Chapter 3 it will be demonstrated that there are some clear 
differences in the way that males and females react to the experience of a vrai or a loss. 
2.7. Experiment 2 
The lack of effects in the first experiment may have been due to the combination of 
the nature of the task and that participants won 50% of the trials; there were only two 
outcomes available from which to choose. It might also have been due to the two response 
modes utilised with the 1 in 2 probability, both a step by step and an end of sequence 
measure. 
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To be a robust phenomenon, the Illusion of Control (and order effects specifically) 
should be repUcable in many different tasks with differing probabilities of success. 
Gambling activities in the real world for example, cover a wide range of probabilities, both 
between the tasks, and within the tasks themselves. The probability of success when 
betting on horse racing depends largely upon the number of horses in a race, while the 
Roulette player can choose to bet on a single number (1 in 37) or can decide to bet on a 
colour. Red or Black (approximately 1 ui 2). Experiment 1 only evaluated the Illusion of 
Control concept within a 1 in 2 probability type task. 
What needs to be evaluated is the validity of the Illusion of Control concept withm 
tasks which are characterised by different probabilities of success, thereby reflecting the 
nature of real world gambling activities. The following Experiment therefore examined the 
same variables, but using the turtle task with four turtles in each race, and with a 1 in 4 
probability of success on any trial. Experiment 3 fiirther reduces this probability to 1 in 8 
(with eight turtles in each race). 
2.7.1. Method 
Participants 
A different batch of 120 Undergraduate smdents were recraited one by one, and 
equally distributed to the three Sequences, such that there were 20 males and 20 females in 
each Sequence. Of each of these 20,10 males and 10 females would therefore respond on 
a St'lt , whilst the other 10 males and 10 females would respond on a Lt/st basis. 
Participants received credit towards their first year undergraduate programme. The 60 
participants who were under the St/lt Response Mode were run at a different time, by Dr 
Kenny Coventry and Anna Norman as part of then work whilst mvestigating the role of 
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erroneous perceptions, (Coventry and Norman, 1998). Participants received a small 
financial incentive to take part. 
Materials 
The Turtle task was utilised again. This time however there were four Turtles in 
each race. The four Turtles that were available to choose between were Red, Green, Blue 
and Yellow. 
The sequence lasted for 32 trials, out of which the participants won 8. The precise 
win sequences for each of the sequences in this Experiment are depicted in Table 2.4 
below, where "W" stands for a win, and " L " for a loss, on that trial. 
Table 2.4. Sequence of Outcomes for each Sequence. Experiment 2 
Sequence 
Trial Descending Ascendinff Random 
1 W L L 
2 W L L 
3 L L W 
4 L L L 
5 W L L 
6 L L L 
7 W L W 
8 L L L 
9 L L L 
10 W L L 
11 W L W 
12 L L L 
13 W L L 
14 L L W 
15 L L L 
16 W L L 
17 L W L 
18 L L L 
19 L L W 
20 L W L 
21 L L L 
22 L W L 
23 L W W 
24 L L L 
25 L L L 
26 L W L 
27 L L W 
28 L W L 
29 L L L 
30 L L W 
31 L W L 
32 L W L 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited by advertisements being posted around the 
University campus and by asking people to take part verbally. The procedure followed the 
conunon procedure outlined in the overview. 
2.7.2, Results and Discussion of Experiment 2 
Participants were asked at the end of the Experunent whether they currently 
gambled or not. 73 participants reported that they gamble on one form or another, whereas 
47 reported that they did not gamble at all, see Table 2.5 below for the niraiber of 
observations in each group. There were no apparent large differences between the 
distribution of "gamblers" and "non-gamblers" between the participants run by Coventry 
and Norman (1998) and participants reported herein. 
Table 2.5. Breakdown of Frequencv of Gambling and Non-Gambling Participants, by 
Sequence and Sex 
Gambles ? 
Male Female Total 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Descending 12 8 10 10 22 18 
Ascending 11 9 14 6 25 15 
Random 13 7 13 7 26 14 
Totals 36 24 37 23 73 47 
A n identical analysis was conducted on the data collected in this Experiment as was 
conducted on Experiment 1. 
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The analysis of the data set was broken up into four sections. Firstly an analysis of 
baseline values was carried out. This was followed by an analysis to evaluate whether an 
Illusion of Control had been induced, and to see how the short term Confidence and the 
Next 100 measures were affected by the two modes of responding. Step by Step or End of 
Sequence. 
Thirdly, an analysis was conducted to see how the two measures flucmated 
throughout the task following the progressive experience of each of the; win sequences. 
This analysis is labelled the Step by Step Analysis as it investigates changes over four time 
periods. 
The fourth stage of the analyses consisted of an investigation into the effects of the 
variables on the measures that were not previously involved in the fiequency of 
measurement manipulation, namely the question battery items. 
2.7.2.1. Baseline Values 
Firstly baseline responses prior to any outcome information were analysed to 
ensure no pre-existing group differences. 
A three-way [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] A N O V A was conducted 
on baseline responses was conducted, with the alpha level of significance set at p<0.05. 
Again, Response Mode specified which measmes were elicited throughout and at the end 
of the tiials which therefore stipulated in this analysis whether the baseline value was the 
short term confidence or the Next 100 measure. The Sequence variable specified which of 
the Descending, Ascending or Random sequences the data referred to. See Appendix 3e 
for tiie A N O V A table. 
No main effect of Sequence or Sex resulted. With this data however, short term 
Confidence was significantly higher than Next 100 predictions at the outset, (main effect of 
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Response Mode, F ( l , 103)=34.20, p<0.001, means 51.24 and 31.75 respectively). 
However, as this variable did not interact with Sequence, there was no cause for concem. 
Although the participants who responded to the Confidence measure (as their SbS 
measure) were run by Coventry and Norman (1998) whereas the participants who 
responded to the Next 100 measure were run by the author, the instractions given to both 
groups were essentially identical. The reason for why this difference arose is therefore 
more likely to be something to do with people's ability (or lack of) to adjust the measures 
in a similar fashion when exposed to a task in which the probability of success on any 
given trial is reduced. 
This argument receives support later in Experiment 3 when the probability of 
success is fvuther decreased, and the difference between participants responses to the two 
measures of confidence vddens. 
2.7.2.2. Illusion of Control: Confidence and Next 100 responses at the End 
of the Trials 
The rationale behind the current analysis was again to see whether an Illusion of 
Control had been induced with the current methodology, and to see how the Confidence 
and the Next 100 measure were affected by the frequency of measurement variable. 
The Between-participant variables used ui the current analysis were: Response 
Mode, defmed which measure was elicited throughout and which was measured just once 
(at the end of the sequence); Sequence, defined whether the participant experienced the 
Descending, Ascending or Random sequence; and Sex. 
The Measure (within-participant, two level) variable stipulated whether the data 
referred to the Confidence or the Next 100 measure. For the first 60 participants (those 
under the St/lt), the SbS measure after the final trial was of Confidence whilst the EoS 
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measure was the Next 100 success rate predictions. For the second 60 participants (those 
under the Lt/st), the SbS measure was the Next 100, whereas the single; EoS measure was 
the short term Confidence. Response Mode was counter-balanced in this way and thereby 
specified which measure was taken with which frequency. 
The responses to the SbS measure after the final trial and the EoS measure were 
analysed using this four-way [2(Response Mode) x 2(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 2(Measure)] 
design. See Appendix 3f for the A N O V A table. 
No main effects of Response Mode, F(l,105)=0.11, p=0.746. Sequence, 
F(2,105)^1.87, p=0.160, or Sex, F(l,105)=0.01, p=0.932 resulted. However, a main effect 
of Measure, F(l,105)=148.84, p<0.001, did result. Confidence was significantly higher 
than Next 100 predictions, means of 53.36 and 26.34 respectively. At the end of the task, 
participants appeared to lower their longer term estimates of success towards that which 
the objective probability would predict (25%), however their Confidence responses did not 
follow suit. 
The interaction between Response Mode and Measure was not sigmficant, 
F(l,105)=2.0424, p=0.156, which demonstrates that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
two measures, collapsed across the three sequences, reacted any differently to each other to 
the frequency of measurement variable. The fact that both the main effect of Sequence, and 
its interaction with Response Mode and Measure were insignificant, F(2,105)=0.4624, 
p=0.632 informs that whether or not eidier measure had been elicited throughout, at the 
end of the sequence, there was no difference between the wm sequences. The early win 
(Descendmg sequence) experience did not lead to significantly higher responses (at tiie end 
of the trials) than responses fiom participants in the Ascending Sequence. Thus leading to 
the conclusion that an Illusion of Control was not induced with respect to these measures 
in this Experiment. Langer and Roth's finding that the Descending Sequence participants 
had exaggerated perceptions of future success rates was not replicated here. 
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Again the Hogarth and Einhom model would have predicted a recency effect with 
respect to the SbS measure. As in Experiment 1, this did not result, further supporting the 
necessity for the model to be adapted so that it can account for what happens when both a 
SbS and an EoS response mode are utilised within the same task. In line with the model 
however, no primacy effect occurred for the SbS measure. 
A further point to note however on the exploratory nature of the research 
methodology vwth the current data set, is the marginal significance of some interactions 
involving the Sex variable. The three way interaction between Sequence, Sex, and 
Measure was of margmal significance, F(2,105)=2.90, p=0.059 (Figure 2.11), as was the 
interaction between Response Mode, Sequence and Sex, F(2,105)=3.02, p=0.053, (Figure 
2.12). On first appearance is it tempting to suggest that as an increase in the available 
outcomes occurs in line with a decrease in the probability of success on any particular trial, 
the Sex factor seems to play a more important role. This wil l be returned to later in the 
general discussion. The Figures are produced here for later comparison with the results 
fiom Experiment 3. 
Figure 2.11. Graph Illustrating the Three-wav hiteraction between Sequence. Sex and 
Measure for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in Experiment 2 
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Figure 2.12. Graph Illustratmg the Three-wav Interaction between Response Mode, 
Sequence and Sex for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in Experiment 2 
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2.7.2.3. Step by Step Analysis 
In order to investigate how Participants' responses were affected by the particular 
win sequences throughout the trials, their responses to the 32 trials were averaged across 
groups of 8 trials. The trials were averaged in this fashion so that confidence dining groups 
of trials during which participants across the sequences won at different local rates could 
be investigated. A four-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 
4(Period) was then conducted. Period, the vwthin-participant factor, refers to the group of 
8 trials, namely the fnst, second, third or fourdi block of eight trials. See Appendix 3g for 
the A N O V A table. 
A main effect of Response Mode resulted, F(l,85)=41.96, p<0.001. The short term 
Confidence responses were significantly higher than participants' Next 100 predictions, 
with means of 46.05 and 27.31 respectively. This effect reiterates the fact that participants 
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appear to have adjusted their predictions for the performance over the next 100 trials, but 
have not been able to adjust their short term confidence to the appropriate objective level 
of 25%. One would expect that confidence on any particular trial in a chance determined 
outcome task would be directly related to the number of outcome options available. With 
the current paradigm one would expect therefore participants' short term Confidence to 
decrease to approach the objective probability of 25%. One could also argue that the ease 
at which people can respond to both measiues might be different. This would then account 
for this difference by suggesting that the Confidence measure is harder to use than the Next 
100. The above suggested inability to adjust responses appropriately according to changes 
in objective probabilities wil l be discussed later in the general discussion section. 
There was a significant interaction between Response Mode and Period, 
F(3,255)=4.39, p=0.005. Again, to overcome the sphericity assumption being violated, the 
very conservative Greenhouse Geisser correction was used. With (1,85) degrees of 
fieedom this interaction was still significant at the 5% level, p=0.039. Throughout the 
blocks of four trials. Next 100 estimates of success did not increase or decrease 
significantly, remaining essentially constant (the first block mean was 29.06, the last 
26.72). However, short term Confidence did increase over the four periods such that by the 
fourth block, participants were significantly more confident (p=0.004, mean 49.84) than 
they were at the start (mean 43.18). 
A significant interaction resulted between Sequence and Period, F(6,255)=6.45, 
p<6.001, see Figure 2.13; significant too with conservative (2,85) degrees of fieedom, 
p=0.003. From the graph it is clear that the largest differences between the win sequences 
were again in the early stages of the trials. Throughout the first half of all trials the 
Descending sequence participants were responding significantly higher than those in either 
of the other two sequences. Furthermore, the responses throughout the second half of the 
trials were no different to each other. This was confirmed by follow up analysis usmg the 
L S D method. 
77 

Figure 2.13. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction Between Sequence and Period for 
the Step bv Step Analvsis in Experunent 2 
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The current Period analysis was therefore similar to that which occurred in 
Experiment 1. Even though the probability of success had changed, specifically decreased, 
the two measures elicited on a SbS response mode flucmated sunilarly throughout the 
experience of the v^ dn sequences. 
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Figure 2.14. Graph Illustrating the Three-way Interaction between Response Mode, 
Sequence and Period for the Step by Step Analysis in Experiment 2 
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The significant three-way interaction between Response Mode, Sequence and 
Period, F(6,255)=2.56, p=0.019 represented by Figure 2.14, provides some more 
information on how the measures fluctuated across the periods. As this also approached 
significance at the 5% level with Greenhouse Geisser conservative degrees of fieedom 
(2,85) p=0.083, Huynh Feldt correction was used to account for the lack of sphericity in 
this analysis. With degrees of fieedom (5,239) this mteraction was still significant, 
p=0.020. 
From viewing the graph it appears that the two measures responded to the 
Descending and to the Ascending sequences in much the same way (although the effects 
were more dramatic for the short-term measure). However there appears to be a difference 
in the way that the responses to the two measures fluctuate under the Random sequence. 
Using the LSD metiiod, follow-up analysis confnmed that for the Next 100 measure there 
were no significant differences between the periods, whereas Confidence was significantiy 
higher at the end of the tiials than at the start, for this sequence. 
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Furthermore, the short term Confidence responses for the Descendmg sequence 
across the four periods were not significantly different to each other. However, this is not 
the case with respect to the other two sequences. For the Ascenduig sequence, the 
responses elicited in the second half of the trials were significantly higher than those in the 
first two blocks of eight trials. For the Random sequence, the average of the responses in 
the last block of eight trials were significantly higher than the first block, and demonstrate 
a general upward shift in confidence throughout the trials. This differential effect of the 
Random sequence on the two measures is of some importance. 
People's longer term estimates of success may explain why people retum to the 
gambling environment sooner; i f people have elevated estimates of their success rates, then 
they would be irrational not to retum to reap the associated rewards, even though the belief 
itself may be fallacious. The fmding that the Next 100 predictions did not increase with 
experience of the task for the random sequence suggests that experience alone may not 
account for people returning to the gambling environment sooner. However, what is 
important to note is that with this 1 in 4 probability task. Confidence on the other hand did 
increase with experience with the task. This provides an account for why it has been 
observed that bet size increases v^th pure experience of the task (Ladouceur et al, 1987; 
Blascovitch et al 1973), and this particular task differentiates between the two measures. 
This difference did not occur in the 1 in 2 probability (Turtle 2) task. 
Another three-way interaction also resulted between Sequence, Sex and Period, 
F(6,255)=2.66, p=0.016, which is represented in Figure 2.15. Huynh Feldt correction for 
lack of sphericity using conservative (5,239) degrees of fieedom still resulted in 
significance, p=0.020. From the figure it appears that imder the Descending and 
Ascending sequences males and females respond to the wins and losses (collapsed across 
both measures) in a similar fashion. 
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Figure 2.15. Graph Illustrating the Three-wav Interaction between Sequence. Sex and 
Period for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in Experiment 2 
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The cause of this interaction appeared to be two fold. Firstly, at the start of the 
sequence, males in the Descending sequence were more confident across both measures, 
than their cormterparts in the Ascending sequence. By the end of the trials, this was no 
longer the case; Ascending male participants were more confident than Descending male 
participants. This cross over effect did not occur for the female participants; Descending 
participants were more confident throughout all four periods than their Ascending 
sequence counterparts. This suggests that males are more volatile in their confidence; 
more directly influenced by their success or failure on the most recent trials than female 
participants. When the v^ns and losses were spread out evenly throughout the sequence as 
they were in the Random sequence, male participants stayed relatively constant in their 
confidence throughout. Female participants decreased their responses in the early stages 
and then continued to rise throughout the remainder of the sequence. This offers the second 
explanation for why this interaction reached significance. This suggests that it is the 
females that rise in confidence due to exposure to the task, rather than to the experience of 
wins and losses themselves. Whereas males react more directly to the recent outcomes. 
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2.7.2.4. Battery Items Analysis 
Analysis was conducted on the question battery items relatuig to the perception of 
success in the longer-term under various imagmed conditions, followed by an analysis on 
the memory questions. See Appendix 3h for all the A N O V A tables for this analysis. 
Longer Term Items 
Firstly an A N O V A was run on the longer-term items. A four-way A N O V A 
[2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 3 (Measure)] was carried out, comparing the 
three levels of the v^thin-participant repeated measure variable; participants' own predicted 
success rates, their success rates i f distracted, and their perceptions of how many trials 
another person would win. 
A main effect of Response Mode resulted, F(l,108)=14.61, p<0.001. Collapsed 
across the three measures, when Confidence had been elicited throughout the task 
responses were significantly lower (mean of 24.02) than when Next 100 estimates have 
been elicited throughout (mean of 31.44). 
Sequence also had a significant effect on responses, F(2,108)=11.21, p<0.001. 
L S D follow-up revealed that the Descendmg sequence scores were significantly higher 
than both the Ascending and the Random sequences; means of 33.93, 26.33, and 22.93 
respectively, whilst the difference between the two latter sequences was not significant. 
A significant main effect of Measure also resulted, F(2,216)=39.46, p<0.001. 
Collapsed across the win sequences, participants thought that they would perform 
significantly worse i f they were distracted (mean of 20.68) than i f able to concentrate 
(26.41), but thought that someone else would perform significantly better to themselves 
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(36.11). This latter finding is in contrast to that observed vi^ ith Experiment 1, in which the 
fact of being directly involved with the task increased people's success rate predictions. 
This difference may have arisen due to the probability of success change or more 
specifically due to the fact that, due to this change, the decrease in the absolute number of 
wins. This wil l be returned to later in the general discussion section. 
Significant interactions between Response Mode and Sequence, F(2,108)=3.82, 
p=0.025, and between Response Mode and Measure, F(2,216)=21.89,. p<0.001 resulted. 
L S D follow up analysis on the former revealed that when long term estimates of success 
(Next 100) have been elicited throughout, tihiere were no differences between the three wm 
sequences (when the measures are collapsed). However, when the short term confidence 
measure was the one that was elicited throughout, the Descending sequence (mean 33.96) 
induced significantly higher responses than the Ascendmg (mean 21.23), which in tum was 
higher (although not significantly) than the Random sequence (mean 16.87). For the 
Ascending and Random sequences, the responses for when the long term measure was 
taken throughout (means of 31.43 and 29.00) were significantly higher than those for when 
the short term confidence was elicited throughout (means of 21.23 and 16.87 respectively). 
See Figure 2.16. 
Follow up analysis on the interaction between Response Mode and Measure 
revealed that the only significant difference lay between participants perceptions of how 
someone else would perform, dependent upon which measure had been elicited throughout 
the trials. Participants who had experience with the long term measure throughout the trials 
responded significantly higher on this measure (mean 46.30) than those who had 
responded with the short term measure throughout, (mean 25.92). 
83 

Figure 2.16. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in Experiment 2 
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The above interactions provide evidence for the notion that even though the 
"distraction" and "someone else" measure were not involved in the frequency of 
measurement manipulation, there was some influence of the SbS measure on these 
otherwise EoS measures. 
Percentage of Trials 
Secondly a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on people's estimates of the percentage of trials that they thought they had won. 
This percentage was calculated by dividing the number of trials they thought they had won 
(Question 1) by the number of trials that they thought there had been (Question 2), 
expressed as a percentage. 
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A main effect of Sex resulted, F(l,108)=5.19, p=0.025. Observing the means 
revealed the fact that Males believed they had won a significantly higher percentage of 
trials than Females (means 30.40% and 26.38% respectively). 
A main effect of Sequence also resulted, F(2,108)=8.12, p<0.001. LSD Follow up 
analysis revealed that Descending sequence responses (mean of 33.41) were significantly 
higher than both the Ascending (mean of 26.22) and Random (mean of 25.54) sequences. 
A significant interaction between Response Mode and Sequence resulted, 
F(2,108)=6.59, p=0.002. Follow up analysis revealed that when long term estimates of 
success were elicited throughout, there was no effect of Sequence on participants beliefs 
about previous success rates. However, when confidence was elicited throughout, there 
was an effect of win Sequence, such that Descending sequence responses were 
significantly higher than Ascending sequence responses which were in tum significantly 
higher than those fiom the Random sequence, (means of 36.06%, 26.09%, and 20.43% 
respectively, see Figme 2.17.) This strongly supports the notion that there was an effect of 
previous measure as the responses to this memory item were different as a fimction of the 
previous SbS measure. When the Next 100 estimates had been elicited throughout, the win 
sequence had no effect, however, when it had not been elicited throughout, and was tteated 
purely as an EoS measure, the differences between the sequences became apparent. 
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Figure 2.17. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the "Percentage of Trials" Analvsis in Experiment 2 
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How Good ? 
Thhdly, a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on perceptions of How Good participants thought they were. 
A significant main effect of Sequence resulted such that the Descending sequence 
resulted in significantly higher responses than both the Ascending and Random sequences, 
means 40.00, 30.93 and 28.98 respectively; F(2,108)=3.64, p=0.030. For this measure 
therefore the win sequence imder which a participant experienced the task did make a 
difference. This fits with Hogarth and Einhom's model (1992) as this measure was an EoS 
measure. People who experienced early wins believed they were significantly better at the 
task than those who won later in the task. 
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2.8. Experiment 3 
2.8.1. Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited by asking Undergraduate students on University 
Campus to take part verbally. Another 60 male and 60 female were recruited one by one, 
and equally distributed to the three sequences, such that there were 20 males and 20 
females in each sequence. 10 males and 10 females in each sequence would therefore 
respond on a St/lt or Lt/st basis. Participants received a small financial incentive to take 
part. 
Materials 
The Turtle task was utilised again. This time however there were eight Turtles in 
each race. The eight Turtles that were available to choose between were Red, Green, Blue, 
Yellow, Purple, White, Brown, Turquoise. 
The sequence lasted for 32 trials, out of which the participants won 4. The precise 
win sequences for each of the sequences in this Experiment are depicted in Table 2.6 
below, where "W" stands for a win, and "L" for a loss, on that trial. 
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Table 2.6. Sequence of Outcomes for each Sequence. Experiment 3 
Sequence 
Trial Descending Ascending Random Extra Plav 
1 W L L L 
2 L L L L 
3 W L L L 
4 L L W W 
5 L L L L 
6 W L L L 
7 L L L L 
8 L L L L 
9 L L L L 
10 W L L L 
11 L L W L 
12 L L L W 
13 L L L L 
14 L L L L 
15 L L L L 
16 L L L L 
17 L L L L 
18 L L L L 
19 L L L L 
20 L L L W 
21 L L W L 
22 L L L L 
23 L W L L 
24 L L L L 
25 L L L L 
26 L L L L 
27 L W L L 
28 L L L W 
29 L L W L 
30 L W L L . 
31 L L L L 
32 L W L L 
Procedure 
The procedure followed the common procedure outlined in the overview. This 
Experiment also incorporated another measure at the end of all the trials and question 
battery items. This involved an "Extended Play" or "Willingness to Continue" measure, as 
utilised by Ladouceur (personal correspondence). Follov^ng the final question of the 
battery, the participant was reminded of their last prediction and the response that they 
gave, which they were asked just prior to the battery of questions. This appeared on the 
screen and they were prompted to click on the "Ok" button to acknowledge that they had 
been reminded'. See Figme 2.18 for a snap-shot. The Experunenter then told the participant 
that that was the end of the Experunent, and that the Experimenter had to leave the room 
for a minute or two to get the small financial incentive that the participant was due for 
taking part. 
Figure 2.18. A snap shot of the reminder of the participant's last prediction and response 
Whilst the Experimenter was away, participants were told that they could either 
continue, read the paper (the cvuxent daily paper was made available) or sit and wait imtil 
the Experimenter's retum. The Experimenter then left the room and retumed exactly four 
minutes later. If the participant clicked on "Ok" to continue vwth the trials, the sequence of 
outcomes followed a pattem similar to that experienced by those in the Random Sequence. 
The precise sequence is depicted in the "Extra Play" colunm of Table 2.6 above. The 
participant either continued "playing" until they wished to stop, or xmtil the Experimenter 
came back in the room, whichever was the sooner. The nmnber of trials that the participant 
took part in during this Extra Play session was recorded. 
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2.8.2. Results and Discussion of Experiment 3 
Participants were asked at the end of the Experiment whether they currently 
gambled or not. 68 participants reported that they gamble on one form or another, whereas 
52 reported that they did not gamble at all. These were approxunately evenly distributed 
across the three Sequences, see Table 2.7 below for the munber of observations in each 
group. 
Table 2.7. Breakdown of Frequencv of Gambling and Non-Gambling Participants, bv 
Sequence and Sex 
Gambles ? 
Male Female Total 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Descending 11 9 10 10 21 19 
Ascending 13 7 11 9 24 16 
Random 12 8 11 9 23 17 
Totals 36 24 32 28 68 52 
The analysis of the data set was broken up into five sections. Firstly an analysis of 
Baseline values followed by an analysis to evaluate whether an Illusion of Control had 
been induced, and to see how the short term confidence and the Next 100 measmes were 
affected by the two modes of responding. Step by Step or End of Sequence. 
Thirdly, an analysis was conducted to see how the two measures flucmated 
throughout the task following the progressive experience of each of the win sequences. 
This analysis is labelled the Step by Step Analysis as it investigates changes over four tune 
periods. 
The fourth stage of the analyses consists of an investigation into the effects of the 
variables on the measures that were not previously involved in the firequency of 
measmement manipulation, namely the question battery items. 
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The final stage of the analysis investigates the amount of continued play by 
participants, to evaluate whether any of the independent variables have the effect of 
increasmg participants willingness to continue with the prediction task. 
2.8.2.1. Baseline Values 
Participants' responses prior to any trial having taken place, and hence no outcome 
information being available at the point of measurement, were analysed to ensure that there 
were no pre-existing differences in the baseKne confidence and Next 100 responses 
between Sequences or between males and females. A three-way [2(Response Mode) x 
3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on baseline 
responses, with the alpha level of significance set at p<0.05. Response Mode specified 
which measures were elicited throughout and at the end of the trials which therefore 
stipulated in this analysis whether the baseline value was the short term Confidence or the 
Next 100 measine. The Sequence variable specified which of the Descending, Ascending 
or Random sequences the data referred to. See Appendix 3i for the A N O V A table. 
A main effect of both Response Mode (F(l,108)=29.09, p<0.001) and Sex 
F(l,108)=5.48, p=0.021, resulted. Confidence was significantly higher than Next 100 
predictions (means 47.37 and 26.93 respectively). Males were significantly less confident 
(collapsed across both measures) than Females, (means 32.72 and 41.58). 
Before the experience of any wins or losses the main effect of Response Mode 
represents again the fact that the participants were not able to adjust their ratings of 
confidence to an appropriate degree. The win rate for the current Experiment as there were 
8 Turtles in each race, was 12.5%. Both the predictions for the Next 100 and Confidence in 
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the first trial were inappropriately higher for a chance determined task such as the one 
utiKsed. 
The lack of a Sequence effect again suggests that any differences that are observed 
in the following analyses can not be attributed to starting values, and one can therefore 
attribute them to the experience of the task itself 
2.8.2.2. Illusion of Control: Confidence and Next 100 responses at the End 
of the Trials 
The rationale behind the current analysis was again to see whether an Illusion of 
Control had been induced with the current methodology, and to see how the Confidence 
and the Next 100 measure were affected by the fiequency of measurement variable. 
The Between-participant variables used in the current analysis were: Response 
Mode, defined which measure was elicited throughout and which was measmed just once 
(at the end of the sequence); Sequence, defined whether the participant experienced the 
Descending, Ascending or Random sequence; and Sex. The Measme (within-participant, 
two level) variable stipulated whether the data referred to the Confidence or the Next 100 
measure. For the first 60 participants (those under the St/lt), the SbS measure after the 
final trial was of Confidence whilst the EoS measure was the Next 100 success rate 
predictions. For the second 60 participants (those imder the Lt/st), the SbS measure was the 
Next 100, whereas the smgle EoS measme was the short term Confidence. Response Mode 
was counter-balanced in this way and thereby specified which measme was taken with 
which fiequency. 
The responses to the SbS measme after the final trial and the EoS measme were 
analysed using this fom-way [2(Response Mode) x 2(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 2(Measme)] 
design, with the alpha level of significance set to p<0.05. See Appendix 3j for the A N O V A 
table. 
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A significant main effect of Response Mode resulted, F(l,108)=10.74, p=0.001 as 
well as a significant main effect of Measure, F(l,108)=40.62, p<0.001.. Confidence in the 
next trial (mean 31.96) was significantly higher than Next 100 predictions (mean 16.83) at 
the end of the sequences. The mteraction between these variables was also significant 
(Response Mode and Measure, F(l,108)=27.04, p<0.001) which is represented m Figure 
2.19, demonstrating a difference in the way the two measures are affected by the firequency 
of measurement manipulation. Follow up analysis using the LSD method revealed that 
when the Next 100 measme had been elicited throughout the trials, there was no difference 
between the measmes by the end of the trials, (mean Confidence of 20.63, and Next 100 
of 17.85). However, when the short term Confidence had been elicited throughout, there 
was a large and significant difference between the two measures, (Confidence mean 43.28, 
Next 100 mean 15.82). When short term Confidence was the SbS measme, at the end of 
the trials it was significantly higher than when it had not been elicited throughout, means 
43.28 and 20.63 respectively. This differential effect of Response Mode was not observed 
in Experiment 1 or Experiment 2. There was no significant interaction between Response 
Mode, Sequence and Measme, so there was no evidence to suggest that the responses 
reacted differently towards each of the particular win sequences, or the frequency of 
measmement manipulation. 
The lack of this interaction suggests that again, there was no Illusion of Contiol 
induced with respect to these measures, again failing to replicate the findmgs of Langer 
and Roth (1975). Participants in the Descending sequence were no more confident, or 
predicted indifferent Next 100 success rates, than participants in the other sequences. 
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Figure 2.19. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Measure for the Illusion of Contiol Analvsis in Experiment 3 
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There was also a significant three-way interaction between Response Mode, 
Sequence and Sex, F(2,108)=3.15, p=0.047, see Figme 2.20, and between Sequence, Sex 
and Measme, F(2,108)=3.25, p=0.043. 
The interaction between Sequence, Sex and Measme (represented in Figme 2.21) 
shows that irrespective of whether a particular measme was elicited throughout the tiials, 
for males, the Sequence did not have a significant effect on either measme. Males however 
responded with significantly higher Confidence ratings than they did for the Next 100 
predictions in all sequences. However for females this was not the case. For females, their 
Next 100 predictions differed significantly between the Descending and Random sequence 
(in the predicted direction), but not between the Ascending and the Random. For their 
Confidence, Ascendmg sequence responses were significantly higher than those in the 
Random confidence, but the difference between the Descending and the Random (and 
Descending and Ascending) was not significant in the follow up analysis. Female 
Ascending and Random Confidence was also significantly higher than the respective Next 
100 responses. Males responded in the same way as Females in this respect. 
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Figure.2.20. Graph Illustratmg the Three-way Interaction between Response Mode. 
Sequence and Sex for the Illusion of Control Analysis in Experiment 3 
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Figme 2.21. Means for the Three-way Interaction between Sequence. Sex and Measme for 
the Illusion of Control Analysis ni Experiment 3 
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2.8.2.3. Step by Step Analysis 
A n identical procedure was xindertaken as was done previously for Experiments 1 
and 2. A four-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 4(Period) was 
conducted. Period, the v^thin-participant factor, refers to which group of 8 trials, namely 
the first, second, third or fourth block of eight trials. The alpha level of significance was set 
at p<0.05. See Appendix 3k for the A N O V A table. 
Across the four blocks of eight trials, agam Confidence was significantly higher 
than Next 100 predictions (main effect of Response Mode F(l,108)=43.98, p<0.001, 
means 40.89 and 19.46 respectively). A main effect of Period also resulted, 
F(3,324)=14.25, p<0.001. See Figme 2.22. Due to lack of sphericity. Greenhouse Geisser 
correction with conservative degrees of fieedom (1,108) was investigated, and was still 
significant, p<0.001. 
The LSD follow up analysis revealed that, collapsed across all other variables, short 
and longer term confidence measures were the highest over the first period, but then fell 
significantly over each subsequent period except between the third and fourth periods 
when it fell but not significantly (means of 34.77, 30.60,28.03 and 27.30 respectively). 
One would have expected this to be the case, simply due to the very small number 
of wins that this particular paradigm involves, namely 4 out of the 32 tiials. Due to this, all 
sequences have long runs of losses, broken up only by fom win trials. 
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Figure 2.22. Graph Illustrating the Main effect of Period for the Step by Step Analvsis in 
Experiment 3 
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A significant three-way interaction resulted between Response Mode, Sequence 
and Sex, F(2,108)=3.59, p=0.031 which is represented in Figure 2.23. 
LSD method follow up analysis revealed that for the males in the Descending 
sequence there was a significant difference between the two measmes (Confidence mean 
of 47.90 was higher than Next 100 mean of 18.22) but, although in the same direction, this 
difference did not approach significance for the female participants, (means of 39.77 and 
29.67 respectively). This finding was reversed with respect to the Ascending sequence, 
where it was the females who responded with significantly higher Confidence ratings 
(48.15) than Next 100 predictions (14.48). For the Random sequence, both males and 
females responded viith significantly higher Confidence ratings than they did with Next 
100 predictions. 
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Figure 2.23. Graph Illustratmg the Three-wav Interaction between Response Mode. 
Sequence and Sex for the Step bv Step Analysis in Experiment 3 
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The two way interaction between Sequence and Period did not reach significance, 
but a look at the graph does suggest that the measmes are reacting to the sequences in a not 
too dissimilar fashion to those taking part in the two previous Experiments (see Figme 
2.24). The Descendmg sequence participants decrease their responses throughout the task, 
whilst participants in the Ascendmg sequence decrease in the early stages, but increase 
throughout the last period. One interesting difference with this task however, is that 
participants in the Random sequence do not follow the trend highlighted in the previous 
two experiments. Whereas before. Random sequence participants generally increased their 
responses with increasing experience with the task, participants here decreased their 
responses consistently. This suggests that pme experience on the task can not increase 
confidence and other responses alone, that there have to be a certain number of wins 
occurring. This may fit into the value of erroneous perceptions and the building of 
strategies as an explanation of contmued play. There are likely to be a limited nmnber of 
failmes of the strategies before people would discount them, and run out of new ones. 
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However, i f they are confirmed more often this might account for increased confidence 
during the other tasks. 
Figure 2.24. Graph Illustrating the Insignificant Two-wav Interaction Between Sequence 
and Period for the Step bv Step Analvsis ru Experiment 3 
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Due to the fact that Participants only predicted the v^nner of the race on four out of 
the 32 occasions, their win rate was particularly poor. Participants were therefore exposed 
to long and regular sequences of losses, only occasionally being broken up by a v^n. 
Additionally this wm was never followed by another win, so participants never 
experienced a sequence of wins. This could explain why the above interaction did not 
reach significance, as one would expect much less fluctuation in both measures throughout 
the trials, as the general outcome is a loss. 
In relation to the Hogarth and Einhom model although this interaction was not 
significant, the figure does indicate that participants were mfluenced by the most recent 
outcomes when responding on the SbS measures. However, again the lack of a trae 
recency effect at the end of the tiials, was not observed, hence the results fiom this 
Experiment do not fit their model completely. This issue wil l be addressed later. 
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2.8.2.4. Battery Items Analysis 
Analysis was conducted on the question battery items relating to the perception of 
success in the longer-term under various imagined conditions, followed by an analysis on 
the memory questions. See Appendix 31 for the A N O V A tables for this analysis. 
Longer Term Items 
Firstly an A N O V A was run on the longer-term items. A four-way A N O V A 
[2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 3 (Measure)] was carried out, comparing the 
three levels of the within-participant repeated measure variable; participants' own predicted 
success rates, their success rates i f distracted; and their perceptions of how many trials 
another person would win. 
A main effect of Measme was observed, F(2,216)=9.10, p<0.001. The LSD follow 
up method confirmed that whereas participants' predictions as to their own success (mean 
16.83) did not differ from their predictions when someone else was performing the task 
(mean 14.48), their predictions when distiacted were significantly lower than both these 
other two measmes, (mean 11.27). 
The results for when distiacted were shnilar therefore to both Experiments 1 and 2. 
However, the three experiments differ in relation to participants' beliefs as to someone 
else's performance at the task. With the two turtle task, participants thought that they 
would do significantly better, with the fom turtle task they thought they would perform 
significantly worse, and with the eight turtle task there was no significant difference. 
A main effect of Sequence, F(2,108)=4.25, p=0.017, resulted; means of 
Descending: 17.58, Ascending: 13.98 and Random: 11.03. Follow up analysis revealed 
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that the significant difference lay between the responses of participants in the Descending 
and Random sequences. 
There was also a significant interaction between Sequence and Sex, F(2,108)=6.68, 
p=0.002. Female participants responded significantly higher (collapsed across the three 
measmes) when under the Descending sequence than their female counterparts in the other 
two conditions, and than male participants in all sequences. See Table 2.8 for the means of 
these comparison groups. Males on the other hand did not differ across"the three sequences 
in their average responses. 
Table 2.8. Means for the interaction between Sequence and Sex. 
Male Female 
Descending 12.80 22.37 
Ascendmg 12.57 15.38 
Random 14.43 7.62 
Percentage of Trials 
Secondly a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on people's estunates of the percentage of trials that they thought they had won. 
This percentage was calculated by dividmg the number of trials they thought they had won 
(Question 1) by the number of trials that they thought there had been (Question 2), 
expressed as a percentage. 
A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(2,100)=7.453, p<0.001. Descending 
sequence participants responded significantly higher than those in both the Ascending and 
Random sequences, means of 27.30%, 13.11% and 15.47% respectively. Early winning 
therefore led participants to believe they had won a significantly higher percentage of the 
trials. From the following interaction it can be seen that the cause of this appears to be due 
to the female participants. 
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A sigmficant interaction resulted between Sequence and Sex, F(2,108)=4.03, 
p=0.020. Follow up analysis revealed that although male and female perceptions did not 
differ between the Ascending and Random sequences, their responses did differ having 
experienced the Descending sequence. Female participants thought they had won a 
significantly higher percentage of trials than their male counterparts, means 36.10% and 
18.49% respectively. 
How Good ? 
Thirdly, a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on perceptions of How Good participants thought they were was then carried 
out. 
Figme 2.25. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the "How Good" Analvsis in Experiment 3 
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Figure 2.25 above represents the two way interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence that resulted, F(2,108)=3.65, p=0.029. LSD follow up analysis confnmed that 
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the only significant difference that resulted was between the way that the How Good 
measure reacted to the Descending (mean 11.30) and the Ascending (mean 19.70) 
sequence when short term Confidence had been elicited throughout and Next 100 
responses at the end of the sequence only. The finding that there was no significant 
difference between responses when the Next 100 measme was elicited throughout seems to 
suggest that the How Good measme is reliant to some extent upon longer term estimates of 
success. 
The interaction between Sequence and Sex was also significant, F(2,108)=7.38, 
p<0.001. However, the interaction between Response Mode, Sequence and Sex, was also 
sigmficant, F(2,108)=4.11, p=0.019, and is represented by Figme 2.26 below. This shows 
that the difference reported in the two way interaction above was due to the female 
participants. Whereas males did not differ when under the two modes of responding, 
females responses did. This was particularly the case with respect to the Descending and 
Ascending sequences. The important point to extiact from this interaction is that again 
there were sex differences occurring on this lower probability of success task. 
Figme 2.26. Graph Illustiating the Three-wav Interaction between Response Mode. 
Sequence and Sex for the "How Good" Analvsis in Experiment 3 
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2.8.2.5. Continued Play 
Table 2.9 shows the frequency at which participants continued to play after the 
Experimenter had left the room, in terms of the number of trials that they took part in. 
Table 2.9. Frequencv distribution of Number of Trials of Continued Plav 
No. of No. of 
Trials Participants Cumulative Count Percentage 
0 60 60 50.00 
1 21 81 17.50 
2 8 89 6.67 
3 2 91 1.67 
4 3 94 2.50 
5 5 99 4.17 
6 6 105 5.00 
7 5 110 4.17 
8 4 114 3.33 
9 3 117 2.50 
10 3 120 2.50 
Half of the participants chose to continue to play, suggesting that for these 
participants at least, there was no need for participants to have won a high number of trials 
for them to continue to play. A third of these participants (21) only played for one 
additional trial but there were many that continued playing past this. It was of interest to 
see whether these participants were primarily in the Descending sequence; more precisely 
to investigate whether the early win experience was more likely to lead to continued play 
than the other two win sequences. 
Finally then, a 3-way [2(Response Mode) x 2(Sequence) x 2(Sex)] A N O V A was 
run on the number of trials that participants took part in whilst the Experimenter was out of 
the room. This measure represents then willingness to continue with the task, and it was 
hypothesised that there would be some relationship between people's perceptions of future 
success, and the number of trials that they took part in on their own accord. One question 
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asked was whether the early winnmg experience lead participants to play for longer. 
However, there was no effect of any of the variables on the number of trials played. 
In terms of investigating any possible relationship between participants short and 
longer term confidence and the number of trials that they participated in, Pearson Product 
Moment correlations were computed, with alpha set at the 5% level. Participants Next 100 
predictions correlated significantly with the number of trials taken part in (r=0.19, 
p=0.035). Although the correlation was weak, the greater their own success rate 
predictions the greater the number of trials they played once the Experimenter had left the 
room. A weak but significant correlation also resulted (r=0.18, p=0.04) vwth participants 
Confidence in the next trial. Again, the more confident they were the greater the nmnber of 
extra trials they played. 
The lack of Sequence effects was not surprising following the lack of such effects 
in the earlier analyses. If indeed early winning had led to significant increases ui 
participants Next 100 predictions for example, then one would expect to have seen 
Sequence effects with respect to the number of trials that participants engaged themselves 
in, in preference to waiting or reading the available newspaper. 
These correlations are important observations in that they suggest that people's 
confidence as to their perceptions for how many tiials they think they would over an extia 
hypothetical series of outcomes is acmally linked to their behaviom, with respect to their 
willingness to continue. 
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2.9. General Discussion and Combined Analysis of Experiments 1, 
2 and 3 
2.9.1. Introduction 
This section serves to address the issue of the robustness of the Illusion of Control 
concept vnth. respect to sequence effects. It also aims to investigate the value of the 
Hogarth and Einhom belief adjustment model (1992) for these types of paradigm in the 
light of the results from the three Experiments. The individual analyses reported served to 
examine whether the Illusion of Control effects were present at particular probabilities, and 
whether the effects occm only under specific circumstances. However, a combined 
analysis of the experiments is necessary in order to evaluate whether the effects present in 
each experiment are unique to particular probabilities of success, or are general across all 
probabilities. 
In order to meaningfiilly compare experiments, participants' responses from the 
three Experiments had to be converted so that they were proportional in terms of the 
objective probability of success in the task which they experienced, hence creating ratios of 
objectivity. The closer to 1 their converted responses were, the more objectively they had 
responded. A figure higher than 1 therefore represented an exaggeration of the measure 
and a figure less than 1, an under-evaluation. For Experiment 1 participants, responses 
were divided by 50 (represented by the 50% probability of success), Experunent 2 
responses by 25 and Experiment 3 participant responses divided by 12.5. This process 
allowed for comparable analysis across the three Experiments, accoimting for the number 
of trials that they had won. 
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The process of analysing the three experunents together also reduces the nmnber of 
individual significance tests carried out thereby reducing the possibility of having observed 
false positives in the individual analyses. 
This combined analysis is only interested in meaningfiil differences between the 
three Experiments. Due to the notion of power and the sample size, even i f effects were 
significant in one individual analysis and not in another does not necessarily mean that the 
responses were in fact behaving differently across the Experiments. In: other words, for the 
differences that arose between the Experiments arising fiom the individual analyses to 
actually exist, in the combined analysis there would need to be an interaction with the 
Experiment variable. 
Additionally this combined analysis could show up some differences between the 
Experiments which are not particularly remarkable and so care wil l be taken to avoid 
making claims about observed effects where effect size is small. 
2,9.2. Illusion of Control: Confidence and Next 100 responses at the End of 
the Trials 
A n identical analysis was conducted as in the individual Experiments, with the 
additional Between-participants variable of Experiment, which specified whether there 
were 2(Experiment 1), 4(Experunent 2) or 8(Experiment 3) turtles in each race. The five-
way A N O V A 3 (Experiment) x 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 2(Measme) 
was conducted. See Table 2.10 for the A N O V A table (also in Appendix 3m). 
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Table 2.10. A N O V A Table for the Illusion of Control Analysis in the Combined Analysis 
of Experiments 1.2 and 3 
1-EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQlIBNCE, 4-SEX. 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 40.0798 324 1.576883 25.4171 .000000 
2 1 13.1274 324 .1.576883 8.3249 .004173 
3 2 5.0335 324 1.576883 3.1920 .042384 
4 1 .0002 324 1.576883 .0002 .990062 
5 1 112.9867 324 .926442 121.9576 .000000 
12 2 14.1982 324 1.576883 9.0040 .000156 
13 4 1.7976 * 324 1.576883 1.1400 .337591 
23 2 1.7016 324 1.576883 1.0791 .341125 
14 2 .1605 324 1.576883 .1018 .903234 
24 1 .1150 324 1.576883 .0729 .787279 
34 2 2.7685 324 1.576883 1.7557 .174428 
15 2 19.6226 324 .926442 21.1806 .000000 
25 1 22.0290 324 .926442 23.7781 .000002 
35 2 .2440 324 .926442 .2634 .768591 
45 1 .1394 324 .926442 .1505 .698297 
123 4 .1792 324 1.576883 .1136 .977682 
124 2 .1133 324 1.576883 .0719 .930678 
134 4 2.7528 324 1.576883 1.7458 .139630 
234 2 3.1848 324 1.576883 2.0197 .134364 
125 2 18.3904 324 .926442 19.8505 .000000 
135 4 .6719 324 .926442 .7252 .575227 
235 2 .6827 324 .926442 .7369 .479382 
145 2 .0737 324 .926442 .0795 .923587 
245 1 .2101 324 .926442 .2268 .634221 
345 2 2.5365 324 .926442 2.7379 .066202 
1234 4 5.9114 324 1.576883 3.7488 .005357 
1235 4 .4481 324 .926442 .4836 .747765 
1245 2 .3942 324 .926442 .4255 .653835 
1345 4 3.2036 324 .926442 3.4580 .008739 
2345 2 .1793 324 .926442 .1935 .824143 
12345 4 1.8615 324 .926442 2.0093 .092921 
A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(2,324)=3.19, p=0.040. Although responses 
from all the Sequences had a ratio greater than miity, suggestmg an overall exaggeration of 
responses (collapsed across the two measmes). Participants in the Descending Sequence 
were significantly less objective (mean of 1.69) in the exaggerated direction, than 
Participants in the Random Sequence, mean of 1.40. The difference between the 
Descending and Ascending (mean of 1.56) sequences was not significant. This provides 
weak evidence for order effects and the Illusion of Control. While the Descending 
responses were the highest as one would expect, the Ascending sequence was not behaving 
in a way consistent vnUi past smdies, not being significantly different from either of the 
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two other sequences. However, the responses to all sequences vvere substantially higher 
than the objective probability would predict. 
The lack of a significant two-way interaction between Experiment and Sequence 
suggests that across the three experiments the effect of Sequence was similar, i.e. that there 
was no significant difference between the Descending and Ascending sequences, thus 
confirming the individual analyses. 
A main effect of Experiment resulted, F(2,324)=25.42, p<0.001. Participants who 
experienced the two-turtle task (hence the 1 in 2 probability of success) were the most 
objective in their responses, with a mean objectivity ratio of 1.13. The four-turtle task 
resulted in a mean of 1.57 whereas the eight-turtle task a mean of 1.95. A l l groups were 
significantly different ffom each other in the follow-up analysis using the LSD method. 
This suggests that the greater the number of possible outcomes in a task the greater the 
exaggeration in people's perception the likelihood of success on flimre trials. 
Of particular mterest was the main effect of Measure, F(l,324)=121.96, p<0.001, 
which represented the fmding that collapsed across the other variables in the analysis. 
Participants' responses to the Confidence measure were significantly less objective (and 
exaggerated) than their Next 100 predictions. This suggests that people were more able to 
be objective when it came to thinking about longer term success (mean of 1.16), than they 
were when considering then confidence in the very next trial (mean of 1.95). This effect 
differed between the three Experiments as the two-way interaction between Experiment 
and Measure was significant (F2,324)=21.18, p<0.001. Figme 2.27 shows that for the 
Confidence measure the difference between the Experiments is greater. What is again 
interesting to note, is that as the probability of success decreases the difference between 
participants' objectivity on the two measures increases. This demonstiates again that as the 
probability of success decreases, people tend to become less objective and exaggerate more 
their Confidence and Next 100 responses, but that this is particularly the case with respect 
to people's short term confidence. 
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Figure 2.27. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Experiment and Measure 
for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments L 2 and 3 
Experiment 
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- D - Expt2-Turtle4 
Confidence Next 100 Expt3-Turtle8 
Measure 
A main effect of Response Mode resulted, F(l,324)=8.32, p=0.004, representmg 
the jBnding that when short term Confidence had been eKcited throughout, at the end of the 
trials, people were less objective (collapsed across the two measures, mean of 1.69) than 
when the longer term measme of Next 100 predictions had been elicited throughout, (mean 
of 1.42). 
The interaction between Response Mode and Measme was also significant, 
F(l,324)=27.78, p<0.001. LSD follow up analysis revealed tiiat tiie Next 100 measme at 
the end of the task was not affected significantly by manipulation of fiequency of 
measmement; there were no differences between whether it had or had not been elicited 
throughout the tiials. When the Confidence measme had been elicited throughout, it was 
significantly higher than when it was it the first time that this measme had been presented, 
(as an EoS measure). Table 2.11 below provides the means fiom this comparison. 
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Table 2.11. Means for the Interaction between Response Mode and Measure at the end of 
the trials 
Response Mode 
Measure Lt/st 
Key To Response 
Mode: 
Confidence 2.26 1.64 
St/lt = Short Term 
Throughout, Long 
Term at End 
Next 100 1.12 1.20 
Lt/st = Long Term 
Throughout, Short 
Term at End 
The two way interaction between Experiment and Response Mode was also 
significant, F(2,324)=9.00, p<0.001.' However, these two way interaction effects differed 
between the three Experiments, as the significant three-way interaction between 
Experiment, Response Mode and Measure was also significant; F(2,324)=19.85, p<0.001, 
see Figure 2.28. 
The figure shows that the responses fiom Experiment 1 (Turtle 2) appeared to be 
actmg in very sunilar ways for both the Confidence and the Next 100 measures with 
respect to both of the Response Modes. There appears also to be no effect of Response 
Mode with Experiment 2 (Tmtle 4) although Confidence measures appear to be 
significantly higher than those fiom Experunent 1. The three way uiteraction comes out 
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Figure 2.28. Graph Illustrating the Three-wav Interaction between Experiment. Response 
Mode and Measure for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of 
Experiments 1.2 and 3 
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mainly due to the responses from imder Experiment 3, in which there was a massive 
difference between the measmes when the short term Confidence had been elicited 
throughout. LSD follow-up analysis confirmed this. 
Thus participants were unable to adjust their short term confidence appropriately, 
even though they were able to adjust their longer term estimates of success. Hence it 
appeared that across all three Experiments, but particularly as the probability of success 
decreased, when focusing on the next trial, participants were not taking into account the 
fact that in the long run they would only win at chance rates, even though when these 
longer term estimates were eUcited, they were obviously very aware of this fact. 
There was also a significant interaction between Experiment, Response Mode, 
Sequence and Sex, F(4,324)=3.75, p<0.005, Figme 2.29. 
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Figure 2.29. Graph Illustrating the Four-way Interaction between Experiment. Response 
Mode. Sequence and Sex for the Illusion of Control Analysis in the Combmed Analysis of 
Experiments 1. 2. and 3 
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Although this four way interaction is difficult to interpret, it does demonstrate the 
finding that as the probability of success in the task decreases, males and females 
responded differently to the fiequency of manipulation measures across the sequences. In 
Experiment 2, the female participants' responses were in the opposite'direction to those of 
their male counterparts. With Experiment 3 there are massively greater differences 
appearing between the Response Modes and this is particularly the case with respect to the 
Ascending sequence. 
The four-way interaction F(4,324)=3.46; p=0.009 between Experiment, Sequence, 
Sex and Measure adds finther support to the necessity of contioUing for sex effects in these 
kinds of experiments. From observing the figme below (Figure 2.30) it can be seen that as 
the probability of success decreases Sex effects become more apparent. In Experiment 1 
there are no major differences to note with respect to this analysis. The largest differences 
appeared with Experiment 3 when tibiere were eight Turtles. Specifically, the Confidence 
and Next 100 measures differed greatest in response to the Descending sequence. 
This mteraction reiterated the observation that xmder Experhnent 3 with the lowest 
probability of success, the interaction between Sex and Sequence became more apparent. 
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Figvire 2.30. Graph Illustrating the Four-way Interaction between Experiment. Sequence. 
Sex and Measure for the Illusion of Control Analysis in the Combined Analysis of 
Experiments 1.2 and 3 
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Again this fom way interaction is hard to mterpret, although it does appear that in 
Experiment 3 there appears to be a primacy effect with respect to the Confidence measme, 
in that the Descending sequence lead males to be more confident than males m the other 
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two sequences. However, an interesting Sex difference appears, in that this did not occur 
for females. Females in the Ascending sequence, who had won the most-recent trials prior 
to being asked, expressed elevated confidence responses as compared to those in the other 
two sequences. Thus it appears that females were affected more by the outcomes of recent 
trials than their male counterparts. 
2.9.2.1. Summary of Findings 
One of the main findings to extract fiom this combined analysis is that although the 
effects were not enthely consistent with previous smdies, there were some effects of 
Sequence on these measmes. People who had experienced the early win sequence did 
have significantly elevated Confidence and Next 100 measmes at the end of the task as 
compared to the Random sequence, irrespective of which measure had been elicited 
throughout. One explanation of why the Descending sequence did not result in 
significantly higher responses than the Ascending sequence, as in previous smdies, is that 
the result was a fimction of having utiKsed a Step by Step response mode throughout the 
sequences. Hogarth and Einhom's belief revision model predicts that a primacy effect 
would result with the EoS measmes, and a recency effect would result with the SbS 
measmes. This would account for why the two sequences were not significantly different 
fiom each other, as in addition to the primacy effect occurring for the Descending 
sequence, the effect of the late wins inherent within the Ascending sequence would also 
result in elevated responses for this condition. 
A finther point to extract fiom this analysis is that people tended to be over inflated 
with respect to short term confidence, particularly as the probability of success in any 
particular trial decreased. In comparison, people tended to be better able to re-adjust their 
longer term perception of fumre success in relation to the probability inherent within the 
task. Furthermore, when focusing on these longer term measures throughout, participants 
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did not display as over inflated responses as when the people were encouraged to focus on 
their confidence in the next trial. 
2.9.3. Step by Step Analysis 
A five-way A N O V A was conducted on the measures averaged over the four blocks 
of eight trials, 3(Experiment) x 2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 4(Period). 
See Table 2.12 for the A N O V A table (also in Appendix 3n). 
Table 2.12 A N O V A table for the Step bv Step Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of 
Experiments 1.2 and 3 
1- EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE. 4-SEX, 5-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 222.3423 324 3.336715 66.63509 .000000 
2 1 243.2688 324 3.336715 72.90668 .000000 
3 2 12.2807 324 3.336715 3.68048 .026271 
4 1 .2430 324 3.336715 .07284 .787422 
5 3 1.7301 972 .341837 5.06120 .001755 
12 2 75.0927 324 3.336715 22.50499 .000000 
13 4 2.5757 324 3.336715 .77194 .544099 
23 2 .1469 324 3.336715 .04402 .956936 
14 2 2.4445 324 3.336715 .73261 .481448 
24 1 .1995 324 3.336715 .05978 .807004 
34 2 1.9243 324 3.336715 .57671 .562320 
15 6 3.7040 972 .341837 10.83549 .000000 
25 3 .0259 972 .341837 .07565 .973108 
35 6 2.3785 972 .341837 6.95802 .000000 
45 3 .2915 972 .341837 .85288 .465150 
123 4 .4191 324 3.336715 .12559 .973156 
124 2 2.7611 324 3.336715 .82750 .438061 
134 4 7.1586 324 3.336715 2.14540 .075010 
234 2 13.5944 324 3.336715 4.07417 .017885 
125 6 1.1068 972 .341837 3.23792 .003723 
135 12 .5655 972 .341837 1.65427 .071923 
235 6 .4643 972 .341837 1.35820 .228599 
145 6 .8831 972 .341837 2.58350 .017295 
245 3 .1470 972 .341837 .43004 .731526 
345 6 .4532 972 .341837 1.32570 .242675 
1234 4 9.5063 324 3.336715 2.84899 .024051 
1235 12 .4014 972 .341837 1.17432 .296739 
1245 6 .4546 972 .341837 1.32997 .240784 
1345 12 .3891 972 .341837 1.13815 .324802 
2345 6 .1742 972 .341837 .50956 .801426 
12345 12 .2436 972 .341837 .71257 .740216 
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Similar main effects resulted of Sequence, Experiment and Response Mode, as 
those previously mentioned. A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(2,324)=3.68, p=0.026. 
Collapsed across all periods, participants in the Descending sequence (mean 1.805) were 
significantly less objective (and exaggerated) than participants in the Ascending sequence, 
mean of 1.185. Neither of these means were significantly different fiom the Random 
sequence, mean of 1.63. A main effect of Experiment resulted, F(2,324)=66.64, p<0.001. 
Collapsed across the other variables in the analysis, although all response were over-
inflated, responses fiom participants in Experiment 3 (mean of 2.41) were significantly 
higher than both Experiment 1 (mean of 1.14) and Experiment 2 (mean of 1.36). This 
suggests again that overall, participants experiencing the task with the lowest probability of 
success were the least objective in their responses, in the inflated direction. A main effect 
of Response Mode resulted, F(l,324)=72.91, p<0.001. Again confirming that Confidence 
was significantly higher than the Next 100 responses (means of 2.05 and 1.23 
respectively). 
A maui effect of Period resulted, F(3,972)=5.06, p=0.002. The only period, 
collapsed across all other measmes ui this analysis, which was significantly different (and 
higher) than the other periods, was the first one (mean of 1.73). The mformation that the 
participants received over the first 8 trials led participants to give particularly over-inflated 
responses, mean of 1.73, as compared to the 2"^ *, 3'^ '' and 4* periods (means of 1.65, 1.60, 
1.58 respectively). 
' Of more interest was the significant interaction between Experiment and Period, 
F(6,972)=10.84, p<0.001, see Figme 2.31 below. With conservative degrees of fieedom 
(2,324), to adjust for the fact that the sphericity assumption for conducting an A N O V A 
was violated, this interaction still resulted in a significant p value; p<0.001. 
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Figure 2.31. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Experiment and Period 
for the Step bv Step Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1,2 and 3 
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When the task involved a 50-50 chance of success (Experiment 1) participants 
responded with values that approximated the objective probability of success, resulting in a 
ratio close to imity, throughout the four periods. When there were four tiutles in the task so 
that participants only won at a 25% rate, it appeared they became less objective believmg 
they would win more and were more confident than objective probability would predict, 
and showed some increase in their responses over the trials. Experiment 3 Participants 
started off with particularly over mflated estimates, but there was a marked decrease in 
these estimates with progression through the task. 
Caution must be taken however when interpretuig these ratio figures. This is 
because a ratio of 1 is only objective i f the participants interpret the response scales as the 
probability of being correct, but we can not be sine that they do this. For the short term 
confidence measme the participants were instructed that a 0 response would suggest that 
they were completely unconfident that they would win, where a 100 response would 
suggest that they were completely confident that they would win. As the probability of 
success decreases in the task across the three Experiments, it is very plausible that the 
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reason for why their responses did not follow the decline in probability, was that 
participants did not equate their confidence in the next trial with the actual probability of 
success. Strong evidence that the confidence measure does not equate with probability is 
provided when looking at the interaction between Experunent, Response Mode and Period 
presented shortly. 
Of particular importance to note was the two-way interaction between Sequence 
and Period which was also significant, F(6,972)=6.96, p<0.001, and was still significant 
with Greenhouse Geisser's conservative degrees of freedom (2,324); p=0.001. Figme 
2.32, confirms (as was observed vwthin the individual analyses) that the SbS measmes 
(when collapsed across both) react in similar ways throughout the task; i.e. the same 
pattem of responses for the SbS measures arise m all three experiments. For the 
Descendmg sequence, participants provided highly over inflated responses in the early 
stages whilst they were wiiming a high proportion of the trials, but lowered their responses 
with progression through the task. The Ascending sequence fell in the confidence measures 
dming the early stages whilst they were losing, but then gradually increased as they began 
to win more and more. The responses from those in the Random sequence displayed a 
minor decline over the four periods. 
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Figure 2.32. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Sequence and Period for 
the Step bv Step Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experunents 1.2 and 3 
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The fact that the three-way interaction between Experiment, Sequence and Period 
did not reach significance lends fiirther support to the notion that the measures respond 
similarly across the three Experiments. This alleviates the concem regarding the lack of a 
significant two-way interaction between Sequence and Period in Experiment 3, and offers 
support to the notion that the reason for the lack of effect was due to the muiimal nmnber 
of wins that participants under that paradigm experienced, which masked the presence of 
the effect. 
The interaction between Experunent and Response Mode was significant, 
F(32,324)=22.50, p<0.001. Figure 2.33. This interaction pouits to the findmg that there 
was little difference appearing with respect to how the Next 100 measure reacted to the 
probability of success in the task, whereas there were marked differences between the 
Experiments with respect to the Confidence level, specifically with respect to Experiment 
3. 
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Figure 2.33. Graph Illustratmg the Two wav Interaction between Experiment and 
Response Mode for the Step bv Step Analvsis in the Combined Analysis of Experiments 1 
2 and 3 
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The three-way interaction between Experunent, Response Mode and Period was 
also significant, F(6,972)=3.24, p=0.004. Huynh Feldt correction was used to account for 
the lack of sphericity; and with conservative degrees of fieedom (5,796) p=0.027. A n 
examination of Figure 2.34 reveals that Participants were more exaggerated in their short 
term Confidence responses than they were in their Next 100 predictions when the 
probability of success decreased and the number of available outcomes increased, which 
also confirms the general tiend observed between the individual analyses. 
Confidence responses in Experiment 3 (Tmtle 8) tended to declme, whilst m 
Experiment 2 (Turtle 4) they generally rose across the fom periods, whereas with 
Experiment 1 (Turtle 2) the Confidence measmes remained relatively flat. With respect to 
the Next 100 measme. Experiment 1 results were similar. Experiment 2 results were the 
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other way around, almost displaymg a decline, whilst ui Experiment 3, although the 
decline across the fom periods was still present, it was much less dramatic. • 
This interaction displays quite clearly that confidence responses across the three 
experiments did not equate with the acmal probability of success in the task. Whereas the 
Next 100 measme was more directly related to the probability of success inherent with the 
task, people's confidence tended not to be affected to the same extent. Turtle 8 
participants' higher responses can be explained by the fact that this analysis involves a 
ratio confidence measme, rather than participants' estimates of the acmal probability of 
success. This in itself suggests that participants may well be fully aware of the probability 
of success, but still have exaggerated confidence. 
Figure 2.34. Graph Illustrating the Three-wav Interaction between Expernnent. Response 
Mode and Period for the Step by Step Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 
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In relation to the possible alternative explanation to the Langer and Roth results, the 
fact that across all Experiments, the SbS measmes (particularly the Confidence measme) 
were not elevated for the Descending sequence near the end of the tiials, suggests that the 
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effect they observed was in fact due to a primacy effect of the early wins. The Hogarth 
and Einhom model would also have predicted this,.and therefore in this respect, the data 
from the three Experiments fits their model. 
In summary. Sequence effects were observed with respect to the step by step 
measures, in that reliably, the most recent outcome information was paramount. As this 
was irrespective of whether the measure concemed was the Confidence or Next 100 it was 
clear that these two measine responded in the same way across all Experiments. 
2.9.4. Battery Item Analysis 
Again an identical analysis was conducted on the items in the question battery as 
for the mdividual analyses. What was of mterest was agaui to see i f the Experiment 
variable had a main effect on the measures in the analysis or interacted with the other 
independent variables. 
Longer Term Items 
On the five-way A N O V A [3 (Experunent) x 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 
2(Sex) X 3 (Measme)] on people's long term measmes (own fiitme success rate, under 
disfraction, and someone else's Next 100), there were differences appearing between the 
Experiments. Table 2.13 below shows the A N O V A table that resulted fiom the analysis 
(also in Appendix 3o). 
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Table 2.13. A N O V A table for the Battery Item Analvsis (Longer Term Items') in the 
Combined Analysis of Experiments L 2 and 3 . 
1-EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 3.08342 324 .877635 3.51333 .030938 
2 1 3.43408 324 .877635 3.91289 .048764 
3 2 8.90363 324 .877635 10.14503 .000053 
4 1 .27075 324 .877635 .30850 .578986 
5 2 11.95179 648 .341761 34.97123 .000000 
12 2 2.55203 324 .877635 2.90785 .056019 
13 4 2.75482 324 .877635 3.13892 .014889 
23 2 2.28496 324 .877635 2.60355 .075558 • 
14 2 .92101 324 .877635 1.04943 .351325 
24 1 .07268 324 .877635 .08282 .773697 
34 2 3.74201 324 .877635 4.26375 .014867 
15 4 3.54776 648 .341761 10.38084 .000000 
25 2 2.45657 648 .341761 7.18800 .000817 
35 4 .01329 648 .341761 .03888 .997120 
45 2 .00575 648 .341761 .01684 .983304 
123 4 .31527 324 .877635 .35923 .837539 
. 124 2 .53695 324 .877635 .61181 .542991 
134 4 5.14414 324 .877635 5.86137 .000145 
234 2 .92963 324 .877635 1.05924 .347916 
125 4 2.21463 648 .341761 6.48007 .000041 
135 8 .12761 648 .341761 .37338 .934736 
235 4 .20091 648 .341761 .58785 .671540 
145 4 .34615 648 .341761 1.01285 .399948 
245 2 .00665 648 .341761 .01946 .980733 
345 4 .31410 648 .341761 .91907 .452280 
1234 4 1.05116 324 .877635 1.19772 .311673 
1235 8 .61880 648 .341761 1.81062 .072114 
1245 4 .15222 648 .341761 .44540 .775792 
1345 8 .18427 648 .341761 .53918 .827255 
2345 4 .92918 648 .341761 2.71880 .028887 
12345 8 .53047 648 .341761 1.55217 .135984 
Collapsed across all other variables, the main effect of Experiment itself, 
F(2,324)=3.51, p=0.031, showed that participants in Experiment 1 imderestunated their 
responses (mean of 0.96) and were significantly different to participants in Experiment 2 
who overestimated theirs, mean of 1.11. Experiment 3 mean responses were again less 
objective, mean of 1.14. 
A main effect of Sequence also resulted, F(2,324)=10.15, p<0.001. Collapsed 
across all other variables in the analysis, the participants in the Descending sequence 
(mean of 1.24) were significantly less objective and higher in their responses than 
participants in both the Ascending (mean of 1.04) and the Random (0.93) sequences. 
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A main effect of Response Mode resulted, F(l,324)=3.91, p=0.049. When 
Confidence was elicited throughout the sequences, collapsed across all three measures, 
people were more objective in their responses (mean of 1.01) than when the Next 100 
measure was taken throughout (mean of 1.13). 
Consistent with results presented so far, a main effect of Measure resulted, 
F(2,648)=34.97, p<0.001. Collapsed across other variables in this analysis, participants 
thought that someone else (mean of 1.19) would do as well as themselves (mean of 1.16) at 
predicting the outcomes in these .tasks. However, they did demonstrate their belief that they 
would perform significantly worse i f they were distracted throughout the trials. This effect 
was not identical across the three Experiments, as the interaction between Experiment and 
Measme was significant, F(4,648)=10.38, p<0.001, Figme 2.35, suggesting that these 
measures did not behave in the same way across all three Experiments. 
Figme 2.35. Graph Illustrating the Two-Wav Interaction between Experiment and Measme 
for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1.2 and 3 
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Although the Under Distraction measure was not affected by the Experiment, the 
Other two measures were. A n interesting observation here was vwth respect to participants' 
responses to the "Someone Else" measme in Experiment 2. With this probability task, they 
believed that someone else would perform significantly better than themselves obtaining a 
significantly higher win rate than both themselves and than the chance rate. It is possible 
that the reason for this difference for this measme in the Tmtle 4 smdy lies in the fact that 
participants believe that they are not doing particularly well, and so believe that someone 
else wil l perform significantly better than themselves. With respect to Experimem 3, the 
reason why these participants believe they would perform better than someone else 
(although not significantly), may lie in the fact that there were minimal wins experienced 
in this Experiment, that the wins were occurring so infrequently that someone else would 
not be able to do any better. 
Figure 2.36. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Expernnent and 
Sequence for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 
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The main effect of Sequence reported above, was not identical across all 
Experiments; as the interesting two way interaction between Expei:iment and. Sequence 
demonstrates, F(4,324)=3.14, p<0.015, see Figme 2.36. From the Figure, it is clear that 
the largest differences arose with respect to the tasks which involved a lower probability of 
success, namely the Turtle 4 and Tmtle 8 experiments. 
A significant interaction between Response Mode and Measme also resulted, 
F(2,648)=7.19, p<0.001. Figure 2.37. 
Figure 2.37. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Measme for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 
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Of interest to note here is that the "Under Distraction" measme was not affected by 
whether the short or longer term measure had been elicited throughout the sequence. 
Eliciting the longer term SbS measme throughout had the effect of raising people's 
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responses to the other two measures, and significantly with respect to the "Someone Else" 
measure. 
A significant three way interaction between Experiment, Sequence and Sex, 
F(4,324)=5.86, p<0.001. Figure 2.38, also resulted. 
Figure 2.38. Graph Illustrating the Three wav hiteraction between Experiment Sequence 
and Sex for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis hi the Combined Analysis of Experiments 
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This three way mteraction suggests that for the female participants, as the 
probability of success decreases the differences between file Sequences becomes 
progressively larger. In Experiment 3 (Turtle 8) the females in the Descending sequence 
were significantly higher than the other two sequences. This effect did not happen for the 
male participants where the only significant difference was that the Descending sequence 
for Experiment 4 resulted in higher longer term measures than the other sequences. 
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A significant three way interaction between Experiment, Response Mode and 
Measure resulted, F(4,648)=6.48, p<0.001. Figure 2.39. 
Figure 2.39. Graph Illustrating the Three wav Interaction between Experiment Response 
Mode and Measme for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of 
Experiments 1. 2 and 3 
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Figure 2.39 shows that the largest differences between the measmes arose when the 
Next 100 measme had been elicited throughout. No differences between the measures 
occurred between the three Experiments when the short term Confidence measme was the 
SbS measme. 
The four way interaction between Response Mode, Sequence, Sex and Measme 
was also significant F(4,648)=2.72, p=0.029, Figme 2.40. 
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Figure 2.40. Graph Illustratmg the Four wav Interaction between Response Mode. 
Sequence. Sex and Measure for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in- the Combined^ 
Analvsis of Experiments 1.2 and 3 
Male Participants 
Mean Ratio 
Response to 
the three 
Longer Term 
Measures 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
c r 
St/Lt Lt/st 
Next 100 
St/Lt Lt/st 
Under Distraction 
St/Lt Lt/st 
Someone Else 
Kev To Response 
Mode: 
St/lt = Short Term 
Throughout, Long 
Term at End 
Lt/st = Long Term 
Throughout, Short 
Term at End 
Sequence 
- o - Descending 
- D- Ascending 
-o— Random 
Female Participants 
Mean Ratio 
Response to 
the three 
Longer Term 
Measures 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
or 
Stflt Lt/st 
Next 100 
St/lt Lt/st 
Under Distraction 
St/it Lt/st 
Someone Else 
Kev To Response 
Mode: 
St/lt = Short Term 
Throughout, Long 
Term at End 
Lt/st = Long Term 
Throughout, Short 
Term at End 
Sequence 
- o - Descending 
- o- Ascending 
—»— Random 
131 

Although this four way interaction is hard to interpret, it does appear that female 
participants were more consistent in their responses across the variables and Experiments 
than their male coimterparts. For all questions it appeared that irrespective • of which 
measme was elicited as the SbS measure, the Descending sequence responses were higher 
than the Ascending, themselves higher than the Random sequence. For males there 
appeared to be great variability in responses as a function of the characteristics of the task. 
Percentage of Trials 
A fom-way A N O V A [2(Experiment) x 2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex)] 
was conducted on people's estimates of the percentage of trials that they thought they had 
won. This percentage was calculated by dividing the nmnber of trials they thought they had 
won (Question 1) by the number of trials that they thought there had been (Question 2), 
expressed as a percentage and then as a ratio as in the above analysis. Table 2.14 below 
shows the A N O V A output that resulted, (also in Appendix 3o). 
Table 2.14. A N O V A table for the Battery Item Analvsis (Tercentage of Trials') in the 
Combnied Analysis of Experiments 1,2 and 3 
1- EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3- SEQUENCE. 4-SEX 
df 
Effect 
MS 
Effect 
df 
Error 
MS 
Error F p-Ievel 
1 2 6.016687 324 .750418 8.01778 .000399 
2 1 .003869 324 .750418 .00516 .942803 
3 2 8.804175 324 .750418 11.73236 .000012 
4 1 .694744 324 .750418 .92581 .336672 
12 2 .280006 324 .750418 .37313 .688869 
13 4 3.701037 324 .750418 4.93197 .000715 
23 2 1.358610 324 .750418 1.81047 .165228 
14 2 2.564544 324 .750418 3.41749 .033982 
24 1 .220636 324 .750418 .29402 .588031 
34 2 2.120845 324 .750418 2.82622 .060698 
123 4 .411123 324 .750418 .54786 .700717 
124 2 .463122 324 .750418 .61715 .540111 
134 4 3.033301 324 .750418 4.04215 .003261 
234 2 .158591 324 .750418 .21134 .809613 
1234 4 .330567 324 .750418 .44051 .779303 
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A main effect of Experiment resulted, F(2,324)=8.02, p<0.001. L S D follow up 
analysis confirmed that collapsed across the other variables in the analysis; participants in 
Experiment 3 (mean of 1.49) thought they had won a significantly higher percentage of 
trials than participants in both Experiment 1 (mean of 1.08) and Experiment 2 (mean of 
1.14). 
A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(2,324)=11.73, p<0.001. LSD follow up 
confirmed that the Descending sequence (mean of 1.54) participants thought they had won 
a significantly higher percentage of trials than both the Ascending (mean of 1.03) and the 
Random (mean of 1.13) sequences. 
The interaction between Experiment and Sequence was significant, F(4,324)=4.93, 
p<0.001, and is represented in Figure 2.41. 
Figme 2.41. Graph Illustratmg the Two-wav Interaction between Expermient and 
Sequence for the "Percentage of Trials" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of 
Experiments 1.2 and 3 
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Figure 2.41 above clearly shows that Descending Sequence participants 
experiencing Turtle 8 (Experiment 3) significantly over-perceived the percentage of wins 
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that they thought they had experienced. The interaction suggests that as the probability of 
success in the trial decreases, the Descending sequence has a greater effect on this 
measure. L S D follow up analysis confirmed this, thus bigger effects appear with respect to 
the lowest probability task. 
The interaction between Experiment and Sex was significant, F(2,324)=3.42, 
p=0.034. LSD follow up analysis revealed that the only significant difference was between 
Female's perceptions of the percentage of trials they thought they had wOn in Experiment 
3, in that the mean for this group was significantly higher than all other groups. The three 
way interaction between Experiment, Sequence and Sex was also significant, 
F(4,324)=4.04, p=0.003. Figure 2.42. 
Figure 2.42. Graph Illustratmg the Three wav Interaction between Experiment. Sequence 
and Sex for the "Percentage of Trials" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 
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This three way interaction shows that the main reason for the two way interaction 
between Experunent and Sex lies in the fact that the females m the Descendmg sequence in 
Experiment 3 believed they had won a significantly higher percentage of trials than 
females in the other sequences. 
These results suggest that even though there was a tendency ui the previous 
analyses for the Ascending sequence responses to be higher than the Random sequence 
responses, due to the use of an SbS response mode hence encomaging some recency 
effects, when it came to people's memory of past success, they were heavily influenced by 
the early information in the task. 
How Good ? 
A fom-way A N O V A [2(Experiment) x 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] 
was conducted on perceptions of How Good participants thought fhey were was conducted. 
Table 2.15 below shows the A N O V A output that resulted (also m Appendix 3o). 
Table 2.15. A N O V A table for the Batterv Item Analvsis (How Good ?) m the Combmed 
Analvsis of Experiments 1.2 and 3 
1- EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 30567.04 324 275.4463 110.9728 0.000000 
2 1 60.84 324 275.4463 .2209 .638676 
3 2 2.37 324 275.4463 .0086 .991435 
4 1 368.04 324 275.4463 1.3362 .248561 
12 2 153.50 324 275.4463 .5573 .573309 
13 4 1446.75 324 275.4463 5.2524 .000413 
23 2 320.09 324 275.4463 1.1621 .314140 
14 2 639.67 324 275.4463 2.3223 .099678 
24 1 .90 324 275.4463 .0033 .954452 
34 2 279.75 324 275.4463 1.0156 .363323 
123 4 664.31 324 275.4463 2.4117 .049025 
124 2 759.86 324 275.4463 2.7586 .064867 
134 4 976.42 324 275.4463 3.5448 .007553 
234 2 614.06 324 275.4463 2.2293 .109249 
1234 4 357.53 324 275.4463 1.2980 .270618 
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A main effect of Experiment resulted, F(2,324)=l 10.97, p<0.001. Participants in 
Experiment 1 thought they were significantly better (mean of 45.91) than participants in. 
Experiment 2 (mean of 33.30) who themselves thought were better than those in 
Experiment 3 (mean of 14.21). 
Because participants have won at a chance rate in each of the experiments, one 
would expect them to rate themselves as mid-way on the 0-100 How Good scale for each 
of the probabilities. However, it appeared that participants' responses were anchored 
closer to the probability inherent within the task. 
A significant interaction resulted between Experiment and Sequence, 
F(4,324)=5.25, p<0.001 which is represented in Figure 2.43. This confirms the individual 
analyses. 
Figure 2.43. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Experiment and 
Sequence for the "How Good" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1. 2 
and 3 
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The interaction between Experiment, Sequence and Sex also resulted, 
E(4,324)=3.54, p=0.008. As Figure 2.44 below shows, the male participants responded in 
similar ways across the three Experiments, dropping their perceptions of how good they 
were at the task as the probability of success decreased (between-participants). However, 
although female participants in the Ascending and Random Sequences responded similarly 
to their male counterparts, there was a difference m the way that those m the Descending 
Sequence responded between the three Experiments. Female participants in Experiment 2 
(Turtle 4) thought they were significantly better dian those in both the other two sequences. 
Figme 2.44. Graph Illustrating the Three-wav Interaction between Experiment. Sequence 
and Sex for the "How Good" Analvsis in the Combmed Analvsis of Experiments 1.2 and 3 
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2.10. Conclusions 
This section aims to focus the reader on the main findings from the analyses of the 
three Illusion of Control experiments, and to relate these to Langer and Roth's (1975) 
findings and the Hogarth and Einhom (1992) belief revision model. 
First of all the effect of the precise win sequence had very little effect on people's 
short and long term measures at the end of the task. In the individual analyses there were 
no main effects of Sequence resulting on these measures. The effect was significant only in 
the combined analysis. The effect size was very small and the fact that it came out in the 
combined analysis was probably due to the inflated number of participants in the analysis. 
Thus even i f the effect is there it is unlikely to be usefiil in terms of offering an explanation 
of continued gambling. In terms of the Langer and Roth (1975) findings, they were not 
entirely replicated within the current experimental programme. The early win sequence 
did not result in significantly higher responses than the late win sequence, although the 
Descendmg sequence was higher than the Random sequence. The lack of difference 
between the Descending and the Ascending sequences could be explained in terms of the 
methodology used. Due to the use of step by step elicitation of responses all participants 
were encomaged to re-evaluate their confidence in the next trial or their longer term 
success rate predictions following each outcome throughout the sequences. Participants in 
the Ascending sequence were winning predominantly in the latter parts of the sequence. 
The fact that their responses were not significantly lower than those in the Descending 
sequences, suggests that these late wins had the effect of raising people's responses. Thus 
recency effects occurred in that participants were affected by recent outcomes. This 
methodology has therefore obliterated the standard order effect at the end of the task. 
A general conclusion to be drawn fiom the results of the current experiments is in 
relation to participants' ability to adjust their short and long term confidence ratings on the 
basis of the objective probabilities of success. As the probability of success on any 
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particular trial decreases from 0.5 (Experiment 1), to 0.25 (Experiment 2) to 0.125 
(Experiment 3), people become;less objective in their responses, as reflected in the main-
effect of Experiment. Their responses tended to be over-inflated, but became particularly 
over inflated when the number of possible outcomes inherent within the task increased 
(hence when the probability of success and the win rate decreased). 
Confidence generally started off (and remamed) higher than Next 100 predictions 
of success. What appeared to be happening was that confidence remained nearer to the 
50% mark and did not appear to be as dependent upon the likelihood of success on the task, 
(i.e. the number of mrtles in the race). This lead to severely over inflated responses when 
the probability of success decreased. On the other hand. Next 100 predictions were more 
dependent upon the objective rate of success, and as such, as the probability decreased so 
did people's longer term estimates of success. 
When choosing between only two outcomes on a random task, participants 
appeared to be able to be appropriately confident, both in their Confidence in the next trial 
and their Next 100 responses. They became less objective in the task which was 
characterised by a 1 in 4 chance of success on any given trial, even in their baseline 
responses before any wirming or losing had taken place. This was particularly the case 
with respect to short term confidence. The difference between the two measures became 
wider when the task involved eight possible outcomes on each race. Across all probability 
tasks, participants' confidence was higher than then Next 100 success rate predictions. The 
implications of this for the real gambling enviroiunent lie in the fact that when presented 
with a gambling opportunity, although people may realise that over tune the chances that 
they will win more than to be expected are slim, they may bet niore on individual events 
due to then over-confidence and lack of understanding of the independence of outcomes, 
and believe that they can in fact utihse recent outcome information to their benefit. This 
lack of understanding of the independence of events is investigated later in the thesis. 
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Although there are effects due to the change in the probability of the task, there are 
also effects in relation to the particular Response Mode employed, i.e. which nieasure 
(short or long term confidence) was elicited throughout the sequences. Focusing on the 
three way interaction between Experiment, Response Mode, and Measure, the main point 
to note is that only with the lowest probability task were there meaningful differences 
appearing between the two measmes but only when the short term confidence measure had 
been elicited throughout. This interaction also displayed the observation that when people 
were encomaged to think longer term (about their longer term success rates) they were a 
lot more objective in their responses, and therefore were providing predictions much closer 
to the chance rate in each of the tasks. 
The Step by Step analysis confirmed the suggestion that the methodology 
encomaged people to focus on recent information throughout the task. For each 
Experiment and for each sequence, the SbS measme tended to be significantly higher in 
periods involving a high local win rate than when the participant was experiencmg a series 
of losses. For the Descending sequence, peoples SbS responses were initially elevated due 
to predominantly winning in the early stages. These responses steadily fell to values 
closely resembling their response they provided at the start of the task, before any trials 
had taken place (through the experience of progressively more losses). The reverse tended 
to be the case for the Ascending sequence, in which participants provided falling responses 
dming the early stages, but then tended to rise throughout the later trials when they began 
to experience progressively more'wins. There were some sex effects that resulted-although 
the effect sizes were again small. 
With respect to this Battery Item analysis, there was a large Sequence effect on 
peoples memory of past success. Those people who had won predominantly early on 
believed they had won a significantly higher percentage of the trials than both the late and 
the random win participants. This effect arose irrespective of the measme taken 
throughout the sequence. This does not constimte an Illusion of Control as defined by 
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Langer (1975, 1983) as the measure does not refer to perceived futme success rates. 
However, it does present the paradox of why do the people who win early, on over 
remember their past success but do not beUeve they will do equally well over futme trials? 
It seems that people were dissociating between what they thought had happened and what 
they thought wil l happen. The order effect affected what they remember having happened, 
but had no effect on what people thought would happen in the futme. Even getting people 
to think about the longer term throughout the task did still not alter this:. 
In relation to the Hogarth and Einhorn belief adjustment model (1992), the 
predictions made with respect to the SbS measures were upheld; using a SbS response 
mode appeared to induce a SbS process. People appeared to be focusing on recent 
outcome information when respondmg to the following trial. There was also some 
evidence in support of the models predicted effects of primacy. When the measmes had 
not been elicited throughout, there was some evidence of the elevating effect of the early 
win sequence, particularly on individuals' memory of past success as noted above. 
It must also be recognised that although the focus of the current work was on the 
Illusion of Control hemistic, there may well have also been many other hemistics and 
biases that may have been operatmg throughout the Turtle smdies. The problems 
associated with this approach were discussed earlier in the introductory chapter. 
There is of comse an altemative explanation to the lack of clear order effects for 
the Illusion of Control. The Illusion of Control paradigm was presented here using a 
computer. Langer and Roth's (1975) smdy for example involved a more physical coin 
tossing experiment. 
During the current methodology some participants, under the instraction of trying 
to influence the outcome of each race in their favom, reported that it would be impossible 
to influence the outcome of a computer, but uidicated that a more physical task would be 
more predictable and controllable. The concept that the outcome could be controlled and 
predicted is equally fallacious with respect to both types of presentation. 
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It could be argued however that the presentation of the task to participants as a 
Psychokinesis task could in.itself have instilled or encouraged the belief that participants 
could have some influence on the outcome. As reported, on the whole, participants were 
predicting much higher rates of success than the objective probability would warrant which 
would fit this argument. This could be explained by the fact that participants in all 
sequences, having received the same Psychokinesis instructions, came or were encomaged 
to believe that over another batch of trials they could improve their Psychokinetic ability 
due to "practice making perfect" where skills and abilities are relevant. However, this 
would not seem to be an appropriate enough explanation. This point is retmned to in the 
general discussion section at the end of Chapter 3. 
Although the difference in presentation of the otherwise identical paradigm is 
unlikely to be the reason for the lack of findings, there are therefore reasons why this needs 
investigation. Before concluding an evaluation of the Illusion of Control, the next chapter 
investigates whether a manual version of the 0.5 probability task produces similar results to 
those found with the turtle task. 
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3. Chapter 3: Manual versus Physical Presentation 
3.1. Experiment 4 
3.1.1. Introduction 
One question that was raised within the discussion of the Turtle experiments was 
the generalisability of the results to all gambling tasks. 
Within the gambling industry there are a variety of types of task that are on offer. 
One distinction that is apparent is the computer versus manual types. So far the 
experiments have utilised a computer task which may well be valid for comparison or 
discussion v^th similar type games within the industry such as video poker and fioiit 
machines, and the developing Internet gambling market. However there are also many 
- manual tasks that are available to the gambler, including activities such as roulette, poker 
and craps. It has been noted that when one is more involved with a task one is more 
confident (e.g. Langer and Roth, 1975) than when one is not. It could be argued that you 
would be more confident in an outcome when a physical action from the gambler is 
required, as it is easier to feel involved in something where you have to make both a 
decision and act on it. What needs to be evaluated therefore is whether or not the Illusion 
of Control effects are dependent upon the nature of the task; were the lack of effects 
observed in the previous experiments due to the use of the SbS measme, or was it due to 
the fact that the task was computer based? If the latter is true it suggests a ftirther criterion 
for the Illusion of Control to develop. It also suggests that caution should be taken when 
generalising from the Langer and Roth smdy (and subsequent research), and that rather 
than generalising to gambHng per se, the results may only offer accounts of gambhng 
behaviour under specific gambling conditions, such as those which are characterised by 
physical rather than non-physical involvement of the gambler. 
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This raises therefore the question of both the validity of computer based laboratory 
tasks -when investigating such phenomena such as the Illusion of Control and the more 
general question of ecological validity of experiments conducted in the laboratory. There 
have been reports that laboratory gambling research lacks this important extemal validity, 
primarily based upon not observing arousal increases in laboratory tasks, thereby labelling 
them as imexciting. 
Anderson and Brown (1984) observed gamblers betting on blackjack in both a real 
and laboratory setting. The within-participant comparisons revealed that all gamblers in the 
real casino simation showed a higher heart rate increase (up to 58 beats per minute). When 
these gamblers were measmed in the artificial laboratory setting, these significant heart 
rate increases were not observed, suggesting that laboratory research lacks ecological 
validity. 
However, some concems were raised as to the measmement of arousal in Chapter 
1. Furthermore, laboratory smdies have been shown to be arousing (Coventry and Norman 
1998), when substantially increasing the level of involvement by asking participants to try 
to influence the outcome. 
Additionally, Ladoucem, Gaboury, Bujold, Lachance and Tremblay (1991) 
compared both cognitive and behavioural components of video poker players during 
laboratory and the namral setting. There were no significant differences with respect to the 
level of motivation to play (measmed by a five question instrument developed by Dumont 
and Ladouceur, 1990), with respect to the number of bets doubled throughout the play 
period, or with respect to the level of erroneous beliefs that were verbalised by participants. 
In the natural setting participants bet with their own money, whereas those in the 
laboratory were given an amount equal to their personal weekly bet. However, tiie 
laboratory participants were allowed to keep all winnings made from the session. What 
the authors observed was that the amount of money gambled in the laboratory was greater 
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than that gambled mider the natural setting. These more recent pieces of evidence suggest 
that, laboratory experiments do have ecological validity. 
Another experiment was run in attempt to assess whether or not the lack of effects 
were due to the way in which the task was presented, investigating the degree of similarity 
that computer based tasks have with manual or physical versions. A n identical paradigm 
was used to that of Experiment 1 although rather than the task being presented with the aid 
of a computer, coin tossing trials were utihsed. Experiment 4 was also presented as a 
prediction task. The methodology was otherwise identical. Experiment 4 also therefore 
allowed for direct comparison of the results with those observed by Langer and Roth 
(1975). 
One issue that was raised from discussion of the results from the Turtle 
experiments was that males and females were responding to vrais and losses in an 
apparently dissimilar fashion. It was decided therefore to add on an additional sequence at 
the end of the paradigm. This sequence was a series of eight consecutive losses. It was 
hypothesised, due to female confidence having demonstrated a trend of greater flucmation, 
that their confidence or SbS measures would fall throughout the period of extra losses. 
3.1.2. Method 
Participants 
60 male and 60 female Undergraduate psychology smdents were recruited one by 
one, and equally distributed to the three Sequences, such that there were 20 males and 20 
females in each Sequence. 10 males and 10 females in each Sequence responded either on 
a St/lt (Confidence throughout. Next 100 at end) or a Lt/st Next 100 throughout. 
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Confidence at end) Response Mode. Participants took part to gain a "Participation Point" 
which they needed as part of their undergraduate course credit requirement. 
The 120 participants fiom the two-turtle Turtle Races in Experiment 1 were used as 
the comparison group. 
Design and Materials 
Three sequences were employed, which varied only in the positions of the wins and 
losses that would be experienced by each participant. They were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1, see Table 2.1. Participants either won predominantly early on in the task 
(Descendmg), predominantly late (Ascending) or in an apparently random fashion 
(Random). Within each sequence, participants were allocated either to the Ss/lt or the Lt/st 
response elicitation. Hence a factorial design of 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 
2(Sex) was again employed. 
The manual task chosen was that of a series of coin tossing trials. Two double-
sided two pence coins (one which was double-sided heads and one which had tails on both 
sides) were obtained to provide a better way of controlling the outcome presented to the 
participants. A twelve inch screen was erected between the experimenter and participant to 
facilitate the changmg of coins. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated opposite the experimenter one at a time. They were 
instructed that the smdy uivolved a coin prediction task, in which they were to predict the 
outcome of each flip of the coin. See Appendix 1 for the set of Instructions given to 
participants. 
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Following each prediction elicited, participants were asked to respond to one of two 
questions, (between-participants), depending upon which Response Mode they were imder. 
As before, Participants under St/lt were asked how confident they were that their prediction 
for the next trial was correct prior to every trial (SbS), and asked how many trials they 
think they would win over the next 100 trials, at the end (EoS). The reverse was true for 
the other half of the participants, ui the Lt/st response mode. Hence the firequency of 
measmement of the two measmes short term Confidence and Next 100 predictions was 
manipulated by either eliciting them on a SbS or an EoS response mode. 
To avoid stressmg the association between the current task and the coimnon use of 
the phrases "It's fifty-fifty" and "Flip a coin over it" an altemative scale to that of 0-100 
was used. For those under the St/lt response mode, a visual short term confidence scale 
was placed in fiont of the participants, showing "Completely confident that you wil l lose" 
represented by "-5", through to "Completely confident that you wil l win" represented by 
"5"; with the centie point "0" marked "Uncertain". This scale was also shown to 
participants in the Lt/st at the end of all trials when they were exposed to this measure for 
the first time. 
Participants were not told that the outcome of each flip of the coin was 
predetermined. Although the outcome of each tiial was predetermined, the experiment was 
designed to give the appearance of a random task. A small screen was erected prior to the 
participant entering the room. The screen was erected so that the switching between the 
two double-sided corns could be done without the participant seeing the switch taking 
place. Participants were informed that their responses were being written down behind the 
screen. To dispel any concems as to the use of the screen, participants were presented with 
the guise that the screen's presence prevented them from seeing previous participants' 
responses. 
Following the briefing the participants first prediction was then recorded. When a 
win was due for any particular tiial, the coin which corresponded with the participants' 
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prediction was used for tliat flip. If a loss was due, tiien the opposite com was used. 
Participants in all Sequences won at a chance rate, hence they experienced a win on 16 of 
the 32 trials. Following their prediction, the SbS measure was then elicited and recorded 
before flipping the coin in foil view of the participant. 
Using this methodology the participant saw the flip of the (selected) coin firom start 
to finish on every trial, unlike the participants in Langer and Roth's study ui which they 
only saw the outcome on 50% of the trials. In addition to seeing the outcome, the 
participant was also instructed verbally whether they had won or had lost that particular 
trial. 
Once all trials had taken place, the prediction and SbS measure for the 33rd trial 
was elicited. Here there was a pause in the trials when the appropriate EoS measme was 
elicited (short term Confidence or Next 100 predictions) followed by the question battery 
as used in the previous experiments; questions designed to measme other aspects related to 
the loC, and participants' memory of past success. 
Following the last question, participants were reminded of their latest predictions 
and SbS measme, and they then embarked upon an additional loss sequence. Participants 
were reminded of the latest prediction that they provided and of their response on the SbS • 
measure, and the coin was flipped again. For these extra trials, all participants lost all eight 
tiials, whilst eliciting the appropriate SbS measme. 
3.1.3. Results and Discussion of Experiment 4 
A n identical analysis was conducted as before; the analysis of the data set was 
again broken up into fom sections. Firstiy an analysis of baseline values followed by an 
analysis to evaluate whether an Illusion of Contiol had been induced, and to see how the 
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short term Confidence and the Next 100 measures were affected by the two modes of 
responding, Step by Step or End of Sequence. 
Thirdly, an analysis was conducted to see how the two measures flucmated 
throughout the task following the progressive experience of each of the win Sequences. 
This analysis is labelled the Step by Step Analysis as it investigates changes in the SbS 
measmes over fom tune periods. 
The fourth stage of the analyses consists of an investigation into the effects of the 
variables on the measures that were not previously involved in the firequency of 
measmement manipulation, namely the question battery items. 
The extent of the significant effect ("p" values) are reported, corrected to three 
decimal places. The alpha level of significance was set to p<0.05. 
Within this data set the short term Confidence measme was made comparable to 
the Next 100 predictions by re-scaling the scale used, so that responses fell between 0-100, 
as utilised for the Next 100 measme. This was done by adding 5 to each Confidence score 
and then multiplying the result by 10. 
3.1.3.1. Baseline Values 
A three-way [2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on baseline responses. See Appendix 4a for the A N O V A table, 
h i this baseline analysis. Response Mode stipulated whether the measme was the 
Confidence or the Next 100 measme, and this variable had a main effect on responses; 
F(l,108)=44.22, p<0.001, such that Confidence was significantly higher than Next 100 
predictions, (means of 62.67 and 47.70 respectively). No interactions or other main effects 
were significant. At the start of the sequence therefore, participants in the different 
sequences responded in a similar way to each other, although confidence responses in the 
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next (the first) trial, were significantly higher than people's estunates of success over the 
Next 100 trials. 
3.1.3.2. Illusion of Control: Confidence and Next 100 responses at the End 
of the Trials 
The responses to the SbS measure after the final trial and the EoS measme were 
analysed using the fom-way [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 2(Measure)] 
design. See Appendix 4b for the A N O V A table. 
A mam effect of Measme resulted, F(l,108)=97.57, p<0.001. Agam, Confidence 
(mean 62.58) was significantly higher than Next 100 predictions (mean 46.24). 
The two way interaction between Response Mode and Sequence was also 
significant at the 5% level, F(2,108)=3.45, p=0.035. Figure 3.1 below shows that at the 
end of the trials there were no differences under one Response Mode (Lt/st) due to the 
Sequence experienced, but there were differences v^ dth respect to the other Response Mode 
(Siyit). 
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Figure 3.1. Graph Illustratmg the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in Experiment 4 
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When the longer term Next 100 measme was elicited throughout the task, there was 
no difference between the Sequences at the end of the task, collapsed across both 
measmes. However, when the Next 100 measme was the EoS measme, and Confidence 
had been elicited throughout, a magnified Illusion of Control effect was observed; 
Participants who had won early on (Descenduig Sequence) were significantly more 
confident (both short and long term) than the participants in the other two Sequences. 
So participants appeared to be particularly over confident both in the short term and 
the longer term, when they had experienced both early wins and the short term Confidence 
measme throughout. Getting people to consider their longer term estimates of success with 
every trial appeared to reduce the effect of winning early, to the point at which early win 
participants were no more confident on either measure than participants who experienced 
the other two sequences. These results suggest that a primacy effect had resulted at the end 
of the task, that people were not behaving according to Bayesian principles, but this was 
only the case when people's short term confidence was elicited throughout. 
None of the other main effects or interactions were significant. 
151 

3.1.3.3. Step by Step Analysis 
Again an identical analysis was conducted on the SbS measures throughout the 
trials as was conducted on the Tmtle Two experhnent data, to investigate how the 
measmes flucmated during the trials under the current task. A fom-way A N O V A 
[2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 4(Period) was conducted. See Appendix 4c 
for the A N O V A table. 
The Response Mode variable had a significant main effect on the measmes 
(collapsed across both measmes and all four Periods under analysis), F(l,108)=88.07, 
p<0.001. Response Mode stipulated which of the two measures was taken throughout. 
Agam Confidence was significantly higher collapsed across all Periods and Sequences than 
Next 100 predictions (means of 63.08 and 45.63 respectively). 
The interaction between Sequence and Period was the only other significant result 
obtained, F(6,324)=3.33, p=0.003. This was still significant with conservative degrees of 
fieedom (2,108), p=0.040. This finding, in addition to the lack of a significant mteraction 
between Sequence, Period and Response Mode [F(6,324)=1.51, p=0.173), suggests that the 
two measmes were reacting in similar fashions throughout the trials, following the 
progressive experience of the Sequences, see Figme 3.2. 
The pattem of responses throughout the trials was indeed very similar to that 
observed with the Turtle Two experunent. Descending Sequence participants were 
significantly higher in both Confidence and Next 100 predictions during the early stages of 
the tiials. Throughout the trials their responses fell so that by the end of the tiials they 
responded with significantiy lower responses than those early stages. This can be 
explained by the win sequence itself, for as the number of trials increase the number of 
local wins that they experience falls. Ascending Sequence participants fell significantly in 
their responses to both measures throughout the early tiials, but then rose gradually as they 
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began to win progressively more in later trials. The responses once all trials had been 
experienced were not significantly different to their startmg values. 
Figme 3.2. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Sequence and Period for 
the Step bv Step Analvsis in Experiment 4 
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In addition, the Random Sequence, although no significant differences were 
observed between the periods under analysis, participants' responses to the measmes 
demonstrated a tendency to increase in an upward fashion as the number of trials 
experienced increased. This latter point has been documented in previous papers, that 
confidence has a tendency to rise with experience (e.g. Coventry and Norman 1998), 
particularly i f manipulated within-participants (Peterson and Pitz 1988). 
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3.1.3.4. Battery Items Analysis 
A n analysis was conducted on the question battery items relating to the perception 
of success in the longer-term under various imagined conditions, followed by an analysis 
on the memory questions, using Response Mode, Sequence, and Sex as the independent 
between-participant variables in the analysis. See Appendix 4d for the A N O V A tables for 
this section of the analysis. 
Longer Term Items 
Firstly an A N O V A was run on the longer-term items. A fom'-way A N O V A 
[2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 3 (Measure)] was carried out, comparing the 
three levels of the within-participant repeated measure variable; participants' own predicted 
success rates, their success rates i f distracted, and their perceptions of how many trials 
another person would win; responses to the same questions that were used in the previous 
experiments. 
A mam effect of Sequence, F(2,108)=5.00, p=0.008, resulted. LSD follow up 
revealed that Descending sequence participants gave significantly higher responses than 
participants in both the Ascendmg and Random sequences, means of 48.51, 41.71 and 
42.37 respectively. 
Males (mean 46.17) also gave significantly higher responses than females (mean 
42.22); mam effect of Sex F(l,108)=4.17, p=0.044. 
A main effect of Measure F(2,216)=14.23, p<0.001 also resulted. Peoples' own 
predictions of success were significantly higher when not distracted (mean of 46.24) than 
when they imagined themselves to be distracted, (mean of 41.09). Collapsed across all 
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other variables, participants felt that someone else v^ould perform similarly to themselves, 
mean of45.25. 
The interaction between Response Mode and Sequence also reached significance, 
F(2,108)=4.07, p=0.020, see Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in Experiment 4 
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Figure 3.3 shows a similar pattern of resuUs as was observed with the earher 
analysis. As the interaction between these two variables and the Measme variable was not 
significant, the three measmes were affected in similar ways by the frequency 
manipulation. Follow up analysis using the LSD method revealed that only responses from 
participants in the Descending sequence were significantly higher than all- other 
comparison groups, and only for those participants under the St/lt response mode. 
The interaction between Sex and Measine F(2,216)=6.09, p=0.003 was significant, 
see Figure 3.4 below. 
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Figure 3.4. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Sex and Measure for the 
Step bv Step Analysis in Experiment 4 
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Follow up analysis revealed that the male participants did not differ m their 
responses to the three measures, whereas the females thought they would perform 
significantly worse i f distracted. 
Percentage of Trials 
Secondly an analysis was conducted on people's estimates of the percentage of 
trials that they thought they had won. This percentage was calculated by dividing the 
number of trials they thought they had won (Question 1) by the number of trials that they 
thought there had been (Question 2), expressed as a percentage. 
A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(2,108)=l5.66, p<0.001. Descending 
sequence participants thought they had won a significantly higher percentage of trials 
(mean 52.92) than both the Ascending (mean 40.03) and Random sequences (43.51). A 
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significant interaction between Response Mode and Sequence was also found, 
F(2,108)=3.38, p=0.p38, and is presented in Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5. Graph Illustiatiug the Two-wav Interaction between Response Mode and 
Sequence for the "Percentage of Trials" Analvsis in Experiment 4 
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From the figme it is apparent that when the Next 100 measure was elicited 
throughout, the Descending sequence responses were significantly higher than the 
Ascending sequence (but not Random), but when Confidence was the SbS measure 
Descending sequence responses were significantly higher than both the other two 
sequences. For the Ascending sequence, responses were significantly higher when the Next 
100 measme was elicited throughout than when the Confidence measure was. The reverse 
was true for the Descending sequence, where participants thought they had won a 
significantly higher percentage than participants in the same sequence but who responded 
with the Next 100 throughout. However, the Descending sequence participants vmder both 
Response Modes responded significantly higher than those experiencing the Ascending 
sequence. LSD follow up analysis confirmed this. 
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How Good ? 
Thirdly, a three-way A N O V A [2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on perceptions of How Good participants thought they were was then carried 
out. 
A main effect of Sequence resulted, F(l,108)=8.09, p<0.001, in the predicted 
direction. Descending Sequence participants thought that they were significantly better at 
the task than either of the two other sequences. See Table 3.1 for the means. 
A n interestmg pomt with the lack of a significant main effect of (or interaction 
with) Response Mode, is that this suggests that there is no overlap of the SbS measmes on 
this How Good measme. It therefore appears that whichever Step by Step measme is used 
throughout the task, there is no effect on this End of Sequence measme. Participants' 
perceptions of How Good they were, were significantly correlated (Pearson Product-
Moment Correlation, r=0.42, N=120, p<0.05) with then predictions for their success rates 
over the next 100 tiials, which would be expected. 
Table 3.1. Means for Participants' perceptions of How Good thev were at the task 
How Good? 
Descending 
Ascending 
Random 
61.00 
50.00 
50.25 
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3.1.3.5. Extra Loss Sequence 
The same SbS measmes were ehcited throughout the additional loss sequence 
experienced by all participants (8 consecutive losses). The average response over the last 
eight trials was calculated and compared with the average response over the last eight trials 
of the main sequence, and a 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 2(Time) 
A N O V A was conducted. See Appendix 4e for the A N O V A table for this analysis. 
A main effect of Response Mode reappeared, F(l,108)=64.76, p<0.001, such that 
again Confidence responses were significantly higher than Next 100 predictions, means of 
60.17 and 43.69 respectively. The extra series of losses also had a main effect on 
responses, significantly reducing people's responses from a mean of 54.05 at the end of the 
main sequence, to a mean of 49.81 after the sequence of losses; F(l,108)=23.42, p<0.001. 
As predicted from the previous observation that males and females, did not tend to 
react in the same way to the experience of wins and losses, the interaction between Sex and 
Time (pre or post loss sequence) was also significant, F(l,108)=5.46, p=0.021. As Figure 
3.6 below shows, the females' average responses dropped significantly fiom 53.76 to 
47.48, whereas males remained relatively stable (54.34 to 52.14). This confirms that 
females were affected more overall than their male coimterparts by a series of consecutive 
losses. The observation that male participants on the whole did not fall in confidence 
(across both short term and longer term confidence) could offer a part explanation for why 
the majority of problem gamblers are male. Whereas females appeared to be under the 
belief that i f they have just experienced a loss another loss is equally likely (perhaps 
perceived it to be more likely), this was not the case for the males. 
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Figure 3.6. Graph Illustrating the Two wav Interaction between Time (pre/post loss 
sequence) and Sex m Experiment 4 
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3.2. General Discussion and Comparison of Experiment 4 
' and Experiment 1 
3.2.1. Introduction 
The two types of task that were used, as aheady discussed, resembled each other in 
every way apart firom the method of presentation of the Illusion of Control paradigm. The 
three distinctive and important differences between the two Experiments were that firstly 
Experiment 1 was presented to participants v^ dth the use of a computer, whilst Experiment 
4 was presented with the use of real coin tossing (physical). Secondly, Experiment 1 was 
presented to participants as a Psychokinesis task, whilst Experiment 4 was presented as a 
Coin Prediction task. Thirdly, Experiment 1 used Turtles as icons whilst Experiment 4 
used coins. Comparisons can however be made between the two types of task as essentially 
every other detail regarding tiie paradigm was identical, although discussion of the 
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potential effects of these differences wil l be presented in the general discussion section 
towards the end of this chapter. 
Due to the observations that the more involved people are in a task and the more 
familiar the task is, the greater the illusion of control induced, (e.g. Langer and Roth 1975) 
one might expect that participants may rate themselves as better at the computer based 
paradigm. With this presentation, it is the participant who makes the physical actions 
throughout the trials. Here, the participant had control over many facets of the experiment, 
including the speed at which they progressed through the trials, and physically choosing 
their outcome. This may have lead them to feel more involved and more in control of the 
task. This might have resulted in these participants having had higher perceptions of how 
good they were at the task as compared to the manual task in which the Experimenter 
conducted the physical movements for each trial. Due to computer games being played 
predominantly by males, one may additionally expect that males would rate themselves as 
better than females. 
Alternatively, participants may have felt that the outcomes on the computer task 
were more likely to be predetermined and therefore more fixable than fixing the outcome 
firom flipping a coin. 
i 
Preferences for gambling activities are observably differentiated between the sexes. 
Particular games are often predominantly played by one sex. Bingo for example is played 
predominantly by females, whereas casino games and horse racing are predominantly 
played by males. A comparison between the two tasks may highlight some differences with 
respect to the two presentation types. 
As the main influence on confidence and Next 100 measmes throughout the trials 
has appeared so far to be whether a win or loss was experienced in the previous trial, the 
step by step measures would be expected to flucmate in similar ways across the two tasks. 
161 
With respect to the baseline confidence measures, the manual presentation of the 
task resulted in higher responses than for the computer presentation. However, for both 
experiments there were no interactions with any other variables. By the end of the trials in 
both experunents the short term measme was significantly higher than the Next 100 
measme. 
In terms of whether the Illusion of Control was induced by the end of the trials, 
there was no apparent clear effect resulting. There were signs however which replicated the 
Langer and Roth findings of exaggerated long term success predictions, but only imder the 
specific condition of the measme having only been elicited at the end of the task (as an 
EoS measme). 
With respect to the Step by Step measmes taken throughout the task, the 
participants responded in very similar ways between the two experiments. It appeared that 
the individuals were basing their responses on a trial by trial basis, focusing on the 
outcome of the recent local trials for the basis of their Confidence or updated Next 100 
perceptions. 
For the items that were not included in the manipulation of the firequency of 
measmement, participants across the two smdies responded in similar ways on the basis of 
the sequence which they had experienced. On peoples memory of past success, those in 
the early win sequence believed they had won a significantly higher percentage of trials 
than participants in the other conditions. These individuals also tended to believe they 
were significantly better at the task, which would be expected considering they thought 
they had had a higher success rate. It appeared therefore, that these other EoS measmes 
were not affected by which of the two SbS measmes had previously been elicited. 
With these EoS measmes there were a few differences arising between males and 
females for those experiencing the computer presentation. It appeared that for the How 
Good measme the sequence only had a significant differential effect for the two sexes with 
respect to the Descending early win sequence. Males in this sequence thought tibat they 
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were significantly better at the task than then female counterparts. This difference was also 
true of the participants' memory of past success where males and females responded 
sunilarly following the experience of the Ascending and Random sequences, but 
differently (males significantly higher) under the Descendmg sequence. Both of these 
findings suggest that the early information is important, and specifically the early wins 
which occur during this latter sequence. 
The following section serves to evaluate whether the lack of strong. Illusion of 
Control effects observed vidth the Turtle experiments (1, 2 and 3) was due to the fact that 
the task was too different jfrom the Langer and Roth (1975) study to expect sunilar results, 
or whether the use of the current methodology (utiUsing Step by Step measures) was the 
main reason. This section therefore addresses, in a combined analysis, the issue of 
ecological validity of computer based laboratory gambling tasks. 
The data was coded such that an additional variable was included in the analysis, 
which stipulated the Type of task; whether the data was obtained under the manual and 
physical coin flipping task, or firom the Turtle Races vnih. two turtles in each race. 
Hence a factorial design for the following analysis of 2(Type) x 2(Response Mode) 
X 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) was employed. The between-participant variable characteristics 
were: Type, physical or computer task; Response Mode, defining which measure was 
elicited throughout and which measme was elicited once only at the end of the sequence; 
Sequence, defining whether the participant experienced the Descending, Ascending or 
Random sequence; and Sex. The alpha level of significance was again set at p<0.05. 
As with the previous combined analysis, the focus here was on the main effects of 
the variable Type, and the interactions that this had with the other independent variables. 
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3.2.2. Illusion of Control: Confidence and Next 100 responses at 
the End of the Trials 
The responses to the SbS measure after the final trial and the EoS measure were 
analysed using a five-way [2(Type) x 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 
2(Measure)] design. Table 3.2 below shows the A N O V A table for this section (also 
presented in Appendix 4f). 
Table 3.2. A N O V A Table for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis 
of Experiments 4 and 1 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 653.33 216 384.3792 1.69971 .193714 
2 1 1512.30 216 384.3792 3.93440 .048575 
3 2 201.61 216 384.3792 .52452 .592591 
4 1 5.21 216 384.3792 .01355 .907440 
5 1 16380.03 216 221.2245 74.04257 .000000 
12 1 .41 216 384.3792 .00106 .974029 
13 2 129.25 216 384.3792 .33626 .714809 
23 2 1405.39 216 384.3792 3.65627 .027440 
14 1 43.20 216 384.3792 .11239 .737766 
24 1 30.00 216 384.3792 .07805 .780228 
34 2 650.40 216 384.3792 1.69208 .186567 
15 1 2604.01 216 221.2245 11.77088 .000721 
25 1 221.41 216 221.2245 1.00083 .318229 
35 2 .46 216 221.2245 .00210 .997902 
45 1 22.53 216 221.2245 .10186 .749920 
123 2 7.79 216 384.3792 .02027 .979940 
124 1 755.01 216 384.3792 1.96423 .162497 
134 2 43.28 216 384.3792 .11260 .893560 
234 2 303.01 216 384.3792 .78830 .455920 
125 1 418.13 216 221.2245 1.89009 .170617 
135 2 851.08 216 221.2245 3.84712 .022818 
235 2 112.98 216 221.2245 .51069 .600804 
145 1 25.21 216 221.2245 .11395 .736020 
245 1 49.41 216 221.2245 .22334 .636984 
345 2 188.13 216 221.2245 .85039 .428674 
1234 2 157.58 216 384.3792 .40995 .664197 
1235 2 106.76 216 221.2245 .48261 .617836 
1245 1 34.13 216 221.2245 .15429 .694854 
1345 2 761.41 216 221.2245 3.44182 .033772 
2345 2 16.21 216 221.2245 .07329 .929350 
12345 2 28.78 216 221.2245 .13008 .878093 
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The main effect of Response Mode F(l,216)=3.93, p=0.049 and the interaction 
between Response Mode and Sequence F(2,216)=3.66, p=0.027 were as before.. The main 
effect of Type did not appear, F(l,216)=1.70, p=0.194. 
A main effect of Measure appeared, F(l,216)=74.04, p<0.001, at the end of the 
trials, mean Confidence was 61.42 whereas Next 100 predictions had a mean of49.74. 
A n interaction between Type and Measme was also significant, F(l,216)=11.77. 
p<0.001. From viewing the Figure 3.7 below, it can be seen that for the Confidence 
measme, collapsed across both Response Modes, there was little difference between the 
participants' responses in the two types of task. 
Figme 3.7. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav interaction between Type and Measme for the 
Illusion of Control Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
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However, Confidence was significantly higher than Next 100 predictions in both 
types of task. In addition to this, participants in the computer task predicted significantly 
higher Next 100 success rates than those doing the coin prediction task. Follow up using 
the LSD method confirmed this. This suggests that there is some differential effect of the 
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task on the one measure, namely the Next 100 predictions, but not the other. More 
information can be obtained however from looking at the significant three way interaction 
between Type, Sequence and Measme, F(2,216)=3.85, p=0.023. Figure 3.8 represents this 
interaction graphically. 
Figme 3.8. Graph Illustrating the Three-way interaction between Tvpe. Sequence and 
Measme for the Illusion of Control Analvsis in the Combuied Analysis of Experiments 1 
and 4 
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For the Confidence measme there were no effects of Sequence in either the coin or 
the Tmtle trials. For thie Next 100 measme there was no effect of Sequence in the Turtle 
trials but the standard order effect was observed for the coin trials, in which the early wins 
lead to significantly higher longer term estimates of success. 
However, this effect occurred when collapsing across the Response Mode, and so 
no information is provided in relation to how the two measmes react to the different tasks 
when eUcited by either a SbS or an EoS Response Mode. The lack of significant 
interactions between the Response Mode variable and Type, or Measure, suggests that the 
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two measures were affected in similar fashions by the Sequences in both smdies imder both 
response elicitation modes. • . '• 
A fom way interaction between Type, Sequence, Sex and Measure resulted, 
F(2,216)=3.44, p=0.034. See Figme 3.9 below. 
This suggests that males and females react somewhat differently to the two types of 
task in relation to their responses on the two measmes. One point to note about this 
interaction is that with the coin trials, the Sequences appear to have similar effects on the 
two measmes in male participants, but not females, albeit that Confidence is significantly 
higher than Next 100 predictions. Perhaps the main point to note is that again the 
assumption that males and females respond in the same way when making decisions on 
uncertain events, is not upheld. It appears that there are differences in terms of how they 
are affected by the task characteristics. 
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Figure 3.9. Graph Illustrating the Four way interaction between Type. Sequence. Sex and-
Measure for the Illusion of Control Analysis in the Combined Analysis of Experiments 1 
and 4 
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3.2.3. Step by Step Analysis 
This analysis of variance was to investigate whether there were any differences in 
the Step by Step measure taken throughout the task between the two tasks. The measures 
taken on a trial by trial basis were averaged into fom blocks of eight trials and an identical 
Period analysis was conducted on the combmed data set for the coin flipping and the Turtle 
races, as to that conducted previously; a five-way A N O V A [2(Type) x 2(Response Mode) 
X 3(Sequence) x 2(Sex) x 4(Period). Table 3.3 below shows that results of this A N O V A , 
(also in Appendix 4g). 
Table 3.3. A N O V A Table for the Step bv Step Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of 
Experiments 4 and 1 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 1591.35 216 800.2333 1.98861 .159925 
2 1 46530.39 216 800.2333 58.14603 .000000 
3 2 2796.93 216 800.2333 3.49514 .032072 
4 1 319.70 216 800.2333 .39951 .528009 
5 3 31.65 648 69.1027 .45800 .711731 
12 1 2981.27 216 800.2333 3.72550 .054897 
13 2 324.92 216 800.2333 .40603 .666800 
23 2 109.26 216 800.2333 .13653 .872455 
14 1 225.48 216 800.2333 .28176 .596093 
24 1 73.84 216 800.2333 .09228 .761595 
34 2 114.67 216 800.2333 .14330 .866577 
15 3 46.79 648 69.1027 .67704 .566305 
25 3 18.25 648 69.1027 .26416 .851233 
35 6 335.13 648 69.1027 4.84977 .000074 
45 3 126.29 648 69.1027 1.82754 .140822 
123 2 256.01 216 800.2333 .31992 .726553 
124 1 338.44 216 800.2333 .42292 .516173 
134 2 1084.04 216 800.2333 1.35466 .260219 
234 2 575.05 216 800.2333 .71861 .488593 
125 3 13.97 648 69.1027 .20211 .894943 
135 6 66.42 648 69.1027 .96111 .450739 
235 6 132.76 648 69.1027 1.92121 .075128 
145 3 34.38 648 69.1027 .49753 .684115 
245 3 45.31 648 69.1027 .65569 .579578 
345 6 35.40 648 69.1027 .51232 .799233 
1234 2 .85 216 800.2333 .00106 .998941 
1235 6 101.03 648 69.1027 1.46207 .188713 
1245 3 54.46 648 69.1027 .78803 .500821 
1345 6 92.28 648 69.1027 1.33537 .239014 
2345 6 35.58 648 69.1027 .51485 .797312 
12345 6 148.05 648 69.1027 2.14253 .046863 
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A main effect of Response Mode resulted, F(l,216)=58.15, p<0.001. This just 
confirms again that Confidence was significantly higher overall (mean 62.60) than Next 
100 success rate predictions, mean of 48.68. A mam effect of Type did not result, 
F(l,216)=1.99,p=0.160. 
A significant main effect resulted of Sequence, F(2,216)=3.50, p=0.032. Follow up 
analysis with the LSD method confirmed that the difference lay between the Descending 
sequence mean (58.84) and Ascending sequence mean, (53.01). The Random sequence did 
not differ fiom either of the other two sequences, mean of 55.07. 
More interesting though, there was an interaction between Sequence and Period 
which was highly significant, F(6,648)=4.85, p<0.001, see Figme 3.10 for the plot of 
means. 
Figure 3.10. Graph Illustratmg the Two-wav Literaction between Sequence and Period for 
the Step by Step Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
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The figme clearly demonstrates that the SbS measmes reacted as they did in each 
of the previous Turtle experiments, with the Descending sequence resulting in high 
responses in the early stages, falling as participants experience progressively more losses, 
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whilst in the Ascending sequence, participants decrease in their confidence responses in 
the early stages, but increase as the niunber of trials and the nmnber of wins increases. The 
lack of a three way interaction with these variables and the Type variable, F(6,648)=0.96, 
p=0.451, suggests that throughout the trials the SbS measmes react similarly rmder both 
types of task. This further suggests that the decision making that has been taking place and 
the expression of confidence throughout the process appears to be very similar for both the 
physical and the computer based task. 
3.2.4. Battery Items Analysis 
A n A N O V A was conducted on the question battery items relating to the perception 
of success in the longer-term imder various imagined conditions, followed by an analysis 
on the memory questions, using Response Mode, Sequence, and Sex as the independent 
variables in the analysis. See Appendix 4h for the A N O V A tables in this analysis. 
Longer Term Items 
Firstly analysis was run on the longer-term items, comparing participants' own 
predicted success rates, their success rates i f distracted, and their perceptions of how many 
trials another person would win. Table 3.4 below shows the output that resulted from this 
analysis. 
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Table 3.4. A N O V A table for the Batterv Item Analvsis fLonger Term Items) in the 
Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 2868.012 216 345.5927 8.29882 .004367 
2 1 391.612 216 345.5927 1.13316 .288290 
3 2 745.893 216 345.5927 2.15830 .118006 
4 1 1203.835 216 345.5927 3.48339 .063343 
5 2 3845.968 432 118.5464 32.44271 .000000 
12 1 8.668 216 345.5927 .02508 .874312 
13 2 1059.387 216 345.5927 3.06542 .048668 
23 2 1607.113 216 345.5927 4.65031 .010536 
14 1 337.568 216 345.5927 .97678 .324101 
24 1 49.612 216 345.5927 .14356 .705142 
34 2 40.401 216 345.5927 .11690 .889726 
15 2 462.038 432 118.5464 3.89752 .021010 
25 2 31.929 432 118.5464' .26934 .764013 
35 4 55.974 432 118.5464 .47217 .756179 
45 2 379.935 432 118.5464 3.20494 .041527 
123 2 192.735 216 345.5927 .55769 .573350 
124 1 15.901 216 345.5927 .04601 .830356 
134 2 1046.551 216 345.5927 3.02828 .050459 
234 2 123.754 216 345.5927 .35809 .699423 
125 2 206.110 432 118.5464 1.73864 .176987 
135 4 116.181 432 118.5464 .98005 .418111 
235 4 99.748 432 118.5464 .84142 .499419 
145 2 99.360 432 118.5464 .83815 .433212 
245 2 101.129 432 118.5464 .85308 .426819 
345 4 94.670 432 118.5464 .79859 .526553 
1234 2 250.343 216 345.5927 .72439 .485795 
1235 4 57.008 432 118.5464 .48089 .749786 
1245 2 370.476 432 118.5464 3.12516 .044925 
1345 4 27.824 432 118.5464 .23471 .918754 
2345 4 41.302 432 118.5464 .34840 .845135 
12345 4 68.137 432 118.5464 .57477 .681082 
A main effect of Type resulted, F(l,216)=8.30, p=0.044. The Next 100 predictions 
were significantly higher after the Turtle computer task (mean 48.19) than they were after 
the coin flipping experiment (mean 44.19). 
A n interaction between Type and Sequence resulted, F(2,216)=3.07, p=0.049. 
Figure 3.11. With the coin trials the standard order effect resulted in that collapsed across 
the three measmes, the Descending sequence resulted in significantly higher responses 
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than the other two sequences. However, this did not result for those experiencing the 
Turtle task. 
Figure 3.11. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Tvpe and Sequence for 
the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
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A n interaction between Response Mode and Sequence also resulted, F(2,216)=4.65; 
p=0.011, as before. 
A significant mam effect of Measure (F(2,432)=32.44, p<0.001) in that, collapsed 
across all other variables, participants thought that they would perform significantly better 
than other people, and than i f they were distracted, means of 49.74, 46.98 and 41.85 
respectively. 
This main effect demonstrates that participants thought that the task required their 
concentration to maintain a higher level of success. The interaction between Type and 
Measure, F(2,432)=3.90, p=0.021, illustrates the fact that the responses to these two 
measures for both task do differ, however, as the plot of their means clearly shows, (Figme 
3.12) they are affected in a very similar way. The most important difference appears to be 
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that the differences between the measures is most marked when having taken part in the 
computerised two Turtle task. Hence although the interaction v/as significant the two tasks 
had similar effects on these particular measmes. 
Figme 3.12. Graph Illustrating the Two wav Interaction between Tvpe and Measure for 
the "Longer Term Items" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
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Additionally, a two way interaction resulted between Sex and Measure, 
F(2,432)=3.20, p=0.042, Figme 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Sex and Measure for the 
"Longer Term Items" Analvsis ni the Combined Analvsis of Experiments I and 4 
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Whereas males thought they would perform similarly to anybody else, females 
thought that somebody else would perform significantly worse than themselves. Both sexes 
thought that i f they were distracted they would perform significantly worse at the task. 
This distraction measme also differentiated between the two sexes in that females 
participants thought that the extent to which being distracted would worsen their 
performance was much greater than for males. 
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Percentage of Trials 
A four-way A N O V A [2(Type) x 2(Response Mode) x 3 (Sequence) x 2(Sex)] was 
conducted on people's estimates of the percentage of trials that they thought they had won. 
This percentage was calculated by dividing the nmnber of trials they thought they had won 
(Question 1) by the number of trials that they thought there had been (Question 2), 
expressed as a percentage. Table 3.5 below shows a summary of the results that were 
obtained. 
Table 3.5. A N O V A table for the Batterv Item Analvsis (Percentage of Trials) in the 
Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
1-TYPE. 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE. 4-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 4132.625 216 201.7259 20.48634 .000010 
2 1 115.870 216 201.7259 .57440 .449344 
3 2 1673.624 216 201.7259 8.29653 .000338 
4 1 .284 216 201.7259 .00141 .970114 
12 1 111.588 216 201.7259 .55316 .457836 
13 2 587.171 216 201.7259 2.91074 .056574 
23 2 407.940 216 201.7259 2.02225 .134856 
14 1 27.234 216 201.7259 .13501 .713656 
24 1 145.980 216 201.7259 .72366 .395889 
34 2 12.050 216 201.7259 .05974 .942029 
123 2 177.454 216 201.7259 .87968 .416398 
124 1 25.190 216 201.7259 .12487 .724155 
134 2 205.198 216 201.7259 1.01721 .363328 
234 2 218.363 216 201.7259 1.08247 .340587 
1234 2 421.761 216 201.7259 2.09076 .126087 
Both a main effect of Type, F(l,216)=20.49, p<0.001, and mam effect of Sequence, 
F(2,216)=8.30, p<0.001 resulted. Participants experiencing the Turtle paradigm thought 
they had a significantly higher percentage of wins (mean 53.78%) than the coin prediction 
participants, (mean of 45.49%). Follow up analysis also revealed that Descending 
176 
sequence participants thought that they had won a significantly higher percentage of trials 
than those in the Ascending sequence, means of 54.07% and 44.93% respectively. 
The interaction between Type and Sequence was of marginal significance, 
F(2,216)=2.91, p=0.057, see Figme 3.14. The Descending sequence responses were 
markedly higher than both the other sequences but only for the manual coin task. 
Figure 3.14. Graph Illustrating the Marginal Two-wav Interaction between Tvpe and 
Sequence for the "Percentage of Trials" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of 
Experiments 1 and 4 
Mean 
Participant 
Estimates 
for tiie 
Percentage 
of Trials they 
thought they 
had won so 
far. 
Coin Turtle 2 
Sequence 
- o - Descending 
- a - Ascending 
-o— Random 
Type 
How Good ? 
Thndly, a fom-way A N O V A [2(Type) x 2(Response Mode) x 3(Sequence) x 
2(Sex)] was conducted on perceptions of How Good participants thought they were was 
then carried out. Table 3.6 below provides a summary of the A N O V A results. 
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Table 3.6. A N O V A table for the Batterv Item Analvsis (How Good ?) in the Combined 
Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE. 4-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 3689.504 216 237.9958 15.50239 .000111 
2 1 165.004 216 237.9958 .69331 .405962 
3 2 68.629 216 237.9958 .28836 .749778 
4 1 1842.604 216 237.9958 7.74217 .005872 
12 1 1.504 216 237.9958 .00632 .936709 
13 2 3013.379 216 237.9958 12.66148 .000006 
23 2 22.804 216 237.9958 .09582 .908668 
14 1 175.104 216 237.9958 .73574 .391978 
24 1 1012.704 216 237.9958 4.25513 .040328 
34 2 545.404 216 237.9958 2.29165 .103552 
123 2 207.554 216 237.9958 .87209 .419543 
124 1 155.204 216 237.9958 .65213 .420241 
134 2 588.654 216 237.9958 2.47338 .086684 
234 2 366.979 216 237.9958 1.54196 .216308 
1234 2 278.229 216 237.9958 1.16905 .312619 
A main effect of Type, F(l,216)=15.50, p<0.001 resulted, as did an effect of Sex, 
F(l,216)=7.74, p=0.006. Turtle race players thought they were significantly worse at the 
paradigm than their counterparts experiencing the coui prediction task, means of 45.91 and 
53.75 respectively. Males thought they were significantly better than females, means of 
52.60 and 47.06 respectively. The fact that Turtle race players thought they were 
significantly worse than the coin prediction participants is in contrast to the previous 
analysis in which it was observed that they thought they had won a significantly higher 
percentage of the trials. 
A significant interaction between Type and Sequence resulted, F(2,216)=4.26, 
p=0.040. This is represented graphically in Figure 3.15. 
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Figure 3.15. Graph Illustrating the Two-wav Interaction between Type and Sequence for 
the "How Good" Analvsis in the Combined Analvsis of Experiments 1 and 4 
Mean 
From the figure it is clear that the biggest difference between the two types of 
presentation occurred for the How Good measure for participants in the Descendmg 
sequence, whereas the participants in the other two sequences reacted similarly to both 
Types. 
The interaction between Response Mode and Sex just reached significance, 
Fl,216)=4.26, p=0.040. However, this interaction was not significant in either of the 
individual analysis of the coin trials or Experiment 1, and so wil l not be reported finther. 
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3.3. General Conclusions and Discussion of the Illusion 
of Control 
There were some differences arising firom the different type of presentation of the 
task. Although the effect sizes were small they are worthy of mention. 
Short term Confidence responses at the end of the task did not differ between the 
two modes of presentation. However, the Next 100 measure was affected by the 
presentation of the task. Participants in the Turtle experiment thought they would win a 
significantly higher number of trials than their counterparts experiencing the coin flipping 
trials. 
Under specific circumstances the order effect was observed with the manual coin 
flipping task. The early wins did uiduce significantly higher longer term estimates of 
success than the other two sequences at the end of the task (but only when the Next 100 
measme had not been eUcited throughout the task). Additionally, the difference between 
the two tasks at the end of the task in the short term Confidence measme was much more 
marked than the difference in the longer term Next 100 estimates. The Next 100 responses 
also tended to be significantly higher for the Turtle task than they were for the coin task. 
With respect to the Battery Items, there were two notable differences. Firstly with 
respect to the Longer Term items although in the same direction, the difference between 
participants own predictions for success over the Next 100, their predicted performance i f 
distracted and their predictions for someone else's performance, was greater for 
participants in the Turtle experiment. The other difference to note was the observation that 
although participants in the Tmtle experiment did not have exaggerated perceptions of 
their previous win history as a fimction of the sequence which they experienced, the effect 
of sequence for those participants in the coin tossing trials approached significance. For 
these participants the early wins lead to participants remembering more wins than both 
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participants in both the other two sequences. However, participants in both types of task 
thought that they would perform significantly worse i f they were distracted, indicating that 
for both presentations, participants thought that concentiation was important for achieving 
wins. 
These differences arising between the two tasks are important in that it appears that 
with the manual coin flipping version of the task, the particular sequences experienced 
could be of importance in terms of participants' fiiture success rate predictions and 
memory of past success. Langer and Roth's (1975) results were therefore replicated to 
some extent. Additionally, the results for the coui flipping trials do provide evidence for 
the predictions made by the Hogarth and Einhom model, in which primacy effects are 
likely when measures are elicited at the end of the sequences only. Furthermore, this 
primacy effect disappears when the measme has been taken throughout the sequence. 
However, this only appUed to the longer term Next 100 measme and not to the short term 
Confidence measme for which there was no effect of primacy at the end of the task. 
These results may therefore provide some evidence for the stiong cogmtive 
hypothesis in terms of differential levels of play, but only for manual type tasks. However, 
it must also be noted that the effect on fiiture success rate predictions only occurred under 
specific circumstances. Additionally, all these effects sizes were small. 
As the three main tasks used a computer based activity, and no real money or risk 
was involved one may argue that the task would not have been exciting and arousing 
enough for participants to continue to play, and for valid comparisons to be made with real 
world gambling tasks. In theory it would have been desirable to obtain a measme of heart 
rate (as a measme of arousal) throughout the smdies reported so far. However, this would 
have lead to further difficulties arismg fiom an attempt to handle too many variables at the 
same tune. Additionally, the methodology utilised for the three Turtle smdies has already 
been reported to have been arousing. 
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The Coventry and Norman (1998) study reported that the task was arousing. Heart 
rate measurements taken throughout the task were all significantly higher than baselines 
taken before the start of the experimental trials. Hence, although no arousal measurements 
were taken throughout the current experiments, the task used has been shown to be 
arousing. The fact that 60 people (half of all participants) continued to play once the 
Experimenter had left the room in Experiment 3, lends support to the notion that the task 
was at least somewhat exciting. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence comes from the 360 
participants across the three Experiments, the vast majority of whom became visibly 
actively involved in the task, often displaying elation when wiiming and frustration when 
losing. 
The other difference in presentation between the two tasks noteworthy of 
discussion is that issue of the instructions that participants received. With the Turtle trials 
participants were asked to try to influence the outcome of each race by using Psychokinesis 
whilst with the coin flipping trials participants were simply instructed to try to predict the 
outcome correctly. It could be argued that this difference in presentation could also offer 
an accoimt of the differences between the results reported above. The argument raised 
earlier (in the discussion of the use of the Psychokinesis cover) that this methodology may 
have induced people to believe that Psychokinetic powers could in fact be utilised and that 
this offered a reason for why people in the Turtle smdies predicted higher rates of fiiture 
success, does not stand up. Looking at the results of the coin tossing trials, where 
participants were not encomaged to influence the outcome, it is clear that people 
experiencing this presentation (that of prediction) were also predicting higher rates of 
success than the objective probability would warrant. A more plausible reason for the 
exaggerated predictions of future success, as this was the case for both types of 
presentation, is the pure experience of the tasks themselves. 
When one considers the third difference in presentation, that of the Turtle Vs Coin 
distinction, another possible reason for the differences arises in relation to the prior beliefs 
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held by participants about the natiure of the two tasks. On the basis of familiarity the two 
tasks differ quite extensively; the flipping coins is much more of an-, everyday occurrence 
than exposure to the concept of Psychokinesis. Although the majority of people had heard 
of Psychokinesis and knew what it was when it had been explained to them, there was 
absolutely no need to present further information about the coin flipping. The prior 
knowledge about the two tasks that people held could potentially partly explain the 
differences observed. People may have believed before any experience of the task that 
they could perhaps have some Psychokinetic ability, or could at least develop it. Likewise, 
participants may have had the firm belief that predicting the outcome of a coin toss would 
become easier once more practice was obtamed. These, and other beliefs about the nature 
of the two tasks, could also have been different in terms of their stability throughout the 
task. Further investigation could make an attempt to assess the nature of people's beliefs 
both before and after experience of the task. However, too much investigation into the 
prior beliefs could confound the effect that the experience of the task has on the individuals 
concemed. Additionally, responses to assessing beliefs after the experience of the task may 
also be confounded due to the experience of the task itself 
Although these differences between the tasks were apparent, they were minor 
differences in relation to the overwhelming sunilarities. This is particularly clear when one 
looks at the results of the analysis of the step by step measures. Here there were no 
differences at all arising between the two types of presentation, suggesting very similar 
findings in respect of recent information being paramount for both types of task. 
The results arising ftom the Extra Loss sequence demonstrated strong support for 
the notion that one can not assiraie that males and females respond to these types of tasks 
in identical ways. This section demonstrated that the two sexes respond differently to a 
series of losses. Whereas males tended on the whole not to be particularly affected by this 
(in terms of the SbS measmes), females' responses throughout the trials dropped 
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significantly. The results to the Battery Items also finther indicated that investigations 
should take accomit and control for sex effects. 
One problem with the Hogarth and Einhom model that is relevant to the current 
work is that it is possible that some people have acmally adopted a step by step process 
when making judgements even when the questions were asked only at the end of the trials. 
The use of the counterbalanced design that was employed here may have increased the 
likelihood of this occurring as participants were always making one or the other 
judgements (the Confidence or the Next 100 measmes) on a step by step basis. 
For the step by step measmes it was clear that people were using a step by step 
process as their responses were highly dependent upon the most recent.outcomes. Hence, 
by the end of the sequences when all participants had won an identical number of trials, 
there was no clear recency (or primacy) effect due to the precise win sequence 
experienced. A n argument could be developed in terms of the above concem with the 
Hogarth and Einhom model. This argument would suggest that the reason for not inducing 
a primacy effect with respect to the End of Sequence measme at the end of the task, could 
be due to the fact that people were affected by having experienced a step by step response 
mode within the same smdy. This argument i f valid, would have to account for the results 
under both presentations of the task, as this would be task independent. Looking at the 
results across the two types of presentation, it becomes clear that this is not a suitable 
explanation for the lack of a primacy effect with the End of Sequence measme for the 
Turtle smdies. This is because when the participants experienced the more physical coin 
tossing trials the primacy effect did occm under specific circumstances. This would 
suggest that although the counterbalancuig could have been a reason for the lack of the 
predicted effects, the most plausible explanations are the ones provided earlier. 
A note regarding the "Continue to Play" measme is that it was only used in 
Experiment 3. In this experiment, participants only won fom out of the 32 trials, and as 
discussed earlier, this low absolute number of wins may not have been enough for the 
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previous v^ i^n order to have the predicted effect. This measure may have highlighted 
differences between the different probabilities of success. It would be of interest to utilise 
this measme in futme smdies involving a similar paradigm across a range of differing 
probabilities of success. This is particularly the case when one considers that for the 
manual presentation (coin flipping) under some circmnstances the order effect appeared, 
hence early wins in a manual task may induce people to play for longer. This would need 
investigation. 
Even though the samphng process and the random allocation of all participants to 
each of the three win sequences would have minimised the possible effects of other 
individual differences playing a role, it would have been desirable to have monitored and 
controlled for them as they could still have played a part. Possible individual differences 
that could have been behind people's responses uiclude their degree of optimism or 
pessimism for example, or indeed the extent to which they are impulsive. 
One general concem regarding the Illusion of Control research and its 
generalisability to all gambling forms, which applies equally to the current work as it does 
to some of the research in the gambling literatme, is that within each of these Experunents 
the probability of success was set and controlled throughout the dmation of the task. Many 
gambling activities are stractured in such a way that there can be within-activity 
probability changes dependent upon the decision of where to place the bet taken by the 
gambler. This point is particularly visible when one considers the game of roulette for 
example. One possible technique for investigating differences between tasks in which the 
probability of success is constant and tasks with within-activity probability changes, would 
be to design and run a series of computer based experiments. Computer versions of 
activities such as roulette could be designed in a similar fashion to the Tmtle tasks, which 
would allow the participant to vary the probability of success on any particular tiial whilst 
still having their wins and their loss positions predetermined by the Experimenter. 
185 
A further point about the probabilities of success related to the tasks used in the 
current work, is that the Experiments only investigated participants' responses to tasks in 
which their win rate matched on to the probability of success. For example, the 
participants in Experiment 1 experienced a task with a 50% chance of success on every 
trial. Overall they also won 50% of the trials. There may be interesting differences to be 
discovered in relation to tasks in which the participants win proportionately more or less 
than the objective probability would warrant. For example, a series of studies could be run 
whereby although the probability of success remains constant throughout the task at 0.5, 
the effects of participants wuming 25% or 75% of the time could be investigated. 
This series of studies has started to bridge the gap between standard Illusion of 
Control studies and real gamblmg, using a paradigm more similar to the real gambling 
task. In doing this, the effects that have been previously observed have not been cleanly 
replicated, although interesting patterns have emerged. The conclusion that one could 
draw here is that the previous tasks have not mimicked the real gambling scenario in an 
appropriate fashion; ignoring what effect wins and losses can have on confidence in local 
outcomes and on longer term estimates of success. This suggests that the Illusion of 
Control is not as applicable to the gambling scenario as was previously thought. 
Gambling tasks, as already argued, can be seen as decision making tasks in which 
both modes of processing (SbS and EoS) are applicable. People have to decide how 
confident they are in their chosen outcome for the next event when both choosing between 
alternatives and placing a bet itself, and take a decision at some point as to when they wil l 
retum to the gambling environment, which is likely to be affected by their longer-term 
esthnates of success. If they believe that they wil l do significantly better than the objective 
probability would warrant on a future trip to the local casino, then subjectively there is no 
reason to delay the event, and delay the receipt of the associated rewards. 
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Although the strong cognitive perspective has received some support in that it is 
clear that recent outcome information is important with respect to participants' confidence 
and longer term estimates (and can therefore offer an account of gambling in general) the 
"strong cognitive hypothesis" has not received the supporting evidence it would need in 
order to explain differential levels of play. The order of events in the task only had a 
significant effect on participants' longer term estimates of success under very specific 
circumstances. The effects on individual confidence and future success rate predictions of 
the particular positions of wins and losses within the sequence did not appear to offer an 
explanation on its own for continued gambling behaviom, evidenced by the lack of a 
consistent stiong sequence effect at the end of the trials. Fmthermore, given the 
oppormtiity to continue the task (Experiment 3) people did not differ in terms of the length 
of continued play as a function of their previous win history on the task. However, there 
was a significant correlation between the confidence at the end of the task and the number 
of tiials that participants played once the Experimenter had left the room. This is 
important in that implies that although previous win sequence has little effect, there is still 
a direct association between confidence and acmal behaviom. This could also benefit fiom 
further investigation. 
In conclusion then, there was evidence in support of the stiong cognitive hypothesis 
in explaining gambling generally, but there was little evidence in support of its ability to 
explain differential levels of play. The following chapters investigate the weak and 
integrative hypotheses outiined inthe intioductory chapter. 
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4. Chapter 4: Erroneous Perceptions, Dissociation, 
the REI and Loss of Control 
4.1. Introduction 
It appears that the early wins and the Illusion of Control perspective cannot explain 
excessive play on their own. The results from the Illusion of Control smdies did not 
support the "strong cognitive hypothesis" in relation to differential levels of play. In this 
chapter the two other hypotheses outlined at the start of the thesis are investigated. These 
are the "weak cognitive hypothesis" and the "integrative hypothesis". 
The "weak cognitive" hypothesis stipulates that there is an individual differences 
element necessary to supplement the "strong cognitive hypothesis". The "integrative 
hypothesis" stipulates that although the decision making process is important, it is only 
important in relation to and interaction with other concepts. This chapter investigates the 
potential role of individual differences in processing styles used in relation to the "weak 
cognitive hypothesis" whilst it also investigates the "integrative hypothesis" in relation to 
the extent to which people become dissociated whilst gambling. 
As we've seen in the previous smdies, people are not objective or realistic in their 
judgements regarding how successful they are likely to be on flimre trials. This lack of 
objectivity demonstrated within the sequential analysis for the previous experunents 
appeared to reflect an apparent lack of knowledge of the independence of outcomes. The 
belief that the subsequent outcomes are related to, and somewhat determined by, previous 
outcomes is erroneous. On the roulette wheel for example, the ball that is spun has no 
memory of where it landed on the trial (or trials) before, and therefore its new restmg 
position is open to the full range of possible numbered slots on every spin. People tend to 
base their beliefs about chance tasks on the law of small numbers, which suggests that a 
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small sample drawn firom the popidation of possible sequences would always be 
representative of the population as a whole. Tossing a com and havmg it land on Heads 
five times in a row, is deemed inappropriately unlikely, even though out of a thousand 
tosses, five Heads in a row is as equally likely to arise as any other sequence. 
The gambling enviromnent and activities offer scope for these kinds of erroneous 
or fallacious beliefs to arise. For example, there are often boards near the roulette tables, 
publicising the most recent outcomes, implying that they can be used to increase one's 
chances of a correct prediction. Alternatively pimters are offered cards and a pen to write 
down the previous outcomes. In terms of probability of success, objectively they serve no 
purpose. 
This chapter investigates the role of erroneous perceptions in gambling per se, and 
the extent of their role in the explanation of persistent gambling. In particular, the 
relationship between the hidividual difference measme of the REI (Epstein 1990) and the 
degree of erroneous perceptions is examined to test the weak cognitive hypothesis. The 
relationship between erroneous perceptions, loss of control and the concept of dissociation 
is the other main focus, as a test of the integrative hypothesis. 
Before outlining how these hypotheses were tested, a review of each of the 
concepts of erroneous perceptions, dissociation and the REI is presented in sequence. 
4.2. Erroneous Perceptions and Gambling 
Erroneous beliefs are beliefs that are false in the sense that they do not respect the 
principles of chance, and they span a range of types of errors. For illustiative purposes 
examples of some of these follow in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Examples of Erroneous Perceptions. 
1. Making cause and effect links 
Ex.: "I am going to double witli a higli card because last time was a low card" 
"Usually, tlie first round is a winning one" 
"I'll bet more because I lost the last three times". 
2. Referring to skills 
Ex:. "I have to get my hand in". 
"I am going to concentrate more, I need to think". 
3. Blaming or congratulating oneself 
Ex.:" I didn't play well this time". 
"I am not proud of myself. 
4. Using mystic or superstitious terms 
Ex.: "Intuition is guiding me". 
"If you think too much, it will ruin your chance of winning". 
"I feel that I'm going to win this tune". 
5. Referring to the concept of luck 
Ex.: "I'm keeping the "2" because it's a number that brings me luck". 
"I'm betting 5 credits because it is my lucky number". 
6. Making predictions 
Ex.: "It's gomg to be a Queen". 
"This time, it will be a straight". 
7. Confirming a hypothesis 
Ex.: "I knew it was going to be a straight, I said so". 
"The guy sitting next to me said that it was due to pay up". 
8. Amazement in front of a result 
Ex.: "How come I didn't win?" 
Evidence for the existence of erroneous beUefs in the gambling setting is 
widespread. A large amount of work has been conducted by Ladoucem and his colleagues 
in Canada, providing evidence for both the existence of erroneous cognitions, and the 
success of cognitive therapies that address those distortions. 
The method typically used for extracting and assessing these erroneous beliefs has 
been a form of protocol analysis, that of the "think aloud" method. This method involves 
instmcting participants to verbalise every thought that passes through their minds whilst 
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playing, without censoring them even i f they initially appear irrelevant. Participants are 
also instructed not to attempt to justify then thoughts and to keep talking as continually as 
possible (Ladoucem, Gaboury, Dumont and Rochette, 1988). Verbalisations are 
subsequently coded as irrational i f their content contains any reference to factors that have 
no objective effect on the outcome, for example, personification of the machine or other 
means of explaining away losses. 
Gabomy and Ladoucem (1989) showed that 70% of gambler's verbalisations were 
erroneous during gambling. This result has been replicated under different conditions: 
frequent or infrequent wins, limited or unlimited stakes, regular or occasional gamblers and 
in a variety of games such as blackjack, video poker, roulette or slot machines (Gaboury, 
Ladouceur, Beauvais, Marchand and Martineau, 1988; Ladoucem and Gaboury, 1988; 
Ladouceur, Sylvain, Duval, Gabomy and Dumont, 1989; Sylvain and Ladouceur, 1992). 
Ladouceur and Dube (1997) investigated the effects of monetary mcentive on the 
cognitive activity of mdividuals and on the bettmg sfrategies that were used whilst playing 
roulette. Their results showed that the percentage of erroneous perceptions clearly 
oumumbered the nmnber of accmate perceptions about the task. Furthermore, it appeared 
that the risk taking behaviour and the percentage of erroneous to non-erroneous 
perceptions were not influenced by monetary incentives. 
Ih another paper by Ladouceur and Dube (1997), the authors got participants to 
recognise and to generate random sequences. Again, whilst doing the task, participants 
verbalised more erroneous than accurate statements. However, in addition to this, the 
authors fiuther analysed the verbaUsations which revealed that the basic cognitive error 
related to the participants' lack of knowledge with respect to the independence of events. 
These results are commonplace; see Ladoucem, Paquet and Dube (1996), Ladoucem, 
Ferland, Boudreault, Morin, Quesnel, Vachon, Giroux and Jacques (1996) and Ladoucem,-
Dube, Giroux, Legendre, and Gaudet (1995) for examples. 
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Although there is good evidence that most gamblers produce erroneous 
verbalisations during gambling, this in itself does not explain loss-.of control. However, 
some evidence for there being a relationship between erroneous perceptions and the loss of 
control comes firom research into the cognitive therapy that has been developed, again 
primarily by Ladouceur in Quebec, Canada. Ladouceur and colleagues have reported 
significant success in reducing the level of gambling by pathological gamblers in their 
treatment centres. The interesting point about the therapy is that the main goal of it was to 
address the erroneous perceptions that appeared to imderlie the clients' gambling 
behaviour. The cognitive therapy targeted the misconception of the notion of the 
randonmess of outcomes in the gambling forms in which they took part. 
Ladouceur et al (1999) report five pathological gamblers at the start of therapy, no 
longer meeting the DSM-IV criteria to be classed as pathological, at the end of the 
treatment. This was maintained at a 6 months follow up, along with a clinically significant 
decrease in the mge to gamble and an increase in then perception of self control. 
Sylvain, Ladoucem and Boisvert (1997) also reported success with a similar focus 
on the cognitive correction of erroneous perceptions. Their success was maintained at both 
the 6 and the 12 month follow ups. Their therapy sessions did however also include 
problem solving and social skills training, alongside relapse prevention techniques, so the 
extent to which the therapy was successfiil due to the correction of fallacious beliefs is 
clouded by the more holistic approach of the therapy. 
Savoie and Ladoucem (1995) demonstrated that providing people with accmate 
information on the negative probability of gains, induced revision of the participants 
beliefs about the task which subsequently lead to them modifying (reducing) their betting 
habits. 
Additionally when Ladouceur and colleagues have utilised other therapy strategies 
which have not mcluded a focus on the cognitive element they have not had success in 
reducmg gambling habits, e.g. Gaboury and Ladoucem (1993). 
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Although these findings do indicate that the focus on the erroneous beliefs within 
the therapy package can reduce the extent of the gamblers gambling behaviom, and 
specifically to below DSMIV criteria, it can not be argued with any great certainty that it 
was the cognitive elements that were responsible for the excessive gambling in the first 
place. However in conjmiction with the above evidence, these therapy results do provide 
some weight to the notion that the cognitive distortions may have some relevance. 
The mere existence of erroneous perceptions does not explain why some people 
continue to gamble and others manage to stop, or continue but at non-problem levels. Any 
significant role of erroneous perceptions on excessive levels of gambling would be 
stiengthened by the existence of a relationship between the level of fallacious beliefs held 
and the fiequency at which the gambler gambles. It would then have to be evaluated 
whether or not the individual is more likely to hold a high level of fallacious beliefs and 
therefore gambles more, or that the gambler develops more fallacious beliefs fiom 
increased exposure to the gambling envnorunent. 
The literature to date on the relationship between fiequency of gambling and the 
level of erroneous perceptions, across a variety of forms, appears at first sight rather 
positive. Many researchers have demonstiated a clear positive correlation between the two, 
e.g. Ladoucem and Walker (1996). However, Coventiy and Norman (1998) suggest that 
the criteria for labelling a verbalisation as erroneous should be made more stiuigent, and as 
wil l be explained there are inherent problems with the "think aloud" method used to access 
these verbalisations. 
Savoie and Ladoucem (1995) reported firstly that all lotto players entertained 
erroneous perceptions, but secondly and more hiterestingly, that regular players were 
found to hold an elevated degree of fallacious beUefs as compared to casual players. 
Griffiths (1994) observed 60 participants in a British amusement arcade and recorded their 
verbalisations. Regular gamblers produced a significantly greater number of irrational 
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beliefs than low frequency gamblers. Coulombe, Ladouceur, Deshamais, and Jobin (1992) 
found sunilar results ui that they observed that on average their 12 regular video poker 
players expressed more erroneous perceptions than their 12 occasional players. In addition 
these authors reported significant correlations between the number of erroneous 
perceptions (verbaUsations) and arousal as measured by heart rates, reporting that the more 
excited the gambler was measmed to be, the greater the number of erroneous verbalisations 
were expressed. However, there are three pertinent problems associated with this smdy 
which apply to the methodologies used generally. Firstly, as discussed in the intioductory 
chapter, there are problems associated with heart rate and its measurement of arousal. 
Secondly, as discussed shortly, the categorisation of whether or not a verbalisation is 
erroneous has arguably been misguided. When the necessary adjustments to the 
methodology have been made, this relationship does not appear (e.g. Coventiy and 
Norman 1998) Thirdly, the think aloud method itself has been criticised due to its ad-hoc 
rationalisation natme (Nisbet and Wilson, 1977). This form of protocol analysis is only 
reliable when the verbaUsations occm during the task. As Coventry and Norman (1998) 
argue, most of the verbalisations that are categorised, as irrational in gambling are produced 
after decisions are made and the outcomes are known. In addition, it is likely that regular 
players require less mental resomces to play the games involved and so have more 
resomces available to allocate to talking during the task. In contiast, lower fiequency 
players, by definition, may have less experience with the tasks and tiierefore have less 
mental resomces available to "think aloud". This being the case, it is likely that regular 
players provide a higher number of erroneous verbalisations, simply due to the fact that 
they could be talking more. What is of more interest therefore would be the percentage of 
erroneous to non-erroneous beliefs and descriptions verbalised by participants during play. 
Investigating this, Coventry and Norman (1998) found no differences between the 
levels of irrational verbaUsations produced by high and low fiequency gamblers, defined as 
such by whether or not they chased their losses. The categorisation metiiod used for 
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defining whether a verbalisation was irrational or not was also much more stringent than 
that used by Griffiths (1994) and by Ladouceur and his colleagues. These authors argued 
that a verbalisation such as "this machine does not like me" is not an irrational statement 
about the task, or which reflects the participants' belief about the nature of the task. They 
argued that this kind of verbalisation is much the same as when a teimis player for example 
blames his or her racket following a bad shot. Very rarely do the tennis players acmally 
believe that their teimis racket was the reason for the bad shot, but rather their expression is 
mstead an attempt to apportion blame away from themselves in a convenient way at the 
time. This the authors argue is what the gambler who personifies the machine for example 
is doing, and this would have been previously termed as irrational. The more appropriate 
categorisation strategy, adopted by Coventry and Norman (1998) was to define any 
verbalisation as irrational i f it demonstrated a lack of understanding of probability theory, 
such as "I have not won for a while, so I must be about to win". With this more appropriate 
categorisation strategy, high and low frequency players were not differentiated by the 
percentage of their verbalisations which were erroneous. 
This method of protocol analysis is therefore not devoid of problems. The criticism 
of the hemistic and biases approach of attempting to match a particular behaviour to a 
particular hemistic can also be made with respect to the verbalisation assessment method. 
In a sense, gamblers may just be trying to explain away the result of their behaviom on a 
post-hoc basis, rather than expressing an acmal belief about the task. Hence although the 
verbalisations may themselves be erroneous, they may not map directly on to the acmal 
beliefs about tiie task, and are therefore less likely to map directiy on to behaviom 
expressed within the task. 
Due to the criticisms of the method of measming the erroneous perceptions, and to 
the fact that they do not differentiate between high and low frequency players, the present 
smdy aims to ask direct questions as to uidividuals' beliefs about the task. This method is 
not subject to the problems outlined above and addresses the acmal beliefs held, rather than 
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getting people to verbalise what comes to mind during a gambling episode. Wagenaar 
(1988) made use of this methodology and observed that the habimal gamblers in his 
sample maintained a high degree of erroneous perceptions, specifically about the game of 
Blackjack. 
In relation to the erroneous perception perspective as measured by verbaUsations, 
caution should therefore be applied i f they are to be smdied on their own when explaining 
continued play. If the levels of erroneous perceptions held do not differ between people 
who gamble regularly and those who do not, how may they play a role in gambling? It may 
be that the level of fallacious beliefs held has a relationship with other individual 
differences or concepts. Two plausible concepts include the processing form utUised (e.g. 
rational or experiential, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier, 1996) and what has been 
defined as Dissociation. 
4.3. Rational Vs. Experiential Processing 
Viewing gambling as a decision making activity involving the accumulation of 
information throughout the experience of the activity at hand, Epstein (1990) and his co­
authors' work on processing styles could be of particular relevance to the cmrent work. 
One of the research areas within this field is the relationship between rational vs. 
experiential thinking and susceptibility to biases in reasoning and decision making 
(Handley et al 2000). These two types of processing have clear and obvious links to the 
two notions of rationality (Evans, 1993, 1996) discussed in Chapter 1, and the view that 
gambling is dominated by implicit processes (Coventry, in press). The experiential process 
has clear links in this perspective with Rationalityi where people act in a way to realise the 
achievement of their goals, where their goals may lie in maximising their involvement in 
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the activity. The use of the rational process would signal Rationality2 whereby people 
reason in a way which conforms to an appropriate normative system such as formal logic. 
According to the cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST, Epstein 1990), people 
use both a rational and an experiential processing system when uitegrating information. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) would have labelled these two systems as heuristic versus 
analytic, and would have argued that these systems operate independently of each other. 
CEST theory however argues that these two systems interact with> each other and that 
behaviom wil l be determined jointly by the two systems, (Handley et al, 2000). The 
proponents of this theory developed the Rational-Experiential Inventory that measmes, 
with fom sub-scales, the extent to which individuals rely on and enjoy using the two modes 
of processing. "According to CEST, the rational system operates primarily at the 
conscious level and is intentional, analytic, primarily verbal, and relatively affect free. The 
experiential system is assumed to be automatic, preconscious, holistic, associationistic, 
primarily non-verbal and intimately associated with affect." (Epstein et al, 1996, p.391). 
Hence it is clear that these dimensions bear some relation to the concepts of rationalityi 
and rationality2, and that the experiential system may map onto implicit processing. The 
REI measmes both people's engagement and their ability in the use of both of the modes of 
processing. A brief presentation of the four scales that make up the REI follows to make 
the potential relevance of the inventory clearer. 
Rational Ability (RA) refers to confidence in one's ability to think logically and 
analytically; for example, "/ have no problem in thinking things through carefully". 
Rational Engagement (RE) refers to reliance on and enjoyment of thinking in an analytical 
and logical maimer; for example, "I enjoy thinking in abstract terms". Experiential Ability 
(EA) refers to confidence in one's inmitive impressions and feelings; for example, "When it 
comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings." Experiential Engagement 
(EE) refers to reliance on and enjoyment of feelings and inmitions in making decisions; for 
example, "Hike to rely on my intuitive impressions." 
197 

Pacini and Epstein (1999) carried out two studies with this 40-item shortened 
version of the original REI. In the fnst study they tested the vaUdity of the new REI whilst 
in the second study they examined behavioural compromises between rational and 
experiential processing in the Ratio-Bias paradigm as a fimction of individual differences 
in thinking style using the REL The total score reliabilities for each of the scales was 
substantial; for the Rationality scale a=0.90 and for the Experientiality scale a=0.87 (the 
latter being more reliable than in the original scale). The correlation between these two 
scales was insignificant (r= -0:04) supporting the assumption of the existence of two 
independent information processing modes. Factor analysis was also used to confirm the 
distribution of the items in two independent main scales. The first factor accounted for 
19.4% of the variance which contained all of the rationality items, whilst the second factor 
accounted for 14.6%, which contained all of the experientiality items. The REI scales and 
subscales also showed discriminant vaUdity as indicated by the different relations with a 
variety of personality variables that were measured. In their second study they observed 
that when optimality is at issue (when the probability between the two trays of white and 
reds jelly beans differed between the two trays presented in the Ratio-Bias paradigm) 
participants' responses to an increase ui incentive (from $0.10 to $2 for a win) depended 
on individual differences in both rational and experiential thinking styles. They concluded 
that the rationality of the individual (as measured by the rationality scale) was the 
determining factor in the degree to which participants responded in a non-optimal fashion. 
In addition to these studies demonstrating reliability and validity of the REI, behavioural 
effects of the individual's score on the REI scale and subscales were also observed. See 
Handley et al (2000) for an in-depth analysis of the REI subscales and successfiil 
validation on use with a U K subject population. 
As was seen in Chapter 2, the Illusion of Control did not appear as robust as was 
previously beUeved, only occurring under specific circumstances. One possibility is that 
the way people process the information they are presented with affects their beliefs about 
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the gambHng forms, and this in tum may affect the way and the frequency at which tiiey 
take part in these activities. Hence the processing style used could partly determine 
gambling behaviom. 
With this in mind, one needs to investigate whether people who prefer certain 
processing styles in preference to others are more prone to take part in gambling and risk 
taking activities. For instance, is it the case that people who feel confident in their ability 
to think logically and analytically (scoring high on the RA) , and express an enjoyment in 
performing tasks where logic and analytical skills play a part (high on RE), are less likely 
to gamble? With gambling tasks there are very few opportunities indeed for the need for a 
logical process when makmg decisions about the possible outcomes, as no matter how 
good the individual is, their ability in logic will have nothing to bear on whether they are 
successfiil or not at arriving at the "correct" response. The logical and analytical skills 
would only come in to play and be of use, ironically, at the consideration of a gambling 
episode stage, when they may prevent the individual firom entering into such chance 
determined tasks, i f monetary gain is the main motivation. 
Conversely, someone who scores highly on the E E scale, could be expected to be 
more likely to enjoy tasks such as those determined by chance; those tasks when any 
concrete information about past events is irrelevant for prediction, where they enjoy 
relying on and testing hunches they have built based on past experience. 
In the following smdy therefore, the REI was administered alongside the rest of the 
questiormaire, to investigate participants' responses to each of the fom sub-scales and how 
they related to their gambling behaviom, and their beliefs about the gambHng they partake 
in. 
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4.4. Dissociation and Gambling 
The integrative model of gambling to be pursued assumes that cognitive variables 
on their own cannot explain why some people are able to control their gambling behaviour 
whilst others continue to gamble to excessive and uhdeshable levels. One plausible 
construct which may be worthy of investigation is that of dissociation. Although there has 
yet be to demonstrated any clear link between fallacious beliefs, loss of control and the 
concept of dissociation, there is a clear rationale as to why such a link should be 
investigated. 
Casinos and other gambling environments design their establishments in such a 
way as to manipulate people's beliefs about the likelihood of success and the regularity of 
wins so that players spend more time at the machines. Research into the 'near miss' has 
shown how near-wins can encourage continued play, and they can encourage fallacious 
beUefs, (e.g. Griffiths 1991). In addition to the layout of the estabUshment, operators have 
become increasingly keen on developing a more 'complete experience', encouraging the 
development of other forms of entertaimnent. A l l these act to place the gambler in an all-
together different (and pleasant) environment, as soon as- the gambler enters the 
establishment. This change in enviromnent may in itself explain part of the reason for 
entering the gambling instimtion, in addition to the motivation to win money. 
Griffiths (1995) attempted to identify which mood states were critical to gambling. 
His results indicated that high frequency fruit machine gamblers experienced more 
depressive moods before playing than low frequency players, and that the high frequency 
players experienced significantly more excitement during gambling than the low frequency 
comparison group. Griffiths also reported (1993) from a postal survey that during play, 
participants experienced increased excitement and a reduction in their depressive moods. 
These participants also reported escapism as their core motivation for gambling. Although 
these papers shed some plausible tight on the issue of mood state and gambUng (and 
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therefore escapism), camion must be taken when generalising firom these results. Both of 
these smdies uivolved self-report measmes in the form of responses to questioimaires, thus 
the methodology is open to criticism with this kind of material. It is very likely that the 
gamblers involved in the smdies responded to the items in such a way as to rationaUse and 
justify their behaviom, hence the likelihood that they report better moods whilst (and firom) 
gambling is increased. 
Dickerson, Cmmingham, England, and Hinchy (1991) reported that for high 
frequency gamblers their prior mood significantly accounted for their persistence while 
losing and for their cognitions regarding the wins that they had received. These offer 
support both to the notion that mood states may well be important and to the notion that the 
gambling enviromnent can alter mood and dissociate the gambler fiom their prior 
enviromnent. Dickerson et al also suggested that there might be a positive link between 
mood state and the level of erroneous perceptions held by the gamblers. 
Dissociation has been documented across a range of phenomena such as alcohol 
use and binge eating, (Baumeister, 1991) but has only received minimal empirical attention 
within gambling settings. Dissociative states involve both an attentional and an emotional 
component where people in such states exhibit a narrowing of attention with a particular 
focus on the immediate experience at hand, and a related positive mood state which allows 
them to block out other life events of an unpleasant nature. Although the term dissociation 
is often related to a specific class of psychiatiic disorders, dissociative experiences of a 
non-pathological natme are common in the general population as well, possibly up to 90% 
of the population; Kihlstiom, GHsky and Anguilo (1994), Putman et al (1996). 
Dissociation is a complex psychophysiological process that produces alterations in 
sense of self, accessibility of memory and knowledge and integration of behaviour 
(Putman 1991b), and refers to an alteration of consciousness that affects attention, memory 
and identity, (Kihlstiom, Glisky and Anguilo, 1994). The DSM-III-R (1987) also classified 
dissociation as such. The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES, Bernstein and Putman 
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1986) is a self-report measure of the frequency of dissociative experiences. It was 
conceptualised as a trait measure (as opposed to a state measme) and it enquires about the 
frequency of dissociative experiences in the daily lives of those who complete the measme. 
Kuley and Jacobs (1988) investigated the relationship between dissociative 
experiences and sensation seeking among social and problem gamblers. Their problem 
gambling group (high frequency gamblers) reported a significantly greater nmnber of 
dissociative experiences than those in the social gambler group (low frequency gamblers). 
The frequency at which someone decides to gamble may lie i n their need for escape 
from everyday thinking or living, therefore one needs to investigate the level of 
dissociation experienced as a fimction of frequency of play. One motivation reported for 
gambling has been, as discussed (in Chapter 1), as a form of escape from every day 
problems. The D S M criteria for pathological gambling includes this item as a recognised 
"symptom". Do people who gamble more frequently than others experience a greater level 
of dissociation? If this is the case, it could suggest that as one gambles more and more, 
one needs to gamble progressively more to experience the same degree of dissociation. 
This habimation type explanation could explain why some people gamble excessively and 
beyond then resomces, as the ability to escape becomes less and less obtainable without 
increasing the frequency and perhaps variability of play. 
Hence loss of contiol, fallacious beliefs (erroneous perceptions) and dissociation 
may all be related to each other and to one's frequency of play. This relationship has yet to 
be investigated and two studies were conducted and are reported below. Smdy 1 was 
conducted using an undergraduate psychology population in order to investigate the 
existence of the relationships discussed above. The observed relationships were then 
followed up vwth a larger general population sample in Smdy 2. 
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4.5. Study 1 
4.5.1. Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Psychology Undergraduate pool at the 
University of Plymouth. In all, 98 (80 women and 18 men) Participants took part for credit 
towards their degree scheme. 
Materials 
Participants were to respond to both a gambling activities questionnaire and to the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (ElEI), (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). The 40 item version of 
the REI was used to determine information processing styles used. This shorter version is 
made up of fom subscales with 10 items on each; Rational Ability (RA), Rational 
Engagement (RE), Experiential Ability (EA), and Experiential Engagement (EE). 
Participants were to respond to each item on the 5-point scale by circling one response 
ranging from 'definitely not tme of rnyself to 'definitely trae of myself. See the Appendix 
5 a to view the 40 item version. 
The gambling activities questionnane consisted of 33 items, and included items 
extracted fiom, the D S M I I - R criteria for Pathological Gambling (1980), and the Gambling 
Attimdes and Beliefs Survey (Breen and Zuckerman, 1999). Table 4.2 displays these items. 
In addition to these items, there were also a number of questions regarding gamblmg 
fiequency, time and amoimt spent, and gambling forms participated in. The fiill 
questionnaire can be seen in Appendix 5b. 
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Table 4.2. Questionnaire Items for Loss of Control. Dissociation and Fallacious Beliefs 
Loss of Control Items 
8. Do you see your gambling activities as ever having lead to a problem? 
9. Have you sought or thought of seeking help for your gambling behaviour? 
10. Was there any time when the amount you were gambling made you nervous? 
11. After wmnmg, do you feel you ought to gamble more to increase your winnings? 
12. Do you gamble until all your spare cash has gone? 
13. After losing, do you spend more money to try to make up for your losses? 
14. Do you ever get into debt as a result of your gambling? 
15. Have you borrowed money to gamble or pay gambling debts? 
16. Do you find you gamble for longer than you intended? 
17. Do you need to gamble with more and more money to achieve the desired excitement? 
18. Do you ever have unsuccessfiil attempts to control, cut back, or stop gambling? . 
19. When you gamble, do you go back another day to win back the money you lost? 
20. Do you ever gamble more money than you intended to? 
21. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or about what happens when you gamble? 
22. Have you hidden betting slips, lottery tickets, gambluig money, or other signs of gambling form 
your spouse, children, or other important people in you life? 
Dissociation Items 
23. Gambling makes me feel really alive. 
24. Sometimes I forget about the time when I am gamblmg. 
25. If I were feeling down, gambling would probably pick me up. 
26.1 like gamblmg because it helps me to forget my everyday problems. 
Fallacious Beliefs Items 
27. If I have not won any bets for a while, I am probably due for a big win. 
28.1 know when I'm on a streak. 
29. It is important to feel confident when I'm gambling. 
30. No matter what the game is, there are betting strategies that can help you to wm. 
31.1 have carried a lucky charm when I gambled. 
32.1 must be familiar with a gambling game if I am going to win. 
33. To be successfiil at gambling, I must be able to identify streaks. 
Procedure 
Participants signed up for a time slot of their choice. They then turned up for the 
session held within the Psychology Department, resulting in groups of between 4 and 20 
participants filling in the questionnaire. 
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4.5.2. Results and Discussion for Study 1 
Although 98 participants took part, 12 participants failed to fill in the questionnaire 
completely or correctly. Hence for the analysis, data fiom the 86 remaining participants 
were analysed. Before an analysis of the main variables is presented, some descriptive 
statistics are presented regarding the participants' gambling activities. This results section 
is stractured such that following these descriptive statistics, the relationship between the 
REI sub-scales and the other variables is then presented, followed by an analysis of the 
inter-correlations between the other variables. 
The nature of gambling on lotteries (such as the U K National Lottery) is different 
from most other forms of gambling, having a number of highly distinctive featmes 
(Fitzgerald, 1997; Wagenaar, 1988). Firstly, they are relatively cheap to play; in the U K a 
single game costs just £1.00. Secondly, they offer enormous jackpot prizes; the typical 
Saturday draw on the U K lottery is around £8-£10 miUion, although these can be much 
higher i f nobody wins a particular week and the prize fimd is rolled over to the following 
week's draw. Thirdly, they offer a very low probability of wirming this jackpot; again to 
take the U K lottery as an example, the odds of winning the jackpot are a little under 14 
million to 1. However, smaller prizes with higher odds are available for matching some of 
the six nmnbers. Fourth, lotteries are relatively infrequent, in the U K there are only two 
draws per week, and hence the associated availability of this form of gambling is restricted. 
A fifth distinctive characteristic is that the outcome information is not inunediate. The 
least amount of time possible between the choosing of the numbers to the acmal draw is 30 
minutes, as no new lottery tickets are sold in the last 30 minutes before the draw takes 
place. The maximum time on the other hand between choosing your numbers and finding 
out whether they have been drawn is four weeks (selecting yom numbers and choosing to 
keep these for four weeks). Furthermore, lotteries are sometimes perceived either as not 
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true gambling forms, or alternatively as socially acceptable forms of gambling (Hill and 
Williamson, 1998). 
Due to the nature of gambling on the National Lottery being distinctively different 
from other forms available, the participants who reported taking part only in the National 
Lottery (taking part in no other form of gambling) were separated out from the analysis, 
and a separate (but identical) analysis was conducted. Hence within each of the analysis 
sections which follow, the analysis is presented for National Lottery Only players, and then 
separately for people who gamble on other forms as well (in addition to, or instead of, the 
National Lottery). 
4.5.2.1. Breakdown of Frequency and Forms Participated In 
Table 4.3 shows the frequency of gamblmg forms taken part in by the sample. 
Although every form listed in the available options on the questioimahe had people 
responding to them, the vast majority of people reported taking part m the National Lottery 
(86%). 31 participants reported playing on both the National Lottery and Scratch Cards 
(11 participants reported playing only on the National Lottery), leaving 51 participants 
involving themselves in other forms as well. In all, over three quarters gambled on the 
National Lottery, whilst 46.5% of them gambled on Scratch Cards and 40.7% on Gaming 
Machines. 
The vast majority of people reported playing only up to and including three forms, 
with an approximately equal spread across the frequency of participants playing one, two 
or three games. These figures can be seen in Table 4.4, which also displays the fiequency 
at which the National Lottery or Scratch cards appeared in relation to the number of forms 
played in. 
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Table 4.3. Number and Percentage of Participants reporting playing on the various forms, 
N-86 
Form Number Percentage 
Horse Racing (Off Course) 9 10.5 
National Lottery 74 86.0 
Bingo 12 14.0 
Horse/Dog Racing (On Course) 19 22.1 
Scratch Cards 40 46.5 
Pools 2 2.3 
Gaming Machines 35 40.7 
Casinos 7 8.2 
Sports Betting 11 12.8 
Other 3 3.5 
Table 4.4. Study 1. Frequency of Number of Forms taken part in, and the degree of 
National Lottery and Scratch Card players. 
No. of People playing National Ciraiulative 
Number of Forms Frequency Lottery and Scratch Cards Frequency 
1 24(27.9%) 18(75%) 18(23.4%) 
2 25(29.1%) 22(88%) 40(51.9%) 
3 23(26.7%) 23 (100%) 63(81.8%) 
4 6(7.0%) 6(100%) 69(89.6%) 
5 4(4.7%) 4(100%) 73 (94.8%) 
6 3(3.5%) 3(100%) 76(98.7%) 
7 1(1.2%) 1(100%) 77(100%) 
Missing Data 12 ^ -
Table 4.5 provides information as to the frequency of the participants' gambling' 
behaviour, their typical length of gambling episode, and their typical expenditure at a 
session. 
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Table 4.5. Frequency Statistics for Frequencv. Length and Expenditure 
Frequency 
Frequency of Gamblmg Episodes 
Less often than once every six months 4 
Less than once a month, but more than once every six months 5 
Less than once a week, but more than once a month 18 
Less than every day, but more than once a week 31 
Every day 28 
Length of Gambling Episode 
No Response 12 
0- 10 mins 69 
l l-30mins 9 
30-60 mins 3 
1- 2 hours 3 
more than 2 hours 2 
Expenditure per Session 
No Response 12 
£l-£5 72 
£6-£10 8 
£11-£25 1 
£26-£50 0 
£51-£100 0 
over£100 0 
4.5.2.2. Erroneous Perceptions, Dissociation and Loss of Control Scores 
A score for each participant for Loss of Control items was achieved by sununing 
the niunber of items within that category that had been responded to with a 'Yes' response. 
The Dissociation and Fallacious Beliefs categories were responded to on a four point 
Likert type scale from Strongly Disagree (score of 1) to Strongly Agree (score of 4), and 
were each summed within each category. Hence the- higher the total, the more fallacies 
held, or the greater the dissociation experienced. 
Table 4.6 below shows a breakdown of the loss of control, dissociation and 
fallacious beliefs held by participants reporting taking part in the various gambling forms. 
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Table 4.6. Breakdown of Loss of Control. Dissociation and Fallacious Beliefs by 
participants' Main Form of Gambling 
Loss of Erroneous 
Control Dissociation Behefs N 
Horse Racing (Off Course) 1.0 6.0 7.0 1 
National Lottery 0.7 6.4 12.3 34 
Bingo 0.0 6.0 8.0 1 
Horse/Dog Racing (On Course) 0.5 6.8 13.2 6 
Scratch Cards 1.6 5.9 12.0 7 
Gaming Machines 3.5 7.3 14.3 12 
Casinos 1.0 5.0 15.0 1 
Sports Betting 4.0 12.0 16.0 1 
Although for this population there were no particular forms of gambling that were 
associated with a very high loss of control, the highest loss of control experienced 
appeared to be with gaming and jfruit machines (mean of 3.5), and on sports betting (mean 
of 4.0). The level of dissociation reported by participants did not particularly distmguish 
between the gambling forms, neither were there any great differences between the levels of 
erroneous perceptions held. However it must be noted that the number of participants 
taking part in the above forms (as their main form) varies across forms drastically in this 
current sample. 
4.5.2.3. National Lottery Only Players 
This section is split up into two parts. Firstly the analysis on the REI sub-scales in 
relation to the other measured variables is presented. This is followed by an analysis of the 
inter-correlations between the other variables. For this group the number of participants 
was very low (N=l 1), so the reliability of the results for this group could be questioned. 
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The relationship between the REI sub-scales and the other variables (National 
Lottery Only players) 
A score was obtained for each of the four sub-scales within the REI by sununmg 
the scores for the 10 items within each sub-scale. For each sub-scale a Likert type response 
scale was presented, whereby participants could respond by circling one of five options. 
These ranged fiom Definitely False (given a score of 1) to Definitely True (given a score 
of 5) with Undecided or Equally True and False acting as the centie point (given a score of 
3). 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlation coefficients were calculated to investigate the 
relationship between the scores on the fom sub-scales on the REI, and the following 
variables: Number of Forms (NoF), Frequency over the last 12 months, Typical Length of 
gambling episode (Length), Typical amount spent per episode (Amoimt), Loss of Contiol 
(LoC), Dissociation, and the Extent of Fallacious beliefs held (Fallacies). The alpha level 
of significance was set at p<0.05. None of the REI dimensions correlated significantly with 
any of the gambling activity questions. See Table 4.7 for the correlation matiix. 
The Inter-correlations between the other variables measured. (National Lottery 
Only players) 
For this population, N = l l , the Length of the typical gambling episode correlated 
significantly with Loss of Contiol, (r=0.99) as did typical Amount spent, (r=0.99). See 
Table 4.7 for the correlation matiix. Length and Amount correlated perfectly, r=1.00. 
Loss of Contiol correlated with Fallacies (r=0.64) but did not correlate significantly with 
Dissociation. Dissociation and Fallacies did not correlate either for this 
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Table 4.7. Correlation Matrix for Student Sample. National Lottery Only Players: (* = p<.05, ** = p<.01). 
Frequency Length Amount 
No. of 
Forms 
Loss of 
Control Dissociation Fallacies RA RE EA EE R 
No. of Forms 
Frequency 
Length 
Amount 
Loss of Control 
Dissociation 
Fallacies 
RA 
RE 
EA 
EE 
R 
E 
1.00 
1.00 .04 
1.00 
.04 
1.00 
1.00 
.19 
99** 
.99** 
1.00 
.13 
.26 
.26 
.24 
1.00 
-.14 -.02 -.02 .31 .02 -.03 .14 
.58 -.03 .43 -.07 -.32 .29* -.24 
.58 -.03 .43 -.07 -.32 .29 -.24 
.64* -.20 .51 -.16 -.44 .21 -.38 
.53 .00 -.28 .13 .06 -.19 .10 
1.00 -.39 .04 -.42 -.17 -.24 -.30 
1.00 .10 .42 .13 .70** .28 
1.00 .38 .16 .78** .28 
1.00 .56* .53* .84** 
1.00 .19 .92** 
1.00 .38 
1.00 
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group. Again however, the numbers in this group were indeed very low, and the results 
should be interpreted with caution. 
4.5.2.4. Players of all types of Gambling (Excluding National Lottery Only 
Players) 
The relationship between the REI sub-scales and the other variables (Gamblers on 
All Forms) 
For this group, N=68. Rational Engagement (RE) correlated negatively with the 
Number of Forms (r=-0.28) but positively with Length (r=0.27). See Table 4.8 for the 
correlation matrix. This suggests that, in line with expectations, that the more one enjoys 
taking part in analytical type tasks the lower the number of forms that they take part in. 
However, the positive correlation with Length indicates that for this sample, the more one 
enjoys such tasks, the longer one stays involved with the current task. This is contrary to 
both expectation and to the negative correlation reported above with the number of forms. 
The Inter-correlations between the other variables measured (Gamblers on All 
Forms) 
For this group, N=68, Dissociation correlated significantly with Loss of Control 
(r=0.35) and Fallacies (r=0.65). See Table 4.8 for the correlation matrix. Loss of Control 
did correlate in the expected direction (r=0.24) although not significantly, with Fallacies. 
Amount spent on a typical episode correlated significantly with typical Length of the 
episode, (r==0.51). 
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Table 4.8. Correlation Matrix for Student Sample. A l l Forms: (* = p<.05, ** = p<.01). 
No. of 
Forms Frequency Length Amount 
Loss of 
Control Dissociation Fallacies RA RE EA EE R E 
No. of Forms LOO .13 -.04 .20 .16 -.14 .07 .00 -.28* .15 .16 -.19 .16 
Frequency 1.00 -.18 -.05 .06 .00 -.12 .03 -.23 .08 .12 -.13 .10 
Length 1.00 .51** -.09 .08 .14 .07 .27* -.03 -.06 .22 -.05 
Amount 1.00 -.03 -.13 • -.05 -.08 .20 .01 .02 .08 .01 
Loss of Control 1.00 .35** .24 -.05 -.16 .12 -.02 -.13 .05 
Dissociation 1.00 .65** -.04 -.14 .00 .07 -.12 .04 
Fallacies 1.00 .15 -.08 -.06 -.18 .03 -.13 
RA 1.00 .37** -.15 -.22 .80** -.19 
RE 1.00 .03 -.03 .86** -.00 
EA 1.00 .78** -.07 .94** 
EE 1.00 -.14 .95** 
R 1.00 -.11 
E 1.00 
4.5.3. Discussion 
For these groups, some relationship seemed to appear between the level of 
fallacious beliefs, the loss of control and the extent of the dissociation experience. The 
participant nmnbers for the National Lottery Only players were small, thereby reducing the 
potential validity of the results. However, looking at the participants who took part in 
other forms, the level of dissociation experienced correlated with both loss of control and 
fallacies in the expected direction. The higher the degree of fallacious beliefs held, the 
greater the dissociation experience, and the greater the loss of control reported. However, 
the loss of control did not correlate independently with the erroneous perceptions variable 
for this group. Although it was not significant, this relationship was in the same direction 
(the greater the number of fallacies that one holds, the greater the loss of control 
experienced) as the significant relationship for the National Lottery Only players. 
As one would expect, for both groups the amount spent on a typical gambling 
episode correlated positively with the length of that gambUng episode, supporting the 
notion that accessibility to a gamble can itself encourage the amount of gambling. 
These results however are correlational and as such do not provide evidence of 
causal links between variables. A discussion of the potential models to be considered to 
account for these Unks will be postponed until towards the end of this chapter. 
The only sign firom the current data that the REI scale may be of relevance to 
gambling was the negative correlation between Rational Engagement and the Number of 
Forms for those participants who reported playing more than just the National Lottery. 
This result indicates that the more one enjoys taking part in activities which involve some 
form of rational decision making, the less the number of forms that one involves 
themselves in, or indeed the less likely they are to take part in gambling activities. What 
was contiary to this was the observation that Rational Engagement also correlated, and 
positively, with the typical Length of the gambling episode. This suggests that the more 
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one enjoys rational decision making tasks, the longer one plays them when they occur. 
This positive correlation would not have been expected. 
There are several relationships that would have been expected to reach significance 
which did not. For instance, one would have also expected both the Rational sub-scales 
(Rational Ability and Rational Engagement) to correlate negatively with Frequency, 
Length, and Amoimt. One would also have expected the two Experiential sub-scales to 
correlate in the opposite direction with the same variables. None of these variables 
correlated with either of the two Experiential sub-scales. 
The National Lottery Only players all spent between £1 and £5 per episode, and all 
reported their typical episode lasting between 0 and 10 minutes. Both these categories 
scored a value of 1 when coding the responses which explains the perfect correlation 
between Amount spent and Length observed vdth the National Lottery Only players. For 
participants who gambled on a variety of forms, the Amount spent on a typical gambling 
episode correlated with the Length of time that the participant reports bemg involved with 
the task on that occasion; the longer you are involved, the more money is spent, as would 
be expected. 
Loss of Control correlated significantly with both Amount spent on a typical 
episode and Length of episode, but only with respect to National Lottery Only players. 
This relationship would also have been expected for people who play a variety of forms. 
In sununary, this study shed some light on the possible relationships between a 
range of variables, particularly with respect to the level of Dissociation, the extent of the 
fallacious beliefs held, and the Loss of Control experienced. The results do not however 
offer support for the notion that the ways in which people enjoy and perceive their ability 
to use an Experiential (heuristic) or Rational (analytic) mode of processing (as measured 
by the REI), bear any relevance to the participation in gambling activities. One reason for 
the lack of relationships found may have been due to sampling. 
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The majority of the smdent sample were low firequency players. Investigating these 
relationships between variables may be more firuit&l with a sample drawn firom the general 
population with an increased munber of higher fiequency gamblers. 
The follovraig smdy was therefore run with a general population sample to fiurther 
investigate the relationships between the variables considered in Smdy 1 and at the same 
time to estabHsh whether the findings fiom the smdent population are generahsable. 
4.6. Study 2 
4.6.1. Method 
Participants 
Names and addresses of 556 adults were drawn randomly firom the Electoral 
Register for the Plymouth area. The resultmg sample consisted of those who retumed the 
completed questionnahe in the stamped addressed envelope, which was provided to 
encomage retum. The 27% return rate consisted of 148 Participants, (65 women, 69 men 
and 14 who did not indicate their gender). 
Materials 
Identical materials were used to those used in Smdy 1. 
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Procedure 
The questionnaire (including both the REI and the gambling sections, as in Study 1) 
was sent out to prospective participants with a covering letter explaining that the study was 
researching the styles of processing that people in the general population use alongside a 
questionnaire about gambling preferences and activities, emphasising individual 
confidentiality. Participants were asked to complete the whole questionnahe and retum it 
in the stamped addressed envelope provided. 
4.6.2. Results and Discussion for Study 2 
23 of the 148 retumed questionnaires had no or little usable data, hence the 
remaming 125 were used in an analysis identical to that performed with Study 1. This 
results section follows an identical structure to that used to present the results firom the 
student sample study (Study 1). Agam participants taking part m the National Lottery only 
were analysed separately. 
4.6.2.1. Breakdown of Frequency and Forms Participated In 
Refer to Table 4.9 for the fiequency of the forms taken part in. Again the National 
Lottery and Scratch Cards appeared to be the most dominant gambling forms, with 114 
(91.2%) purchasing National Lottery tickets. 
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Table 4.9. Number and Percentage of Participants reporting playing on the various forms. 
N=125. 
Form Number Percentage 
Horse Racing (Off Course) 15 12.0 
National Lottery 114 91.2 
Bingo 18 14.4 
Horse/Dog Racing (On Course) 17 13.6 
Scratch Cards 41 32.8 
Pools 23 18.4 
Gaming Machines 22 17.6 
Casinos 6 4.8 
Sports Betting 6 4.8 
Other 6 4.8 
Table 4.10 shoves that 84% of people reported playing only up to and including 
three forms, although a majority of these reported only taking part in one, and on 82.8% of 
the time, this happened to be the National Lottery. 
Table 4.10. Main Population. Frequency of Number of Forms taken part m. and the degree 
of National Lottery and Scratch Card players. 
Nmnber of Forms Frequency 
No. ofPeople playmg National 
Lottery and/or Scratch Cards 
Cmnulatiye 
Frequency 
1 58 (46.4%) 48 (82.8%) 48(41.7%) 
2 28 (22.4%) 28 (100%) 76 (66.1%) 
3 19 (15.2%) 19 (100%) 95(82.6%) 
4 9 (7.2%) 9 (100%) 104 (90.4%) 
5 7 (5.6%) 7 (100%) 111(96.5%) 
6 1 (0.8%) 1 (100%) 112(98.3%) 
7 3 (2.4%) 3 (100%) 115(100%) 
Missing Data 23 
- -
Table 4.11 provides mformation as to the frequency of the participants' gambling 
behayiom, their typical length of gambling episode, and their typical expenditme at a 
session. 
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Table 4.11. Frequencv Statistics for Frequencv. Length and Expenditure. 
Frequency 
Frequencv of Gamblmg Episodes 
Less often than once every six months 27 
Less than once a month, but more than once every six months 14 
Less than once a week, but more than once a month 12 
Less than every day, but more than once a week 41 
Every day 54 
Length of Gambling Episode 
No Response 29 
0- 10 mins 102 
11-30 mins 7 
30-60 mins 4 
1- 2 hours 4 
more than 2 hours 2 
Expenditure per Session 
No Response 23 
£l-£5 107 
£6-£10 10 
£11-£25 4 
£26-£50 2 
£51-£100 1 
over£100 1 
Again the National Lottery was engaged in by the vast majority of participants 
(91.2%). The data also represented a high incidence of Scratch card play among the 
participants, (32.8%). Only a limited number of people gambled in Casinos (4.8%). 
Whereas with the smdent sample only 2.3% of participants played on the Pools, 15.5% of 
this sample played. Gambling on sports was the only other main difference between the 
two samples, with 12.8% of the smdent sample, but only 4.8% of the general population. 
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4.6.2.2. Erroneous Perceptions, Dissociation and Loss of Control Scores 
Table 4.12. Breakdown of Loss of Control. Dissociation and Fallacious Beliefs by Form 
Loss of Erroneous 
Control Dissociation Behefs N 
Horse Racing (Off Course) 6.5 9.0 17.5 2 
National Lottery 0.4 5.6 11.0 96 
Bingo 1.5 8.5 14.0 2 
Horse/Dog Racing (On Course) 0.5 8.0 15.0 2 
Scratch Cards 0.5 6.5 12.0 2 
Pools 0.0 4.5 12.5 2 
Gaming Machines 2.3 7.3 12.6 8 
Sports Betting 2.0 11.0 17.0 1 
Table 4.12 above shows a breakdown of the loss of control, the dissociation and the 
erroneous beliefs scores broken down by participants' main gambling forms. For example, 
as one might expect, loss of control was less of an issue for people playing predominantly 
on the National Lottery, Scratch cards and Pools. The point that on course betting also did 
not result in a high loss of control score (mean 0.5) would suggest something about the 
availability of the betting forms. When betting on comse there are only a limited nmnber of 
races planned to run at the particular meeting for that particular day, and hence access is 
somewhat limited, as the focus of the day is the racing occurring on comse. However, in 
comparison, those predominantly taking part in off-course betting have easier access to the 
whole spectrum of racing available. This could account for why the loss of control reported 
by these participants was particularly high in comparison to the other forms, (mean of 6.5). 
A score was obtained for each of the variables in an identical fashion to that utilised 
for Smdy 1 reported earlier. Again, Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficients were 
calculated to investigate the nature and strength of the relationship between all the 
variables. 
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4,6,2.3. National Lottery Only Players 
The relationship between the REI sub-scales and the other variables (National 
Lottery Only players) 
Rational Engagement correlated with Frequency (r=0.30), and with Length 
(r=0.39). and Experiential Engagement correlated negatively with, Frequency (r=-0.40), 
and with Length (r=-0.47). Experiential Ability also correlated negatively with Length 
(r=-0.35). See Table 4.13 for the correlation matrix. The correlations for this group were 
in direct contrast to expectations. This may in itself provide further evidence that gamblers 
playing on the National Lottery Only ought to be analysed separately to those taking part 
in other less socially acceptable forms. 
The Inter-correlations between the other variables measured (National Lottery 
Only players) 
Fallacies correlated significantly with Loss of Control (r=0.56) and Dissociation 
(r=0.68), but Loss of Control did not correlate significantly with Dissociation. Frequency 
correlated with Length (r=0.85). Loss of Contiol (r=0.65), Amount did not correlate with 
any variables. Length correlated with Loss of Contiol (r=0.52). See Table 4.13 for the 
correlation matrix. 
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Table 4.13. Correlation Matrix for Main Population. National Lottery Only Players; (* = p<.05, ** = p<.01). 
No. of Loss of 
Forms Frequency Length Amount Control Dissociation Fallacies RA RE EA EE R E 
No. of Forms 1.00 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r: ~ ~ ~ 
Frequency ~ 1.00 .85** -.03 .65** -.14 .26 -.06 .30* -.28 -.40** .13 -.36* 
Length ~ 1.00 -.04 .52** -.18 .15 .06 .39** -.35* -.47** .24 -.44** 
Amount ~ 1.00 -.03 .18 .24 -.09 -.08 -.21 -.14 -.09 -.19 
Loss of Control 1.00 .05 .56** .04 .21 -.23 -.25 .13 -.25 
Dissociation 1.00 .68** .16 .01 -.04 -.02 .09 -.03 
Fallacies ~ 1.00 .14 .12 -.10 -.03 .14 -:07 
RA 1.00 .75** -.21 -.30* .93** -.27 
RE 1.00 -.18 -.32* .93** -.26 
EA ~ 1.00 .75** -.21 94** 
EE 1.00 -.33* .93** 
R ~ 1.00 -.29* 
E 1.00 
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4.6.2.4. Players of all types of Gambling (excluding National Lottery Only 
Players) 
The relationship between the REI sub-scales and the other variables (Gamblers on 
All Forms) 
Rational Engagement correlated with Fallacies (r=0.23) and with Loss of Control 
(r=0.24). Rational Ability correlated negatively with Length, (r=-0.26). See Table 4.14 for 
the correlation matrix. The correlations with R E suggest that the more one enjoys 
analytical activities, the greater the number of fallacious beliefs held and the greater the 
loss of control. However, as the R A correlation with Length suggests, as the participants' 
perception of how good they were at such tasks increased, the typical length of a gambling 
episode decreased. 
The Inter-correlations between the other variables measured (Gamblers on All 
Forms) 
Dissociation correlated with Loss of Control (r=0.49) and with Fallacies (r=0.71); 
and Loss of Control correlated with Fallacies (r=0.50). Amount also correlated with 
Dissociation (r=0.50). Loss of Control (r=0.33) and Fallacies (r=0.43). Fallacies correlated 
with Number of Forms (r=0.28). See Table 4.14 for the correlation matrix. 
Participants' Frequency of playing did not correlate with any variables. One 
question raised in the introduction to this section asked whether higher frequency players 
were more prone to experience dissociation, held more fallacious beUefs and experienced a 
greater loss of confrol. As there were no significant correlations there was no evidence to 
223 

Table 4.14. Correlation Matrix for Main Population. A l l Forms : (* = p<.05, ** = p<.01). 
No. of 
Forms Frequency Length Amount 
Loss of 
Control Dissociation Fallacies RA RE EA EE R E 
No. of Forms 1.00 -.12 -.04 .20 .08 .18 .28* .08 .18 .12 .16 .15 .15 
Frequency 1.00 -.01 -.04 -.04 -.07 .17 -.12 -.15 -.12 -.06 -.15 -.10 
Length 1.00 -.02 -.05 .06 -.02 -.26* -.19 -.08 -.12 -.25* -.11 
Amount 1.00 .33** .50** .43** -.13 -.07 .03 .22 -.11 .14 
Loss of Control 1.00 .49** .50** .09 .24* .16 .13 .18 .15 
Dissociation 1.00 .71** .13 .11 .00 -.01 .13 -.00 
Fallacies 1.00 .07 .23* .15 .11 .17 .14 
RA 1.00 .66** . .10 -.13 .90** -.03 
RE 1.00 .24* -.06 .91** .08 
EA 1.00 .70** .19 .90** 
EE 1.00 -.10 .94** 
R 1.00 .03 
E 1.00 
suggest that higher frequency gamblers score any higher on these other variables than low 
firequency players. However, withm-group correlations (by Frequency) demonstiate that 
the higher the fiequency, the more likely the three-way relationship between Fallacies, 
Loss of Contiol and Dissociation was to appear. See Table 4.15 for this correlation matrix. 
Table 4.15. Within-group correlations - for Frequencv: (* =p<0.05, ** =p<0.01). 
Frequency Loss of Contiol Dissociation Fallacies 
1 (Less than twice a year) Loss of Contiol 1.00 0.30 0.46 
N = l l Dissociation 1.00 0.84** 
Fallacies 1.00 
2 (More than twice a year) Loss of Contiol 1.00 0.86* 0.77 
N=6 Dissociation 1.00 0.93** 
Fallacies 1.00 
3 (More than once a month) Loss of Contiol 1.00 0.64** 0.50* 
N=22 Dissociation 1.00 0.80** 
Fallacies 1.00 
4 (More than once a week) Loss of Contiol 1.00 0.45** 0.52** 
N=36 Dissociation 1.00 0.65** 
Fallacies 1.00 
4.6.3. Discussion 
For both groups in the analysis. Loss of Contiol correlated with the level of 
fallacious beliefs held. The more fallacious beliefs a person held, the more loss of contiol 
they reported experiencing. The more fallacies that a person held was also positively 
related to the level of dissociation experienced. What was of additional interest with the 
Main population sample was that the level of dissociation also correlated positively with 
the Loss of Contiol, such that the more dissociated a person reported beuig whilst 
gambling on their chosen forms, the higher the loss of contiol they experienced. With 
participants reporting playing on a variety of forms these three variables also correlated 
with the Amovmt spent on a typical gambling episode, suggesting that the more money 
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they spent, the higher the loss of control, the greater the dissociation experience and the 
greater the number of fallacious beliefs held. 
In terms of the relevance of the REI to gambhng beliefs and activities, the Main 
study demonstrated some relationships between the REI sub-scales and the gambling 
items. 
Strangely, the more one prefers to take part in activities requiring a more rational 
approach to the task (i.e. tasks unlike gambling tasks) the greater the loss of control and the 
greater the number of fallacies. This was contrary to what one would expect. However, 
people's perceptions of their ability to process the task in a rational way correlated 
negatively vwth the length of the typical gambling episode, hence the better they thought 
they were at using a rational process the shorter the gambling episode. For the Main 
population neither of the Experiential sub-scales correlated hi a significant way to any of 
the gambling items. 
For the National Lottery Only players. Rational Engagement correlated with 
Frequency and with Length. What is interesting about this relationship is that the 
correlation coefficient was positive, suggesting that the more one enjoys taking part in the 
analytic type activities, the longer and more regularly one plays the National Lottery. The 
correlation between these variables and Experiential Engagement was in addition stionger 
and negative, suggesting that the more one likes taking part in activities in which heuristics 
can play a part, less time is spent playing on the Lottery, and less often. Drawing 
conclusions fiom this must however be done with caution, particularly due to the scoring 
of the items. The size of the coefficients can be explamed by the natme of a National 
Lottery gamble as discussed earlier. A bet on the Lottery does not require much time, costs 
a set amount per go, and the number of draws is restricted to two per week. This issue has 
obvious affects on the Frequency, Amount and Length items in the analysis. In addition, 
these rather unpredicted relationships could be explained in terms of the advertising and 
presentation of the National Lottery surrounding each event. For example, when the balls 
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are selected, the narrator informs tiie audience of how many times that particular ball 
(nmnber) has been selected; in order to attract attention to irrelevant information in an 
attempt to encomage the belief both that this information is in fact relevant, and that the 
prediction task does need some analytical skills to take part. 
The significant correlation between fallacies and the number of forms taken part in 
suggests that the more forms one takes part in the greater the number of fallacious beliefs 
are held. Implications of this wil l be addressed in the general discussion section below. 
4.7. General Discussion 
For both Smdy 1 and Smdy 2, for the National Lottery Only players there was a 
significant positive correlation between Fallacies and Loss of Control. The greater the 
number of fallacies beheved in, the greater the loss of contiol. For the National Lottery 
Only players in the Main population smdy the relationship between the number of fallacies 
and the level of dissociation also reached significance. This relationship also occurred for 
both smdies for people who reported playing on a variety of forms, as did the relationship 
between the level of dissociation and loss of contiol. This provides stiong support for the 
notion that the dissociation may be experienced whilst gambling, and is Imked to erroneous 
perceptions and the ability to keep contiol of one's gambling behaviom. These three 
variables, Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Contiol all correlated positively with one 
another, with only the correlation between Fallacies and Loss of Contiol for the smdent 
sample (Smdy 1) not reaching significance (r=0.24). For the Main population data, the 
three way relationship extended to include the typical amount spent on a gambUng episode. 
The amount spent on a gambling episode was positively correlated with all three variables. 
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Although no causal relationships can be inferred ftom these correlational results, 
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the three variables of Fallacies, Loss of 
Control and Dissociation are related. The way in which they are related is open for 
interpretation and some finther analysis. 
4.8. Further Analysis - Modelling 
The inter-correlations observed in the above analysis suggest that there is indeed a 
significant relationship between the measured variables of Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss 
of Control. This is the first evidence of this relationship. Correlations between these 
variables could be used to predict (with some caution) one variable's value given the 
knowledge of another. For example, i f one has a measure of the extent to which someone 
holds fallacious beliefs, it may be possible to predict the extent to which they become 
dissociated and/or lose control with their gambling behaviour. However, it is very 
important to note that mere correlations do not imply that that one variable causes the 
other(s). Correlations only offer a measure of the extent to which the measured variables 
vary in harmony with each other, thus representing a measure of the degree to which they 
are related. It is not possible to imply causality fiom correlational analyses due to there 
potentially being other unmeasured variables which intervene that could have heavy 
influences, causing the observed correlations. It is still not clear fiom the current studies 
whether there is any underlying imphcit behaviour causing the erroneous perceptions to 
exist or whether the erroneous perceptions are a cause in then own right. Further studies 
would need to be done to investigate the processing that occurs online, whilst actually 
gambling. 
There are however a number of models that could explain the relationships 
observed. These vwll be presented before usmg the statistical approaches of Confirmatory 
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Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling to provide evidence on the relative 
merits of these models in accoimting for the data. 
Four possible non-recursive models have theoretical relevance that exist to fit the 
data, and these are presented in Table 4.16 below. Model "F-D-LoC" for example 
represents the case where the extent of Fallacious beliefs that a person holds has a direct 
influence on the level of Dissociation that is experienced. This induced Dissociation then 
leads, due to the dissociative experience rendering the individual unaware of the amount of 
time and money that they have invested in the activity to the individual experiencing a 
Loss of Control. In addition to these non-recmsive models, any recursive model could also 
be in the nmning to account for the data. Recmsive models include any non-recmsive 
model in which there are additional feedback loops. For example, it could be the case that 
Model F-D-LoC had an additional feedback loop allowing for the induced Loss of Control 
to exaggerate (hence cause) fiuther Dissociation or finther Fallacies bemg developed in the 
individual's attempt at firrther explaining why they are continuing with the behaviom. 
Alternatively or additionally there may be a process by which the level of Dissociation can 
feedback and influence the degree of Fallacious beliefs, or that Fallacies have a direct 
influence on the extent of the Loss of Contiol experienced. 
Table 4.16. Possible models with theoretical relevance. 
Model Factors 
F-D-LoC Fallacies ^ Dissociation 
D-F-LoC Dissociation ^ Fallacies 
F-LoC-D Fallacies ^ Loss of Contiol 
D-LoC-F Dissociation ^ Loss of Contiol 
Loss of Contiol 
Loss of Contiol 
^ Dissociation 
w. Fallacies 
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Note that there are two potential non-recursive models which were excluded firom 
the investigation which would not be of much theoretical relevance. These would have 
been models which had, as their starting point and influence, the Loss of Control. If this 
was the case, then one would have to hypothesise about other factors that may influence 
the Loss of Control, separate to the notion of erroneous perceptions and dissociation. 
Given that other candidates have not come to light, and are not strongly suggested in the 
gambling literatme, these models were excluded from consideration. 
The models xmder the current investigation view the holding of erroneous 
perceptions or the level of Dissociation experienced, as the initial influences, which 
ultimately leads to a Loss of Contiol. This can occm, within the models outlined, either 
directly from either Fallacies or Dissociation (as in models F-LoC-D or D-LoC-F) or as a 
result of some prior relationship between these two concepts, (as in models F-D-LoC and 
D-F-LoC). Models F-LoC-D and D-LoC-F assume therefore that as a consequence of 
experiencing a Loss of Contiol, the individual either gets dissociated, or develops 
fallacious beliefs in order to explain or rationalise then loss of contiol. 
Fitting these models to the data using Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structmal 
Equation modelling techniques enables one to uivestigate the relative merits of each, as 
Structural Equation provides a way of looking at the data and evaluating how consistent it 
is with causal models. 
The purpose of model fitting, as explained by Dermis, Newstead and Wright 
(1996), carried out here using EQS (a statistical software package), "is to predict the entire 
pattem of covariances and variances amongst the variables in the analysis. EQS determines 
values for the unknown parameters of the model in such a way as to minimise the 
discrepancy between the observed variances and covariances and those predicted by the 
model" (p. 524), and in this case, a maximum likelihood criterion was used. Under the 
assumption of multivariate normality this criterion leads to a fimction which is 
approximately distiibuted as chi-squared with a number of degrees of fieedom which 
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depends on the niunber of measured variables and on the number of parameters which are 
estimated in fittiiig the model. The value of this statistic can be used to.assess the overall, 
compatibility of the model with the data, a value which represents the extent to which the 
model fits the data. Each model can be fitted, and models can therefore be compared in this 
way. 
To facilitate the Factor analysis, the 15 Loss of Control items were grouped into 
three parcels. The number of items that were responded to with a "Yes" response withm 
each of the three groups constimted the Loss of Control score for that group. The items 
were grouped by their content into questions relating to problems associated with 
gambling, feelings associated with gambling, and chasing behaviour. Table 4.17 below 
displays the items groupings. The responses fiom both the smdent population and the 
main population (Smdy 1 and 2 participants) were included in this factor analysis. 
Table 4.17. Loss of Control Item Groupings for Factor Analvsis 
Associated Problems 
8. Do you see your gambling activities as ever having lead to a problem? 
9. Have you sought or thought of seeking help for your gambling behaviour? 
14. Do you ever get into debt as a result of your gambling? 
15. Have you borrowed money to gamble or pay gambling debts? 
22. Have you hidden betting slips, lottery tickets, gambling money, or other signs of gambling form 
your spouse, children, or other important people in you life? 
Associated Feelings 
10. Was there any tune when the amount you were gambling made you nervous? 
17. Do you need to gamble with more and more money to achieve the desired excitement? 
18. Do you ever have unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back, or stop gambling? 
21. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or about what happens when you gamble? 
Chasing 
11. After winnmg, do you feel you ought to gamble more to increase your winnmgs? 
12. Do you gamble until all your spare cash has gone? 
13. After losing, do you spend more money to try to make up for your losses? 
16. Do you find you gamble for longer than you mtended? 
19. When you gamble, do you go back another day to win back the money you lost? 
20. Do you ever gamble more money than you intended to? 
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The model predicted that these three variables v/ould be influenced by what was 
labelled Factor 1. 
The 7 Fallacious beliefs items were entered as individual variables. The model 
predicted that these variables would be influenced by what was labelled Factor 2. 
Likewise, Factor 3 was predicted to influence the fom Dissociation items which were 
entered into the Factor Analysis. Table 4.18 presents some descriptive statistics for the 
variables involved in the Factor Analysis. 
Table 4.18. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Factor Analvsis. N=192 
Std. 
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Loss of L0C1 0 4 0.1458 0.6305 5.157 27.336 
Control L0C2 0 3 0.2031 0.5272 2.976 9.544 
L0C3 0 6 0.5313 1.1618 2.686 7.27 
Fallacious F27 1 3 1.5312 0.6383 0.791 -0.411 
Beliefs F28 1 3 1.5729 0.6591 0.72 -0.549 
F29 1 4 1.9219 0.8617 0.397 -0.968 
F30 1 4 1.7031 0.7995 0.768 -0.453 
F31 1 4 1.4583 0.5952 1.057 0.873 
F32 1 4 2.0365 0.9674 0.449 -0.919 
F33 1 4 1.7396 0.7893 0.751 -0.233 
Dissociation D23 1 3 1.6875 0.636 0.373 -0.691 
D24 1 4 1.6563 0.7837 0.946 0.09 
D25 1 3 1.4375 0.6108 1.069 0.099 
D26 1 3 1.4115 0.5439 0.845 -0.383 
One important point to note with the above descriptive statistics are the Skewness 
and Kurtosis figures for the Loss of Control items. These figmes (much higher than zero) 
represent the fact that these measmes, especially the first Loss of Control parcel, are not 
normally distributed. The maximum likelihood method used assumes that the measmes 
which are used are normally distributed, which is clearly not the case for this parcel, which 
could cause concem for any models which result. To partially alleviate this concem, the 
Robust method (as developed by Satorra and Bentler 1988, 1994) was used throughout the 
modelling, which takes some account of the lack of normality in distribution for the 
measmes involved. 
Table 4.19 below displays the correlation matrix for the Loss of Control, Fallacious 
Beliefs and Dissociation variables, the relationship between which the Factor Analysis was 
used to investigate. 
Table 4.19. Correlations and p values for Variables in the Factor Analvsis. 
L0C1 L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 D23 D24 D25 D26 
Loss of L0C1 1 .304** .358** .054 .151* .002 .128 -.026 .111 .129 -.055 .144* -.017 -.023 
Control L0G2 1 .669** .362** .372** .277** .305** .119 .324** .342** .300** .411** .259** .237*-
LOGS 1 .380** .441** .319** .362** .123 .346** .414** .311** .552** .386** .348* 
Fallacious F27 1 .729** .590** .434** .348** .443** .515** .476** .534** .529** .664*= 
Beliefs F28 1 .623** .623** .381** .534** .620** .467** .616** .480** .507* 
F29 1 .536** .458** .581** .555** .548** .487** .453** .493* 
F30 1 .309** .583** .690** .424** .471** .321** .355* 
F31 1 .353** .345** .256** .239** .468** .433* 
F32 1 .637** .351** .431** .354** .359* 
F33 1 .379** .439** .379** .397* 
Dissociation D23 1 .529** .529** .570* 
D24 1 .447** .530* 
D25 1 .700* 
026 1 
Correlation is significant at the .01 level 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level 
The first stage in the analysis was to establish whether each variable was measming 
what it was supposed to be measuring. This is done by running a measmement model, in 
which all possible relationships between the three latent variables in the analysis are 
allowed to exist. 
The path diagram for the measmement model explored with the data is shown in 
Figme 4.1 where "F" denotes a Fallacy Item, " D " a Dissociation Item, and "LoC" a Loss 
of Control Item. It follows the standard convention for such diagrams. The variables hi 
circles are latent variables which the model assumes influence the manifest or measured 
variables, which are represented by squares. The Factor Analysis was run to investigate 
the measmement model, using EQS. 
The Robust Comparative Fit Index of .910 indicated that the model did indeed fit 
the data adequately, with a Satorra-Bentler Scaled of 166.4, with 74 degrees of fireedom. 
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However, what also became apparent was that the output ftom the factor analysis 
suggested that the Dissociation item (D24), "Sometimes I forget the time when gamblmg", 
was also measuring (loading on) Factor 1, the Loss of Control factor. The nature of the 
content of this item could well fit uito the loss of control category. The Lagrange 
Multiplier test (for adding parameters) suggested that the model would fit the data 
significantly better i f this variable was allowed to load on to the Loss of Control factor. 
Figure 4.1 The Path Diagram for the Measurement Model Which Was Investigated, (with 
Standardised values) 
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The factor analysis was then re-run with this amendment, see Appendix 5c for the 
output of nmning this measurement model. The model fit was improved, represented by 
the increase in the Robust Comparative Fit Index to .919, and by the fact that the 
measurement equation outputs specified that this item was significantly loaded on by 
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Factor 3 (Dissociation). Furthermore the Satorra-Bentler Scaled x with 73 degrees of 
fireedom had decreased fiom 166.4 to 156.3. AUthe items loaded significantly on the 
factors they were intended to load on. Additionally, generally more than 50% of the 
variance in the measured variables could be explained by the factors, except for the two 
items; Loss of Contiol 1 and the "I've carried a lucky charm when gambUng" within the 
Fallacy items. This latter measure on closer reflection is not necessarily a true fallacy as it 
addresses a particular behaviour rather than assessing a particular belief In other words, 
an individual responding positively to this item does not necessarily believe that although 
he or she may carry a lucky charm, this lucky charm will have any positive effect on 
whether or not they vmi at the gambling activities. The estimates for the correlations 
between the three Factors were remarkably stiong. The correlation between Loss of 
Contiol (Factor 1) and Fallacies (Factor 2) was estimated by the model at .55, between 
Loss of Contiol and Dissociation (Factor 3) at .46, and between Fallacies and Dissociation 
the estimated correlation was .77. 
Given that above measmement model suggested that the measured variables were 
measuring what they were plaimed to measme, and that each of the Loss of Contiol, 
FaUacies and Dissociation factors appeared to be unitary constructs, Stiructmal Equation 
Modellmg was then performed usmg EQS to investigate how the underlying constructs 
mfluence each other. This procedme also acts as a check that the observed variables were 
measuring the factors (the underlying concepts) that were proposed. Here though, one 
only allows correlations between the constructs that are predicted from om theoretical 
predictions. 
Several variants of the model, those discussed earlier, were assessed using EQS. 
Table 4.20 provides the values and the fit indices for each of the models, where larger 
fit indices indicate a better fit to the data, and the maximum index value is approximately 
one. The value of provides an indication of how well the model under investigation fits 
the data. It can be used to test the null hypothesis that the departme of the data from the 
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model is no higher than what would be expected by chance i f the model were true. Even in 
moderate samples though, non-significant are unusual. The smaller the for any given 
degrees of freedom the better the model fit. In addition, when one model is a constrained 
version of another model, then one can use the change in to test whether the constraint 
has made the model worse at fitting the data. If the change in y^ is significant this means 
that the constraint has made the model worse. If the change in y^ is non-significant, then 
the constrained model is a simpler model which fits the data equally well. 
Table 4.20. Measures of fit for a number of variants of the model depicted in Figure 4.1 
Model F-(D-LoC) D-(F-LoC) F-D-LoC D-F-LoC F-LoC-D D-LoC-F 
Recursive Recursive Non-
recmsive 
Non-
recursive 
Non-
recmsive 
Non-
recursive 
Robust Comparative 
Fit Index 
.919 .919 .916 .920 .863 .863 
i 222.5 • 222.5 232.9 222.9 291.2 291.2 
Satorra-Bentler 
Scaled x^  
156.3 156.3 160.4 156.1 214.6 214.6 
Degrees of Freedom 73 73 74 74 74 74 
Note: See the text and Table 4.16 for a description of the models. 
The fit of each of these models wil l be examined in tum. The F-(D-LoC) recmsive 
model of Table 4.20 specifies that the Loss of Control factor was influenced by both the 
degree of fallacious beliefs and by the level of dissociation. It is recursive in that Fallacies 
also influenced Dissociation. The Robust Comparative Fit Index (CFI) suggests that this 
model adequately explains the data. 
However the path coefficient in this model between Dissociation and Loss of 
Contiol (0.046) was not significant. The ratio of the path coefficient to its standard error of 
estimate (0.619), which is approximately distiibuted as z, was less than the criterion value 
of z of 1.96, hence this path coefficient was not significant at the 5% level. This suggests 
that the direct path between Dissociation and Loss of Contiol is superfluous, and can be 
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removed jfrom the model without making the model sigmficantly worse. The path 
coefficients between Fallacies and Loss of Control (0.238) and between Dissociation and 
Fallacies (0.711) were both sigmficant at the 5% level, with ratios of 2.936 and 8.087 
respectively. These demonstiate that Fallacies had a significant influence on Loss of 
Contiol, and that Dissociation had a significant influence on Fallacies. 
Model D-(F-LoC) was run reversing the influence so that the level of Dissociation 
loaded on Fallacies. Identical fit indexes resuhed as structmal equation modelling would 
not be able to distinguish between variants of the similar recursive model with the same 
three factors. The standardised path coefficients demonstiated again that the influence of 
Dissociation on Loss of Contiol was not significant (path coefficient of 0.047), whereas the 
influence of Fallacies on the Loss of Contiol (0..238) and of Dissociation on Fallacies 
(0.839) were both significant at tiie 5% level. 
Either of these two models therefore could explain the inter-correlations between 
the measmed variables, although it was not possible to distinguish between which of these 
two models was better. However, the fact that the influence of Dissociation directly on 
Loss of Contiol was not significant, suggests tiiat a simpler non-recmsive model such as 
D-F-LoC (without the additional loading of Dissociation on Loss of Control) would 
adequately account for the data. These recursive models were therefore dropped as 
explanations of the relationship between the constmcts. Investigating non-recmsive models 
would indicate the relative importance of the position of the three factors in terms of 
causality. 
Structural Equation modelling was used to investigate the relative merits of the 
non-recursive models discussed earlier (see Table 4.16 above). In particular the aim was to 
distinguish between models which have Loss of Contiol as the end point and those that do 
not (e.g. F-D-LoC vs. F-LoC-D) and between which of the two concepts. Fallacies (title 
Ladoucem model) or Dissociation, appears to be the best candidate for the antecedent 
(between F-D-LoC and D-F-LoC). 
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Table 4.20 shows the fit indices for these non-recursive models. The D-LoC-F 
model can effectively be ruled out for further investigation as the fit. indices are low and 
below the accepted rule of thumb level of 0.9. In addition, the Lagrange Multiplier test (for 
adding parameters) suggested that a significant improvement to the model would involve 
allowing Fallacies to load on to Dissociation, thereby reverting to the recursive model. 
The F-LoC-D model can also be ruled out as the fit indices relating to this model 
are low, and as there are altemative models that better explain the relationship between the 
variables, represented by their higher fit indices. The fact that the values for both these 
latter two models was substantially higher than for the F-D-LoC and the D-F-LoC models 
also informs that these models are not as good at accounting for the data. 
Thus the two models that appear to account for the data best are the two models 
investigated with Loss of Control being the consequent rather than the antecedent as 
predicted. See Appendix 5d and 5e for the output fiom the equation modelling for these 
two models. 
Table 4.21 below shows the differences in for the fom non-recursive models 
imder investigation. 
Table 4.21. Differences in for the Non-recursive Models Under Investigation 
F-D-LoC D-F-LoC F-LoC-D D-LoC-F 
F-D-LoC - 7.8 31.6 31.5 
D-F-LoC 7.8 - 23.8 23.7 
F-LoC-D 31.6 23.8 - .1 
D-LoC-F 3L5 217 .1 -
In terms of distinguishing between these two non-recmsive models in evaluating 
which of the two fits the data the best, two somces of information can be used. Firstly the 
fact that the Robust CFI was higher (but only marguially) for the non-recmsive D-F-LoC 
model than that of the F-D-LoC model, suggests that the Dissociation leading to Fallacies 
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model was better. The second somce of mformation relates to the omcome of the Lagrange 
Multiplier test (for addmg parameters mto the model). The suggestions that this output 
indicated, were that for the Fallacies leading to Dissociation model (F-D-LoC) the model 
would be significantly improved in its ability to accovmt for the relationship between the 
variables, i f further links between the three factors were added to the model; thereby 
making it a recmsive model. However, even with these changes (allowing Dissociation to 
load on to Loss of Control, and Loss of Control onto Fallacies) it would fare no better than 
the non-recmsive model in which additional relationships between the factors were not 
reconunended (i.e. in the D-F-LoC model). Therefore, although it was clear that the F-D-
LoC and the D-F-LoC provide better models for the data, concluding which of the two best 
fits the data is not viable as the fit indices were indeed very close. 
One additional capability of EQS is to investigate the impact of different samples. 
The above modelling tieated the data set as a imitary sample. One could argue however, 
that the smdent population data could be different (and therefore ought to be tieated 
separately) to the data drawn from the main population. Likewise one could argue (as 
argued earlier) that gambling on the National Lottery only is inherently different from 
gambling on a variety of other forms. 
To investigate this, a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) model was run 
within the EQS package. This uivestigates whether the sample or the natme of the 
individual's gambling activities have any effects on the latent constructs in the model. The 
MIMIC model tieated the gambling type and the population (smdent versus general 
population) from which the participants were drawn as further variables that could 
potentially influence the three main constracts of Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of 
Contiol. By looking at the paths from these two background variables one can see i f the 
three constructs differ across type of gambling form and population. This model is 
presented in Figme 4.2 below. 
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The MIMIC model fit was strong, with a Robust Comparative Fit Index of 0.910, with a 
Satorra-Bentler Scaled of 198.35, with 96 degrees of freedom. This tends to indicate 
that the measmement model is satisfactory for all subgroups within the sample. 
Figure 4.2 The Path Diagram for the MIMIC Model (with Standardised values) 
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The point of reporting this procedme and the results stemming from it, is that there 
was no significant impact of population on the constructs. A l l three path coefficients fiom 
Population to the three maui factors were not significant at the 5% level. Here then there 
were no differences observed between the use of a smdent sample and a sample dravm 
fiom the general population. However, there were signs that the natme of the relationship 
240 
between the constructs for people who played only on the National Lottery differed from 
that for people who gamble on a variety of forms. A l l three path coefficients firom 
Gambling Type to the three main variables were significant at the 5% level. It suggested 
that National Lottery Only players tended to become less dissociated, held a lower degree 
of fallacious beliefs, and experienced less loss of control. From viewing the natme of a 
National Lottery gamble, as discussed earlier, this difference would be expected. For 
example, due to the short length of time that is required to take this kind of gamble, there is 
less chance for someone to experience the characteristics of a dissociative experience. This 
also confirms that in the earlier analysis it was advisable to investigate the National Lottery 
only players on their own. 
This is the first time that evidence for the existence of a relationship between these 
three factors has been demonstrated. There is strong evidence to suggest that a dissociative 
experience plays an important role in the development of loss of control, in addition to 
fallacious beliefs held by the gambler. 
This raises questions for the Ladoucem view that central to the loss of control are 
erroneous perceptions. Although this smdy has not shown that this is not the case, it has 
added an important dimension to the model. It appears that although erroneous perceptions 
may be important in the progression to a loss of contiol state, what appears to precede this 
loss of contiol is the degree to which the mdividual gets dissociated, usuig the gambling 
activity for an altogether different experience fiom their everyday life. 
This begs the question of whether any general dissociative personality tiait or 
tendency could partly explain an individuals' gambling activities, and whether high 
fiequency gamblers have an increased tendency, both within and outside of the gambling 
context, to become dissociated. The followmg chapter therefore investigates these 
possibilities. In addition, the following chapter investigates whether or not high fiequency 
gamblers use heuristics more readily in decision making tasks than non- or low fiequency 
gamblers. Of additional interest is whether gamblers utilise heuristics more readily 
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generally, or whether their henristical use is context specific. In other words, is it the case 
that high fiequency gamblers utilise heuristics more readily but only within the gambling 
context? 
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5. Chapter 5: Dissociation, Erroneous Beliefs, 
Heuristics and Biases, and Loss of 
Control 
5.1. Introduction 
The results from the studies in Chapter 4 suggested that there was no relationship 
between the extent of the use of either the rational or the experiential processing style (as 
measured by the REI) and people's reported gambling behaviom. Although there was little 
evidence for the weak cogmtive hypothesis with respect to the processing styles, the 
relationship observed between the other variables did suggest some support for the 
mtegrative hypothesis. 
Although the smdies were questiormaire based, and therefore did not take measmes 
durmg a real gamblmg task, the results did demonstrate a clear relationship between the 
level of dissociation experienced within the gambling task, the level of erroneous 
perceptions and the extent of the loss of control experienced. Furthermore the results of 
the Stmctmal Equation modelling suggested that the models that best accounted for the 
data were the ones in which the relationship between erroneous perceptions and 
dissociation influenced the extent of loss of control, although it was hard to distinguish 
between the F-D-LoC and the D-F-LoC models. Developing both the erroneous 
perceptions and gambling dissociation scales by increasing the number of relevant items 
may provide a clearer picture of which concept precedes the other in terms of progression 
to state where the individual loses control over their gambling behaviom. 
The dissociation items that were involved in the previous smdy related to 
dissociative experiences within the gambling context. The items referred only to feelings 
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of dissociation whilst involved with the individual's chosen gambling activities. This begs 
the question of whether any general dissociative personality trait or tendency could partly 
explain an individuals gambling activity, or whether the dissociation is ui fact context 
specific. It may be that the level of dissociation experienced is only relevant when an 
individual experiences it whilst taking part in their chosen gambling form. 
If the extent to which someone becomes dissociated in everyday life (one measme 
of which is the DES, Bernstein and Putman, 1986) was measmed in relation to erroneous 
perceptions, gambling dissociation and loss of control, and a clear relationship was 
demonstrated, this would support the weak cognitive hypothesis. It could be that 
individual differences in general dissociation are a predictor of the relationship between 
dissociation and other variables in the gambling context. The natme of the relationship of 
this general dissociation with the other variables could be investigated with a structural 
equation modelling technique, the resuhs of which could be used to evaluate the weak 
hypothesis. This chapter therefore mvestigates the role of general dissociation hi 
explaining continued gambling, and its relation to the other variables found to be of 
importance. The measmes of fallacious beliefs and gambling dissociation were developed 
for the cmrent investigation in order to both replicate the previous analysis with an 
increased number of relevant items and to uicrease the Ukelihood of being able to 
distinguish between which of the two constructs precedes the other in the progression to 
the loss of control state. 
The cognitive perspective assumes that gamblers are actively involved with the 
task, although the resuhs of Chapter 2 suggested that the cognitive perspective could not 
provide a completely clear pictme. As stated, there was no evidence resulting from the 
investigation conducted hi Chapter 4 to suggest that the processing style employed has any 
effect on people's gambluig beliefs or behaviom. However, that does not rule out the 
possibility that there are other individual differences that could partly explain gambling 
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beliefs and behaviour. A n altemative individual difference approach, to be investigated 
here, involves the extent to which people reason with the use of some heuristics and biases. 
In relation to this individual difference approach, Stanovich and West (1998) have 
examined a wide variety of tasks firom the hemistics and biases literatme, and observed 
that there is in fact considerable intemal consistency in performance on these tasks. 
Participants who provide the normative response on one task were usually significantly 
more likely to provide the normative response for another task. 
This suggested to the authors that the deparmre fiom the normative responses on 
each of the tasks was more hkely to be due to systematic factors and not to non-systematic 
performance errors (e.g. temporary lapses of attention, memory deactivation and other 
sporadic information-processing mishaps). They investigated a variety of tasks whilst 
measming mtelhgence, usmg the Scholastic Aptimde Test (SAT). They observed that 
overall, the people demonstiating responses that more closely resembled the normative 
response were those that achieved higher SAT scores. 
For example, participant SAT scores were stiongly and positively correlated with 
performance scores on syllogistic reasoning tasks (r=0.470). Likewise, on the abstiact 
original version of the Wason selection task, where typically only 10% of participants 
choose the correct card selections, those that did, tended to be those with higher SAT 
scores (with a correlation between the two of r=0.394). Furthermore on the Statistical 
reasoning tasks that they examined, participant performance scores again correlated 
significantly with the intelligence measme, r=0.347. In fact across a wide range of tasks 
the correlations between participant performance and their SAT scores tended to be 
significant, stiong and positive, (see Stanovich 1999, Stanovich and West, 1998). 
One potential application of this programme of work lies in the proposition that i f it 
is the case that gamblers gamble because they are more prone to exhibiting the use of 
hemistics and biases, and hence provide responses further away fiom the normative 
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response, the individual difference may itself not be proneness to heuristical reasoning, but 
rather to their lov^er intelligence. 
Although the inteUigence of those participants hi the current work was not 
measured, it would have been interesting to have done so. However, there has been 
evidence in the gambling literamre which contradicts this application of Stanovich's work. 
Ceci and Liker (1986) provide evidence that their high frequency on-comse horse race 
gamblers were more intelligent than population norms, as measmed by the Wechsler Adult 
hitelligence Scale (WAIS). Furthermore, they argued that their findings suggested that IQ 
is umelated to skilled performance at the racetrack and additionally, imrelated to real-
world forms of cognitive complexity. 
However, Stanovich and West (1998) do argue that there is another imderlying 
factor which could partly account for people's performance on the reasoning tasks that 
they investigated which they labelled "thinking disposition". This thinking disposition was 
concepmalised (m line with Baron, 1985) as the extent to which an mdividual would weigh 
new evidence against a favoured belief, would spend time on a problem before giving up, 
or would, in forming one's own opinion, weigh heavily on the opinions of others. 
Stanovich and West (1998) provided evidence that in addition to cognitive ability, this 
thinking disposition also correlated positively and significantly with performance on the 
tasks. Although their results suggested that cognitive capacity was the stiongest unique 
factor, individual differences in thinking disposition and cognitive capacity jointly 
accounted for 31.3% of the variance in performance. 
In line with Stanovich's notion of individual differences in performance, this 
chapter looks at the performance of participants across a range of heuristics and biases in 
relation to their gambling behaviom. 
In relation to the "weak cognitive hypothesis" this chapter therefore investigates the 
degrees of bias held by gamblers gambling at varying degrees of fiequency, and looks at 
whether high frequency gamblers are more prone to the use of heuristics and influenced 
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more readily by biases than low frequency players. Furthermore, i f this is the case, this 
chapter investigates whether high frequency gamblers are affected by these more in the 
gambling simation specifically, or whether they make use of them more readily generally 
(even in non-gambling contexts). In other words, do high frequency gamblers have the 
same biases outside of the gambling context? 
Wagenaar (1988) argued that gamblers are not a limited group of people who have 
less than optunal reasoning strategies. Rather he argued that gamblers gamble because they 
tend to select hemistics at the wrong time. In the reasoning literature there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that certain biases play a role in the decisions that people arrive at. The 
hemistics and biases approach to probabilistic inference and judgement is mostly 
associated with the work Kahneman and Tversky (see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 
1982 for a review). 
As discussed in the intioductory chapter, the general theoretical approach takes the 
perspective that inmitive assessments of probability appear to reflect the use of simple 
stiategies, rather than reflecting true probability theory. Although the use of these can 
result in more efficient decision making, they can often lead to systematic errors. See 
Evans (1989), Evans and Over (1996) and Cavemi, Fabre and Gonzalez (1990) for a 
discussion of some of these heuristics and biases. 
The rest of this intioduction is devoted to specific hemistics and biases which are 
assessed in the smdy that follows. A presentation of the base rate fallacy, the availability 
and representative heuristic, items assessing the perception of randomness and the 
hindsight bias follows over the coming pages. The precise items that were used in the 
questiormaire are presented in the methodology section. 
A substantial amount of research has been conducted into investigatmg how people 
combine prior probabilities with specific information when these two elements are 
apparently opposing each other. The fallacy that results has become to be known as the 
"base rate fallacy". When given information about a smdent's personality, one might 
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conclude that the student is studying library services rather than engineering, just on the 
basis of a stereotyped view of these professions, even though nmnbers of students studying 
for engineering greatly exceeds the numbers studying library services. Hence people can 
tend to ignore the base rate information when making their decisions. 
Within gambling decision making, people's subjective probability of success can 
often be sigmficantly higher than the objective probability would warrant. Hence it appears 
that people tend to ignore the base rate information of the probability of success specified 
by the natme and characteristics of the task itself The gambler may cherish their strong 
belief that tonight will be their lucky night in which they wil l make up for all their previous 
losses, ignoring the base rate information which would suggest that they are in fact equally 
likely to lose on this occasion as they were on the previous gambling episodes. 
A typical example of the base rate fallacy, used in the cmrent investigation, is that 
of tiie 'cab problem' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972a, Bar-Hillel, 1980). The individual is 
presented with the following information. 
A taxi cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab 
companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 85% of the cabs in 
the city are Green, 15% are Blue. 
A wimess identified the cab as Blue. The Court tested the reliability of the 
viitaess under the same chcumstances that existed on the night of the 
accident, and concluded that the wimess correctly identified each one of the 
two coloms 80% of the time, and failed 20% of the time. 
They are then asked "What is the likelihood that the cab involved in the accident 
was Blue rather than Green?" The modal response by untiained "judges is usually 
observed to be about 0.8, whereas the correct mathematical solution is 0.43, (Bimbaum, 
1983). 
This kind of task demonstiates that people often ignore important information 
which has a direct effect on realistic probability judgements. Is it the case that gamblers 
who partake with varying fiequency are different in terms of the likelihood of their 
ignoring base rate information. Do they do this in gambling activities only, or is it general 
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to their problem solving and decision making ability? These are questions which the 
current investigation attempts to address. 
Two of the most well known heuristics are the availability and the representative 
heuristics which were presented earlier. 
The observation that people appear to reliably make use of past information which 
is in fact irrelevant when making the next decision, (e.g. Ladouceur. et al, 1996, 1997) 
suggests that people tend not to be aware of the independence of events, suggesting a belief 
in the law of small mmibers, that short sequences should be representative of the larger 
population from which they are drawn, (Tversky and Kahneman 1971, Kahneman and 
Tversky 1972). Of comse there are gamblmg forms (e.g. horse racing) where past 
information is relevant to some extent. However, when the outcome of the task is 
determined purely by chance (e.g. as in the game of roulette) past information is 
completely irrelevant. This heuristic induces people to expect that any small sample drawn 
from a population should be representative of the population as a whole, that chance 
operates to produce all possible outcomes with equal frequencies in the short run. This is 
embodied in the well known gamblers fallacy that after a long run of "heads" a "tail" 
becomes increasingly likely. 
Wagenaar (1977) presented participants with a selection of sequences of white and 
black dots which were supposed to represent possible outcomes of 100 flips of a coin. The 
participants' task was to indicate which of the sequences was most likely to have been the 
one really produced by flipping a coin. He observed that there was a reliable preference 
for sequences in which there was low repetition in outcomes, i.e. sequences within which 
there were few long runs of one particular outcome. This again supports the participants 
focus on the law of small numbers. The question remains as to whether there are any 
individual differences with respect to the extent to which people employ this hemistic. 
Two similar types of sequences were presented to participants hi the current investigation, 
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one series of sequences from a gambling context and the other from a non-gambling 
context. The probability of repetition was modelled on the Wagenaar (1977) smdy, in that 
the sequences had a probability of repetition of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. 
As previously discussed, one of the problems with the heuristics and biases 
approach is that it is difficult to distmguish between which hemistic may have been used 
on a particular occasion. The discussion of the availability and representative heuristics 
presented the case that both heuristics could predict altemative behavioms in the same 
situation, and as such association of a particular heuristic with a particular gamble is rather 
post-hoc. 
Rather than attempting to distinguish between the two, and assigning post-hoc 
reasons for why the particular prediction was made (on the basis of the representative or 
availability heuristic for example) the current smdy focused on the confidence which the 
participants had in their prediction. The assumption made here was that confidence 
responses which differed fiom the objective probability of success would signal the fact 
that the participants had utilised the information presented in the item in some way. 
Following the points raised so far in the thesis that the amount of information made 
available tends to increase peoples confidence in their prediction ability, two amounts of 
information were presented. In an attempt to identify the extent to which the amount of 
previous recent outcome information affected peoples confidence, several sequences 
representing previous outcomes fiom the spms of a roulette wheel (for the gambling 
specific items) were presented, following which participants were asked to make both a 
prediction, as to the next unknown outcome (predicting a Red or a Black outcome) and to 
express their degree of confidence on a 0-100 scale that their prediction was correct. 
In addition to manipulating the amount of information (short or long) presented to 
the participants, the information can also be varied in relation to whether a particular 
previous outcome was more "available". This can be done by manipulating the proportion 
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of each of the binary outcomes so that either both are equally available (over the comse of 
the presented sequence) or one particular outcome is most available. 
The differential effects of these manipulations on people's confidence in their 
decisions, and hence the use of this heuristic, was investigated. 
Another bias that has been demonstrated to play a role in probability judgements is 
that of the conjunction fallacy, (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). 
The probability of a conjunction, two things occurring at once, caimot exceed the 
probability of its constiment parts, i.e. the probability of the first occurring and the 
probability of the second occurring, because the extension (or probability set) of the 
conjimction is included in the extension of its constiments. 
Judgements under uncertainty however are often mediated by inmitive hemistics 
that are not boimd by the conjimction rule, and instances of a specific category can be 
easier to imagine or to rehieve than instances of a more hiclusive category. The 
representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear 
more probable than one of its constiments. The extent to which people were affected by 
this conjimction fallacy was investigated usuig the following example. 
In four pages of a novel (about 2000 words), how many words would you expect to 
find have the form i n g (seven letter words that end with "ing") ? 
In fom pages of a novel (about 2000 words), how many words would you expect to 
find have the form n _ (seven letter words with "n" as the sixth letter) ? 
The greater the difference between people's responses to each of these two items 
represents the extent to which the availability hemistic has played a role. The first item is 
a subset of the second and by definition there are less instances when this occms. 
However, i f availability plays a role then responses would be greater for the first item as 
remembering items with the "ing" form would be more available. 
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It has been demonstrated that people are often over confident with respect to the 
likelihood that their prediction is correct; in foresight therefore people overestimate the 
likelihood of success. Additionally, there is ample evidence to suggest that people often 
demonstrate what has become known as the hindsight bias (e.g. Fischhoff, 1975, Fischhoff 
and Beyth, 1975). The reasoning literature has observed that people are over confident in 
their ability to have predicted an event once the event has occurred. For example Gilovich 
(1983) showed that gamblers displayed hindsight bias with respect to the results of football 
matches. In hindsight people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in 
foresight. People believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much 
better than was acmally the case. They even tend to misremember their own predictions so 
as to exaggerate in hindsight what they knew in foresight, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975). 
Hindsight bias has been identified in many areas. Of relevance is the conunon 
finding that even intense involvement with a particular topic can not reduce the extent of 
hindsight bias, (Fischhoff, 1975). For example, Detmer, Fryback and Gassner (1978) found 
hindsight bias in the judgements of smgeons appraising an episode involving a possible 
leaking abdominal aortic anemism. Arkes Wortmaim, Saville and Harkness (1981) 
demonstrated the bias with physicians, whilst Pennington et al (1980) observed it with 
pregnant women judging the results of personal pregnancy tests. The results of these 
smdies suggest that neither educational achievement nor heavy experience with the topic 
reduce people's ability to be influenced by the hindsight bias. 
It could be argued that high fiequency gamblers are "educated" in their domain, in 
that they are especially aware of the procedmes (betting choices available, rule of the 
activities etc) required for gambling in their chosen activities. This argument could be 
posmlated to predict that high frequency gamblers would be less likely to affected by the 
hindsight bias than low frequency gamblers. However, in light of the above research, this 
argument is not sustainable. This is particularly the case when one considers the 
availability and ease at which hindsight could take effect, considering the potential vast 
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number of predictions and outcomes due to the speed at wliich outcome information is 
made available in most gambling forms. The degree to vi^hich high and low frequency 
gamblers were affected by hindsight within a gambling specific and non-gambling specific 
context was investigated. 
For the higher frequency gambling group of participants, recruitment took place 
within two off-comse gambling estabhshments. Due to the fact that the participant sample 
was on location to gamble, and not to take part in research, it was envisaged that 
motivating people to take part would be difficult, particularly as only a very small financial 
incentive could be offered. To increase the chances of people willing to participate, the 
amount of time required to complete the current investigation had to be kept to a minimum 
(25-30 minutes). Hence although the measure of heuristics and biases involved in the 
current investigation is by no means exhaustive, the limits imposed by the natme of the 
recraitment process favoured the restriction to the above main items. 
In summary then, in relation to the "weak cognitive hypothesis" this chapter 
examines whether there are any individual differences in the degree to which people make 
use of these heuristics when making decisions. Also in relation to this hypothesis this 
chapter addresses the potential role of general dissociation in explaining the dissociative 
state experienced whilst gambling and therefore contiibuting to continued play, whilst in 
the light of the integrative hypothesis, re-addresses the relationship between fallacious 
beliefs, gambling specific dissociation and their influence on the extent of the loss of 
contiol experienced. 
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5.2. Study 3 
5.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Recruitment was attempted at Newton Abbott Race Course an hour and a half 
before the days races commenced. No one agreed to take part out of the 40 people 
approached. 38 Gamblers were recruited firom within two Betting Offices, one run by 
Hoopers, the other the William Hi l l Group. This group made up the majority of the higher 
fiequency gambling group. 92 participants were recruited fiom the University of 
Plymouth Undergraduate population. A l l participants were given a small financial 
incentive to fill in the questiormaire which took 25 minutes to complete. 
Materials 
A questioimaire was prepared. The latter part of the questioimahe constimted the 
same items as the questionnaire used in Experiment 5 with respect to fiequency of 
gambling, choice of gambling forms participated in and loss of contiol. The fallacious 
beliefs section was developed fiirther to include a wider range of items. The dissociation 
scale was also developed for gambling specific items. The items in this part of the 
questionnaire are presented in Table 5.1 below. The complete questioimaire is presented in 
Appendix 6a. 
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Table 5.1. Questionnaire Items for Loss of Control. Dissociation (Gambling') and 
Fallacious Beliefs 
Loss of Control Items Y E S / N O 
8. Do you see your gambling activities as ever having lead to a problem? 
9. Have you sought or thought of seeking help for your gambling behaviour? 
10. Was there any time when the amount you were gambling made you nervous? 
11. After winning, do you feel you ought to gamble more to increase your winnings? 
12. Do you gamble until all your spare cash has gone? 
13. After losing, do you spend more money to try to make up for your losses? 
14. Do you ever get into debt as a result of your gambling? 
15. Have you borrowed money to gamble or pay gambling debts? 
16. Do you fmd you gamble for longer than you intended? 
17. Do you need to gamble with more and more money to achieve the desired excitement? 
18. Do you ever have unsuccessful attempts to control, cutback, or stop gambling? 
19. When you gamble, do you go back another day to win back the money you lost? 
20. Do you ever gamble more money than you intended to? 
21. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or about what happens when you gamble? 
22. Have you hidden betting slips, lottery tickets, gambling money, or other signs of gambling form your 
spouse, children, or other important people in you life? 
Dissociation Items (Gambling) Strongly Agree - Strongly Disagree 
23. Gambling makes me feel really alive. 
24. Sometimes I forget about the time when I am gamblmg. 
25.1 get a real buzz that lifts me when I gamble. 
26. Whilst gambling I feel I'm free, able to do and choose what I like. 
27.1 feel less stressed when I gamble. 
28. Whilst I'm in the gambling envkonment, I usually don't notice what other people are up to. 
29. As soon as I start gambling I feel different to how I did before. 
30. If I were feeling down, gambling would probably pick me up. 
31.1 like gambling because it helps me to forget my everyday problems. 
Fallacious Beliefs Strongly Agree - Strongly Disagree 
32. If I have not won any bets for a while, I am probably due for a big win. 
33.1 know when I'm on a streak. 
34. It is important to feel confident when I'm gambling. 
35. No matter what the game is, there are betting strategies that can help you to win. 
36.1 have carried a lucky charm when I gambled. 
37.1 must be familiar with a gambling game if I am gomg to win. 
38. To be successfiil at gamblmg, I must be able to identify streaks. 
39.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinking "I feel that I'm going to wm this time". 
40.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinkmg "I knew it was going to be that, I said so". 
41.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinking "How come I didn't win?" 
42.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinking "This time wasn't very good, I could have played better." 
Although the Loss of Control items in Table 5.1 are drawn mainly firom established 
checklists and the Fallacious Belief items are closely representative of long identified 
erroneous perceptions, the Dissociation items are a new attempt to measure dissociation 
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specifically in gambling. Since several items (23, 25, 27, 39 and 30) could possibly be 
construed ais having face validity for the measmement of mood management or even 
arousal, fiirther work may need to be done in the validation of that sub-scale to ensure that 
it is measuring dissociation and not something else. 
The general dissociation (non-gambling) items that were used in the cmrent smdy 
were extracted fi-om the DES (Bernstein and Putman, 1986) which assesses dissociation in 
everyday life, and are presented in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2. General Dissociation Items extracted from the DES. Bernstein and Putman 
1986 
Dissociation (GeneraD Strongly Agree - Strongly Disagree 
43. Some people have the experience of driving a car and suddenly realising that they don't remember what 
has happened during all or part of the trip. 
44. Some people have the experience of finding themselves m a place and having no idea how they got 
there. 
45. Some people have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to themselves or watching 
themselves do something and they actually see themselves as if they were looking at another person. 
46. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their lives. 
47. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember happening 
really did happen or whether they just dreamed them. 
48. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but fmding it strange and unfamiliar. 
49. Some people fmd that when they are watching television or a movie they become so absorbed in the 
story that they are unaware of other events happening around them. 
50. Some people sometimes fmd that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it feels as 
though it were really happening to them. 
51. Some people fmd that in one situation they may act so differently compared with another situation that 
they feel almost as if they were two different people. 
52. Some people sometimes fmd that they hear voices that tell them to do things or comment on things that 
they are domg. 
The fhst part of the questionnahe however was designed to assess the use of a 
range of heuristics and biases that have been suggested to play a role in decision making 
during gambling. Hemistics that were assessed in the questiormaire were those that are 
most relevant to the gambling simation; those discussed earlier in the Introduction to this 
chapter; Availability, Representativeness, Base Rate fallacy. Hindsight Bias, Illusion of 
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Control / Gamblers Fallacy, and a replication (but with shortened sequences and with the 
two types of content) of Wagenaar's perception of randomness items. 
In addition to participants being requhed to select the outcome they thought most 
likely to occur (following the information provided), they were also asked to express how 
confident they were that they had chosen the "correct" response, on a 0-100 scale. 
"Where possible, for each type of question there were two versions of the question, 
one indicating a gambling simation and one out of the gambling context. The items in this 
part of the questionnaire are presented in Table 5.3 below. 
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Table 5.3. Items in the Heuristic and Bias section rPerformance section) 
Qu. Baseluie Confidence (no nast information) 
7a. You tum up at a Casino to play Roulette. You arrive at the table and place a bet. 
What would you choose to go for first? Red or Black? 
la . A friend takes a coin out of a pocket and is about to flip it into the air. Would you 
go for Heads or Tails? 
Availabilitv and Representativeness - Gambling Specific 
2. You have been observing the outcomes at a Roulette table. The outcomes so far on 
the table you've been looking at have been: 
Black, Red, Black, Black, Black, Black, Black, Red, 
What do you think the next outcome will be? Please Circle: Red Black 
How confident would you be? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
Other Previous Outcome Information Presented 
23. Red, Black, Black, Red, Black, Red, Red, Black.... 
28. Red, Red, Black, Red, Red, Red, Black, Red, Black, Red, Red, Red, Red, Red, Red, Black 
11. Red, Red, Black, Red, Black, Black, Red, Red, Black, Red, Black, Black, Black, Red, Red, Black... 
Availabilitv and Representativeness - Non-gambling 
22. Imagine everybody in every city in the world was photographed. From studying 
the photos, it appears that 50% of the photos show people with their heads facing 
to the left, whilst the other 50% of the people are looking to the right. 
You are presented with a series of these photos in which the direction of gaze, in 
the order that you receive them, is as follows: 
Right, Left, Right, Right, Right, Right, Right, Left,.... 
If presented with another photo, which dhection do you think the person's head 
wil l be facing? 
Please Circle: Right Left 
Other Previous Outcome Information Presented 
13. Left, Right, Right, Left, Right, Left, Left, Right,.... 
25. Left, Left, Right, Left, Left, Left, Right, Left, Right, Left, Left, Left, Left, Left, Left, Right.... 
8. Left, Left, Right, Left, Right, Right, Left, Left, Right, Left, Right, Right, Right, Left, Left, Right.... 
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Table 5.3. (continued') 
Other Availabilitv Items 
6a. In four pages of a novel (about 2000 words), how many words would you expect to 
find have the form i n g (seven letter words that end in "ing")? 
14a. In four pages of a novel (about 2000 words), how many words would you expect to 
find have the form n _ (seven letter words with "n" as the sixth letter) ? 
5a. Suppose you sample a word at random from an English text. Is it more likely that the 
word starts with the letter "k" or that "k" is its thhd letter? 
Base Rate - Gambling Specific 
26. Trainer A enters 15 horses and Trainer B enter 10 horses into the season's races. Before 
entering the paddock before a particular race, a punter points to a horse and reports that 
it comes from Trainer B. It is known that even from a distance, the punter can correctly 
report which Trainer the horse belongs to 80% of the time, and fails 20% of the time. 
a. "What is the likelihood that the horse that the punter points to, comes from Tramer B? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
Base Rate - Non-gambling 
3. A taxi cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the 
Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 150 of the cabs hi the city are Green, 100 are 
Blue. A wimess identified the cab as Blue. The Court tested the reliability of the wimess 
under the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident, and concluded 
that the witness correctly identified each one of the two coloms 80% of the time, and 
failed 20% of tiie tune. 
a. "What is the likelihood that the cab mvolved in the accident was Blue ratiier than Green? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
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Table 5.3 ("continued') 
Perception of Randonmess - Gambling Specific 
4. A new "Wheel of Fortune has 50 segments that you can bet on. Half of the numbers are 
even (E), half are odd (0), and they are distributed around the wheel equally. 
How random do you think the sequence below is as arising fiom the spimiing of the 
Wheel? 
0-2 E E O E O E E O E O E O E O E E G E O E O O E E G E 
Please Indicate from 0 (Not at all Random) to 100 (Completely Random) 
Other Perceptions ofRandomness - different probabilities of repetition 
0.4 O Q E O E E G E E E E E G G Q E E Q E G E G G E G E 
0.6 O O E E E E E O E O O O E E E E O O E E E O O E O O 
0.8 O O O O O O O O O E E O O O O O E E E E E E E O E E 
Perception of Randonmess - Non-gambling 
20. How likely do you think the sequence of outcomes below is to occm fiom flipping a coin: 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlilcely) to 100 (Completely Lilcely) 
Other Perceptions of Randomness - different probabilities of repetition 
•^4 •O«O»#Ct tM10OO>«O«Q«Q0«Q»»0CO0«O»0OO»»»CX3»O»0tOO» 
O C t t t M 0 » 0 0 0 » » » » 0 0 » » » C X : ) » 0 0 0 0 » 0 C l l t M C X X X X X ) » » » 0 O » » » 
O t t f M t t C X : t t 8 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 — 0 0 C t i m 8 » 0 Q 0 0 < 0 0 C i m t M > 
Gamblers Fallacv 
10. You decide to go to a Casmo for the evenmg. You arrive and watch some of the players 
playing the various games, before making yom way to one of the roulette tables. You 
decide to play yourself, and have won the last few trials. You decide to stick to betting 
on Red or Black for the time being. 
a. How confident are you that you wil l win the next round? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
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Table 5.3 ("contmued) 
Hindsight Bias - Gambling Specific. Pre-outcome 
12. The outcomes of the spin of the Roulette wheel are clearly displayed for you to look at. 
Out of the last 8 outcomes, there was a sequence of four red in a row, followed by fom 
black numbers. 
a. "What do you think the following outcome was? Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident are you that yom choice is the correct one? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
Hindsight Bias - Gambling Specific. Post-outcome 
27. The outcomes of the spin of the Roulette wheel are clearly displayed for you to look at. 
Out of the last 8 outcomes, there was a sequence of fom red in a row, followed by fom 
black numbers. 
a. Given that the next outcome that you've just seen was in fact Red, how confident would 
you have been in predicting it? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
Hindsight Bias - Non-gambling. Pre-outcome 
9. Two cormtries were at battle against each other. Country A had only 1000 soldiers to 
start with, but had a much stronger technological weapons backing, compared to the 
much stronger army of 2000 soldiers hi Country B with a much weaker technological 
backing. Although the battle was fierce and a close-call for both countries, one country 
did finally win the battle. 
a. "Which one do you think it was? 
b. How confident are you that your decision is the correct one? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
Hindsight Bias - Non-gamblmg. Post-outcome 
24. Two countries were at battle agamst each other. Country A had only 1000 soldiers to 
start with, but had a much shonger technological weapons backing, compared to the 
much stronger army of 2000 soldiers in Counhy B with a much weaker technological 
backing. Although the battle was fierce and a close-call for both countries. Country A 
country did finally win the battle. 
a. How confident would you have been in predicting this? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
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The order of the 28 questions was randomised subject to a few conditions. For the 
assessment of the Hindsight bias, there were two pairs of questions; one for the gambling 
specific and one for the non-gambling content. For each pair, one question had to appear 
later in the questionnaire than the other for any chance of identification of the bias having 
effect. Certaui other questions could not appear next to each other or on the same page. 
These included the availability items with the varying outcome ratios. The positions of 
these items were therefore re-randomised until they met the criteria. 
Procedure 
The smdent sample were recruited by placing adverts around the University 
Campus, advertising that a 30 minute experimental session would be taking place, for 
which they would receive the sum of £3. 92 smdents turned up to take part. They were 
seated in a lecture theatre and were given the questionnanes along with brief uistructions. 
They were instructed to fill in the questionnahe on then own without consultmg others, to 
answer all questions; that there were no right or wrong answers and that they should not 
spend too long on any one item. Before leaving the theatre participants were debriefed, 
handed back the questionnaires, and received dieir financial incentive. 
The other participants were recruited firom within a Plymouth branch of Hoopers 
Bookmakers, and within a London branch of William Hi l l bookmakers. Consent to ask 
patrons was obtained fiom the office managers before approaching prospective gamblers. 
Participants here were approached individually and asked i f ttiey would be willing 
to help out with some research into decision making. They were informed of the small 
financial incentive for taking part, and of the confidentiality of their responses. Those who 
agreed to take part were then given the brief mstructions and a copy of the questionnahe. 
Approximately a third of people approached agreed to take part. For some people, 
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spending time taking part in research was simply out of the question, for others the 
financial hicentive of £3 was not enough.' 
Once those who agreed had completed the questionnahe, they were given the £3 
and were debriefed. 
5.2. Results and Discussion for Study 3 
Fhstly some descriptive statistics on the fiequency data relating to the current 
sample is presented. The analysis on the data was separated into three sections. In the first 
instance an analysis was conducted on the constmcts involved that were identical to those 
mvolved in Chapter 4, namely the relationship between Fallacious Beliefs, Dissociation 
and Loss of Contiol. Using a confirmatory factor analysis on the data, the models 
discussed in the previous chapter were reassessed v^ith the current data set, which involved 
higher fiequency gamblers. 
The second part of the analysis was carried out to investigate, using exploratory 
Factor Analysis, the relationship between the performance measmes on the heuristic and 
bias items in the questioimahe, to see i f any number of factors underlying the responses to 
these items could be identified and interpreted. Before this procedme could occm, 
measmes of bias had to be calculated. Further details of this procedme wil l follow. 
Following this, the third and final stage of this analysis was to run a confirmatory 
factor analysis to investigate the existence of a relationship between the Fallacious Beliefs, 
Dissociation, and Loss of Contiol constracts and the factors coming out of the performance 
factor analysis. This would enable some discussion to take place with respect to how these 
constracts may interact vwth or influence the extent to which an individual is biased. 
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5.2.1. Breakdown of Frequency and Forms Participated In 
Table 5.4 shows the frequency of gambling forms taken part in by the sample. 
Almost 80% of this sample played the National Lottery, whilst 40% bought scratch cards. 
As can be seen from this table, the numbers of people taking part in the various forms is 
more evenly spread than the previous sample. 
Table 5.4. Nmnber and Percentage of Participants reporting plaving on the various forms. 
N=120. 
Form Number Percentage 
Horse Racing (Off Comse) 46 38.3 
National Lottery 95 79.2 
Bingo 18 15.0 
Horse/Dog Racing (On Course) 36 30.0 
Scratch Cards 46 38.3 
Pools 12 10.0 
Gaming Machines 54 45.0 
Casinos 18 15.0 
Sports Betting 33 27.5 
Other 12 10.0 
Table 5.5 below shows the numbers of people who partake in a varying nmnber of 
forms. Again, the majority of people played up to and including three forms, although 
there were a number of people playing five to eight forms of gambling. 
Table 5.5. Smdy 3. Frequencv of Nmnber of Forms taken part in. and the degree of 
National Lottery and Scratch Card plavers 
Number of Forms Frequency 
No. of People Playing National 
Lottery and Scratch Cards 
1 27(22.5%) 15(55.6%) 
2 27(22.5%) 21(77.8%) 
3 28(23.3%) 25(89.3%) 
4 12(10.0%) 11(91.7%) 
5 15(12.5%) 14(93.3%) 
6 5(4.2%) 5(100%) 
7 3(0.03%) 3(100%) 
8 3(0.03%) 3(100%) 
Missing 14 
-
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Table 5.6 provides information as to the frequency of the participants' gambling 
behaviour, their typical length of gambling episode, and their typical expenditme at a 
session. 
Table 5.6. Frequencv Statistics for Frequencv. Length and Expenditure 
Frequency 
Frequencv of Gambling Episodes 
Less often than once every six months 12 
Less than once a month, but more than once every six months 23 
Less than once a week, but more than once a month 25 
Less than every day, but more than once a week 33 
Everyday 18 
Length of Gambling Episode 
No Response 5 
0- 10 mins 62 
11-30 nuns 11 
30-60 mins 6 
1- 2 homs 19 
more than 2 homs 17 
Expenditme per Session 
No Response 22 
£l-£5 68 
£6-£10 11 
£l l -£25 7 
£26-£50 7 
£51-£100 3 
over£100 2 
5.2.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the Relationship Between 
Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Control 
This smdy included the same measmes as the smdy in Chapter 4. However there 
were fom additional Fallacy items, and five additional gambling related dissociation items. 
A l l these items are presented in Table 5.1 above. In addition, although not initially 
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inserted into the current factor analysis, there were 10 general dissociation items, relating 
to how dissociated people get in every day life. A presentation and discussion of these 
additional general dissociation items wil l follow. As a multivariate normal distribution of 
responses to the measured variables is assumed when conducting a maximum likelihood 
factor analysis, some descriptive statistics were calculated. Table 5.7 below provides 
statistics for all the items under uivestigation. 
Table 5.7. Descriptive Statistics for Items in Factor Analvsis. N=120 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Loss of LoC1 .00 5.00 .4333 .9503 2.734 8.462 
Control LoC 2 .00 4.00 .6333 1.0202 1.514 1.343 
LoC 3 .00 6.00 1.1250 1.5695 1.487 1.507 
Fallacious F32 1.00 4.00 1.9417 .8431 .539 -.417 
Beliefs F33 1.00 4.00 2.1167 .8218 .149 -.773 
F34 1.00 4.00 2.4167 .7841 -.463 -.605 
F35 1.00 4.00 2.2833 .8320 -.130 -.836 
F36 1.00 4.00 1.7083 .6908 .925 1.376 
F37 1.00 4.00 2.5333 .8881 -.395 -.645 
F38 1.00 4.00 2.1417 .7917 .051 -.776 
F39 1.00 4.00 2.5167 .7777 -.656 -.303 
F40 1.00 4.00 2.5667 .7964 -.578 -.229 
F41 1.00 4.00 2.3333 .7485 -.267 -.612 
F42 1.00 4.00 2.2833 .7580 -.174 -.659 
Dissociation D23 1.00 4.00 2.0667 .8475 .125 -1.066 
D24 1.00 4.00 2.0333 .8593 .340 -.742 
D25 1.00 4.00 2.2000 .8461 .027 -.873 
D26 1.00 4.00 2.0667 .8475 .377 -.532 
D27 1.00 4.00 1.8000 .7053 .450 -.349 
D28 1.00 4.00 2.0750 .8009 .262 -.549 
029 1.00 4.00 2.0250 .8040 .152 -.967 
D30 1.00 4.00 2.0667 .9591 .679 -.399 
D31 1.00 4.00 1.7750 .7272 .641 .069 
General DG43 1.00 4.00 2.7917 .7548 -.587 .368 
Dissociation DG44 1.00 4.00 2.5083 .7559 -.088 -.299 
DG45 1.00 4.00 2.2500 .7247 .118 -.231 
DG46 1.00 4.00 2.6083 .7367 -.511 .021 
DG47 1.00 4.00 2.8167 .6215 -.711 1.303 
DG48 1.00 4.00 2.7083 .5855 -.610 .578 
DG49 1.00 4.00 3.0167 .5648 -.849 3.446 
DG50 1.00 4.00 2.6667 .6395 -.748 .598 
DG51 1.00 4.00 2.5583 .6835 -.294 -.083 
DG52 1.00 4.00 2.2667 .8475 .131 -.628 
The Loss of Control items were grouped into three parcels in an identical fashion to 
previously. The story in relation to the non-normality of the distribution in relation to the 
Loss of Control measmes was improved with the current data set, (see Table 5.7 above for 
the Skewness and Kurtosis measures of normality). However, as the Loss of Control 1 
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measure (related to the problems associated with the individuals' gambling activities) was 
not especially normally distributed, the Robust technique (as developed by Satorra and 
Bentler 1988) was again used. This method takes some account of the fact that some 
measmes are not normally distributed. Confirmatory Factor analysis was run on the data 
to see i f a similar model would account for this data, as it did for the data for the smdy in 
Chapter 4. 
The measurement model, run to check that the measures were measuring the factors 
that they were supposed to be measuring, was identical to that run with the previous data 
set (as depicted m Figme 4.1, Chapter 4), using a Maximmn Likelihood criterion. This 
resulted in a robust comparative fit index (CFI) of 0.929, suggesting that the model fit was 
adequate, with all the items loading significantly on the factors which they were supposed 
to load on. The resulting Satorra-Bentler scaled was 285.37, with 227 degrees of 
fireedom and a probability value of 0.0052. 
The Lagrange Multiplier Test (for adding parameters) again suggested that the 
model would account for the data significantly better i f the Question 24 (the same 
dissociation item as before) was allowed to load on the Loss of Control Factor. As this was 
a replication of the previous analysis, and made theoretical sense, the measmement model 
was re-run with this loading. The resulting Robust Comparative Fit index increased to 
0.938, whilst the Satorra-Bentler scaled fell to 276.37 with 226 degrees of fieedom. This 
loading was therefore followed through into all the subsequent analysis. 
One interesting and important point to note was that with the previous measmement 
models, the Lagrange Multiplier Test had suggested that the model would benefit 
significantly with the additional loading of the fhst fallacy item on the Dissociation factor. 
This additional loading, as mentioned, did not make theoretical sense. With the increased 
number of items within the fallacies and dissociation constructs and vidth this population, 
this suggested improvement was not significant. This indicated that the improvement 
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suggestion may have been spurious, and confirmed the decision not to allov/ this particular 
loading. 
The correlations between the Factors are displayed in Table 5.8 below. The 
strongest correlation was between the Fallacy and Dissociation factors, replicating the 
findings from the analysis on the previous chapter's data set. Additionally, all three factors 
were very strongly correlated. In this measmement model however, the Dissociation factor 
was more strongly correlated with the Loss of Control Factor, than the Fallacy factor was. 
This would favom the non-recursive model in which Fallacies lead to Dissociation that 
lead to Loss of Control, (F-D-LoC). However, the models that were raised in the previous 
chapter to offer accounts of the relationship between these constructs were assessed with 
the current data set. 
Table 5.8. Correlation Matrix for Factors 
Factor Loss of Control Fallacies Dissociation 
Loss of Control 1.00 0.560 0.657 
Fallacies ^ 1.00 0.787 
Dissociation 1.00 
Before these models were investigated using EQS, the fourth factor of possible 
interest was that of the general dissociation factor, measured by the items extracted firom 
the DEI (Bernstein and Putman 1986). 
The measmement model was nm with this additional factor to investigate the 
possible relationships between this general dissociation factor and the other constructs in 
the analysis, and also to check that the 10 General Dissociation items had in fact been 
measming a General Dissociation factor. The model assessed is presented in Figme 5.1, 
with these additional items loadmg on this additional factor (Factor 4). These fom Factors, 
Loss of Contiol, Fallacies, Dissociation (gambling) and General Dissociation were allowed 
to covary within the model. 
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Figure 5.1. The Path Diagram for the Measurement Model Which Was Investigated 
Factor 1 = Loss of Control 
Factor 2 = Fallacies 
Factors = Dissociation 
Factor 4 = General Dissociation 
The output fiom this analysis suggested that there were some problems with respect 
to the fourth factor, that of General Dissociation. The model fit was not especially stiong, 
with a Robust Comparative Fit Index of 0.887. The largest standardised residuals all 
appeared to be in relation to items within this measme. In addition, the Lagrange Multiplier 
test (for adding parameters) suggested that the model would be significantly better at 
accounting for the data i f extensive adjustments were made. The majority of these 
adjustments were in relation to some of these general dissociation items being allowed to 
load on Factor 1 (Loss of Contiol factor), some on Factor 2 (Erroneous Perceptions) and 
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some on Factor 3 (Dissociation - gambling specific). This suggested that some of the items 
within those extracted fiom the DEI were measuring different things. 
The final point regardmg the concem over this general dissociation measme, is that 
in the measmement model, it failed to correlate in any way with the other .constmcts (see 
Table 5.9 for the correlation matrix), whereas the inter-correlations between the otiier 
constracts were strong. 
Table 5.9. Correlation Matrix for Factors with General Dissociation 
Factor Loss of Control Fallacies Dissociation General Dissociation 
Loss of Control 1.00 0.561 0.657 0.109 
Fallacies 1.00 0.787 0.026 
Dissociation 1.00 0.053 
General Dissociation 1.00 
Although a complete investigation of the General Dissociation factor is beyond tiie 
scope of the current work, a preliminary investigation into a single (and then two) factor 
solution was conducted, to see i f the general dissociation measmes were measuring a 
unitary factor. 
A single factor Factor Analysis was run on the General Dissociation measmes on 
their own. The resultant fit was particularly poor; with a Comparative Fit Index of 0.772. 
This suggested that there may m fact be two or more sub-factors within the consti^ict of 
General Dissociation as measmed with the 10 items used hi the current smdy. A two 
factor exploratory factor analysis was therefore conducted to see whether the items used 
appeared to load on two different factors. The results provided evidence to suggest that 
there were some items loadmg on the two factors separately. Factor 1 was loaded on by 6 
items (DG - 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, See Table 5.2 above). These items appeared to be 
generahsed dissociation, whereas the items that loaded on Factor 2 (items D G - 45, 51, and 
52) appeared to be to do with a method of relinquishing responsibility, potentially blaming 
another person for their actions by eitiier implymg that they often feel that they are 
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watching themselves (firom an extemal perspective) domg the task - and that that is then 
role in the activity; or that they hear someone tellmg them what to do. 
However, these are somewhat arbitiary conceptualisations of these two factors and 
are rather ad-hoc. In addition to this, fiurther concem relates to the fact that the measures 
used for the dissociation scale, although extiacted from a validated general dissociation 
scale (Bemstein and Putman 1986), were still only a subset of the original questiormahe. 
Further research involving all 40 items in the original scale would be necessary to evaluate 
whether or not this General Dissociation scale could involve more than one factor. These 
sub-factors could then be re-investigated as to their relationship with the other constiructs, 
to see whether or not this Factor 2 both exists and is of relevance. It would be milikely that 
the General Dissociation factor (Factor 1) would have much to offer the model fittmg, 
because as a single factor concept it did not. However this would also need to be 
investigated fiurther. 
The fact that the General Dissociation factor did not relate to any of the other 
variables under investigation, and that the items appeared to be measuring more than one 
constiruct, lead to the conclusion that as a unitary constiruct it did not offer any useful 
information in the present context and was therefore dropped from the model and 
subsequent analysis. 
In smmnary therefore, the three factor measmement model outlined above was the 
most suitable model to work with, having a good Robust Comparative Fit Index (0.938), 
with the items loading on the constracts that they were supposed to load on. 
The models that were raised and discussed in the previous Chapter, were then re­
assessed with the new data set. Table 5.10 presents these models again whilst Table 5.11 
below provides the statistics resulting from the model fitting which can be used to assess 
the relative merits of the models. 
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Table 5.10. Possible models with theoretical relevance 
Model Factors 
F-D-LoG Fallacies • Dissociation • Loss of Control 
D-F-LoC Dissociation ^ Fallacies ^ Loss of Control 
F-LoC-D Fallacies ^ Loss of Control ^ Dissociation 
D-LoC-F Dissociation ^ Loss of Control ^ Fallacies 
Table 5.11. Measures of fit for a nmnber of variants of the model depicted m Figure 4.1. 
Model F-D-LoC D-F-LoC F-LoC-D D-LoC-F 
Non- Non- Non- Non-
recmsive recmsive recursive recmsive 
Robust Comparative Fit Mdex 0.939 0.929 0.900 0.900 
328.9 340.0 367.2 367.2 
Satorra-Bentler Scaled 277.1 284.9 308.7 308.6 
Degrees of Freedom 227 227 227 227 
Note: See Table 5.10 for a description of the models. 
The important objective was to evaluate which of these models best.fits the data 
collected in the current smdy, and whether the conclusions reached m the previous Chapter 
were replicated with this new sample vidth the extended items. 
What is a meaningfiil difference for one model to be significantly better than 
another? There are several criteria one can use. Firstly, one can observe the goodness of fit 
indices, (i.e. the Robust Comparative Fit Index (Robust CFI) of each model). A good, 
albeit a somewhat arbitrary, cut off point for a good model to data fit, would be in the 
absolute value for the Robust CFI to be above 0.9. The second method is observing the 
size of the for the model; the smaller the value the better the fit of the model (with 
respective degrees of freedom). 
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First of all it appeared that all four models had an adequate fit, represented by their 
strong Robust Comparative Fit Indices. As the Robust CFI is a measme of fit, the higher 
the index, the better the fit of the model to the data. Hence on initial comparison the F-D-L 
model appears to fit the best. 
In Chapter 4 the results indicated that it v a^s hard to determine between the D-F-
LoC and the F-D-LoC models as the difference between them was minimal. Although the 
X for the D-F-LoC model was smaller than the % for the F-D-LoC model (a difference of 
4.3), and the correlation between Fallacies and Loss of Control was stronger (0.549) than 
the correlation between Dissociation and Loss of Contiol (0.459), the Robust Comparative 
Fit hidices differed only marginally by 0.04 (Robust CFI's of 0.916 for the F-D-LoC 
model, and 0.920 for the D-F-LoC model). Thus with that data set it was hard to evaluate 
which of these two models best fit the data. 
The differences between the x^  values for the four non-recursive models under 
uivestigation fiom the current population are presented in the matrix Table 5.12 below. 
Table 5.12. Differences in for the Non-recursive Models Under Investigation. 
F-D-LoC D-F-LoC F-LoC-D D-LoC-F 
7.8 31.6 31.5 
23.8 23.7 
0.1 
F-D-LoC 
D-F-LoC 
F-LoC-D 
D-LoC-F 
One point to note is that the x^  difference between the F-D-LoC and the D-F-LoC 
models is less than the difference between either of these two models and any model in 
which LoC is in the middle (i.e. F-LoC-D or D-LoC-F). This again replicates the results 
fiom the Chapter 4 smdy and supports the notion that the models that involve LoC at the 
end (as a consequence of the relationship between Fallacies and Dissociation) fit the data 
the best. 
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What was therefore clear was that these two (F-D-LoC and D-F-LoC) models were 
substantially better fits of the data than either of the models in which LoC was not a dhect 
consequence of the relationship between Fallacies and Dissociation. 
Furthermore, with the current data sample and with the additional Fallacy and 
Dissociation items, it became easier to distinguish between these two models. The fit 
indices for the F-D-LoC model was 0.939 which was higher, representing a better fit, than 
the D-F-LoC model, which had a fit mdex of 0.929. Additionally, tiie F-D-LoC had a 
smaller of 211.1, witii 227 degrees of fieedom, as compared to 284.9 for the D-F-LoC 
model. 
The correlation between Fallacies and Dissociation was stionger than the 
correlation between Fallacies and Loss of Contiol. Likewise, the correlation between 
Dissociation and Loss of Contiol was stionger than the relationship between Fallacies and 
Loss of Contiol. Both of these correlations along with the differences m between the 
models, and the respective Robust CFPs, suggest that the F-D-LoC model fitted the data 
most appropriately. 
5.2.3. Factor Analysis for the Heuristics and Biases 
"Performance" Analysis 
This smdy sought to investigate the relationship between the variables of Fallacies, 
Dissociation and Loss of Contiol and people's performance on the tasks. What is meant by 
performance is the extent to which the individual is biased or applies the certain heuristics 
when making a decision about the outcome of a future uncertain event. The extent to which 
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the participants' responses differed firom the objective expected (normative) rate was 
calculated and taken as this measme of "bias". 
For each item therefore, the objective normative response or the appropriate 
confidence level was subtracted from the participants' response, such that a signed 
difference resulted. For example, on the first question which asked how confident of then 
prediction the participants would be i f they were to predict the outcome of a flip of a coin 
(a baseline confidence measme), i f the individual's response was above 50 they would end 
up with a positive integer, representing the fact that they were over confident. Likewise for 
the Base Rate item (Kahneman and Tversky 1973), which the posterior probability of the 
cab being blue was 0.41, the participant's response was converted into a deviance fiom 
this normative probability. If the response was higher than this then this represented the 
fact that they had ignored the base rate information about the acmal percentage of cabs in 
the city. 
A n exploratory factor analysis was run to extiact fom factors ^. A l l fom resultmg 
factors had clear item loadmgs. Table 5.13 below shows the Factor Loadings on each of 
the items within the analysis, whilst Table 5.14 presents the correlation matrix for these 
factors. See Appendix 6b for the complete output of this factor analysis. 
^ A three and a five factor solution were also investigated. The results however suggested that clear 
identification of the resulting factors within each solution did not occur. Furthermore, the resulting factors 
were not particularly interpretable, hence the analysis rested on the reported four factor solution. 
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Table 5.13. Pattem Matrix Showing Item-Factor Loadings, for the Four.Factor Solution 
Factor 1 Factor2 Factors Factor4 
baseline gambling (g) .293 .280 -.071 -.290 
baseline non-gambling (ng) .188 -.135 .000 .005 
sequences.g.short info,25/75 .442 -0.029 -.072 .031 
sequences.g.long info,25/75 .795 -.110 .013 .093 
sequences.g.siiort info,50/50 .805 .028 -.086 .001 
sequences.gjong lnfo,50/50 .599 -.064 .106 -.083 
sequences.ng.short info,25/75 .757 -.002 .031 .001 
sequences.ng.long info,25/75 .802 -.079 .073 .024 
sequences.ng.short info.50/50 .606 .066 -.058 -.099 
sequences.ng.long info.50/50 .537 -.011 .151 -:021 
availability - word estimate ing-n -.036 .015 .114 -.067 
Avail, but confidence in k - word estimate -.055 -.037 -.009 .017 
avail, confidence in k word (m) .335 -.102 -.062 .165 
base rate gambling .010 -.189 -.085 .394 
base rate non-gambling .000 -.051 -.130 .377 
percept of randomness,g,0.2 -.078 .473 .099 .156 
percept of randomness,g,0.4 .053 .621 -.188 .286 
percept of randomness,g,0.6 -.064 .759 -.242 .230 
percept of randomness.g.O.S -.094 .812 .075 -.173 
confidence in g.p.r. 0.2 .053 .072 .040 .761 
confidence in g.p.r. 0.4 .049 .106 .007 .845 
confidence in g.p.r. 0.6 -.053 .104 .084 .738 
confidence in g.p.r. 0.8 .056 .175 .116 .586 
percept of randomness,ng,0.2 -.109 .460 .286 -.037 
percept of randomness.ng,0.4 -.070 .281 .146 .024 
percept of randomness.ng,0.6 .125 .823 -.025 -.179 
percept of randomness.ng.O.B -.034 .799 .141 -.285 
confidence in ng.p.r. 0.2 .026 .001 .890 .035 
confidence in ng.p.r. 0.4 .079 .132 .787 .017 
confidence in ng.p.r. 0.6 .076 .115 .829 -.035 
confidence in ng.p.r. 0.6 .076 .115 .829 -.035 
confidence in ng.p.r. 0.8 -.052 -.097 .932 -.044 
confidence in ng.p.r. 0.8 -.052 -.097 .932 -.044 
hindsight, gambling -.113 -.128 .012 .316 
hindsight, gambling -.113 -.128 .012 .316 
hindsight, non-gambling .144 .303 -.249 -.140 
hindsight, non-gambling .144 .303 -.249 -.140 
gamblers fallacy .360 .213 -.130 -.087 
gamblers fallacy .360 .213 -.130 -.087 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
Table 5.14. Correlation matrix for the four factors extracted 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
1 1.00 0.104 0.417 0.371 
2 1.00 0.381 0.479 
3 1.00 ' 0.549 
4 1.00 
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Table 5.13 presents the Pattem Matrix for the loadings that each of the items had on 
each of the factors. As can be seen, the Sequences items loaded heavily on Factor 1. these 
items related to the individual's use of past information in making both then decision about 
the next outcome and their confidence in then judgement. One explanation of why people 
would be confident followmg the presentation of tiie mformation is that they would have 
acmally used it to make a decision. If they had not utiUsed the information, as would be 
appropriate as past information has no bearing on fiiture outcomes on these chance 
determined events, then individuals would be expected to be no more confident than 
objective probability would warrant. The scale offered was fiom zero to 100, with the 
implied midway of 50 as uncertain, i.e. neither confident nor unconfident. 
No other items loaded heavily on this Factor, and these items did not load heavily 
on any other Factor. Interpreting Factor 1 therefore, it appeared that it had to do with the 
inappropriate use of past information when making a decision about a ftiture event. This 
factor explained 21.90% of the variance. The gamblers fallacy item also loaded to some 
extent on this factor. This item asked how confident the respondent would be on the next 
tiial, given that they had just won the recent tiials. Again then, this is a past information 
item, and those who were more confident having just won the recent tiials, tended also to 
be those who made use of past information. What was interesting about the items that 
loaded on this factor, is that it was not type specific. In other words, it was not only the 
gambling sequence item responses that loaded on this factor, but also the non-gambling 
sequence items. This suggests that the factor relates to a general tendency to use past 
information when making a decision, and also suggests that those people who make use of 
past information in the gambling context also appear to make use of past information in 
non-gambling simations as well. 
This factor would therefore be expected to be correlated with Fallacies, Loss of 
Contiol, Dissociation, Frequency, Amount spent and typical Length of an episode. The 
investigation of this wil l follow the discussion of the other factors. 
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From viewing Table 5.13 in relation to the second factor extracted, there was a 
different cluster of items that loaded on it. These were the perception of randonuiess items, 
again both in a gamblmg and non-gambling context. As there were no other items that 
loaded heavily on this factor, and as these items did not load heavily on any other factor, 
this factor can be interpreted as an understanding of the principle of randonmess. This 
factor explained 10.77% of the variance (see Table 5.15) and was loaded on by both the 
gambling and non-gambling specific perception of randonmess items which suggested that 
it was a general imderstanding of randonmess factor. People who understand the principle 
of randonmess and the independence of events do so in any context. This would be 
expected as it would be strange i f the principle was understood and applied in one, but not 
another, context. However, although people may have a clear understanding of the 
principle of randonmess they may not acmally use it. 
Table 5.15. Percentage of Variance Explained by Each Factor 
Factor % of Variance Cimaulative % 
1 21.90 21.90 
2 10.77 32.67 
3 5.05 37.72 
4 4.82 42.55 
The third and fourth factors extracted were loaded on by the items relating to 
people's confidence in their judgements of the apparent randonmess of the sequences 
which they were presented with. The third factor was loaded on by the non-gambling 
confidence items whereas the fourth was loaded on by the gambling confidence items. 
These factors therefore appeared to have less to do with bias, but rather to do with the 
observation that some people have inflated confidence with respect to gambling items 
(Factor 4) whereas others have inflated confidence with respect to non-gambling 
randonmess judgements (Factor 3). Additionally, these factors only accounted for a very 
small percentage of the variance. 
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Stanovich's individual difference approach has received some support in that these 
factors do seem to offer some account for the differences in performance across the tasks. 
The extent to which the two main factors interpreted here as the inappropriate Use of Past 
information and the Understanding of the Principle of Randomness, are related to the 
intelhgence and the thinking disposition factors that Stanovich proposes would need some 
exploration in a future study. 
One way to assess whether the interpretation of these factors not only makes 
theoretical sense but also that the mterpretation is vaUd, is to calculate factor scores for 
each participant and correlate them with the other variables measured. At the same time 
this procedure allows for the uivestigation of the relationship between these other variables 
(Frequency items. Loss of Control, and Dissociation) with these four factors. If there were 
significant relationships observed, this would provide information as to whether or not 
higher frequency gamblers were more or less affected by the heuristics and biases, and 
whether or not the context (gambling or non-gambling) in which the item was presented 
made a difference in this respect. 
As mentioned above. Factor 1 interpreted as having to do v^ith the use of past 
information when making a decision about a future uncertain event, would be expected to 
correlate positively With. Fallacies, Dissociation, and potentially therefore Loss of Control, 
in addition to the jBrequency type items. 
If people do not make use of past information, as they are aware that its use wil l not 
objectively increase the chance of success on any particular trial, in other words they 
maintain the understanding of the randonmess principle (Factor 2), then they would be 
expected to not partake in gambling activities to the same degree, and to hold less 
fallacious beliefs about the tasks. This Factor should therefore correlate negatively with 
these other variables. Table 5.16 below presents these correlations. 
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Table 5.16. Correlations for Factor Scores with other variables 
No of Amount spent Total Amount 
forms Frequency over 12 months Length Total LoC Total F Total D Total DG conf spent Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
No of forms 1.000 .536* .376* .437* .488* .446* .449* .017 .130 .162 .131 -.035 .177 .033 
Frequency .536* 1.000 .238* .439* .419* .430* .415* -.122 .034 .193 .143 -.127 .035 -.076 
Amount 12 months .376* .238* 1.000 .162 .311* .242* .293* .050 .102 .462* .095 .077 .187 -.090 
Length .437* .439* .162 1.000 .424* .510* .523* -.048 -.048 .239* .020 -.179 .048 -.028 
Total LoC .488* .419* .311* .424* 1.000 .455* .570* .052 .145 .186 .080 -.126 .175 .062 
Total F .446* .430* .242* .510* .455* 1.000 .656* .006 -.013 .145 .055 -.154 .064 -.010 
Total D .449* .415* .293* .523* .570* .656* 1.000 .049 .189 .223* .193* -.016 .256* .145 
Total DG .017 -.122 .050 -.048 .052 .006 .049 1.000 .068 -.148 -.008 .096 .142 .016 
Total confidence .130 .034 .102 -.048 .145 -.013 .189 .068 1.000 -.030 .802* .402* .798* .672* 
Amount spent .162 .193 .462* .239* .186* .145 .223* -.148 -.030 1.000 -.030 -.054 -.014 -.010 
Factor 1 .131 .143 .095 .020 .080 .055 .193* -.008 .802* -.030 1.000 .079 .443* .379* 
Factor 2 -.035 -.127 .077 -.179 -.126 -.154 -.016 .096 .402* -.054 .079 1.000 .406* .510* 
Factor 3 .177 .035 .187 .048 .175 .064 .256* .142 .798* -.014 .443* .406* 1.000 .580* 
Factor 4 .033 -.076 -.090 -.028 .062 -.010 .145 .016 .672* -.010 .379* .510*" .580* 1.000 
(Significant correlations are suffixed with a *, j:7<0.05) 
Generally where the correlations failed to reach significance, they were still in the 
predicted direction. The correlation between Factor 1 (Use of Past Information) and 
Dissociation (gambling) was significant at the 5% level. This suggested that the people 
who used past information tended also to be the people who experienced the greatest level 
of gambling specific dissociation. This factor also correlated positively, although weakly 
and not significantly, with Loss of Contiol, Fallacies, Number of Forms and the Frequency 
of gambling behaviour. So although this relationship was not significant, the direction of 
the relationship suggested that those people who gamble more frequently were also the 
ones who tended to be the people who made use of past information more readily. 
Factor 2 (Understanding of Randonmess principle) did not correlate significantly 
with these other variables. Again however, the relationship was in the predicted direction. 
The more someone understood the independence of events principle, the individual took 
part in less gambling Forms, less Frequently, spent less money hi a typical gambling 
episode, became less Dissociated and held fewer Fallacious beliefs about the activities. 
One correlation which was significant was between this factor and the total confidence 
measure. This positive correlation suggested that the more the individual understood the 
principle of randomness, the more confident they would be. Although this may appear an 
obscme result, it is possible tiiat this correlation arose due to it being a total confidence 
score. This measure therefore includes, for example, the confidence in the participants 
judgements of randonmess perception. It is likely that these people who believed that the 
outcome sequences presented were equally random (and very random) were also very 
confident in then judgements. 
The main interesting correlation with respect to Factor 3 (Confidence in non-
gambling items) was the significant positive relationship it had with gambling 
Dissociation. Factor 4 (Confidence in gambling items) would have been expected to be 
more stiongly correlated with this variable. However, both correlations were positive, 
suggesting that those people who were confident in gambling and non-gambling items 
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tended to be those who became dissociated during gamblmg. This is backed up by the 
positive (although not significant) correlation between Total Confidence and Dissociation. 
Both of these factors correlated positively and significantly -with the Total Confidence 
measure. The fom factors extiacted and their interpretation appear therefore to have 
validity. However, the interpretation of Factors 3 and 4 must be tieated vidth some caution 
as these Factors are particularly weak, explaining only a very small percentage of the 
variance, (5.05% and 4.82% respectively). 
The next stage of the process was to investigate the natme of the relationship 
between these four factors and the factors identified in the previous analysis, namely the 
Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Contiol constructs. 
5.2.4. Analysis Combining 7 Factors 
People who understand the principle of randonmess (Factor 2 in the "performance" 
analysis) would be less likely to develop erroneous perceptions about the task. If they have 
grasped the concept that each outcome is independent of those that have occurred before, 
they would be fiilly aware that the use of past information would be fiitile, in terms of 
objectively increasing the likelihood of success on any given fiitme tiial. These people 
would therefore be less likely to become dissociated on the task, as they would not be 
expected to be focusing on the past information. They would also therefore be less likely to 
lose contiol over their gambhng behaviom and perhaps also less likely to gamble in the 
first place. 
In the same vain. Dissociation would also be expected to be related to the "Use of 
past information" factor, (Factor 1 hi the "performance" analysis). People who believe that 
past information can and should be used, wil l need to focus consciously on the previous 
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outcome information so that they can subjectively increase then chance of success on a 
subsequent trial. In doing so, the dissociative experience, as characterised by a narrovraig 
of attention on the task at hand, would be more likely to result. 
Another expected relationship to appear would be between Fallacies and the factor 
relating to confidence in choice on gambling outcomes, (Factor 4 in the "performance" 
analysis). The people who hold many fallacious behefs about the tasks are likely to be 
those that are more confident in then choice of gamble than those, that hold very few 
fallacious behefs. If they haven't grasped the notion of independence of events, then they 
are likely to believe that after a long series of Red's on the roulette wheel, a Black outcome 
is increasingly more likely; and would therefore be more confident in betting on a Black 
outcome. 
However, before any of these could be investigated, a measurement model was nm 
within HQS to ensme that there were no extensive cross loadings of items on other factors; 
i.e. the measures within each hypothesised factor were loading on that factor alone, and not 
on any others. 
The model emerging fiom the above "performance" factor analysis was 
incorporated into a confirmatory factor analysis in order to find out about the correlation 
between the constmcts emerging fiom the exploratory factor analysis and those previously 
considered, namely Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Control. 
Only the items that loaded heavily on each of the four factors were carried through 
into the following procedme. 
Within the resulting measmement model each of the four "performance" factors 
were allowed to covary with each of the factors aheady considered. When conducting a 
confirmatory factor analysis With factors that have been derived by extraction fiom an 
exploratory factor analysis, caution needs to be exercised in relation to the fit of the 
283 
exploratory derived portion of the combmed model or any fit statistics which incorporate 
this. This is because this part of the model is bound to fit the data because of the way it has 
been derived. 
The measurement model that resulted did not fit the data particularly well. The 
Robust CFI was 0.827. The Lagrange Multiplier Test (for addmg parameters) did not 
suggest any significant improvements to the model which would have made theoretical 
sense. 
Before rejecting the model fit however, the correlations between the seven factors 
are presented in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17. Correlations Among Independent Variables 
Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loss of Contiol 1 1.00 0.555* 0.653* 0.025 -0.160 0.060 0.073 
Fallacies 2 1.00 0.781* -0.100 -0.336* -0.126 -0.175 
Dissociations 1.00 0.032 -0.232* -0.058 -0.169 
Use of Information 4 1.00 0.011 0.463* 0.366* 
Understandmg of Randomness 5 1.00 0.399* 0.565* 
Confidence in non-gambling items 6 1.00 0.622* 
Confidence in gambling items 7 1.00 
Significant correlations are marked with an *; p<0.05. 
What is apparent is that none of the factors extiacted fiom the exploratory 
("performance") factor analysis correlated significantly with the Loss of Contiol factor. 
This might be due to the possibility that Loss of Contiol is far removed fiom these other 
factors; in other words, that there may be another intervening variable (or other variables) 
that play their part before the Loss of Contiol state is reached. 
It is also worth noting that it appears that those people who do understand the 
principle of randonmess are those that do not develop many fallacious beliefs about the 
task, experience less dissociation and do not suffer fiom a loss of control. Noteworthy 
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correlations therefore include the significant correlation between the "Understanding 
Randomness" factor and Fallacies, -0.336. This was as predicted, and is consistent with the 
notion that the more a person understands the principle of randomness, the less fallacious 
beliefs that person wil l develop and maintain about tiie gamblmg activity. 
This Understanding of Randomness factor also correlated negatively (-0.126), 
although not significantly, with Loss of Contiol, such that the more an individual believed 
in the independence of events, the lower the loss of contiol they experienced. 
The correlation between Dissociation and Understanding of Randonmess was also 
significant, with a correlation coefficient of -0.232. The negative correlation represents the 
finding that the less a person understands the basic principle of randonmess, the greater the 
dissociative experience. 
The expectation that the relationship between Dissociation and the "Use of Past 
Information" factor would be stiong and positive did not result, with a very weak but 
positive correlation of 0.03. The correlation between Fallacies and Confidence in 
Gambling items, was not significant either, nor was it in the predicted direction, with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.175. 
However, as this measmement model did not fit the data particularly well, the 
reason for this negative correlation could be lie in the fact that this Confidence in 
Gambling items factor was not a particularly valid construct (it only explained a small 
proportion of the variance in responses). 
In addition, an important observation was that out of these extia fom 
"performance" factors, only the Understanding of Randonmess factor correlated in any 
interesting way with the Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Contiol. The other factors 
correlated among themselves, but did not interact with these other constructs. These other 
factors therefore had no clear relationship (dhect or indhect) with the Loss of Contiol, and 
would therefore not be particularly usefiil in a model explaining conthiued play. For the 
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next stage of the analysis, only this Understanding of Randonmess factor was brought 
forward. 
In relation to the evaluation of the four factor models in which the Understanding 
of Randonmess factor was involved with the Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Control, it 
would be odd i f the Understanding of Randomness factor (R) did not load better on 
Fallacies directly (R-F-D-LoC) than it did on Dissociation (R-D-F-LoC). Examhung the 
correlations between the factors resulting firom the measurement model would provide 
clarification of this. 
A four factor measurement model was therefore run within EQS, allowing 
Understanding of Randomness, Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Control to covary 
within the model. 
Although the resulting fit was still not particularly strong, the fit index had 
increased fiom 0.827 to 0.837 suggesting that this four factor model was better at 
predicting the data than the model with all the "performance" factors. The correlations 
between the factors are presented in Table 5.18 below. 
Table 5.18.Correlations Among Independent Variables 
Loss of Understanding of 
Control Fallacies Dissociation Randonmess 
Loss of Control 1.00 0.553* 0.651* -0.162 
Fallacies 1.00 0.782* -0.345* 
Dissociation 1.00 -0.239* 
Understanding of Randomness 1.00 
Significant correlations are marked with an *; ^<0.05. 
The strength of the correlations between the constructs signals the probable 
direction of their relationship. The fact that again the correlation between Fallacies and 
Dissociation was stionger than the correlation between Fallacies and Loss of Contiol, 
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suggested that Fallacies become estabUshed leading to a Dissociation leaduig to Loss of 
Control. 
The reason why the measmement model did not fit the data particularly well had to 
be investigated. Considering that the three factor model (Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss 
of Control) fitted the data, this suggested that the reason may lie with the fourth factor, 
namely the Understanding of Randonmess construct. 
Further investigation revealed that the correlations between the randonmess items 
were heavily over-represented within the residual matrix, suggesting that this one factor 
might not have been enough. A smgle factor model on the Understanding of Randonmess 
construct was therefore conducted to see i f there was any evidence to suggest that more 
than one factor should be employed to account for the responses to these "randonmess" 
items. 
Again the model fit was found not to be particularly strong, with a Robust CFI of 
0.796. A l l the items loading on this Understanding of Randonmess factor had to do with 
their perception of randomness of a presented sequence of outcomes. It is possible that the 
participants recognised that the gambling and non-gambling items within this perception of 
randonmess material was related, and might also have been able to remember what they 
wrote on the previous items. The fact that all the gambling items came first, followed later 
in the questiomiaire by all the non-gambling perception of randonmess items, lends support 
to this idea. Because of the fact that these responses were therefore likely to be related, 
residual pairs were allowed to covary within the model, to see i f this benefited the model 
fit. Each gambling probability item residual was allowed to correlate with its counterpart 
non-gambling item. For example, the residual for the gambling 0.2 perception of 
randomness item was allowed to correlate with the equivalent non-gambling item. 
The resulting model fit was an improved 0.873. However, although the resultant 
residual correlation matrix (see Table 5.19) provided evidence that two of the pairs were 
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correlated (strongly and positively) as allovi^ed for, there were two item pahs that did not 
correlate to the same extent. 
If the reason for the lack of initial fit had been solely due to the notion that 
participants could have remembered their previous responses, and hence these responses 
were correlated, then one would expect all item pairs to be correlated both positively and 
strongly. As Table 5.19 shows, this was not the case, raising concem regardmg this 
technique for improving the fit of the model. 
Table 5.19. Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables (residuals) 
Non-Gamblmg 
Gambling Item 02 0^ 4 0^ 6 0.8 
0.2 0.408 
0.4 -0.064 
0.6 -0.486 
0.8 0.408 
If they had been of the same sign (specifically all positive), this would have 
suggested that the participants could have responded to the later similar items in relation 
(with the help of their memory) to their responses to the previous (and related) items. 
The fact that the correlation between two pairs were strong and positive (0.408) 
suggests that for these items, there was some priming effect of the previous items 
responded to. However, of the other two pairs (the 0.4 and 0.6 probability) one was stiong 
whilst the other was weak, and both negative. 
This raises some concems with respect to the measurement of this "Understanding 
of Randonmess" factor. However, this factor did correlate with Dissociation and Fallacies, 
but not with Loss of Contiol. This does provide evidence that this factor is important and 
may well be a precursor to extended play and loss of control. Rimning and testing the fit 
of various models (stractmal equation modelhng) would help to identify at which point the 
Understanding of Randonmess factor had most effect. It would help determine whether 
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most of its effect was directly omo Fallacies then on to Dissociation, before Dissociation 
influenced Loss of Control, or whether the Understandmg of Randonmess factor heavily 
influenced the Dissociation factor directly. However, as the measurement model's fit index 
was not particularly strong, structural equation modelling which was used to help 
distinguish between the various non-recmsive models, could not be implemented here. 
Further research would have to be done expanding on and developing the items that 
measmed this Understanding of Randonmess factor. The implications of this factor will be 
fiirther discussed in the final chapter. 
5.3. Discussion 
hi summary therefore, several fmdmgs of theoretical importance have come to 
light. Firstly, the relationship between Fallacies, Dissociation and Loss of Contiol was 
replicated within the current smdy. Fmthermore, the evidence tended to favour the 
account of the data provided by one of the models. The model that fitted the data best was 
the model m which the level of Fallacious beliefs uifluenced the level of Dissociation 
within the gamblmg activity, the result of which influenced the degree of the Loss of 
Contiol. This has expanded upon the Ladouceur model in which the development and 
maintenance of erroneous perceptions are seen as the primary and main cause for an 
individuals loss of contiol. The current analysis has however, demonstiated that the picture 
is not as sunple as that. What emerges is the important influence of erroneous perceptions 
on the extent to which someone becomes dissociated whilst gambling. The correlation 
between Dissociation and Loss of Contiol was stionger than the correlation between 
Fallacies and the Loss of Contiol. This, along with the model fit indices and the values, 
represents the fact that the extent of fallacious beliefs held does have an effect on the level 
of loss of contibl experienced, but via an intervening construct, that of Dissociation. 
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The study also showed that the concept of General Dissociation had no observable 
relationship with the other constructs imder investigation. The extent to which an 
individual became dissociated in everyday life, had no bearing on whether or not they 
became dissociated within the gambling context, and additionally had no effect on 
gambling behaviom or consequences. However, it was noted that only a subset of the DES 
(Bemstein and Putman, 1986) items were used to measure this general dissociation. 
Furthermore, it was noted that the items used to assess this, appeared to be potentially 
loading on two separate factors, suggestmg that the DES may itself benefit from a factor 
analytical technique, to ensme that this general dissociation factor is a singular construct. 
From the performance analysis, it was possible to conclude that although there 
appeared to be four factors resulting, the only factor of theoretical interest which had some 
bearing on the other constmcts under investigation, was the factor relating to an 
individual's grasp of the independence of events concept, particularly the ability to 
acknowledge and understand the principle of randonmess. The other candidate which 
came close to being of value was the Factor relating dhectly to the use of past information. 
Although the correlation between this factor and the other constmcts was not significant 
(except for with Dissociation) the correlations were in the predicted dhection. Further 
research could attempt to develop thie measurement of this factor to discover whether it 
does in fact have a significant bearing on the current discussion. 
Although Frequency did correlate sfrongly with Loss of Confrol, the Understanding 
of Randomness factor did not. The other performance factors relating to the degree that 
hemistics and biases play a role in excessive play did not correlate with any of these 
variables. Even the Understanding of Randonmess factor, although it correlated with 
Fallacies and Dissociation in the predicted dhection (it correlated negatively and 
significantly with both), it did not correlate directly with Loss of Confrol. The clear 
conclusion to be drawn from these results is that higher frequency gamblers did not appear 
to be more biased than the lower frequency players in the sample. 
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There are several reasons why the analysis on the use of heuristics and biases was 
not more J&uitful. Firstly, only a limited range of hemistics were assessed. Secondly, the 
way in which they were assessed may have been too far removed from acmal gambling 
simations. Asking questions presented on paper with hypothetical past outcomes may have 
been too different from acmally sitting at a roulette table to have invoked the use of the 
same thought processes that the real gambling scenario would. A ftirther possible cause 
may have been the sample recruited. The majority of the higher frequency gamblers that 
were asked to take part declined to do so. Recruitment was attempted at Newton Abbott 
Race Comse an horn and a half before the days races commenced. No one agreed to take 
part out of the 40 people approached, representing the fact that those participants who 
agreed to take part (from those asked within the off-course betting agencies) may 
themselves reflect a bias m samplmg. A fiirther bias in sampling arises due to the fact that 
the higher frequency group were all recmited from within these agencies, thereby 
reflecting a bias in terms of the gambling activities that the participants frequented. The 
majority of these gamblers bet mainly on horse and dog races, whilst many items within 
the questioimaire related to games which are available within a Casino establishment. 
Running fiirther smdies offering greater incentives with participants covering a much 
wider range of gambling forms, whilst tapping these gambling forms more thoroughly with 
the questionnaire items, may provide more fiiiitfiil results. 
What is clear from the current Performance factor analysis, which is consistent with 
Stanovich's individual difference approach, is that there appear to be consistent general 
factors that seem to offer some account for performance across a range of hemistic and 
bias type tasks. The Performance factor analysis here revealed two factors, interpreted as 
the Understanding of the Principle of Randonmess and the Use of Past Information, which 
appeared to underlie performance. 
As discussed earlier, Stanovich (1990) and Stanovich and West (1998) 
demonstiated evidence for two factors underlying performance on the tasks that they 
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investigated. The extent to which the two factors extracted in the current work relate to 
their cognitive capacity and thinking disposition factors needs to be explored. It is not 
imlikely that that inteUigence levels would be good predictors of whether or not someone 
believes in the independence of events. 
However the relationship between the observed factors and loss of control with 
respect to gamblmg is less clear. In the current work neither of the two resulting factors 
correlated significantly v^th Loss of Control. Additionally, no. particular differences 
appeared in the way that high and low frequency gamblers responded to and displayed the 
use of the heuristics and biases assessed. 
So although there may be individual differences in the performance on these tasks 
and in the decision to gamble or not to gamble, based on the cvuxent results this approach 
seems unlikely to differentiate between those maintain contiol over then gambling and 
those who continue to problematic levels. However, the possibUity that the two factors that 
Stanovich proposed are related to Loss of Contiol can not be ruled out, and warrants 
further investigation. 
The relationship between the level of Fallacious beliefs. Dissociation (gamblmg 
specific) and Loss of Contiol was replicated very clearly with the current investigation. 
What was also clear was that evidence tended to favour the F-D-LoC model in terms of 
accoxmting for the data. These results therefore suggest that the level of Fallacious beliefs 
does not act as a solitary construct in influencing the level of loss of contiol experienced. 
Rather, the extent of the fallacious beliefs held encomages the experience of a dissociative 
state, which in tum influences the loss of contiol. Altiiough not too stiong an emphasis can 
be placed on the observations with respect to the Understanding of Randonmess factor, the 
correlation between Understanding of Randonmess and the Fallacies factor was stionger 
than the correlation between Understanding of Randomness and Dissociation. This 
suggests that underlying the Fallacies factor is tiie imderstandtng of the principle of 
randonmess, implying that the less people are aware of the independence of events, the 
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greater the number of erroneous perceptions are built up and maintained, which encourage 
the dissociative state, which in tum increases the chance of reaching the position at which 
it is infinitely harder to cease one's gambling behaviour. 
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6. Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1. Introduction 
This thesis aimed to investigate the role of the cognitive perspective in the 
explanation of gambling behaviour. In particular, the thesis set out to test the validity of 
three versions of the cognitive perspective, v^^hich were labelled the "strong", "weak" and 
"integrative" hypotheses in Chapter 1. The strong cognitive hypothesis was tested in 
relation to whether the order of information participants receive dming a task can itself can 
lead to exaggerated perceptions of success, but particularly to differential levels of future 
success rate predictions and hence future expected play. The focus here was on testing the 
claim from Langer and Roth (1975) that early wins can induce a magnified illusion of 
contiol as compared to other types of sequence. The weak cognitive hypothesis was tested 
with a view to investigating the notion that although the way people react to what happens 
during the task is important, an individual differences perspective is necessary to explain 
differential levels of play. In relation to this, the extent to which people employed a 
rational or experiential processing style was examined, along with the extent to which 
people used some hemistics and were affected by biases in their decision making. This 
investigation also focused on whether there were any individual differences in the extent to 
which someone becomes dissociated in everyday hfe. Fhially, the integrative hypothesis 
was investigated by evaluating the relationship between erroneous beliefs dming gambling, 
levels of dissociation experienced whilst gambling, and loss of contiol of gambling 
behaviom. 
The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the results of the smdies presented above 
with a view to final evaluation of the three hypotheses. Initially the evidence for each of 
these hypotheses wil l be considered in turn, and a number of caveats to the experimental 
work are presented along with recommendations for fiiture research. Finally the chapter 
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wil l examine the implications the results have for the explanation of both normal and 
problematic levels of gambling behaviour, and the implications for therapy are discussed. 
6.2. Summary of findmgs 
6.2.1. The Strong Cognitive Hypothesis 
The fhst two experimental chapters investigated the "strong cognitive hypothesis". 
It was argued that i f it was the case that cognitive processes alone could account for the 
different levels of play, then the order of the events experienced during a task may be good 
predictors of the levels of play. The case was presented that gambling activities can be 
viewed as decision making tasks. People have to decide how confident they are in their 
chosen outcome for the next event when both choosing between alternatives and placing a 
bet itself The chapters investigated the role of outcome mformation gathered during the 
task in relation to its effect on people's short and longer term confidence levels. 
First of all, in relation to tiie turtle tasks presented at three different probabilities, 
the effect of the precise win sequence had very little effect on participants' short and long 
term measures at the end of the task. This demonstiates the fmding that although 
participants had developed an Illusion of Contiol, represented by their over inflated 
confidence and future success rate predictions, the standard order effects (as observed by 
Langer and Roth, 1975) were not cleanly replicated. 
The lack of difference between the Descending and the Ascending sequences could 
be explained in terms of the effect of eliciting measures throughout the tiials. The late wins 
experienced by those in the Ascending sequence could have had the effect of raising 
responses to similar levels to those of early win participants. This indeed was the case, as 
the analysis on the step by step measures revealed. This methodology had therefore 
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obliterated the order effects as observed by Langer and Roth (1975), supportmg in part the 
belief revision model of Hogarth and Einhom (1992). The importance of this lies in the 
fact that the methodology used within these experiments more closely resembles the real 
gambling scenario. Here the win sequence had no significant bearing on participants' 
confidence in the next trial and their longer term estimates of success at the end of the 
trials. The Illusion of Control and specifically the order effects observed by Langer and 
Roth (1975) may therefore be less pertinent to the explanation of gambling as was 
previously thought. 
Although these resuhs do not provide sufficient evidence for the strong cognitive 
hypothesis in terms differential levels of play, they do support this hypothesis in relation to 
gambling in general. This was particularly the case in relation to the measmes elicited on a 
trial by trial basis. A clear recency effect was observed that was consistent across all three 
experiments conducted. It was clear that participants were basing their responses 
throughout the task on the success or failme of then recent predictions. Throughout the 
early stages of the early win sequence, participants were consistently responding with 
higher estimates, both in terms of short term confidence and longer term estimates of 
• success than participants who were losing predominantly early on. By the end of the trials, 
those having lost early on, became more confident (short and longer term) when they 
began winning trials as they approached the end of the sequence. Those in the early vwn 
sequence then became less confident (short and long term) throughout the latter part of 
their sequence when they were predominantly losing. 
Interestingly, there was a consistent difference between participants' short term 
confidence and their longer term estimates of success. Furthermore, this difference became 
greater as the probability of success inherent in the task decreased. Confidence generally 
started off (and remained) higher than Next 100 predictions of success. What appeared to 
be happening was that confidence remahied mid-way on the confidence scale (nearer to the 
50% confident mark) and did not appear to be as dependent upon the likelihood of success 
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on the task, (i.e. the number of turtles in the race). This lead to severely over inflated 
responses vi^ hen the probability of success decreased. On the other hand. Next 100 
predictions were more dependent upon (more anchored to) the objective rate of success; as 
the probability decreased so did participants' longer term estimates of success. 
This suggests that participants were aware of the fact that m the long run they 
would only wm at a chance rate as prescribed by the probability of success inherent withm 
the task. Participants were able to adjust their longer term estimates of success much more 
appropriately across all three probability tasks. However, people still tended to think that 
i f they were distracted then they would perform significantly worse at the task. This 
implies that they beheve that they have to concentrate in order to perform well. 
When participants were not encomaged to think longer term throughout the task, 
they provided responses that appeared to reflect their neglect of the fact that they would 
only win at a chance rate in the long term. Under these conditions they were experiencing 
an important narrovmig of attention, focusmg in on the information extiactable fiom the 
task. 
The implications of this for the real gambling enviromnent lie m the fact that when 
presented with a gambhng opportunity, although people may realise that over time the 
chances that they wil l win more than to be expected are slim, they may bet more on 
individual events. They may bet more due to their over confidence and lack of 
understanding of the independence of outcomes, and believe that they can in fact utilise 
recent outcome information to their benefit, hi terms of therapeutic value, it seems that 
getting people to focus on the longer term, getting them to focus away from merely the 
local recent information, may prevent them from becoming excessively "unobjective" and 
exaggerated in their confidence. 
Participants' memory of past success was affected by the previous win sequence. A 
clear primacy effect resulted in that participants who had won early on in then tiials 
exaggerated their previous success history, providing responses that were significantly 
297 
higher than those who had experienced their wins in the latter part of the hials. This raises 
a rather paradoxical issue. Why is it that participants who won early on believed they had 
performed significantly better at the task, but did not think they would perform 
significantly better over the following trials? This is a question that would require finther 
investigation particularly when one considers the observation in Experiment 3 that the 
more confident someone was, the greater the number of trials they played. 
The manual coin presentation of the paradigm did however show up some different 
results which were discussed in Chapter 3. The previous win sequence did have an effect 
of increasing responses on both participants' memory of past success and on futme 
estimates of success, but only when this measme had not been elicited throughout. 
Although these effects were small, and the coin tossing trials were arguably less 
ecologically valid than the Turtle experiments, this suggested that caution should be 
applied when generalising to all forms of gambling. 
A finther point to note with respect to the observations fiom the smdies within 
these two chapters, is that it was clear that one can not safely assume that males and 
females respond to sequences of wins and losses in an identical fashion. The extra loss 
sequence presented in Chapter 3 revealed that although female participants became less 
confident throughout this, their male counterparts on the whole did not. This may be due 
to the case that males are generally more susceptible to the gambler's fallacy, that after 
every loss, a win is increasingly more likely. Further research should take account of this 
finding and further investigate any differences between the way that the two sexes respond 
to the experience of the task. 
Although the "Continued Play" measure was only utilised in the final Turtle 
experiment where participants won four out of the 32 trials, there was an interesting result. 
Although participants were not affected by the previous win sequence in terms of how 
many extra trials they chose to play, those people who were more confident at the end of 
the trials played on for longer. This striking affect of viewing gambling as a decision 
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making task is very important, as it demonstrates that there is an association between 
participants' confidence and the extent to which they continue to play. Further research 
could make use of fliis type of measme whilst investigating tasks with different probability 
of success, and different absolute numbers of wins. 
The ability of these smdies to reject the strong cognitive hypothesis with respect to 
problem gambling is not as limited as would be suggested by the fact that the sample used 
was drawn only firom a smdent undergraduate population. The smdent population 
represented a cross section of the gambling population. Additionally, the MIMIC model 
run as part of the factor analysis in Chapter 5 confirmed that there were no differences in 
respect of the variables under consideration between the smdent sample used in the final 
smdy or the high fiequency gamblers recmited fiom the betting estabhshments. 
The related issue to the non-use of high frequency gamblers is that of the ecological 
validity of the laboratory experiments. The tasks involved participants taking part hi a 
laboratory setting where none of the usual gambhng environmental cues were available. 
Participants were not acmally gambling and no money was involved. Although the type of 
task that was used here has been shown to be arousing, fiirther research could make the 
laboratory task more similar hi terms of the extemal cues and potential monetary gain. 
One must also consider the probabilities of success related to the tasks used in the 
current work. The Experiments only investigated participants' responses to tasks in which 
their win rate mapped onto the probability of success. For Experiment 1, in which there 
were two possible outcomes, hence there was a probability of success of 0.5, participants 
won 50% of all tiials. Likewise, for Experunents 2 and 3, the probabilities were 0.25 and 
0.125 with win rates of 25% and 12.5% respectively. Particular differences may arise with 
respect to the "Continue to Play" measure. Increasing or decreasing the absolute number 
of wins (with or without altering the probability associated with the task) may result in the 
position of the wins and losses inducing people to continue play to varying degrees. This 
could also be investigated. 
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Another pomt with respect to the generalisability of the results to all gambling 
forms is that within each of these Experiments the probability of success was set and 
controlled throughout the duration of the task. Many gambling activities are structured in 
such a way that there can be within-activity probability changes dependent upon the 
decision of where to place the bet taken by the gambler. For example, in roulette the 
gambler can choose to bet on an even shot (with slightly less than a 50% chance of 
success) or on a single number where the chance of success is 1 in 37. One possible 
technique for investigating differences between tasks in which the probability of success is 
constant and tasks with within-activity probability changes, would be to design and run a 
series of computer based experiments. The turtle task used here could be modified to 
enable the participant to vary the probability of success on any particular trial whilst still 
having the position of their wins and losses predetermined by the Experimenter. 
6.2.2. The Weak Cognitive Hypothesis 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigated the "weak cognitive hypothesis". In Chapter 4 the 
investigation focused on the relationship between the individual difference measure of the 
REI and the degree of erroneous perceptions held by the gambler. In Chapter 5 the extent 
to which people get dissociated in everyday life (general dissociation) and the extent to 
which people exhibit the use of heuristics and biases was examined. 
First of all, the results fiom the analysis with respect to the processing style as 
measmed by the REI provided no evidence for the weak cognitive hypothesis. There were 
no significant relationships between any of the four sub scales of the REI (Rational Ability, 
Rational Engagement, Experiential Ability, Experiential Engagement) and any of the 
gambling fiequency items within the questioimaire. 
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Gambling is one activity where the opportunity for experiential processing is rife 
and where the use of a rational processing style would be expected to have the effect of 
reducing the activity. With the current sample the extent to which someone preferred using 
an experiential style had no significant relationship with the level of their gambling 
behaviour. In fact the REI scores had little bearing on the any of the gambling activity 
items. 
One reason why the REI did not come up with any interesting findings in terms of 
relationships of the subscales with the gambling items within the questioimahe may be due. 
to the measme itself The measme only asks people for their preference and their ability to 
think and engage in rational or experiential forms of processing. It is a self report measme 
and does not acmally measme performance or ability in acmally using these two types of 
processing, and as such may not be sensitive to the implicit processes postulated in the dual 
process account. Developing a way to measme then acmal use and ability of these two 
forms of processing may provide resuhs indicating that these processes are relevant in a 
model of gambhng behaviom. 
With respect to the general dissociation constract intioduced in Chapter 5, again 
there was little evidence fiom this individual differences variable to support the weak 
cognitive hypothesis. There were some concems v^th respect to the measurement of this 
constract, (by the DES, Bemstein and Putman 1986), which may have been part of the 
reason for why this variable had no relationship with the other variables of interest. It 
appeared fiom the exploratory factor analysis that the items that were used were loading on 
two separate factors, suggesting that general dissociation may not be a unitary constract. 
Even though the items used were only a subscale of the original Bernstein and Putman 
scale, this does not bode well for tiie full scale. This highlights the need for futme research 
to apply factor analytical techniques to the measures of dissociation, to ensure that they do 
in fact measure the same thing. 
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The final individual difference variable which was addressed in relation to the level 
of erroneous beliefs, gambling dissociation and loss of contiol, as well as the other 
gambHng fiequency items, was the extent to which people exhibit some heuristics and 
biases when making decisions. Here there was some support for the weak cognitive 
hypothesis. Of the four factors that were extiacted, the two that accoimted for most of the 
variance were interpreted as a Use of Past Information factor, and an Understanding of the 
Principle of Randonmess factor. These factors wil l be retumed to in a later section when 
discussmg a possible model. 
However only this Understanding of the Principle of Randomness factor correlated 
in any significant way with Fallacious Behefs and gambhng Dissociation. None of the four 
factors extiacted correlated with Loss of Contiol, which was itself correlated with 
firequency of gambling behaviour. 
Because of the fact that the extent to which someone rmderstood the principle of 
randonmess correlated significantiy and negatively with the level of fallacious beliefs and 
the level of dissociation, there was ample evidence to suggest that this factor requires 
further investigation. The reason why this factor did not correlate v^ith the Loss of Contiol 
may be because it is too far removed from the Loss of Contiol (i.e. there are intervening 
variables - Fallacious Beliefs and Dissociation). Apart from the findings in relation to tins 
particular factor, there was no evidence to suggest that higher fiequency gamblers were 
any more prone to the use of the heuristics and biases assessed in the current work, than 
low fiequency gamblers. Neither was there any significant evidence therefore, that higher 
fiequency gamblers were more prone to the use of the assessed heuristics within the 
gambling context in comparison to outside the gambling environment. 
However, as stated above, there was some evidence for this weak cognitive 
hypothesis, stemming fiom the outcome of the factor analysis in relation to the 
Understanding of Randomness factor. With further development this concept may be very 
firuitfiil in terms of developing a stionger account for gambling behaviour. One hypothesis 
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for the influence of this factor would be that it directly affects the extent to which someone 
builds and maintams fallacious beliefs about the tasks. The benefit of mcludhig this factor 
in any model to account for loss of control could then be evaluated. 
In line with Stanovich's individual differences approach to performance on 
reasoning tasks, there did appear to be two general factors that could partly explain the 
variance in performance. The appearance of these two factors (the Understanding of the 
Principle of Randomness and the Use of Past Information) offers support for the individual 
difference approach. Further studies could be carried out to investigate the nature of the 
relationship that these two factors have with those proposed by Stanovich (1999) and 
Stanovich and West (1998). 
The results of the current work did not reveal any factor that appeared to 
differentiate between the individuals' level of play. That does not mean that either of the 
two factors proposed by Stanovich (1999) and Stanovich and West (1998) could not 
differentiate between levels of play, as neither were measured in the current work. In 
relation to the intelligence factor it is unclear how this may apply to the gamblmg situation, 
particularly when one considers the Ceci and Liker (1986) study reported above. The role 
of their second factor, that of thinkmg disposition certauily warrants further mvestigation, 
as do any other individual differences that may arise firom fiurther studies conducted in this 
vain. 
As discussed in the final section to the previous chapter, only a small number of the 
whole range of hemistics were assessed in the current work, and perhaps more importantly 
the method by which they were assessed may not have tapped the use of them 
appropriately. The bias in sampling may also have had an effect. Both the fact that the 
sample size with respect to the gamblers was fairly limited (due to both the resomce 
restiaints and to the difficulty with which higher frequency gamblers could be recruited) 
and additionally because those gamblers that were successfully recruited were all recruited 
within two off-comse betting agencies. This part of this smdy's sample were primarily 
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horse and dog race gamblers and may therefore not be particularly representative of 
gamblers, as a whole. This is particularly a concem when we consider the argument that 
gambling is not a homogenous activity as discussed earlier. To improve on this simation, 
further research would need to investigate the use of a wider range of hemistics and biases, 
and could attempt a much wider recmitment strategy, involving a larger sample of higher 
frequency gamblers and one that is drawn from a wider range of domains. 
6.2.3. The Integrative Hypothesis 
Chapters 4 and 5 presented smdies which were conducted with the aim of 
evaluating the strength of the "integrative hypothesis" in investigating the relationship 
between erroneous beliefs that people might maintain aibout gambling and the level of 
dissociation experienced specifically during the task. These two constracts were evaluated 
in the light of the relative influences on the third constract, that of the extent of the loss of 
control experienced. There was substantial evidence in support of this hypothesis, making 
this integrative explanation the most likely candidate for explaming differential levels of 
gambling behaviom out of those investigated in the current progranune of work. 
The smdy reported in Chapter 4 on the smdent and general population provided 
evidence that the relationship between the level of fallacious beliefs held and the extent of 
the dissociative experience whilst gambling was a good predictor of the extent of loss of 
control reported by individuals. 
The results clearly indicated that recursive models that allowed feedback loops 
between the constructs were no better at accounting for the data than the non-recursive 
ones. Furthermore, the models that involved the Loss of Control constract intervening 
between the Fallacious Behefs and Dissociation conshucts clearly did not fit the data as 
well as the models in which the Loss of Control was a consequence of the relationship 
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between these other two variables. The question that remained was whether the Fallacious 
beliefs element was a precursor or more of a consequence of the extent to which people 
became dissociated whilst gambling. This question was answered with the results from the 
smdy reported in Chapter 5. 
The results in this smdy replicated the findings observed hi Chapter 4. Of 
additional interest was that with the development of the Fallacies and the gambling 
Dissociation measmes, and with the more representative sample, there was sufficient 
evidence to report that the two non-recmsive models in which Fallacies and Dissociation 
preceded Loss of Confrol were different in terms of their ability to fit the data. The 
Fallacies-Dissociation-Loss of Confrol model appeared the best model to account for the 
data obtained. 
There are a couple of points to mention with respect to the Structmal Equation 
modelling technique used for the investigation into these models. Firstly, some concem 
ought to be raised regarding the fact that, particularly as problem gambling is likely to 
develop over time, the technique only relates to data collected at a single point in time. 
Although the constmcts investigated here are likely to be relatively stable dispositions, this 
stiesses the importance of conducting further research of a longimdinal nature, to 
investigate further the antecedents which appear before one reaches problematic levels of 
gambling. Secondly, it is possible that both the extent to which someone holds erroneous 
perceptions and the extent of then gambling specific dissociation, are both correlated with 
another factor not assessed within the current work, which could partly account for the 
observed relationships. Such unsuspected additional factors might undermine the 
conclusions reached from the modelling of experiments. The modelling technique can not 
prove any particular model, but rather can only disprove models hence further 
investigation into other models with additional factors could be conducted. Both of these 
above issues would need further investigation. 
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The resuhs reported suggest that the Ladouceur perspective (that erroneous 
perceptions are central to excessive gambling and loss, of control) although not incorrect, is 
not complete. It has ignored a crucial constmct which in conjmiction with erroneous 
perceptions provides a better predictor of continued play. The mediating variable it seems 
is that of the extent to which people become dissociated throughout the task. The 
implications of this both for a model of gambling behaviom and for therapy are 
considerable. 
6.3. Towards a Model of Gambling Behaviour 
One could argue that the smdies hi the current work did not focus heavily on real 
gamblers, and for that reason the work has limited implications for pathological (or 
problem) gambling. However, Dickerson's (1993) perspective that one should move away 
from a two category approach to gambling was adopted throughout the thesis. Dickerson 
argues that rather than making the distinction between pathological and non-pathological, 
gambling should be viewed on a continuum from low to high frequency. Hence we should 
be looking at levels of gambling frequency, rather than pmely those who have reached 
"pathological" stams as defined by,various classification tools. So although there was not a 
particularly high proportion of people who would have normally been defined as 
"pathological" gamblers, the thesis investigated participants who ranged fiom low to high 
frequency in their gambling behaviour. 
At the outset of the thesis it was argued that the success of any theory would best 
be judged on two criteria. Firstly, as the majority of western indusfrialised societies gamble 
(Walker 1992) any proposed theory would first have to provide an adequate account of 
normal gambling. The second criterion on which a theory ought to be judged, is to what 
extent it can explain why some people lose control and gamble at excessively high 
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frequencies, whilst others manage to confrol then gamblmg behaviour. The model to be 
proposed here attempts .to account for both of these issues in relation to the degree of the, 
consfructs exhibited by individuals. 
We can begin a with consideration of the explanation of gambling in general. 
Firstly, overconfidence was rife throughout the studies. Participants were systematically 
over confident in then predictions of success. If people believe that they are more likely to 
vwn than chance would determine then, even though this is a fallacious belief, this alone 
can accoimt for why they are likely to gamble as they are less likely to be consciously 
aware of the negative expected retum. Secondly it was observed that erroneous beliefs are 
not the domain of the high frequency gambler alone, but they also characterise gambling 
and gambling decision making generally. The smdent, general population and the higher 
frequency gambling groups all expressed beliefs hi the fallacious behefs items to a varymg 
degree. One explanation of why people do not learn from the negative vraming experience, 
is that they do in fact win often enough. In addition to the occasional wins, as discussed 
earlier, a loss can also confirm and hence encomage the false beliefs that people hold. 
Take, for example, the belief in the gamblers fallacy that after a sequence of reds on the 
roulette wheel a black becomes more likely. If a black occms the belief is confirmed. If 
however, fiirther reds result the belief is easily sfrengthened that a black is even more 
likely on the following frial. Hence both wins and losses can reinforce and hence maintain 
the false beliefs that individuals may hold. 
As Coventry (hi press) has suggested, the use of past information in order to make 
fiitme decisions dming gambling characterises normal decision making. The 
Understanding of Randonmess factor that was exfracted from the factor analysis correlated 
negatively with the level of erroneous beliefs and the level of dissociation experienced 
within the gambling task. The greater the individual's understanding that each trial is 
independent of the others in the sequence, and that use of past mformation in chance 
determined events is fiitile, the lower the number of erroneous beliefs held by the 
307 

individual. Additionally, the more they miderstood this principle, the less dissociated 
people became during.the task. The level of erroneous beliefs aiid the level of dissociation 
experienced both correlated positively with the loss of control which correlated with 
frequency. The higher the number of fallacious beliefs the greater the loss of control 
experienced. This was also true for the level of dissociation. The important interpretation 
of this is that those people who understand the principle of randomness are less likely to 
gamble. However, this does not mean that they do not gamble at all. If decision making 
during gambling is largely an implicit, unconscious process, then it is not inconsistent for 
someone to have an understanding of probability theory explicitly, yet still "switch off' 
during gambling, making decisions implicitly and unconsciously. 
The explicit system would suggest to people that continuing to gamble is not in 
their best interests as losing is generally the most available and explicit outcome. However, 
the implicit system tells them something completely different. For the gambling behaviom 
to continue this hnplicit system would have to dominate. Indeed, the results from the 
cmrent work suggest that this is the case. 
The Illusion of Confrol smdies shed new light on the way in which information is 
used by participants during decision making tasks. Much of the focus in cognitive 
approaches to gambling has been centred on the importance of early wins (as initially 
reported by Langer and Roth 1975), supported by some anecdotal evidence from therapy 
that problem gamblers often had large wins early on in their gambling careers, (e.g Custer 
and Milt , 1985). The studies presented above in light of Hogarth and Einhom's belief 
revision model (1992), suggest that recent information is much more important in the 
explanation of gambling behaviour. Although confidence at the end of the task correlates 
with the extent of continued play, the large flucmations in confidence levels based on the 
last few frials indicates blatant 'short-termism' in the behaviour of the gambler. This 
provides support for the evidential theories (e.g. Cohen 1979) and fits with evidence that 
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participants are even prepared to pay a price for access to previous recent outcomes, 
(Ladouceur etal, 1996, 1997). : 
When one considers loss of control of gambling behaviour, the results fit with the 
notion that short term concems are paramount for gamblers. The focus on immediate 
events in the gambling envhomnent and an acute awareness of how and when past recent 
information can predict future success, can perhaps lead to a lack of awareness of tune and 
outside events; characteristics of the dissociation experience. Due to this narrowing of 
attention, people may become less aware of the extemal Cues availiable that would 
otherwise be effective signals that they ought to terminate the particular activity and how 
long they have actually been gambling. In the casino for example "Chips" are used to 
represent money, so that the firequency of loss of real money is less obvious. Features of 
gambling establishment design minimise the number of temporal cues available to their 
clients. Two examples of this are not displaying clocks and keeping the munber of 
vmidows to a minimum (generally none), firom which an estimation of the time of day by 
the changing amount of light extemal to the establishment could be made. 
The important correlations between fallacious beliefs, dissociation during gambling 
and loss of contiol fit this overall pictme. The fallacious beliefs items were generally 
tapping the use of past information. It appeared that the more the individual uses past 
information and therefore held more fallacious beliefs about gambling, the more the 
individual was forgetting then everyday problems, forgetting the time whilst they were 
gambling and reported feeling more alive whilst they gamble. These characteristics of the 
dissociation experience fit the notion that whilst the individual gambles they are dealing 
with the task implicitly and unconsciously. 
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6.4. Future Research and Implications for Therapy 
It appears that the need to become dissociated may be important in terms of 
explaining higher frequency gambling. The important relationship between the level of 
fallacious beliefs held and the extent of dissociation experienced whilst gambling can not 
go unconsidered. What distinguishes between someone who does not lose confrol with 
their gambling behaviom from someone who gambles at excessive levels may be the 
extent to which they "switch off" during gambling and become dissociated within the 
gambling context. The DES (Bernstem and Putman 1986) however may not be a good 
measme of people's deshe for this experience. As we saw there were concems raised as to 
the measmement of this construct. Further uivestigation could develop the measme of 
dissociation, in particular with respect to the specific experience of dissociation within the 
gambling context. Future research could also evaluate the level of dissociation 
experienced online, with measmes taken much closer to the gambling experience itself 
This would tease out whether for example, higher frequency gamblers were acmally worse 
in their judgements of the amount of time that has passed in that gambling episode. 
As discussed hi Chapter 4, the cognitive therapies that have been developed 
primarily by Ladoucem, have had some beneficial effects (e.g. Ladoucem et al, 1989). It 
has however, not been enthely clear how they have worked. The key element to then 
therapy has been the breakdown of cognitive distortions about gambling tasks, and an 
attempt at encomaging gamblers' understanding of the principle of randonmess. The 
results presented here shed new light on the possible effects of de-biasing. 
Within this model, the therapy would be predicted to work, not pmely because of 
the correction of the erroneous perceptions, but because of the effect this has of making the 
task more explicit, and of reduchig the dissociative experience by breaking the link 
between erroneous perceptions and dissociation. Developing high fiequency gamblers' 
understanding of the principle of randonmess by correcting the fallacious beliefs and 
310 
getting them to focus on then longer term estimates of success is likely to have the effect 
of making the activity less enjoyable as the same amount of dissociation is not achieved. 
Furthermore, within this model, correction of the erroneous" perceptions would not 
be likely to be sufficient on its own. Once the gambler starts believing in the independence 
of events, the actual gambling activity itself will undoubtedly become less interesting, as 
there is then less perceived control and predictability. At this pohit, it is likely that the 
individual wil l have conflicting internal motivations. On the one hand the individual is ' 
attenipting to overcome a habit which they want to extinguish so that the associated 
disadvantages can be minimised. On the other hand, the individual is trying to overcome 
an activity which they have used effectively as a form of escapism firom then everyday 
existence. This attempt to prevent an activity which has had an hnportant role in the life of 
the gambler, could make the gambler lose the drivmg force and motivation for this change 
to occm. A more comprehensive and successfiil therapy would need to address the 
subjective value of the dissociation experience, estabhshing and tackling the reasons for 
this need for the dissociation experience. Additionally, the identification and 
encouragement of an altemative and less problematic activity which also offers this 
experience could be pmsued. 
This account does not neglect the importance of addressmg people's grasp of the 
principle of randonmess and rmpredictability. If people fail to grasp this and beheve they 
can in fact beat the game, then they are unlikely to be motivated to cmb their behaviom, 
even in the light of their behaviom being party to destioying their familial, economic and 
social lives. Rather it stiesses the importance for cognitive therapies to not only focus on 
the erroneous perceptions arising fiom a misunderstanding of the randonmess principle, 
but also to ensure that a focus on dissociation experience is also present. 
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7. Appendices. 
7.1. Appendix 1: Instructions to Participants (Verbal Briefing) 
Experiments 1-3 inclusive 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. 
First of all I would like to check your understanding of the term Psychokinesis. 
(Confirm the working defiiution that Psychokinesis involves the ability to influence 
outcomes, to move objects in the extemal world, without any physical contact.) 
This smdy involves a series of Turtle Races. For each race you can select a Turtle that you 
think and want to win the next race fiom the available Turtles, which wil l appear on the 
screen. Once you have clicked on yom chosen Turtle, you will then be asked (either:) 
How Confident are you that your chosen Tmtle will win the race?" (or:) How many trials 
you think you would win over the next 100 trials?". 
You can enter your response (on a 0-100 scale) directly usmg the keyboard in fiont of you. 
You wi l l then click on the "Go" button to start the race. The Turtles wil l appear at the 
centre of the blue chcle and will move in a random fashion towards the edge of the chcle. 
Once a Turtle crosses the white perimeter of the chcle the race has been won. The winning 
Trutle wil l remain on the screen whilst you are informed whether you won or lost that 
particular race. The Tmtles available for the next race wil l then reappear on the screen for 
you to make yom selection. 
What I would like you to do is to try to encomage yom chosen Turtle to win the race, to 
cross the line before the other Turtle(s) in the race, to win as many races as possible. You 
can try to encomage your Turtle in any way that you can without touching the computer 
itself 
I remind you of your right to withdraw at any time throughout the smdy, i f you do you wil l 
still keep yom participation point (if applicable), and that all yom responses vwU be treated 
with complete confidentiality. 
Are there any questions? 
Please write and sign yom name on this participation list, and I shall give you yom 
participation point. (If applicable). 
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Experiment 4 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study, which shouldn't take long'to complete. 
This study is for my third year project and involves a coin prediction task. 
I wiU ask you to predict the outcome of each flip of the coin, and prior to each trial I wil l 
be asking you how confident you feel you are that your prediction is correct. Please give 
your response to this on the scale that you have in ftont of you. 
Explain: 
Completely Confident that 
you'll lose 
-5 
Uncertain 
0 
Completely Confident that 
you'll win 
5 
I remind you of your right to withdraw at any time throughout the study, i f you do you wil l 
still keep your participation point (if applicable), and that all your responses wil l be tieated 
with complete confidentiality, that is why this screen is here so that you can't see previous 
participants' responses and that later people can't see yours. 
Are there any questions? 
Please write and sign your name on this participation list, and I shall give you your 
participation point. (If applicable). 
Quick re-cap on what is required. 
If there aren't any (more) questions , I'll have your fhst prediction then please. 
313 
7.2. Appendix 2: Short Questionnaire items 
(To assess assumption that bet size correlates to confidence). 
Bracketed figures represent odds within item, and were not available to participants. 
Items were presented in a random order, the same random order fox each participant. 
(1-2) 
You are asked to predict the outcome of a flip of a com. How confident would you be that 
it wi l l be a Head? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(1-2) 
You have £100 of yom own money, and you have to place a bet on one spin of the 
Roulette wheel. You decide to bet on Red or Black. How much would you place? 
(1-3) You are asked to decide between the fair dice landing on one of the following 
options. Low (lor2). Middle (3or4) or High (5or6). You choose High. How confident 
would you be that you wil l win? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(1-3) 
You have £100 of you own money. At the Roulette table, you decide that you wil l bet on 
the outcome being 12 or below, as opposed to it being a number fiom 13-36. How much 
of yom £100 would you be prepared to bet on this? 
(1-6) You are asked to predict the outcome of a roll of a fair dice. How confident would 
you be that you are correct? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(1-6) 
You have £100 of yom own money. There are 12 greyhounds in a dog race and you have 
chosen Number 4 and Number 7. How much money in all would you be prepared to place 
on this race. 
(1-12) 
In a local lottery draw, there are 48 numbers to choose from, and you decide to buy up four 
numbers. How confident would you be that you wil l win something? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(1-12) 
A l l the Jacks, Queens and Kings are taken out of a normal pack of cards and are shuffled 
properly. You predict that the top card wil l the Eling of Spades. You are given £100. 
How much would you be prepared to bet on yom prediction? 
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(1-20) 
You are at a Point to Point, and there are 20 equally fit horses in the next race. You make 
you choice of horse. How confident would you be that your horse would win? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(1-20) 
You have £100 of your own money, and asked to bet on picking out one Spotted inarble 
from a bag containing 6 Spotted marbles and 14 normal marbles, all of equal size. How 
much would you be prepared to place? 
(9-13) 
A computer prints out one new random number at a time in the range 0 to 104. You predict 
that the first number to come out w3ill be anywhere fiom 32-104. How confident are you 
that you.will be right? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(9-13) 
You predict that the first card drawn from a pack of shuffled cards wil l be a card with a 
value of less than 10. You have £100 of your own money. How much of this would you be 
prepared to place? 
(2-3) 
At the Roulette table you have placed a bet on each of the numbers from 13 to 36. How 
confident would you be that one of your numbers v^U come up? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(2-3) 
A friend is about to roll a dice on which you are about to bet some of your £100. How 
much of tills would you be prepared to bet on it not being a 1 or a 6? 
(5-6) 
A turtle race v^th 24 turtles is about to commence. Four of the turtles are marked with a 
cross. How confident are you that none of the four marked turtles vrais the race? 
Please indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
(5-6) 
Six children are playing Pooh-sticks (throwing sticks into the flowing river under a bridge, 
and the owner of the stick which comes out the other side first is the winner). One of the 
children is a boy. You have £100 of you own money. How much would you be prepared 
to bet that any one of the girls wins? 
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7.3. Appendix 3: Statistical Analyses for Experiments 1,2 and 3 
ANOVA tables. 
Experiment 1 (Turtle 2) 
3a. Baseline Responses 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-Ievel 
1 1 52.008 108 371.1102 .140143 .708873 
2 2 624.758 108 371.1102 1.683485 .190562 
3 1 39.675 108 371.1102 .106909 .744324 
12 2 993.358 108 371.1102 2.676721 .073351 
13 1 1197.008 108 371.1102 3.225480 .075297 
23 2 125.625 108 371.1102 .338511 .713584 
123 2 42.858 108 371.1102 .115487 .891042 
3b. Illusion of Control: End of Sequence Measures 
1- RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX, 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 731.504 108 553.5532 1.32147 .252868 
2 2 7.204 108 553.5532 .01301 .987071 
3 1 3.037 108 553.5532 .00549 .941087 
4 1 2961.038 108 259.8106 11.39691 .001023 
12 2 914.779 108 553.5532 1.65256 .196366 
13 1 403.004 108 553.5532 .72803 .395410 
23 2 462.862 108 553.5532 .83617 .436155 
14 1 15.504 108 259.8106 .05967 .807474 
24 2 252.762 108 259.8106 .97287 .381283 
34 1 22.204 108 259.8106 .08546 .770587 
123 2 573.504 108 553.5532 1.03604 .358356 
124 2 28.754 108 259.8106 .11067 .895332 
134 1 28.704 108 259.8106 .11048 .740241 
234 2 59.954 108 259.8106 .23076 .794320 
1234 2 112.779 108 259.8106 .43408 .648984 
3c. Step By Step Analysis 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX, 4-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 12977.90 108 1185.651 10.94580 .001275 
2 2 2308.03 108 1185.651 1.94664 .147729 
3 1 541.08 108 1185.651 .45636 .500776 
4 3 22.55 324 99.164 .22743 .877284 
12 2 345.06 108 1185.651 .29103 .748076 
13 1 48.05 108 1185.651 .04053 .840827 
23 2 873.95 108 1185.651 .73710 .480890 
14 3 13.44 324 99.164 .13553 .938801 
24 6 271.68 324 99.164 2.73974 .013056 
34 3 115.83^  324 99.164 1.16807 .321963 
123 2 277.65 108 1185.651 .23417 .791625 
124 6 174.77 324 99.164 1.76239 .106227 
134 3 68.86 324 99.164 .69444 .555998 
234 6 55.96 324 99.164 .56436 .758635 
1234 6 129.00 324 99.164 1.30088 .256204 
3d. Battery Items 
Longer Term Items 
1- JRESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX, 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 258.403 108 377.2546 .68496 .409710 
2 2 138.836 108 377.2546 .36802 .692970 
3 1 783.225 108 377.2546 2.07612 .152513 
4 2 3412.053 216 153.2898 22.25883 .000000 
12 2 122.586 108 377.2546 .32494 .723273 
13 1 204.003 108 377.2546 .54076 .463713 
23 2 776.108 108 377.2546 2.05725 .132784 
14 2 198.819 ,216 153.2898 1.29702 • .275466 
24 4 298.344 216 153.2898 1.94628 .103892 
34 2 455.408 216 153.2898 2.97090 .053356 
123 2 315.503 108 377.2546 .83631 .436092 
124 4 168.828 216 153.2898 1.10136 .356863 
134 2 65.853 216 153.2898 .42960 .651326 
234 4 52.567 216 153.2898 .34292 .848758 
1234 4 49.878 216 153.2898 .32538 .860762 
Percentage of Trials 
1- RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 227.438 108 243.1193 .935498 .335599 
2 2 1443.945 108 243.1193 5.939243 .003572 
3 1 7.746 108 243.1193 .031859 .858671 
12 2 558.439 108 243.1193 2.296977 .105455 
13 1 358.810 108 243.1193 1.475862 .227073 
23 2 1537.720 108 243.1193 6.324959 .002526 
123 2 146.579 108 243.1193 .602911 .549048 
How Good ? 
1- RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 99.008 108 257.8694 .38395 .536803 
2 2 44.858 108 257.8694 .17396 .840568 
3 1 5161.408 108 257.8694 20.01559 .000019 
12 2 1008.858 108 257.8694 3.91228 .022890 
13 1 .675 108 257.8694 .00262 .959291 
23 2 1856.008 108 257.8694 7.19747 .001163 
123 2 99.775 108 257.8694 .38692 .680083 
Experiment 2 (Turtle 4) 
3e. Baseline Responses 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 10863.18 103 317.6577 34.19777 .000000 
2 2 230.09 103 317.6577 .72434 .487095 
3 1 187.25 103 317.6577 .58947 .444381 
12 2 491.49 103 317.6577 1.54722 .217745 
13 1 282.38 103 317.6577 .88893 .347974 
23 2 141.02 103 317.6577 .44393 .642735 
123 2 316.22 103 317.6577 .99546 .373081 
3f. Illusion of Control: End of Sequence Measmes 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX, 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 45.23 105 430.5913 .1051 .746493 
2 2 803.94 105 430.5913 1.8671 ..159674 
3 1 3.23 105 430.5913 .0075 .931166 
4 1 42508.09 105 285.6046 148.8354 .000000 
12 2 653.50 105 430.5913 1.5177 .223988 
13 1 192.67 105 430.5913 .4475 .505011 
23 2 9.00 105 430.5913 .0209 .979330 
14 1 583.32 105 285.6046 2.0424 .155936 
24 2 515.58 105 285.6046 1.8052 .169503 
34 1 177.96 105 285.6046 .6231 .431680 
123 2 1300.37 105 430.5913 3.0200 .053062 
124 2 132.08 105 285.6046 .4624 .631015 
134 1 189.16 105 285.6046 .6623 .417588 
234 2 829.08 105 285.6046 2.9029 .059280 
1234 2 555.14 105 285.6046 1.9437 .148287 
3g. Step by Step Analysis 
l-RESPQNSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX, .4-PERIOD 
df MS • df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 31556.91 85 752.1069 41.95800 .000000 
2 2 1801.53 85 752.1069 2.39531 .097272 
3 1 975.17 85 752.1069 1.29658 .258038 
4 3 127.73 255 86.7702 1.47211 .222587 
12 2 288.26 85 752.1069 .38327 .682803 
13 1 1913.51 85 752.1069 2.54419 .114412 
23 2 1154.39 85 752.1069 1.53488 .221393 
14 3 380.87 255 86.7702 4.38938 .004939 
24 6 559.95 255 86.7702 6.45324 .000002 
34 3 120.15 255 86.7702 1.38465 .247915 
123 2 1800.19 85 752.1069 2.39352 .097437 
124 6 222.42 255 86.7702 2.56334 .019869 
134 3 185.30 255 86.7702 2.13549 .096204 
234 6 230.39 255 86.7702 2.65516 .016236 
1234 6 279.92 255 86.7702 3.22595 .004513 
3h. Battery Item Analysis 
Longer Term Items 
l-RESPONSEMODE. 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX, 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 4950.625 108 338.9645 14.60514 .000222 
2 2 3800.203 108 338.9645 11.21121 .000038 
3 1 47.669 108 338.9645 .14063 .708388 
4 2 7302.978 216 185.0589 39.46298 .000000 
12 2 1293.658 108 338.9645 3.81650 .025030 
13 1 550.069 108 338.9645 1.62279 .205437 
23 2 .450.636 108 338.9645 1.32945 .268918 
14 2 4050.033 216 185.0589 21.88510 .000000 
24 4 73.769 216 185.0589 .39863 .809514 
34 2 108.811 216 185.0589 .58798 .556334 
123 2 91.003 108 338.9645 .26847 .765055 
124 4 187.792 216 185.0589 1.01477 .400627 
134 2 121.744 216 185.0589 .65787 .518989 
234 4 173.453 216 185.0589 .93728 .443184 
1234 4 199.853 216 185.0589 1.07994 .367318 
Percentage of Trials 
l-RESPONSEMODE. 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 90.0408 108 93.72388 .960703 .329200 
2 2 761.2098 108 93.72388 8.121835 .000518 
3 1 486.5882 108 93.72388 5.191721 .024662 
12 2 617.8734 108 93.72388 6.592487 .001989 
13 1 97.1169 108 93.72388 1.036202 .310981 
23 2 80.0890 108 93.72388 .854520 .428344 
123 2 144.0253 108 93.72388 1.536699 .219756 
How Good ? 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 93.633 108 380.5796 .246028 .620894 
2 2 1384.725 108 380.5796 3.638463 .029566 
3 1 67.500 108 380.5796 .177361 .674488 
12 2 869.808 108 380.5796 2.285483 .106625 
13 1 480.000 108 380.5796 1.261234 .263908 
23 2 268.225 108 380.5796 .704780 .496476 
123 2 13.975 108 380.5796 .036720 .963958 
Experiment 3 (Turtle 8) 
3i. Baseline Responses 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 12525.63 108 430.5611 29.09142 .000000 
2 2 317.42 108 430.5611 .73724 .480827 
3 1 2358.53 108 430.5611 5.47781 .021096 
12 2 924.31 108 430.5611 2.14675 .121824 
13 1 333.33 108 430.5611 .77418 .380880 
23 2 222.31 108 430.5611 .51632 .598176 
123 2 1305.56 108 430.5611 3.03223 .052332 
3j. Illusion of Control: End of Sequence Measures 
l-RESPONSEMODE. 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX. 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 6375.70 108 593.8680 10.73589 .001413 
2 2 1092.38 108 593.8680 1.83943 .163851 
3 1 33.00 108 593.8680 .05557 .814078 
4 1 13725.94 108 337.9255 40.61824 .000000 
12 2 163.05 108 593.8680 .27456 .760433 
13 1 33.00 108 593.8680 .05557 .814078 
23 2 1260.08 108 593.8680 2.12182 .124781 
14 1 9139.00 108 337.9255 27.04444 .000001 
24 2 79.99 108 337.9255 .23670 .789635 
34 1 42.50 108 337.9255 .12578 .723540 
123 2 1869.20 108 593.8680 3.14751 .046926 
124 2 229.38 108 337.9255 .67879 .509383 
134 1 6.34 108 337.9255 .01875 .891329 
234 2 1098.50 108 337.9255 3.25073 .042568 
1234 2 398.51 108 337.9255 1.17929 .311424 

3k. Step by Step Analysis 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX, 4-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 55129.21 108 1253.486 43.98071 .000000 
2 2 2286.70 108 1253.486 1.82427 .166272 
3 1 677.17 108 1253.486 .54023 .463930 
4 3 1367.71 324 96.012 14.24515 .000000 
12 2 129.70 108 1253.486 .10347 .901790 
13 1 610.03 108 1253.486 .48667 .486916 
23 2 2107.48 108 1253.486 1.68129 .190968 
14 3 143.24 324 96.012 1.49191 .216618 
24 6 150.20 324 96.012 1.56441 .156883 
34 3 234.61 324 96.012 2.44356 .064053 
123 2 4502.80 108 1253.486 3.59223 .030876 
124 6 17.84 324 96.012 .18585 .980649 
134 3 114.16 324 96.012 1.18906 .313935 
234 6 141.61 324 96.012 1.47488 .186079 
1234 6 49.72 324 96.012 .51781 • .794778 
31. Battery Items 
Longer Term Items 
l-RESPONSEMODE. 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX. 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 80.278 108 304.5636 .263583 .608718 
2 2 1294.686 108 304.5636 4.250955 .016707 
3 1 309.878 108 304.5636 1.017449 .315380 
4 2 937.144 216 103.0534 9.093776 .000161 
12 2 105.586 108 304.5636 .346680 .707815 
13 1 41.344 108 304.5636 .135750 .713265 
23 2 2033.886 108 304.5636 6.678035 .001843 
14 2 50.978' 216 103.0534 .494673 .610459 
24 4 14.169 216 103.0534 .137496 .968264 
34 2 75.878 216 103.0534 .736296 .480083 
123 2 432.186 108 304.5636 1.419034 .246422 
124 4 174.361 216 103.0534 1.691949 .152932 
134 2 11.411 216 103.0534 .110730 .895231 
234 4 59.236 216 103.0534 .574810 .681198 
1234 4 255.978 216 103.0534 2.483933 .044695 
Percentage of Trials 
l-RESPONSEMODE. 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 51.381 108 310.2210 .165628 .684833 
2 2 2311.967 108 310.2210 7.452645 .000929 
3 1 787.293 108 310.2210 2.537845 .114069 
12 2 173.763 108 310.2210 .560127 .572787 
13 1 145.782 108 310.2210 .469929 .494489 
23 2 1250.444 108 310.2210 4.030817 .020497 
123 2 63.821 108 310.2210 .205727 .814373 
How Good ? 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 175.208 108 164.8602 1.062769 .304888 
2 2 6.633 108 164.8602 .040236 .960577 
3 1 3.008 108 164.8602 .018248 .892797 
12 2 601.033 108 164.8602 3.645715 .029366 
13 1 60.208 108 164.8602 .365208 .546895 
23 2 1216.133 108 164.8602 7.376756 .000993 
123 2 677.433 108 164.8602 4.109138 .019057 
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Combined Analysis of Experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
3m. Illusion of Control: End Of Sequence Measures 
1-EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 40.0798 324 1.576883 25.4171 .000000 
2 1 13.1274 324 1.576883 8.3249 .004173 
3 2 5.0335 324 1.576883 3.1920 .042384 
4 1 .0002 324 1.576883 .0002 .990062 
5 1 112.9867 324 .926442 121.9576 .000000 
12 2 14.1982 324 1.576883 9.0040 .000156 
13 4 1.7976 324 1.576883 1.1400 .337591 
23 2 1.7016 324 1.576883 1.0791 .341125 
14 2 .1605 324 1.576883 .1018 .903234 
24 1 .1150 324 1.576883 .0729 .787279 
34 2 2.7685 324 1.576883 1.7557 .174428 
15 2 19.6226 324 .926442 21.1806 .000000 
25 1 22.0290 324 .926442 23.7781 .000002 
35 2 .2440 324 .926442 .2634 .768591 
45 1 .1394 324 .926442 .1505 .698297 
123 4 .1792 324 1.576883 .1136 .977682 
124 2 .1133 324 1.576883 .0719 .930678 
134 4 2.7528 324 1.576883 1.7458 .139630 
234 2 3.1848 324 1.576883 2.0197 .134364 
125 2 18.3904 324 .926442 19.8505 .000000 
135 4 .6719 324 .926442 .7252 .575227 
235 2 .6827 324 .926442 .7369 .479382 
145 2 .0737 324 .926442 .0795 .923587 
245 1 .2101 324 .926442 .2268 .634221 
345 2 2.5365 324 .926442 2.7379 .066202 
1234 4 5.9114 324 1.576883 3.7488 .005357 
1235 4 .4481 324 .926442 .4836 .747765 
1245 2 .3942 324 .926442 .4255 .653835 
1345 4 3.2036 324 .926442 3.4580 .008739 
2345 2 .1793 324 .926442 .1935 .824143 
12345 4 1.8615 324 .926442 2.0093 .092921 
3n. Step by Step Analysis 
1- EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 222.3423 324 3.336715 66.63509 .000000 
2 1 243.2688 324 3.336715 72.90668 .000000 
3 2 12.2807 324 3.336715 3.68048 .026271 
4 1 .2430 324 3.336715 .07284 .787422 
5 3 1.7301 972 .341837 5.06120 .001755 
12 2 75.0927 324 3.336715 22.50499 .000000 
13 4 2.5757 324 3.336715 .77194 .544099 
23 2 .1469 324 3.336715 .04402 .956936 
14 2 2.4445 324 3.336715 .73261 .481448 
24 1 .1995 •324 3.336715 .05978 .807004 
34 2 1.9243 324 3.336715 .57671 .562320 
15 6 3.7040 972 .341837 10.83549 .000000 
25 3 .0259 972 .341837 .07565 .973108 
35 6 2.3785 972 .341837 6.95802 .000000 
45 3 .2915 972 .341837 .85288 .465150 
123 4 .4191 324 3.336715 .12559 .973156 
124 2 2.7611 324 3.336715 .82750 .438061 
134 4 7.1586 324 3.336715 2.14540 .075010 
234 2 13.5944 324 3.336715 4.07417 .017885 
125 6 1.1068 972 .341837 3.23792 .003723 
135 12 .5655 972 .341837 1.65427 .071923 
235 6 .4643 972 .341837 1.35820 .228599 
145 6 .8831 972 .341837 2.58350 .017295 
245 3 .1470 972 .341837 .43004 .731526 
345 6 .4532 972 .341837 1.32570 .242675 
1234 4 9.5063 324 3.336715 2.84899 .024051 
1235 12 .4014 972 .341837 1.17432 .296739 
1245 6 .4546 972 .341837 1.32997 .240784 
1345 12 .3891 972 .341837 1.13815 .324802 
2345 6 .1742 972 .341837 .50956 .801426 
12345 12 .2436 972 .341837 .71257 .740216 
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3o. Battery Items 
Longer Term Items 
1-EXPERIMENT, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 3.08342 324 .877635 3.51333 .030938 
2 1 3.43408 324 .877635 3.91289 .048764 
3 2 8.90363 324 .877635 10.14503 .000053 
4 1 .27075 324 .877635 .30850 .578986 
5 2 11.95179 648 .341761 34.97123 .000000 
12 2 2.55203 324 .877635 2.90785 .056019 
13 4 2.75482 324 .877635 .3.13892 .014889 
23 2 2.28496 324 .877635 2.60355 .075558 
14 2 .92101 324 .877635 1.04943 .351325 
24 1 .07268 324 .877635 .08282 .773697 
34 2 3.74201 324 .877635 4.26375 .014867 
15 4 3.54776 648 .341761 10.38084 .000000 
25 2 2.45657 648 .341761 7.18800 .000817 
35 4 .01329 648 .341761 .03888 .997120 
45 2 .00575 648 .341761 .01684 .983304 
123 4 .31527 324 .877635 .35923 .837539 
124 2 .53695 324 .877635 .61181 .542991 
134 4 5.14414 324 .877635 5.86137 .000145 
234 2 .92963 324 .877635 1.05924 .347916 
125 4 2.21463 648 .341761 6.48007 .000041 
135 8 .12761 648 .341761 .37338 .934736 
235 4 .20091 648 .341761 .58785 .671540 
145 4 .34615 648 .341761 1.01285 .399948 
245 2 .00665 648 .341761 .01946 .980733 
345 4 .31410 648 .341761 .91907 .452280 
1234 4 1.05116 324 .877635 1.19772 .311673 
1235 8 .61880 648 .341761 1.81062 .072114 
1245 4 .15222 648 .341761 .44540 .775792 
1345 8 .18427 648 .341761 .53918 .827255 
2345 4 .92918 648 .341761 2.71880 .028887 
12345 8 .53047 648 .341761 1.55217 .135984 
Percentage of Trials 
1 - E X P E R I M E N T , 2 - R E S P O N S E M O D E ; 3 - S E Q U E N C E , 4 - S E X . • 
df M S df M S 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 6.016687 324 .750418 8.01778 .000399 
2 1 .003869 324 .750418 .00516 .942803 
3 2 8.804175 324 .750418 11.73236 .000012 
4 1 .694744 324 .750418 .92581 .336672 
12 2 .280006 324 .750418 .37313 .688869 
13 4 3.701037 324 .750418 4.93197 .000715 
23 2 1.358610 324 .750418 1.81047 .165228 
14 2 2.564544 324 .750418 3.41749 .033982 
24 1 .220636 324 .750418 .29402 .588031 
34 2 2.120845 324 .750418 2.82622 .060698 
123 4 .411123 • 324 .750418 • .54786 .700717 . 
124 2 .463122 324 .750418 .61715 .540111 
134 4 3.033301 324 .750418 4.04215 .003261 
234 2 .158591 324 .750418 .21134 .809613 
1234 4 .330567 324 .750418 .44051 .779303 
How Good ? 
1- E X P E R I M E N T , 2 - R E S P O N S E M O D E , 3 - S E Q U E N C E , 4 - S E X 
df M S df M S 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 2 30567.04 324 275.4463 110.9728 0.000000 
2 1 60.84 324 275.4463 .2209 .638676 
3 2 2.37 324 275.4463 .0086 .991435 
4 1 368.04 324 275.4463 1.3362 .248561 
12 2 153.50 324 275.4463 .5573 .573309 
13 4 1446.75 324 275.4463 5.2524 .000413 
23 2 . 320.09 324 275.4463 1.1621 .314140 
14 2 639.67 324 275.4463 2.3223 .099678 
24 1 .90 324 275.4463 .0033 .954452 
34 2 279.75 324 275.4463 1.0156 .363323 
123 4 664.31 324 275.4463 2.4117 .049025 
124 2 759.86 324 275.4463 2.7586 .064867 
134 4 976.42 324 275.4463 3.5448 .007553 
234 2 614.06 324 275.4463 2.2293 .109249 
1234 4 357.53 324 275.4463 1.2980 .270618 
7.4. Appendix 4: Statistical Analyses for Experiment 4 
A N O V A tables for analysis conducted in Chapter 3. 
Experiment 4 (Coins) 
4a. Baseline Responses 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 6720.033 108 151.9648 44.22098 .000000 
2 2 36.858 108 151.9648 .24255 .785055 
3 1 14.700 108 151.9648 .09673 .756386 
12 2 82.358 108 151.9648 .54196 .583183 
13 1 .033 108 151.9648 .00022 .988211 
23 2 74.725 108 151.9648 .49173 .612933 
123 2 31.558 108 151.9648 .20767 .812800 
4b. Illusion of Control: End Of Sequence Measmes 
l-RESPONSEMODE. 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX, 4-RFACTORl 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 781.20 108 231.5588 3.37368 .068996 
2 2 300.91 108 231.5588 1.29951 .276895 
3 1 9.20 108 231.5588 .03975 .842348 
4 1 16023.00 108 164.2255 97.56712 .000000 
12 2 799.50 108 231.5588 3.45270 .035196 
13 1 543.00 108 231.5588 2.34499 .128610 
23 2 281.15 108 231.5588 1.21418 .300974 
14 1 624.04 108 164.2255 3.79988 .053849 
24 2 423.58 108 164.2255 2.57925 .080496 
34 1 47.70 108 164.2255 .29048 .591023 
123 2 45.88 108 231.5588 .19813 .820559 
124 2 194.34 108 164.2255 1.18336 .310188 
134 1 82.84 108 164.2255 .50441 .479098 
234 2 494.65 108 164.2255 3.01204 .053342 
1234 2 35.21 108 164.2255 .21442 .807356 
4c. Step by Step Analysis 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX, 4-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 36533.76 108 414.8158 88.07225 .000000 
2 2 813.81 108 414.8158 1.96185 .145576 
3 1 4.10 108 414.8158 .00989 .920968 
4 3 55.88 324 39.0410 1.43136 .233509 
12 2 20.20 108 414.8158 .04870 .952487 
13 1 364.23 108 414.8158 .87804 .350829 " 
23 2 324.77 108 414.8158 .78293 .459644 
14 3 18.78 324 39.0410 .48105 .695684 
24 6 129.86 324 39.0410 3.32632 .003417 
34 3 44.84 • 324 39.0410 1.14848 .329619 
123 2 298.25 108 414.8158 .71900 .489556 ^ 
124 6 59.03 324 39.0410 1.51193 .173471 
134 3 30.90 324 39.0410 .79150 .499343 
234 6 71.72 324 39.0410 1.83694 .091360 
1234 6 54.63 324 39.0410 1.39932 .214243 
4d. Battery items 
Longer Term Items 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX, 4-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 141.878 108 337.8018 .42000 .518311 
2 2 1687.869 108 337.8018 4.99663 .008406 
3 1 1408.178 108 337.8018 4.16865 .043616 
4 2 895.953 216 62.9787 14.22628 .000002 
12 2 1375.103 108 337.8018 4.07074 .019750 
13 1 60.844 108 337.8018 .18012 .672115 
23 2 355.919 108 337.8018 1.05363 .352225 
14 2 39.219 216 62.9787 .62274 .537432 
24 4 22.686 216 62.9787 .36022 .836737 
34 2 383.436 216 62.9787 6.08835 .002677 
123 2 73.219 108 337.8018 .21675 .805479 
124 4 101.444 216 62.9787 1.61077 .172634 
134 2 363.436 216 62.9787 5.77078 .003618 
234 4 57.478 216 62.9787 .91265 .457383 
1234 4 29.186 216 62.9787 .46343 .762530 
Percentage of Trials 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 .020 108 113.7473 .00018 .989402 
2 2 1781.486 108 113.7473 15.66179 .000001 
3 1 10.979 108 113.7473 .09652 .756645 
12 2 384.954 108 113.7473 3.38430 .037535 
13 1 24.945 108 113.7473 .21930 .640515 
23 2 76.095 108 113.7473 .66898 .514341 
123 2 188.048 108 113.7473 1.65320 .196243 
How Good ? 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE, 3-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 67.500 108 195.0926 .345990 .557620 
2 2 1577.500 108 195.0926 8.085904 .000534 
3 1 440.833 108 195.0926 2.259611 .135706 
12 2 52.500 108 195.0926 .269103 .764575 
13 1 187.500 108 195.0926 .961082 .329105 
23 2 385.833 108 195.0926 1.977693 .143368 
123 2 7.500 108 195.0926 .038443 .962299 
4e. Extra Loss Sequence 
l-RESPONSEMODE, 2-SEQUENCE. 3-SEX. 4-RFACTORl 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 16283.48 108 251.4560 64.75677 .000000 
2 2 11.25 108 251.4560 .04474 .956264 
3 1 411.80 108 251.4560 1.63766 .203390 
4 1 1076.85 108 45.9878 23.41610 .000004 
12 2 7.19 108 251.4560 .02858 .971833 
13 1 415.08 108 251.4560 1.65071 .201612 
23 2 101.58 108 251.4560 .40398 .668660 
14 1 1.41 108 45.9878 .03059 .861482 
24 2 17.96 108 45.9878 .39052 .677658 
34 1 250.87 108 45.9878 5.45515 .021358 
123 2 720.12 108 251.4560 2.86380 .061394 
124 2 39.15 108 45.9878 .85127 .429718 
134 1 8.30 108 45.9878 .18043 .671851 
234 2 120.81 108 45.9878 2.62701 .076910 
1234 2 162.36 108 45.9878 3.53048 .032717 
Combined Analysis for Chapter 3. 
Experiment 4 (Coins) and Experiment 1 (Turtle 2). 
4f. Illusion of Control: End of Sequence Measures 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX. 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 653.33 216 384.3792 1.69971 .193714 
2 1 1512.30 216 384.3792 3.93440 .048575 
3 2 201.61 216 384.3792 .52452 .592591 
4 1 5.21 216 384.3792 .01355 .907440 
5 1 16380.03 216 221.2245 74.04257 .000000 
12 1 .41 216 384.3792 .00106 .974029 
13 2 129.25 216 384.3792 .33626 .714809 
23 2 1405.39 216 384.3792 3.65627 .027440 
14 1 43.20 216 384.3792 .11239 .737766 
24 1 30.00 216 384.3792 .07805 .780228 
34 2 650.40 216 384.3792 1.69208 .186567 
15 1 2604.01 216 221.2245 11.77088 .000721 
25 1 221.41 216 221.2245 1.00083 .318229 
35 2 .46 216 221.2245 .00210 .997902 
45 1 22.53 216 221.2245 .10186 .749920 
123 2 7.79 216 384.3792 .02027 .979940 
124 1 755.01 216 384.3792 1.96423 .162497 
134 2 43.28 216 384.3792 .11260 .893560 
234 2 303.01 216 384.3792 .78830 .455920 
125 1 418.13 216 221.2245 1.89009 .170617 
135 2 851.08 216 221.2245 3.84712 .022818 
235 2 112.98 216 221.2245 .51069 .600804 
145 1 25.21 216 221.2245 .11395 .736020 
245 1 49.41 216 221.2245 .22334 .636984 
345 2 188.13 216 221.2245 .85039 .428674 
1234 2 157.58 216 384.3792 .40995 .664197 
1235 2 106.76 216 221.2245 .48261 .617836 
1245 1 34.13 216 221.2245 .15429 .694854 
1345 2 761.41 216 221.2245 3.44182 .033772 
2345 2 16.21 216 221.2245 .07329 .929350 
12345 2 28.78 216 221.2245 .13008 .878093 
4g. Step by Step Analysis 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE. 4-SEX, 5-PERIOD 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 1591.35 216 800.2333 1.98861 .159925 
2 1 46530.39 216 800.2333 58.14603 .000000 
3 2 2796.93 216 800.2333 3.49514 .032072 
4 1 319.70 216 800.2333 .39951 .528009 
5 3 31.65 648 69.1027 .45800 .711731 
12 1 2981.27 216 800.2333 3.72550 .054897 
13 2 324.92 216 800.2333 .40603 .666800 
23 2 109.26 216 800.2333 .13653 .872455 
14 1 225.48 216 800.2333 .28176 .596093 
24 1 73.84 216 800.2333 .09228 .761595 
34 2 114.67 216 800.2333 .14330 .866577 
15 3 46.79 648 69.1027 .67704 .566305 
25 3 18.25 648 69.1027 .26416 .851233 
35 6 335.13 648 69.1027 4.84977 .000074 
45 3 126.29 648 69.1027 1.82754 .140822 
123 2 256.01 216 800.2333 .31992 .726553 
124 1 338.44 216 800.2333 .42292 .516173 
134 2 1084.04 216 800.2333 1.35466 .260219 
234 2 575.05 216 800.2333 .71861 .488593 
125 3 13.97 648 69.1027 .20211 .894943 
135 6 66.42 648 69.1027 .96111 .450739 
235 6 132.76 648 69.1027 1.92121 .075128 
145 3 34.38 648 69.1027 .49753 .684115 
245 3 45.31 648 69.1027 .65569 .579578 
345 6 35.40 648 69.1027 .51232 .799233 
1234 2 .85 216 800.2333 .00106 .998941 
1235 6 101.03 648 69.1027 1.46207 .188713 
1245 3 54.46 648 69.1027 .78803 .500821 
1345 6 92.28 648 69.1027 1.33537 .239014 
2345 6 35.58 648 69.1027 .51485 .797312 
12345 6 148.05 648 69.1027 2.14253 .046863 
4h. Battery Items 
Longer Term Items 
1-TYPE. 2-RESPONSEMODE, 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX, 5-MEASURE 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 2868.012 216 345.5927 8.29882 .004367 
2 1 391.612 216 345.5927 1.13316 .288290 
3 2 745.893 216 345.5927 2.15830 .118006 
4 1 1203.835 216 345.5927 3.48339 .063343 
5 2 3845.968 432 118.5464 32.44271 .000000 
12 1 8.668 216 345.5927 .02508 .874312 
13 2 1059.387 . 216 345.5927 3:06542 .048668 
23 2 1607.113 216 345.5927 4.65031 .010536 
14 1 337.568 216 345.5927 .97678 .324101 
24 1 49.612 216 345.5927 .14356 .705142 
34 2 40.401 216 345.5927 .11690 .889726 
15 2 462.038 432 118.5464 3.89752 .021010 
25 2 31.929 432 118.5464 .26934 .764013 
35 4 55.974 432 118.5464 .47217 .756179 
45 2 379.935 432 118.5464 3.20494 .041527 
123 2 192.735 216 345.5927 .55769 .573350 
124 1 15.901 216 345.5927 .04601 .830356 
134 2 1046.551 216 345.5927 3.02828 .050459 
234 2 123.754 216 345.5927 .35809 .699423 
125 2 206.110 432 118.5464 1.73864 .176987 
135 4 116.181 432 118.5464 .98005 .418111 
235 4 99.748 432 118.5464 .84142 .499419 
145 2 99.360 432 118.5464 .83815 .433212 
245 2 101.129 432 118.5464 .85308 .426819 
345 4 94.670 432 118.5464 .79859 .526553 
1234 2 250.343 216 345.5927 .72439 .485795 
1235 4 57.008 432 118.5464 .48089 .749786 
1245 2 370.476 432 118.5464 3.12516 .044925 
1345 4 27.824 432 118.5464 .23471 .918754 
2345 4 41.302 432 118.5464 .34840 .845135 
12345 4 68.137 432 118.5464 .57477 .681082 
Percentage of Trials 
1-TYPE, 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE. 4-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 4132.625 216 201.7259 20.48634 .000010 
2 1 115.870 216 201.7259 .57440 .449344 
3 2 1673.624 216 201.7259 8.29653 .000338 
4 1 .284 216 201.7259 .00141 .970114 
12 1 111.588 216 201.7259 .55316 .457836 
13 2 587.171 216 201.7259 2.91074 .056574 
23 2 407.940 216 201.7259 2.02225 .134856 
14 1 27.234 216 201.7259 .13501 .713656 
24 1 145.980 216 201.7259 .72366 .395889 
34 2 12.050 216 201.7259 .05974 .942029 
123 . 2 177.454 216 201.7259 .87968 .416398 
124 1 25.190 216 201.7259 .12487 .724155 
134 2 205.198 216 201.7259 1.01721 . .363328 
234 2 218.363 216 201.7259 1.08247 .340587 
1234 2 421.761 216 201.7259 2.09076 .126087 
How Good ? 
1-TYPE. 2-RESPONSEMODE. 3-SEQUENCE, 4-SEX 
df MS df MS 
Effect Effect Error Error F p-level 
1 1 3689.504 216 237.9958 15.50239 .000111 
2 1 165.004 216 237.9958 .69331 .405962 
3 2 68.629 216 237.9958 .28836 .749778 
4 1 1842.604 216 237.9958 7.74217 .005872 
12 1 1.504 216 237.9958 .00632 .936709 
13 2 3013.379 216 237.9958 12.66148 .000006 
23 2 22.804 216 237.9958 .09582 .908668 
14 .1 175.104 216 237.9958 .73574 .391978 
24 1 1012.704 216 237.9958 4.25513 .040328 
34 2 545.404 216 237.9958 2.29165 .103552 
123 2 207.554 216 237.9958 .87209 .419543 
124 1 155.204 216 237.9958 .65213 .420241 
134 2 588.654 216 237.9958 2.47338 .086684 
234 2 366.979 216 237.9958 1.54196 .216308 
1234 2 278.229 216 237.9958 1.16905 .312619 
7.5. Appendix 5 
5 a. Rational-Experiential Inventory, (Pacini and Epstein, 1999) 
40-item version. 
Rational Ability Subscale 
I am not that good at figuring out comphcated problems 
I am not very good at solving problems that requhe careful logical analysis 
I am not a very analytical thinker 
Reasoning things out carefully is not one fo my strong points 
I don't reason well under pressure 
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people 
I have a logical mind 
I have no problem in thinking things through carefully 
Using logic usually works well for me figuring out problems in my life 
I usually have clear, explamable reasons for my decisions 
Rational Engagement Subscale 
I try to avoid simations that requhe thinking in depth about something 
I enjoy mtellecmal challenges 
I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking 
I enjoy solving problems that requhe hard thinking 
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity 
I prefere complex to simple problems 
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction 
I enj oy thinking in abstract terms 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough 
forme 
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Learning news ways to think would be very appealing to me 
Experiential Ability Subscale 
I don't have a very good sense of intuition 
Using my "gut-feelings" usually works well for me in figining out problems in my life 
I believe in trusting my hunches 
I trust my initial feelings about people 
When it comes to trustmg people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings 
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes 
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest "gut-feelings" to find an answer 
M y snap judgements are probably not as good as most people's 
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even i f I cant explain how I know 
I suspect my himches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate 
Experiential Engagement Subscale 
I like to rely on my mtuitive impressions 
Intuition can be a very usefiil way to solve problems 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action 
I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition 
I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition 
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings 
I don't think it's a good idea to rely on one's inmition for important decisions 
I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions 
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive 
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions 
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5b. Complete Questionnaire for Study 1. 
1. Do you gamble? Y E S N O 
2. If NO, have you ever gambled N O YES 
Please answer the following questions about gambling over the last 12 months. 
3. Which of the following activities have you wagered money on? (please circle) 
Horse/Dog racing (Off course) The National Lottery Bingo 
Horse/Dog racing (On comse) Scratch Cards Pools 
Gaming machines (fruit machines etc.) Casino games Other: 
Sports betting (Motor sports. Football etc.) 
4. Which is the form of gamblmg you take part in most often? 
5. Over the last 12 months, on average, how often have you gambled? (please chcle) 
Every day Less than every day, but Less than once a week, 
more than once a week. but more than once a 
month. 
Less than once a month. Less often than once 
but more than once every every six months 
six months 
6. How long is yom typical gambling episode? (please circle) 
0-10 mins 11-30 mins 30-60 mins 1-2 homs more than 2 
homs 
7. On average, how much do you spend per session? (please circle) 
£l-£5 £6-£10 £l l -£25 £26-£50 £51-£100 over £100 
8. Do you see yom gambling activities as ever having lead to a problem? N O Y E S 
9. Have you sought or thought of seeking help for yom gambling behaviour? 
YES N O 
10. Was there any time when the amount you were gambling made you nervous? 
YES N O 
11. After wiiming, do you feel you ought to gamble more to increase yom wiimings? 
N O YES 
339 

12. Do you gamble until all yom spare cash has gone? YES N O 
13. After losing, do you spend more money to try.to makeup for yom losses?NO YES 
14. Do you ever get into debt as a resuh of your gambling? N O YES 
15. Have you borrowed money to gamble or pay gambling debts? YES N O 
16. Do you fmd you gamble for longer than you intended? N O YES 
17. Do you need to gamble with more and more money to achieve the desired excitement? 
YES N O 
18. Do you ever have unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back, or stop gambling? 
N O YES 
19. When you gamble, do you go back another day to win back the money you lost? 
N O YES 
20. Do you ever gamble more money than you intended to? Y E S N O 
21. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or about what happens when you 
gamble? YES N O 
22. Have you hidden betting slips, lottery tickets, gambling money, or other signs of 
gambling form yom spouse, children, or other important people in you life? 
N O YES 
Please respond to the following items bv ending the option that best describes the wav vou 
feel. 
(Please only chcle one option) 
23. Gambling makes me feel really alive. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
24. Sometimes I forget about the time when I am gambling. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
25. If I were feeling down, gambling would probably pick me up. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
26.1 like gambling because it helps me to forget my everyday problems. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
27. If I have not won any bets for a while, I am probably due for a big win. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
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28.1 know when I'm on a streak. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly.Disagree 
29. It is important to feel confident when I'm gamblmg. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
30. No matter what the game is, there are betting strategies that can help you to win. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
31.1 have carried a lucky charm when I gambled. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
32.1 must be familiar with a gambling game i f I am going to win. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
33. To be successfiil at gambling, I must be able to identify streaks. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Shongly Agree 
Thank you for yom co-operation. 
5c. Measurement Model for Study 1, Chapter 4. 
EQS, A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM 
COPYRIGHT BY P.M. BENTLER 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
1 /TITLE 
2 Allsubs 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 DATA='D:\ANT\ALLSUBS.ESS'; 
5 VARIABLES= 14; CASES= 192; 
6 METHODS=ML, ROBUST; 
7 MATRIX=RAW; 
8 /LABELS 
9 V1=L0C1; V2=LOC2; V3=LOC3; V4=F27; V5=F28 
10 V6=F29; V7=F30; V8=F31; V9=F32; V10=F33; 
11 V11=Q23; VI2= =Q24; V13=Q25; V14=Q26; 
12 /EQUATIONS 
13 VI = + *F1 + E l ; 
14 V2 = + *F1 + E2; 
15 V3 = + *F1 + E3; 
16 V4 = + *F2 + E4; 
17 V5 = + *F2 + E5; 
18 V6 = + *F2 + E6; 
19 V7 = + *F2 + E7; 
20 V8 = + *F2 + E8; 
21 V9 = + *F2 + E9; 
22 VlO = + *F2 + ElO; 
23 Vl l = + *F3 + E l l ; 
24 V12 = + *F3 + *F1 + E12; 
25 V13 = + *F3 + E13; 
26 V14 = + *F3 + E14; 
27 /VARIANCES 
28 Fl = 1.00; 
29 F2 = 1.00; 
30 F3 = 1.00; 
31 El = * ; 
32 E2 = * ; 
33 E3 = * ; 
34 E4 = * ; 
35 E5 = * ; 
36 E6 = * ; 
37 E7 = * ; 
38 E8 = * ; 
39 E9 = * ; 
40 ElO = * ; 
41 E l l = * ; 
42 E12 = * ; 
43 E13 = * ; 
44 E14 = * ; 
45 /COVARIANCES 
46 F1,F2=*; 
47 F1,F3=*; 
48 F2,F3=*; 
49 /LMTEST 
50 PROCESS=SIMULTANEOUS; 
51 SET=PW, PFV , PFF, PDD, GW, GVF, GFV, GFF, BVF, 
52 /END 
52 RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ 
DATA IS READ FROM D:\ANT\ALLSUBS.ESS 
THERE ARE 14 VARIABLES AND 192 CASES 
IT IS A RAW DATA ESS FILE 
342 
MULTIVARIATE SOFTWARE, INC. 
VERSION 5.7b (C) 1985 - 1998. 
SAMPLE STATISTICS BASED ON COMPLETE CASES 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS {G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
LOCI 
0.1458 
5.1572 
27.3362 
0.6305 
L0C2 
0.2031 
2.9758 
9.5437 
0.5272 
L0C3 
0.5313 
2.6856 
7.2697 
1.1618 
F27 
1.5312 
0.7913 
-0.4110 
0.6383 
F28 
1.5729 
0.7199 
-0.5492 
0.6591 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
F29 
1.9219 
0.3965 
-0.9678 
0.8617 
F30 
1.7031 
0.7679 
-0.4528 
0.7995 
F31 
1.4583 
1.0573 
0.8734 
0.5952 
F32 
2.0365 
0.4490 
-0.9190 
0.9674 
F33 
1.7396 
0.7510 
-0.2334 
0.7893 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
Q23 
1.6875 
0.3731 
-0.6913 
0.6360 
Q24 
1.6563 
0.9463 
0.0897 
0.7837 
Q25 
1.4375 
1.0692 
0.0986 
0.6108 
Q26 
1.4115 
0.8448 
-0.3832 
0.5439 
MULTIVARIATE KURTOSIS 
MARDIA'S COEFFICIENT (G2,P) = 
NORMALIZED ESTIMATE = 
130.1328 
42.5959 
ELLIPTICAL THEORY KURTOSIS ESTIMATES 
MARDIA-BASED KAPPA = 0.5809 MEAN SCALED UNIVARIATE KURTOSIS = 0.9668 
MARDIA-BASED KAPPA IS USED IN COMPUTATION. KAPPA= 0.5809 
CASE NUMBERS WITH LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO NORMALIZED MULTIVARIATE KURTOSIS: 
CASE NUMBER 
ESTIMATE 
88 
697.9184 
92 
697.9184 
115 
1331.0284 
121 
927.1008 
136 
717.7889 
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COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 14 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM' 14 VARIABLES) 
BASED ON 192 CASES. 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.397 
L0C2 V 2 0.101 0.278 
L0C3 V 3 0.262 0.410 1.350 
F27 V 4 0.022 0.122 0.282 0.407 
F28 V 5 0.063 0.129 0.338 0.307 0.434 
F29 V 6 0.001 0.126 0.319 0.324 0.354 
F30 V 7 0.064 0.129 0.337 0.221 0.328 
F31 V 8 -0.010 0.037 0.085 0.132 0.150 
F32 V 9 0.068 0.165 0.389 0.274 0.340 
F33 V 10 0.064 0.142 0.380 0.259 0.323 
Q23 V 11 -0.022 0.100 0.230 0.193" 0.196 
Q24 V 12 0.071 0.170 0.503 0.267 0.318 
Q25 V 13 -0.007 0.083 0.274 0.206 0.193 
Q26 V 14 -0.008 0.068 0.220 0.231 0.182 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.743 
F30 V 7 0.369 0.639 
F31 V 8 0.235 0.147 0.354 
F32 V 9 0.485 0.451 0.203 0.936 
F33 V 10 0.377 0.435 0.162 0.486 0.623 
Q23 V 11 0.300 0.216 0.097 0.216 0.190 
Q24 V 12 0.329 0.295 0.111 0.327 0.271 
Q25 V 13 0.239 0.157 0.170 0.209 0.183 
Q26 V 14 0.231 0.154 0.140 0.189 0.171 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.404 
Q24 V 12 0.264 0.614 
Q25 V 13 0.205 0.214 0.373 
Q26 V 14 0.197 0.226 0.233 0.296 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES = 14 
DEPENDENT V ' S : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DEPENDENT V'S : 11 12 13 14 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 17 
INDEPENDENT F'S : 1 2 3 
INDEPENDENT E'S : 1 2 3 
INDEPENDENT E'S : 11 12 13 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 32 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 17 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 26236 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 2500000 WORDS 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IS 0.30445E-07 
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MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
CASE CONTRIBUTION TO PARAMETER VARIANCES (IN DESCENDING ORDER) 
CASE 121= 0.103 13.55% CASE 33= 0.061 8.03% 
CASE 88= 0.043 5.61% CASE 92= 0.043 5.61% 
CASE 115= 0.039 5.07% CASE 60= 0.038 4.95% 
CASE 53= 0.031 4.10% CASE 29= 0.027 3.52% 
CASE 117= 0.023 3.07% CASE 11= 0.021 2.78% 
CASE 65= 0.020 2.66% CASE 183= 0.019 2.50% 
CASE 70= 0.016 2.05% CASE 120= 0.015 2.03% 
CASE 136= 0.015 2.02% CASE 66= 0.012 1.59% 
CASE 96= 0.011 1.44% CASE 54= 0.010 1.34% 
CASE 95= 0.009 1.12% CASE 34= 0.007 0.98% 
CASE 73= 0.007 0.93% CASE 112= 0.006 0.84% 
CASE 101= 0.006 0.82% CASE 41= 0.005 0.67% 
CASE 93= 0.005 0.63% CASE 90= 0.004 0.56% 
CASE 50= 0.004 0.55% CASE 1= 0.004 0.55% 
CASE 13= 0.004 0.50% CASE 3= 0.003 0.45% 
CASE 6= 0.003 0.44% CASE 51= 0.003 0.43% 
CASE 26= 0.003 0.42% CASE 16= 0.003 0.42% 
CASE 111= 0.003 0.41% CASE 119= 0.003 0.34% 
CASE 158= 0.003 0.34% CASE 12= 0.002 0.33% 
CASE 125= 0.002 0.32% CASE 87= 0.002 0.32% 
CASE 169= 0.002 0.31% CASE 86= 0.002 0.30% 
CASE •154= 0.002 0.30% CASE 58= 0.002 0.29% 
CASE 107= 0.002 0.29% CASE 178= 0.002 0.29% 
CASE 62= 0.002 0.29% CASE 83= 0.002 0.28% 
CASE 27= 0.002 0.28% CASE 72= 0.002 0.27% 
CASE 135= 0.002 0.27% CASE 190= 0.002 0.26% 
CASE 7 6= 0.002 0.26% CASE 191= 0.002 0.25% 
CASE 123= 0.002 0.25% CASE 48= 0.002 0.24% 
CASE 182= 0.002 0.24% CASE 4= 0.002 0.23% 
CASE 118= 0.002 0.22% CASE 104= 0.002 0.22% 
CASE 100= 0.002 0.21% CASE 148= 0.002 0.21% 
CASE 152= 0.002 0.21% CASE 186= 0.002 0.21% 
CASE 46= 0.002 0.20% CASE 155= 0.002 0.20% 
CASE 192= 0.002 0.20% CASE 42= 0.002 0.20% 
CASE 124= 0.001 0.20% CASE 131= 0.001 0.20% 
CASE 40= 0.001 0:19% CASE 68= 0.001 0.19% 
CASE 145= 0.001 0.19% CASE 187= 0.001 0.18% 
CASE 110= 0.001 0.18% CASE 106= 0.001 0.18% 
CASE 75= 0.001 0.17% CASE 45= 0.001 0.17% 
CASE 5= 0.001 0.17% CASE 109= 0.001 0.16% 
CASE 94= 0.001 0.16% CASE 81= 0.001 0.15% 
CASE 79= 0.001 0.15% CASE 67= 0.001 0.14% 
CASE 122= 0.001 0.14% CASE 189= 0.001 0.13% 
CASE 132= 0.001 0.13% CASE 64= 0.001 • 0.12% 
CASE 103= 0.001 0.12% CASE 89= 0.001 0.12% 
CASE 85= 0.001 0.11% CASE 80= 0.001 0.11% 
CASE 25= 0.001 0.10% CASE 129= 0.001 0.09% 
CASE 157= 0.001 0.09% CASE 74= 0.001 0.09% 
CASE 71= 0.001 0.09% CASE 78= 0.001 0.09% 
CASE 56= 0.001 0.09% CASE 69= 0.001 0.09% 
CASE 105= 0.001 0.08% CASE 44= 0.001 0.08% 
CASE 8= 0.001 0.07% CASE 128= 0.001 0.07% 
CASE 127= 0.001 0.07% CASE 28= 0.001 0.07% 
CASE 36= 0.001 0.07% CASE 49= 0.001 0.07% 
CASE 22= 0.001 0.07% CASE 7= 0.000 0.07% 
CASE 57= 0.000 0.06% CASE 184= 0.000 0.06% 
CASE 17= 0.000 0.06% CASE 162= 0.000 0.06% 
CASE 160= 0.000 0.06% CASE 10= 0.000 0.06% 
CASE 116= 0.000 0.06% CASE 9= 0.000 0.06% 
CASE 133= 0.000 0.06% CASE 175= 0.000 0.05% 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES APPEAR IN ORDER, 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING OPTIMIZATION. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA) : 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.000 
L0C2 V 2 0.008 0.000 
L0C3 V 3 0.007 0.000 0.000 
F27 V 4 -0.043 0.018 -0.003 0.000 
F28 V 5 -0.011 0.011 0.013 0.035 0.000 
F29 V 6 -0.086 -0.014 -0.065 0.003 -0.013 
F30 V 7 -0.012 0.006 -0.002 -0.062 0.005 
F31 V 8 -0.048 -0.024 -0.084 -0.009 -0.012 
F32 V 9 -0.021 0.022 -0.004 -0.055 -0.035 
F33 V 10 -0.015 0.015 0.029 -0.034 -0.012 
Q23 V 11 -0.072 0.021 0.010 0.024. 0.002 
Q24 V 12 -0.041 -0.011 0.006 0.045 0.065 
Q25 V 13 -0.059 -0.001 0.043 0.028 -0.011 
Q26 V 14 -0.059 -0.013 -0.003 0.058 -0.015 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.000 
F30 V 7 -0.012 0.000 
F31 V 8 0.044 -0.021 0.000 
F32 V 9 0.041 0.060 0.008 0.000 
F33 V 10 -0.019 0.087 -0.012 0.081 OiOOO 
Q23 V 11 0.071 0.014 -0.004 -0.018 -0.018 
Q24 V 12 0.029 0.031 -0.021 0.020 -0.003 
Q25 V 13 -0.002 -0.055 0.064 -0.037 -0.037 
Q26 V 14 -0.002 -0.051 0.038 -0.049 -0.042 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.000 
Q24 V 12 0.032 0.000 
Q25 V 13 -0.008 -0.031 0.000 
Q26 V 14 -0.009 -0.010 0.016 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS = 0.0240 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS = 0.0277 
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STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.000 
L0C2 V 2 0.024 0.000 
L0C3 V 3 0.009 -0.001 0.000 
F27 V 4 -0.107 0.054 -0.004 0.000 
F28 V 5 -0.027 0.031 0.017 0.083 0.000 
F29 V 6 -0.159 -0.031 -0.065 0.005 -0.023 
F30 V 7 -0.024 0.014 -0.002 -0.121 0.010 
F31 V 8 -0.128 -0.077 -0.122 -0.025 -0.030 
F32 V 9 -0.035 0.044 -0.004 -0.089 -0.055 
F33 V 10 -0.031 0.035 0.032 -0.067 -0.023 
Q23 V 11 -0.180 0.062 0.014 0.058 0.006 
Q24 V 12 -0.084 -0.026 0.007 0.090' 0.125 
Q25 V 13 -0.153 -0.002 0.061 0.071 -0.027 
Q26 V 14 -0.171 -0.047 -0.005 0.167 -0.042 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.000 
F30 V 7 -0.018 0.000 
F31 V 8 0.086 -0.044 0.000 
F32 V 9 0.049 0.078 0.014 0.000 
F33 V 10 -0.027 0.138 -0.026 0.106 0.000 
Q23 V 11 0.130 0.028 -0.010 -0.029 -0.036 
Q24 V 12 0.043 0.050 -0.045 0.026 -0.004 
Q25 V 13 -0.005 -0.113 0.176 -0.063 -0.077 
Q26 V 14 -0.003 -0.117 0.117 -0.093 -0.098 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.000 
Q24 V 12 0.063 0.000 
Q25 V 13 -0.019 -0.064 0.000 
Q26 V 14 -0.025 -0.025 0.047 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0485 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0560 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 11,V 1 V 13,V 8 V 14,V 1 V 14,V 4 V 6,V 1 
-0.180 0.176 -0.171 0.167 -0.159 
V 13,V 1 V 10,V 7 V 11,V 6 V 8,V 1 V 12,V 5 
-0.153 0.138 0.130 -0.128 0.125 
V 8,V 3 V 7,V 4 V 14,V 8 V 14,V 7 V 13,V 7 
-0.122 -0.121 0.117 -0.117 -0.113 
V 4,V 1 V 10,V 9 V 14,V 10 V 14,V 9 V 12,V 4 
-0.107 0.106 -0.098 -0.093 0.090 
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DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
60-
45-
30-
15-
* I 
* 1 
* 1 
* RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
! 1 -0.5 _ — 0 0.00% 
* ! 2 -0.4 
-
-0.5 0 0.00% 
* ! 3 -0.3 
-
-0.4 0 0.00% 
* ! 4 -0.2 - -0.3 0 0.00% 
* * 5 -0.1 
-
-0.2 10 9.52% 
* ! 6 0.0 -0.1 58 55.24% 
* * ! 7 0.1 
-
0.0 30 28.57% 
* ! 8 0.2 
-
0.1 7 6.67% 
* * ! 9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
* * A •0.4 - 0.3 0 0.00% 
* * ! B 0.5 
-
0.4 0 0.00% 
* * * ! C ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
•k k 1 
* * * * ; TOTAL 105 100.00% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C EACH "*" REPRESENTS 3 RESIDUALS 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 1480.833 ON 91 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 1298.83295 INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 911.40087 
MODEL AIC = 76.52717 MODEL CAIC = -234.26999 
CHI-SQUARE = 222.527 BASED ON 73 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS LESS THAN 0.001 
THE NORMAL THEORY RLS CHI-SQUARE FOR THIS ML SOLUTION IS 236.192. 
SATORRA-BENTLER SCALED CHI-SQUARE = 156.3208 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.00000 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.850 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 0.866 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.892 
ROBUST COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX = 0.919 
ITERATIVE SUMMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 0.307062 1.00000 2.50006 
2 0.096850 1.00000 1.39587 
3 0.042296 1.00000 1.17779 
4 0.006874 1.00000 1.16653 
5 0.003242 1.00000 1.16530 
6 0.001003 1.00000 1.16510 
7 0.000474 1.00000 1.16506 
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MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS; 
(ROBUST STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
LOCI =V1 = .241*F1 + 1.000 El 
.047 
5.119 
( .090) 
( 2.682) 
L0C2 =V2 = .386*F1 + 1.000 E2 
.036 
10.603 
( .072) 
( 5.352) 
L0C3 =V3 = 1.062*F1 + 1.000 E3 
.078 
13.704 
( .147) 
( 7.210) 
F27 =V4 = .488*F2 + 1.000 E4 
.040 
12.137 
( .033) 
( 14.676) 
F28 =V5 = .557*F2 + 1.000 E5 
.040 
14.101 
( .031) 
( 18.143) 
F29 =V6 = .659*F2 + 1.000 E6 
.054 
12.129 
( .046) 
( 14.327) 
F30 =V7 = .580*F2 + 1.000 E7 
.051 
11.257 
( .047) 
( 12.258) 
F31 =V8 = .290*F2 + 1.000 E8 
.042 
6.876 
( .041) 
( 7.147) 
F32 =V9 = .673*F2 + 1.000 E9 
.063 
10.650 
( .058) 
( 11.544) 
F33 =V10 = .601*F2 + 1.000 ElO 
.050 
12.068 
( .045) 
( 13.441) 
Q23 =V11 = .450*F3 + 1.000 E l l 
.042 
10.594 
( .039) 
( 11.385) 
Q24 =V12 = .292*F1 + .382*F3 + 1.000 E12 
.054 .055 
5.363 6.957 
( .091) • ( .060) 
( 3.206) ( 6.403) 
Q25 =V13 = 
( 
. 474*F3 
.039 
12.023 
.039) 
+ 1.000 E13 
( 12.056) 
Q26 =V14 = 
( 
.458*F3 
.034 
13.496 
.032) 
( 14.499) 
+ 1.000 E14 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
I Fl - Fl 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I F2 - F2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I F3 - F3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1.000 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1.000 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1.000 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
E D 
El - LOCI .339*1 I 
.036 I I 
9.514 I I 
( .145)1 I 
( 2.334)1 I 
I I 
E2 - L0C2 .129*1 I 
.018 I I 
7.083 I I 
( .028)1 I 
( 4.599)1 I 
I I 
E3 - L0C3 .221*1 I 
.095 I I 
2.326 I I 
( .105)1 I 
( 2.108)1 I 
I I 
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E4 - F27 
E5 - F28 
E6 - F29 
E7 - F30 
E8 - F31 
E9 - F32 
ElO - F33 
E l l - Q23 
E12 - Q24 
E13 - Q25 
E14 - Q26 
.169*1 
.020 I 
8.429 I 
.026)1 
6.487)1 
I 
.124*1 
.017 I 
7.380 I 
.020)1 
6.299)1 
I 
.309*1 
.037 I 
8.432 I 
.042)1 
7.362)1 
I 
.303*1 
.035 I 
8.719 I 
.040)1 
7.591)1 
I 
.270*1 
.029 I 
9.479 I 
.050)1 
5.420)1 
I 
.483*1 
.054 I 
8.880 I 
.074)1 
6.561)1 
I 
.262*1 
.031 I 
8.454 I 
.040)1 
6.505)1 
I 
.202*1 
.025 I 
8.254 I 
.030)1 
6.676)1 
I 
.280*1 
.033 I 
8.598 I 
.040)1 
6.949)1 
I 
.149*1 
.020 I 
7.431 I 
.026)1 
5.743)1 
I 
.086*1 
.014 I 
6.027 I 
.014)1 
6.009)1 
I 
COVARIANCES AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
F2 
Fl 
F3 
Fl 
F3 
F2 
F2 
Fl 
F3 
Fl 
F3 
F2 
.549*1 
.062 I 
8.891 I 
.052)1 
10.622)1 
I 
.459*1 
.071 I 
6.432 I 
.0870 I 
5.283)1 
I 
.772*1 
.041 I 
18.733 I 
.052)1 
14.889)1 
I 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
LOCI =V1 = .382*F1 + .924 El .146 
L0C2 =V2 = .733*F1 + .681 E2 .537 
L0C3 =V3 = .914*F1 + .405 E3 .836 
F27 =V4 = .765*F2 + .644 E4 .585 
F28 =V5 = .845*F2 + .535 E5 .714 
F29 =V6 = .764*F2 + .645 E6 .584 
F30 =V7 .725*F2 + .689 E7 .526 
F31 =V8 = .487*F2 + .873 E8 .237 
F32 =V9 = .696*F2 + .718 E9 .484 
F33 =V1.0 .762*F2 + .648 ElO .580 
Q23 =V11 = .707*F3 + .707 E l l .500 
Q24 =V12 = .373*F1 + .488*F3 + .676 E12 .544 
Q25 =V13 = .776*F3 + .631 E13 .602 
Q26 =V14 .842*F3 + .540 E14 .709 
CORRELATIONS AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
F2 
Fl 
F3 
Fl 
F3 
F2 
F2 
Fl 
F3 
Fl 
F3 
F2 
.54 9*1 
I 
I 
.459*1 
I 
I 
.772*1 
I 
I 
E N D 0 F M E T H O D 
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LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER TEST REQUIRES 13073 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATES 2500000 WORDS. 
LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST (FOR ADDING PARAMETERS) 
ORDERED UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS: 
NO CODE PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY PARAMETER CHAl 
1 2 12 V4,F3 22.760 0.000 0.316 
2 2 12 VI, F3 10.216 0.001 -0.175 
3 2 12 V10,F3 8.811 0.003 -0.244 
4 2 12 V12,F2 7.621 0.006 0.246 
5 2 12 V8,F3 6.965 0.008 0.203 
6 2 12 V7,F3 6.541 0.011 -0.221 
7 2 12 V8,F1 5.898 0.015 -0.125 
8 2 12 V9,F3 4.472 0.034 -0.228 
9 2 12 VI, F2 3.499 0.061 -0.107 
10 2 12 V3,F3 3.137 0.077 0.211 
11 2 12 V6,F1 3.084 0.079 -0.104 
12 2 12 V14,F2 3.001 0.083 -0.118 
13 2 12 V6,F3 1.818 0.178 0.121 
14 2 12 V14,F1 1.541 0.215 -0.049 
15 2 12 V5,F1 1.429 0.232 0.049 
16 2 12 V11,F2 1.354 0.245 0.088 
17 2 12 V13,F2 1.219 0.270 -0.081 
18 2 12 V10,F1 0.808 0.369 0.049 
19 2 12 V13,F1 0.704 0.401 0.036 
20 2 12 V3,F2 0.675 0.411 -0.105 
21 2 12 V2,F2 0.488 0.485 0.033 
22 2 12 V11,F1 0.312 0.576 0.026 
23 2 12 V5,F3 0.111 0.739 -0.021 
24 2 12 V9,F1 0.058 0.810 0.017 
25 2 12 V4,F1 0.055 0.815 0.010 
26 2 12 V7,F1 0.044 0.835 0.012 
27 2 12 V2,F3 0.039 0.844 -0.009 
28 2 0 F3,F3 0.000 1.000 0.000 
29 2 0 F2,F2 0.000 1.000 0.000 
30 2 0 F1,F1 0.000 1.000 0.000 
MULTIVARIATE LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST BY SIMULTANEOUS PROCESS IN STAGE 1 
PARAMETER SETS (SUBMATRICES) ACTIVE AT THIS STAGE ARE: 
PVV PFV PFF PDD GW GVF GFV GFF BVF BFF 
CUMULATIVE MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS UNIVARIATE INCREMENT 
STEP PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE D.F. PROBABILITY CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY 
1 V4,F3 22.760 1 0.000 22.760 0.000 
2 VI, F3 32.976 2 0.000 10.216 0.001 
3 V8,F3 42.266 3 0.000 9.291 0.002 
4 V12,F2 49.545 4 0.000 7.278 0.007 
5 V8,F1 55.883 5 0.000 6.338 0.012 
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5d. EQS output for F-D-LoC model. 
EQS, A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM 
COPYRIGHT BY P.M. BENTLER 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
1 /TITLE 
2 Allsubs 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 DATA='C:\GAMBLING\ALLSUBS.ESS•; 
5 VARIABLES= 14; CASES= 192; 
6 METHODS=ML, ROBUST; 
7 MATRIX=RAW; 
8 /LABELS 
9 V1=L0C1; V2=LOC2; V3=LOC3; V4=F27; V5=F28; 
10 V6=F29; V7=F30; V8=F31; V9=F32; V10=F33; 
11 V11=Q23; V12=Q24; V13=Q25; V14=Q26; 
12 /EQUATIONS 
13 VI = + Fl + E l ; 
14 V2 = + *F1 + E2; 
15 V3 = + *F1 + E3; 
16 V4 = + F2 + E4; 
17 V5 = + *F2 + E5; 
18 V6 = + *F2 + E6; 
19 V7 = + *F2 + E7; 
20 V8 = + *F2 + E8; 
21 V9 = + *F2 + E9; 
22 VlO = + *F2 + ElO; 
23 Vl l = + F3 + E l l ; 
24 V12 = + *F3 + *F1 + E12; 
25 V13 = -f *F3 + E13; 
26 V14 = + *F3 + E14; 
27 Fl= + *F3 + Dl; 
28 F3=*F2 + D3; 
29 /VARIANCES 
30 F2 = * ; 
31 El = * ; 
32 E2 = * ; 
33 E3 = * ; 
34 E4 = * ; 
35 E5 = * ; 
36 E6 = * ; 
37 E7 = * ; 
38 E8 = * ; 
39 E9 = * ; 
40 ElO = * ; 
41 E l l = * ; 
42 E12 = * ; 
43 E13 = * ; 
44 E14 = * ; 
45 /COVARIANCES 
46 /LMTEST 
47 PROCESS=SIMULTANEOUS; 
48 SET=PW, PFV, PFF, PDD, GW, GVF, GFV, GFF, BVF, BFF; 
49 /END 
49 RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ 
DATA IS READ FROM C:\GAMBLING\ALLSUBS.ESS 
THERE ARE 14 VARIABLES AND 192 CASES 
IT IS A RAW DATA ESS FILE 
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MULTIVARIATE SOFTWARE, INC. 
VERSION 5.7b (C) 1985 - 1998. 
SAMPLE STATISTICS BASED ON COMPLETE CASES 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
VARIABLE -
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
LOCI 
0.1458 
5.1572 
27.3362 
0.6305 
F29 
1.9219 
0.3965 
-0.9678 
0.8617 
Q23 
1.6875 
0.3731 
-0.6913 
0.6360 
L0C2 
0.2031 
2.9758 
9.5437 
0.5272 
F30 
1.7031 
0.7679 
-0.4528 
0.7995 
Q24 
1.6563 
0.9463 
0.0897 
0.7837 
L0C3 
0.5313 
2.6856 
7.2697 
1.1618 
F31 
1.4583 
1.0573 
0.8734 
0.5952 
Q25 
1.4375 
1.0692 
0.0986 
0.6108 
F27 
1.5312 
0.7913 
-0.4110 
0.6383 
F32 
2.0365 
0.4490 
-0.9190 
0.9674 
Q26 
1.4115 
0.8448 
-0.3832 
0.5439 
F28 
1.5729 
0.7199 
-0.5492 
0.6591 
F33 
1.7396 
0.7510 
-0.2334 
0.7893 
MULTIVARIATE KURTOSIS 
MARDIA'S COEFFICIENT (G2,P) = 130.1328 
NORMALIZED ESTIMATE = 42.5959 
ELLIPTICAL THEORY KURTOSIS ESTIMATES 
MARDIA-BASED KAPPA = 0.5809 MEAN SCALED UNIVARIATE KURTOSIS = 0.9668 
MARDIA-BASED KAPPA IS USED IN COMPUTATION. KAPPA= 0.5809 
CASE NUMBERS WITH LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO NORMALIZED MULTIVARIATE KURTOSIS: 
CASE NUMBER 88 
ESTIMATE 697.9184 
92 115 121 136 
697.9184 1331.0284 927.1008 717.7889 
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COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 14 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 14 VARIABLES) 
BASED ON 192 CASES. 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.397 
L0C2 V 2 0.101 0.278 
L0C3 V 3 0.262 0.410 1.350 
F27 V 4 0.022 0.122 0.282 0.407 
F28 V 5 0.063 0.129 0.338 0.307 0.434 
F29 V 6 0.001 0.126 0.319 0.324 0.354 
F30 V 7 0.064 0.129 0.337 0.221 0.328 
F31 V 8 -0.010 0.037 0.085 0.132 0.150 
F32 V 9 0.068 0.165 0.389 0.274 0.340 
F33 V 10 0.064 0.142 0.380 0.259 0.323 
Q23 V 11 -0.022 0.100 0.230 0.193 0.196 
Q24 V 12 0.071 0.170 0.503 0.267 0.318 
Q25 V 13 -0.007 0.083 0.274 0.206 0.193 
Q26 V 14 -0.008 0.068 0.220 0.231 0.182 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 ,V 10 
F29 V 6 0.743 
F30 V 7 0.369 0.639 
F31 V 8 0.235 0.147 0.354 
F32 V 9 0.485 0.451 0.203 0.936 
F33 V 10 0.377 0.435 0.162 0.486 0.623 
Q23 V 11 0.300 0.216 0.097 0.216 0.190 
Q24 V 12 0.329 0.295 0.111 0.327 0.271 
Q25 V 13 0.239 0.157 0.170 0.209 0.183 
Q26 V 14 0.231 0.154 0.140 0.189 0.171 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.404 
Q24 V 12 0.264 0.614 
Q25 V 13 0.205 0.214 0.373 
Q26 V 14 0.197 0.226 0.233 0.296 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =16 
DEPENDENT V ' S : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DEPENDENT V'S : 11 12 13 14 
DEPENDENT F'S : 1 3 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 17 
INDEPENDENT F'S 
INDEPENDENT E'S 
INDEPENDENT E'S 
INDEPENDENT D'S 
2 
1 
11 
1 
2 
12 
3 
3 
13 
4 
14 
10 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 31 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 19 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 25814 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 2500000 WORDS 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IS 0.30445E-07 
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MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
CASE CONTRIBUTION TO PARAMETER VARIANCES (IN DESCENDING ORDER) 
CASE 121= 11.215 53.40% CASE 53= 1.279 6.09% 
CASE 183= 0.935 4.45% CASE 29= 0.908 4.32% 
CASE 120= 0.803 3.82% CASE 65= 0.686 3.27% 
CASE 92= 0.554 2.64% CASE 88= 0.554 2.64% 
CASE 33= 0.542 2.58% CASE 95= 0.496 2.36% 
CASE 66= 0.444 2.12% CASE 117= 0.402 1.91% 
CASE 34= 0.218 1.04% CASE 11= 0.182 0.86% 
CASE 60= 0.172 0.82% CASE 93= 0.133 0.64% 
CASE 90= 0.126 0.60% CASE 70= 0.094 0.45% 
CASE 41= 0.083 0.40% CASE 115= 0.073 0.35% 
CASE 3= 0.069 0.33% CASE 68= 0.056 0.27% 
CASE 118= 0.053 0.25% CASE 42= 0.050 0.24% 
CASE 109= 0.043 0.20% CASE 105= 0.039 0.18% 
CASE 136= 0.036 0.17% CASE 13= 0.035 0.17% 
CASE 112= 0.029 0.14% CASE 76= 0.026 0.12% 
CASE 191= 0.021 0.10% CASE 148= 0.020 0.09% 
CASE 96= 0.019 0.09% CASE 50= 0.019 0.09% 
CASE 1= 0.017 0.08% CASE 54= 0.017 0.08% 
CASE 101= 0.015 0.07% CASE 87= 0.014 0.07% 
CASE 4= 0.014 0.07% CASE 131= 0.014 0.07% 
CASE 73= 0.013 0.06% CASE 44= 0.013 0.06% 
CASE 4 6= 0.013 0.06% CASE 104= 0.013 0.06% 
CASE 83= 0.012 0.06% CASE 86= 0.012 0.06% 
CASE 178= 0.012 0.06% CASE 119= 0.012 0.06% 
CASE 27= 0.011 0.05% CASE 152= 0.011 0.05% 
CASE 111= 0.011 0.05% CASE 190= 0.010 0.05% 
CASE 81= 0.010 0.05% CASE 100= 0.010 0.05% 
CASE 135= 0.010 0.05% CASE 58= 0.010 0.05% 
CASE 72= 0.009 0.04% CASE 62= 0.009 0.04% 
CASE 155= 0.009 0.04% CASE 79= 0.008 0.04% 
CASE 80= 0.008 0.04% CASE 125= 0.008 0.04% 
CASE 124= 0.008 0.04% CASE 186= 0.008 0.04% 
CASE 16= 0.007 0.03% CASE 103= 0.007 0.03% 
CASE 6= 0.007 0.03% CASE 127= 0.007 0.03% 
CASE 110= 0.006 0.03% CASE 106= 0.006 0.03% 
CASE 107= 0.006 0.03% CASE 169= 0.006 0.03% 
CASE 123= 0-.006 0.03% CASE 26= 0.006 0.03% 
CASE 158= 0.006 0.03% CASE 22= 0.006 0.03% 
CASE 48= 0.005 0.03% CASE 132= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 182= 0.004 0.02% CASE 56= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 94= 0.004 0.02% CASE 64= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 51= 0.004 0.02% CASE 45= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 192= 0.004 0.02% CASE 12= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 5= 0.003 0.02% CASE 128= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 154= 0.003 0.01% CASE 17= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 162= 0.003 0.01% CASE 98= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 99= 0.003 0.01% CASE 35= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 14= 0.003 0.01% CASE 75= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 67= 0.003 0.01% CASE 126= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 89= 0.003 0.01% CASE 2= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 85= 0.002 0.01% CASE 40= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 25= 0.002 0.01% CASE 174= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 102= 0.002 0.01% CASE 145= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 84= 0.002 0.01% CASE 8= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 122= 0.002 0.01% CASE 187= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 63= 0.002 0.01% CASE 133= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 9= 0.002 0.01% CASE 116= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 47= 0.001 0.01% CASE 189= 0.001 0.01% 
CASE 156= 0.001 0.01% CASE 91= 0.001 0.01% 
CASE 184= 0.001 0.01% CASE 129= 0.001 0.01% 
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PARiiMETER ESTIMATES 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
APPEAR IN ORDER, 
WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING OPTIMIZATION. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA) : 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.000 
L0C2 V 2 0.014 0.000 
L0C3 V 3 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
F27 V 4 -0.025 0.048 0.059 0.000 
F28 V 5 0.009 0.045 0.085 0.035 0.000 
F29 V 6 -0.063 0.025 0.017 0.000" -0.015 
F30 V 7 0.009 0.041 0.074 -0.061 0.007 
F31 V 8 -0.038 -0.007 -0.049 -0.012 -0.014 
F32 V 9 0.004 0.064 0.084 -0.055 -0.033 
F33 V 10 0.007 0.052 0.108 -0.033 -0.009 
Q23 V 11 -0.076 0.016 -0.025 0.015 -0.006 
Q24 V 12 -0.034 0.003 0.002 0.054 0.077 
Q25 V 13 -0.062 -0.004 0.011 0.022 -0.016 
Q26 V 14 -0.061 -0.016 -0.032 0.055 -0.018 
F29 F36 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.000 
F30 V 7 -0.014 0.000 
F31 V 8 0.040 -0.023 0.000 
F32 V 9 0.039 0.063 0.005 0.000 
F33 V 10 -0.019 0.091 -0.014 0.085 0.000 
Q23 V 11 0.059 0.006 -0.010 -0.028 -0.027 
Q24 V 12 0.040 0.044 -0.017 0.035 0.011 
Q25 V 13 -0.011 -0.060 0.059 -0.043 -0.042 
Q26 V 14 -0.007 -0.053 0.034 -0.052 -0.044 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.000 
Q24 V 12 0.020 0.000 
Q25 V 13 -0.005 -0.038 0.000 
Q26 V 14 -0.004 -0.015 0.024 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS = 0.0285 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS = 0.0329 
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STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.000 
L0C2 V 2 0.043 0.000 
L0C3 V 3 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
F27 V 4 -0.063 0.142 0.080 0.000 
F28 V 5 0.022 0.129 0.111 0.083 0.000 
F29 V 6 -0.115 0.056 0.017 0.000 -0.026 
F30 V 7 0.018 0.098 0.080 -0.120 0.014 
F31 V 8 -0.101 -0.023 -0.071 -0.031 -0.036 
F32 V 9 0.006 0.125 0.074 -0.089 -0.051 
F33 V 10 0.014 0.124 0.118 -0.065 -0.018 
Q23 V 11 -0.189 0.046 -0.034 0.038; -0.015 
Q24 V 12 -0.069 0.006 0.002 0.109 0.148 
Q25 V 13 -0.161 -0.014 0.015 0.057 -0.039 
Q26 V 14 -0.178 -0.056 -0.050 0.157. -0.050 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.000 
F30 V 7 -0.020 0.000 
F31 V 8 0.077 -0.048 0.000 
F32 V 9 0.047 0.082 0-.009 0.000 
F33 V 10 -0.028 0.143 -0.030 0.111 0.000 
Q23 V 11 0.108 0.012 -0.027 -0.046 -0.053 
Q24 V 12 0.060 0.070 -0.036 0.046 0.018 
Q25 V 13 -0.021 -0.123 0.164 -0.073 -0.087 
Q26 V 14 -0.015 -0.123 0.106 -0.099 -0.103 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.000 
Q24 V 12 0.040 0.000 
Q25 V 13 -0.013 -0.080 0.000 
Q26 V 14 -0.011 -0.035 0.074 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0556 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS = 0.0642 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 11,V 1 V 14,V 1 V 13,V 8 V 13,V 1 V 14,V 4 
-0.189 -0.178 0.164 -0.161 0.157 
V 12,V 5 V 10,V 7 V 4,V 2 V 5,V 2 V 9,V 2 
0.148 0.143 0.142 0.129 0.125 
V 10,V 2 V 13,V 7 V 14,V 7 V 7,V 4 V 10,V 3 
0.124 -0.123 -0.123 -0.120 0.118 
V 6,V 1 V 5,V 3 V 10,V 9 V 12,V 4 V 11,V 6 
-0.115 0.111 0.111 0.109 0.108 
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DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
60 
RANGE FREQ PERCENT 
45- * 
! * 1 -0.5 
-
— 
0 0.00% 
! * * 2 -0.4 - -0.5 0 0.00% 
! * * 3 -0.3 - -0.4 0 0.00% 
! * * 4 -0.2 
-
-0.3 0 0.00% 
30- * * 5 -0.1 
-
-0.2 9 8.57% 
! * * 6 0.0 - -0.1 44 41.90% 
! * * 7 0.1 
-
0.0 38 36.19% 
! * * 8 0.2 
-
0.1 14 13.33% 
! * * 9 0.3 - 0.2 0 0.00% 
15- * * * - A 0.4 
-
0.3 0 0.00% 
! * * * ! B 0.5 
-
0.4 0 0.00% 
! * * * * 1 C ++ - 0.5 0 0.00% 
! * * * * 1 
! * * * * ! TOTAL 105 100.00% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C EACH "*" REPRESENTS 3 RESIDUALS 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 1480.833 ON 91 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 1298.83295 INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 911.40087 
MODEL AIC = 84.89250 MODEL CAIC = -230.16216 
CHI-SQUARE = 232.892 BASED ON 74 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS LESS THAN 0.001 
THE NORMAL THEORY RLS CHI-SQUARE FOR THIS ML SOLUTION IS 255.678. 
SATORRA-BENTLER SCALED CHI-SQUARE = 160.4043 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.00000 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.843 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 0.859 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.886 
ROBUST COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX = 0.916 
ITERATIVE SUMMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 0.227608 1.00000 2.42034 
2 0.103756 1.00000 1.59959 
3 0.079674 1.00000 1.46459 
4 0.104016 1.00000 1.28382 
5 0.045304 1.00000 1.22043 
6 0.007776 1.00000 1.21936 
7 0.000965 1.00000 1.21933 
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MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH'STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
(ROBUST STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
LOCI =V1 = 1.000 Fl + 1.000 El 
L0C2 =V2 = 
L0C3 =V3 = 
1.582*F1 
.322 
4.918 
' .564) 
2.805) 
4.744*F1 
.975 
4.866 
1.670) 
2.841) 
+ 1.000 E2 
+ 1.000 E3 
F27 =V4 1.000 F2 + 1.000 E4 
F28 =V5 
F29 =V6 = 
F30 =V7 = 
F31 =V8 = 
F32 =V9 
F33 =V10 = 
Q23 =V11 = 
1.136*F2 
.093 
12.218 
.075) 
15.166) 
1.356*F2 
.123 
11.005 
.117) 
11.590) 
1.180*F2 
.115 
10.219 
.131) 
9.039) 
.602*F2 
.089 
6.741 
.090) 
6.666) 
1.372*F2 
.140 
9.766 
.156) 
8.812) 
1.221*F2 
.113 
10.790 
.120) 
10.191) 
1.000 F3 
+ 1.000 E5 
+ 1.000 E6 
+ 1.000 E7 
+ 1.000 E8 
+ 1.000 E9 
+ 1.000 ElO 
+ 1.000 E l l 
Q24 =V12 = 1.017*F1 
.291 
3.492 
( .329) 
+ .929*F3 
.139 
6.705 
( .149) 
+ 1.000 E12 
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Q25 =V13 = 
( 
3.093) 
1.035*F3 
.108 
9.580 
.097) 
( 10.635) 
{ . 6.217) 
+ 1.000 E13 
Q26 =V14 .989*F3 
.097 
10.168 
.092) 
10.733) 
+ 1.000 E14 
CONSTRUCT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
(ROBUST STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
F l =F1 = .264*F3 
.068 
3.891 
.092) 
2.874) 
+ 1.000 Dl 
F3 =F3 . 7 4 3 * F 2 
.088 
8 . 3 9 8 
.079) 
9 . 4 3 4 ) 
+ 1.000 D3 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
F2 - F2 .239*1 
.039 I 
6.086 I 
.032)1 
7.402)1 
I 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
E D 
El - LOCI .343*1 Dl - Fl .041*1 
.036 I .016 I 
9.592 I 2.531 I 
( .145)1 ( .033)1 
( 2.358)1 ( 1.251)1 
I I 
E2 - L0C2 .141*1 D3 - F3 .071*1 
.019 I .016 I 
7.376 I 4.367 I 
( .031)1 ( .019)1 
( 4.485)1 ( 3.757)1 
I I 
E3 - L0C3 .116*1 I 
.112 I I 
1.033 I I 
( .119)1 I 
( .967)1 I 
I I 
E4 - F27 .168*1 I 
.020 I I 
8.393 I I 
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E5 - F28 
E6 - F29 
E7 - F30 
E8 - F31 
E9 - F32 
ElO - F33 
E l l - Q23 
E12 - Q24 
( .026)1 I 
( 6.537)1 I 
I I 
.126*1 I 
.017 I I 
7.388 I I 
( .020)1 I 
( 6.283)1 I 
I I 
.302*1 I 
.036 I I 
8.362 I I 
( .042)1 I 
( 7.274)1 1 
I I 
.306*1 I 
.035 I I 
8.721 I I 
( .040)1 I 
( 7.621)1 I 
I I 
.268*1 I 
.028 I I 
9.462 I I 
( .050)1 I 
{ 5.345)1 I 
I I 
.485*1 I 
.055 I I 
8.878 I I 
( .073)1 I 
( 6.620)1 I 
I I 
.266*1 I 
.031 I I 
8.474 I I 
( .040)1 I 
( 6.619)1 I 
I I 
.201*1 I 
.024 I I 
8.291 I I 
( .030)1 I 
( 6.649)1 I 
I I 
.280*1 I 
.033 I I 
8.610 I I 
( .041)1 I 
( 6.818)1 I 
I I 
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VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CONTINUED) 
E13 - Q25 .155*1 I 
.020 I I 
7.701 I I 
( .025)1 I 
( 6.101)1 I 
I I 
E14 - Q26 .097*1 I 
.014 I I 
6.727 I I 
( .015)1 I 
( 6.643)1 I 
I I 
STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
LOCI =V1 = . 371 Fl + .928 El .138 
L0C2 =V2 .703*F1 + .712 E2 .494 
L0C3 =V3 = .956*F1 + .293 E3 .914 
F27 =V4 = .767 F2 + .642 E4 .588 
F28 =V5 .843*F2 + .538 E5 .711 
F29 =V6 .770*F2 + .638 E6 .593 
F30 =V7 - .722*F2 + .692 E7 .521 
F31 =V8 = .495*F2 + .869 E8 .245 
F32 =V9 = .694*F2 + .720 E9 .481 
F33 =V10 = .757*F2 + .653 ElO .573 
Q23 =V11 = .709 F3 + .705 E l l .503 
Q24 =V12 = .304*F1 + .535*F3 + .676 E12 .543 
Q25 =V13 = .764*F3 + .645 E13 .584 
Q26 =V14 .820*F3 + .572 E14 .673 
Fl =F1 .508*F3 + .861 Dl .258 
F3 =F3 .806*F2 + .593 D3 . 649 
E N D O F M E T H O D 
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LAGRANGIAN MULTIPLIER TEST REQUIRES 14561 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATES 2500000 WORDS. 
LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST (FOR ADDING PARAMETERS) 
ORDERED UNIVARIATE TEST STATISTICS: 
NO CODE PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY PARAMETER CHA] 
1 2 20 V4,F3 20.861 0.000 0.747 
2 2 10 D3,D1 9.068 0.003 -0.021 
3 2 22 F3,F1 9.068 0.003 -0.521 
4 2 16 F1,F2 9.068 0.003 0.220 
5 2 20 VI, F3 8.538 0.003 -0.368 
6 2 20 V10,F3 7.548 0.006 -0.561 
7 2 12 V12,F2 7.408 0.006 0.523 
8 2 20 V7,F3 5.666 0.017 -0.510 
9 2 20 V14,F1 4.663 0.031 -0.334 
10 2 12 V14,F2 4.196 0.041 -0.305 
11 2 20 V9,F3 4.166 0.041 -0.543 
12 2 20 V8,F3 4.090 0.043 0.381 
13 2 12 V13,F2 3.753 0.053 -0.317 
14 2 20 V8,F1 3.749 0.053 -0.365 
15 2 20 V5,F1 2.918 0.088 0.250 
16 2 12 V2,F2 2.424 0.120 0.123 
17 2 12 VI, F2 2.035 0.154 -0.148 
18 2 20 V10,F1 1.985 0.159 0.280 
19 2 20 V6,F1 1.131 0.287 -0.227 
20 2 20 V6,F3 0.986 0.321 0.218 
21 2 20 V3,F3 0.831 0.362 0.296 
22 2 20 V11,F1 0.580 0.446 -0.148 
23 2 20 V4,F1 0.571 0.450 0.120 
24 2 20 V2,F3 0.456 0.500 0.073 
25 2 20 V7,F1 0.352 0.553 0.125 
26 2 20 V9,F1 0.295 0.587 0.142 
27 2 12 V3,F2 0.139 0.709 0.071 
28 2 12 V11,F2 0.096 0.757 0.053 
29 2 20 V5,F3 0.004 0.948 -0.010 
30 2 20 V13,F1 0.003 0.954 0.010 
31 2 0 V4,F2 0.000 1.000 0.000 
32 2 0 F1,D1 0.000 1.000 0.000 
33 2 0 V11,F3 0.000 1.000 0.000 
34 2 0 VI, Fl 0.000 1.000 0.000 
35 2 0 F3,D3 0.000 1.000 0.000 
MULTIVARIATE LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER TEST BY SIMULTANEOUS PROCESS IN STAGE 1 
PARAMETER SETS (SUBMATRICES) ACTIVE AT THIS STAGE ARE: 
PW PFV PFF PDD GW GVF GFV GFF BVF BFF 
CUMULATIVE MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS UNIVARIATE INCREMENT 
STEP PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE D.F. PROBABILITY CHI-SQUARE PROBABILITY 
1 V4,F3 20.861 1 0.000 20.861 0.000 
2 F3,F1 29.929 2 0.000 9.068 0.003 
3 V12,F2 39.045 3 0.000 9.116 0.003 
4 VI, F3 47.583 4 0.000 8.538 0.003 
5 V8,F3 53.476 5 0.000 5.893 0.015 
365 
5e. EQS output for D-F-LoC model. 
EQS, A STRUCTURAL EQUATION PROGRAM MULTIVARIATE SOFTWARE, INC. 
COPYRIGHT BY P.M. BENTLER VERSION 5.7b (C) 1985 - 1998. 
PROGRAM CONTROL INFORMATION 
1 /TITLE 
2 Allsubs 
3 /SPECIFICATIONS 
4 DATA='C:\GAMBLING\ALLSUBS.ESS'; 
5 VARIABLES= 14; CASES= 192; 
6 METHODS=ML, ROBUST; 
7 MATRIX=RAW; 
8 /LABELS 
9 V1=L0C1; V2=LOG2; V3=LOC3; V4=F27; V5=F28; 
10 V6=F29; V7=F30; V8=F31; V9=F32; V10=F33; 
11 V11=Q23; V12=Q24; V13=Q25; V14=Q26; 
12 /EQUATIONS 
13 VI = + Fl + E l ; 
14 V2 = + *F1 + E2; 
15 V3 = + *F1 + E3; 
16 V4 = + F2 + E4; 
17 V5 = + *F2 + E5; 
18 V6 = + *F2 + E6; 
19 V7 = + *F2 + E7; 
20 V8 = + *F2 + E8; 
21 V9 = + *F2 + E9; 
22 VlO = + *F2 + ElO; 
23 Vl l = + F3 + E l l ; 
24 V12 = + *F3 + *F1 + E12; 
25 V13 = + *F3 + E13; 
26 V14 = + *F3 + E14; 
27 Fl= + *F2 + Dl; 
28 F2=*F3 + D3; 
29 /VARIANCES 
30 F3 = * ; 
31 El = * ; 
32 E2 = * ; 
33 E3 = * ; 
34 E4 = * ; 
35 E5 = * ; 
36 E6 = * ; 
37 E7 = * ; 
36 E8 = * ; 
39 E9 = * ; 
40 ElO = * ; 
41 E l l = * ; 
42 E12 = * ; 
43 E13 = * ; 
44 E14 = * ; 
45 /COVARIANCES 
4 6 /LMTEST 
47 PROCESS=SIMULTANEOUS; 
48 SET=PW, PFV, PFF, PDD, GW, GVF, GFV, GFF, BVF, BFF; 
49 /END 
49 RECORDS OF INPUT MODEL FILE WERE READ 
DATA IS READ FROM C:\GAMBLING\ALLSUBS.ESS 
THERE ARE 14 VARIABLES AND 192 CASES 
IT IS A RAW DATA ESS FILE 
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SAMPLE STATISTICS BASED ON COMPLETE CASES 
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
LOCI 
0.1458 
5.1572 
27.3362 
0.6305 
L0C2 
0.2031 
2.9758 
9.5437 
0.5272 
L0C3 
0.5313 
2.6856 
7.2697 
1.1618 
F27 
1.5312 
0.7913 
-0.4110 
0.6383 
F28 
1.5729 
0.7199 
-0.5492 
0.6591 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
F29 
1.9219 
0.3965 
-0.9678 
0.8617 
F30 
1.7031 
0.7679 
-0.4528 
0.7995 
F31 
1.4583 
1.0573 
0.8734 
0.5952 
F32 
2.0365 
0.4490 
-0.9190 
0.9674 
F33 
1.7396 
0.7510 
-0.2334 
0.7893 
VARIABLE 
MEAN 
SKEWNESS (Gl) 
KURTOSIS (G2) 
STANDARD DEV. 
Q23 
1.6875 
0.3731 
-0.6913 
0.6360 
Q24 
1.6563 
0.9463 
0.0897 
0.7837 
Q25 
1.4375 
1.0692 
0.0986 
0.6108 
Q26 
1.4115 
0.8448 
-0.3832 
0.5439 
MULTIVARIATE KURTOSIS 
MARDIA'S COEFFICIENT (G2,P) = 130.1328 
NORMALIZED ESTIMATE = 42.5959 
ELLIPTICAL THEORY KURTOSIS ESTIMATES 
MARDIA-BASED KAPPA = 0.5809 MEAN SCALED UNIVARIATE KURTOSIS = 0.9668 
MARDIA-BASED KAPPA IS USED IN COMPUTATION. KAPPA= 0.5809 
CASE NUMBERS WITH LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO NORMALIZED MULTIVARIATE KURTOSIS: 
CASE NUMBER 88 92 115 121 136 
ESTIMATE 697.9184 697.9184 1331.0284 927.1008 717.7889 
COVARIANCE MATRIX TO BE ANALYZED: 14 VARIABLES (SELECTED FROM 14 VARIABLES) 
BASED ON 192 CASES. 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.397 
L0C2 V 2 0.101 0.278 
L0C3 V 3 0.262 0.410 1.350 
F27 V 4 0.022 0.122 0.282 0.407 
F28 V 5 0.063 0.129 0.338 0.307 0.434 
F29 V 6 0.001 0.126 0.319 0.324 0.354 
F30 V 7 0.064 0.129 0.337 0.221 0.328 
F31 V 8 -0.010 0.037 0.085 0.132 0.150 
F32 V 9 0.068 0.165 0.389 0.274 0.340 
F33 V 10 0.064 0.142 0.380 0.259 0.323 
Q23 V 11 -0.022 0.100 0.230 0.193 0.196 
Q24 V 12 0.071 0.170 0.503 0.267 0.318 
Q25 V 13 -0.007 0.083 0.274 0.206 0.193 
Q26 V 14 -0.008 0.068 0.220 0.231 0.182 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.743 
F30 V 7 0.369 0.639 
F31 V 8 0.235 0.147 0.354 
F32 V 9 0.485 0.451 0.203 0.936 
F33 V 10 0.377 0.435 0.162 0.486 0.623 
Q23 V 11 0.300 0.216 0.097 0.216 0.190 
Q24 V 12 0.329 0.295 0.111 0.327 0.271 
Q25 V 13 0.239 0.157 0.170 0.209 0.183 
Q26 V 14 0.231 0.154 0.140 0.189 0.171 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.404 
Q24 V 12 0.264 0.614 
Q25 V 13 0.205 0.214 0.373 
Q26 V 14 0.197 0.226 0.233 0.296 
BENTLER-WEEKS STRUCTURAL REPRESENTATION: 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES =16 
DEPENDENT V S : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DEPENDENT V'S : 11 12 13 14 
DEPENDENT F'S : 1 2 
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 17 
INDEPENDENT F'S : 3 
INDEPENDENT E ' S : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
INDEPENDENT E'S : 11 12 13 14 
INDEPENDENT D'S : 1 3 
NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS = 31 
NUMBER OF FIXED NONZERO PARAMETERS = 19 
3RD STAGE OF COMPUTATION REQUIRED 25811 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATED 2500000 WORDS 
DETERMINANT OF INPUT MATRIX IS 0.30445E-07 
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MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOLUTION (NORMAL DISTRIBUTION THEORY) 
CASE CONTRIBUTION TO PARAMETER VARIANCES (IN DESCENDING ORDER). 
CASE 121= 9.382 53.25% CASE 53= 0.986 5.59% 
CASE 183= 0.829 4.71% CASE 29= 0.783 4.44% 
CASE 120= 0.685 3.89% CASE 33= 0.602 3.42% 
CASE 92= 0.538 3.05% CASE 88= 0.538 3.05% 
CASE 95= 0.419 2.38% CASE 65= 0.343 1.95% 
CASE 60= 0.237 1.35% CASE 34= 0.231 1.31% 
CASE 66= 0.227 1.29% CASE 136= 0.188 1.07% 
CASE 117= 0.166 0.94% CASE 11= 0.137 0.78% 
CASE 70= 0.089 0.50% CASE 90= 0.079 0.45% 
CASE 3= 0.078 0.45% CASE 115= 0.073 0.42% 
CASE 93= 0.070 0.40% CASE 42= 0.049 0.28% 
CASE 105= 0.049 0.28% CASE 118= 0.045 0.25% 
CASE 68= 0.039 0.22% CASE 41= 0.037 0.21% 
CASE 109= 0.036 0.21% CASE 13= 0.030 0.17% 
CASE 112= 0.025 0.14% CASE 76= 0.025 0.14% 
CASE 191= 0.024 0.14% CASE 1= 0.020 0.11% 
CASE 96= 0.017 0.10% CASE 50= 0.017 0;.10% 
CASE 54= 0.016 0.09% CASE 16= 0.016 0.09% 
CASE 73= 0.015 0.09% CASE 4= 0.014 0.08% 
CASE 111= 0.014 0.08% CASE 104= 0.013 0.07% 
CASE 178= 0.013 0.07% CASE 44= 0.012 0.07% 
CASE 148= 0.012 0.07% CASE 4 6= 0.012 0.07% 
CASE 101= 0.012 0.07% CASE 83= 0.011 0.06% 
CASE 131= 0.011 0.06% CASE 135= 0.010 0.06% 
CASE 87= 0.009 0.05% CASE 190= 0.009 0.05% 
CASE 72= 0.009 0.05% CASE 8 6= 0.009 0.05% 
CASE 110= 0.009 0.05% CASE 58= 0.009 0.05% 
CASE 119= 0.009 0.05% CASE 62= 0.009 0.05% 
CASE 100= 0.008 0.05% CASE 152= 0.008 0.05% 
CASE 27= 0.008 0.04% CASE 124= 0.007 0.04% 
CASE 155= 0.007 0.04% CASE 6= 0.007 0.04% 
CASE 186= 0.006 0.04% CASE 169= 0.006 0.03% 
CASE 79= 0.006 0.03% CASE 123= 0.006 0.03% 
CASE 81= 0.006 0.03% CASE 48= 0.005 0.03% 
CASE 158= 0.005 0.03% CASE 26= 0.005 0.03% 
CASE 182= 0.005 0.03% CASE 132= 0.005 0.03% 
CASE 107= 0.005 0.03% CASE 45= 0.005 0.03% 
CASE 80= 0.004 0.03% CASE 51= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 192= 0.004 0.02% CASE 94= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 154= 0.004 0.02% CASE 12= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 64= 0.004 0.02% CASE 84= 0.004 0.02% 
CASE 125= 0.003 0.02% CASE 128= 0.003 0.02% 
CASE 106= 0.003 0.02% CASE 162= 0.003 0.02% 
CASE 17= 0.003 0.02% CASE 103= 0.003 0.02% 
CASE 67= 0.003 0.02% CASE 98= 0.003 0.02% 
CASE 126= 0.003 0.02% CASE 40= 0.003 0.02% 
CASE 14= 0.003 0.02% CASE 35= 0.003 0.02% 
CASE 99= 0.003 0.02% CASE 5= 0.003 0.01% 
CASE 85= 0.003 0.01% CASE 75= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 25= 0.002 0.01% CASE 56= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 127= 0.002 0.01% CASE 145= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 122= 0.002 0.01% CASE 89= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 9= 0.002 0.01% CASE 116= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 133= 0.002 0.01% CASE 63= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 187= 0.002 0.01% CASE 8= 0.002 0.01% 
CASE 2= 0.002 0.01% CASE 129= 0.001 0.01% 
CASE 69= 0.001 0.01% CASE 189= 0.001 0.01% 
CASE 22= 0.001 0.01% CASE 71= 0.001 0.01% 
CASE 78= 0.001 0.01% CASE 47= 0.001 0.01% 
CASE 74= 0.001 0.01% CASE 157= 0.001 0.01% 
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PARAMETER ESTIMATES APPEAR IN ORDER, 
NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED DURING OPTIMIZATION. 
RESIDUAL COVARIANCE MATRIX (S-SIGMA) : 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.000 
L0C2 V 2 0.007 0.000 
L0C3 V 3 0.006 0.000 0.000 
F27 V 4 -0.044 0.016 -0.005 0.000 
F28 V 5 -0.013 0.009 0.011 0.034 0.000 
F29 V 6 -0.088 -0.016 -0.067 0.003 -0.013 
F30 V 7 -0.014 0.004 -0.003 -0.062 0.006 
F31 V 8 -0.049 -0.025 -0.085 -0.009 -0.012 
F32 V 9 -0.023 0.020 -0.006 -0.055 -0.034 
F33 V 10 -0.017 0.013 0.028 -0.034 -0.012 
Q23 V 11 -0.069 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.002 
Q24 V 12 -0.041 -0.010 0.015 0.042 0.062 
Q25 V 13 -0.056 0.004 0.059 0.027 -0.011 
Q26 V 14 -0.056 -0.009 0.012 0.057 -0.016 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.000 
F30 V 7 -0.011 0.000 
F31 V 8 0.044 -0.020 0.000 
F32 V 9 0.042 0.062 0.008 0.000 
F33 V 10 -0.018 0.088 -0.012 0.083 0.000 
Q23 V 11 0.071 0.014 -0.004 -0.018 -0.018 
Q24 V 12 0.026 0.029 -0.022 0.017 -0.005 
Q25 V 13 -0.003 -0.055 0.064 -0.037 -0.037 
Q26 V 14 -0.002 -0.051 0.037 -0.049 -0.042 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.000 
Q24 V 12 0.035 0.003 
Q25 V 13 -0.007 -0.027 0.000 
Q26 V 14 -0.009 -0.007 0.016 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE COVARIANCE RESIDUALS 
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0.0244 
0.0281 
STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL MATRIX: 
LOCI L0C2 L0C3 •F27 F28 
V 1 V 2 V 3 V 4 V 5 
LOCI V 1 0.000 
L0C2 V 2 0.021 0.000 
L0C3 V 3 0.009 0.000 0.000 
F27 V 4 -0.110 0.049 -0.007 0.000 
F28 V 5 -0.030 0.025 0.014 0.081 0.000 
F29 V 6 -0.162 -0.036 -0.067 0.005 -0.023 
F30 V 7 -0.027 0.009 -0.003 -0.121 0.011 
F31 V 8 -0.130 -0.080 -0.123 -0.025 -0.030 
F32 V 9 -0.037 0.040 -0.005 -0.089 -0.054 
F33 V 10 -0.033 0.030 0.030 -0.068 -0.022 
Q23 V 11 -0.172 0.076 0.035 0.056 0.004 
Q24 V 12 -0.082 -0.023 0.017 0.084' 0.120 
Q25 V 13 -0.145 0.014 0.083 0.069 -0.028 
Q26 V 14 -0.163 -0.031 0.019 0.164^  -0.044 
F29 F30 F31 F32 F33 
V 6 V 7 V 8 V 9 V 10 
F29 V 6 0.000 
F30 V 7 -0.017 0.000 
F31 V 8 0.086 -0.043 0.000 
F32 V 9 0.051 0.080 0.015 0.000 
F33 V 10 -0.026 0.140 -0.026 0.108 0.000 
Q23 V 11 0.130 0.028 -0.010 -0.030 -0.037 
Q24 V 12 0.038 0.046 -0.047 0.023 -0.008 
Q25 V 13 -0.005 -0.113 0.176 -0.063 -0.077 
Q26 V 14 -0.005 -0.118 0.116 -0.094 -0.099 
Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
V 11 V 12 V 13 V 14 
Q23 V 11 0.000 
Q24 V 12 0.070 0.006 
Q25 V 13 -0.019 -0.056 0.000 
Q26 V 14 -0.025 -0.017 0.047 0.000 
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
AVERAGE OFF-DIAGONAL ABSOLUTE STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
0.0488 
0.0563 
LARGEST STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS: 
V 13,V 8 V 11,V 1 V 14,V 4 V 14,V 1 V 6,V 1 
0.176 -0.172 0.164 -0.163 -0.162 
V 13,V 1 V 10,V 7 V 11,V 6 V 8,V 1 V 8,V 3 
-0.145 0.140 0.130 -0.130 -0.123 
V 7,V 4 V 12,V 5 V 14,V 7 V 14,V 8 V 13,V 7 
-0.121 0.120 -0.118 0.116 -0.113 
V 4,V 1 V 10,V 9 V 14,V 10 V 14,V 9 V 9,V 4 
-0.110 0.108 -0.099 -0.094 -0.089, 
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DISTRIBUTION OF STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
I 
60-
RANGE FREQ PERCENT. 
45-
30-
15-
* * ! 1 -0.5 -
— 
0 0.00% 
* * ! 2 -0.4 
-
-0.5 0 0.00% 
* * ! 3 -0.3 
-
-0.4 0 0.00% 
* * ! 4 -0.2 - -0.3 0 0.00% 
* * 5 -0.1 
-
-0.2 10 9.52% 
* ! 6 0.0 
-
-0.1 42 40.00% 
* * ! 7 0.1 
-
0.0 46 43.81% 
* * ! 8 0.2 0.1 7 6.67% 
* * ! 9 0.3 
-
0.2 0 0.00% 
* * A 0.4 
-
0.3 0 0.00% 
* * ! B 0.5 
-
0.4 0 0.00% 
* ! C ++ 
-
0.5 0 0.00% 
TOTAL 105 100.00% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C EACH "*" REPRESENTS 3 RESIDUALS 
GOODNESS OF FIT SUMMARY 
INDEPENDENCE MODEL CHI-SQUARE = 1480.833 ON 91 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
INDEPENDENCE AIC = 1298.83295 INDEPENDENCE CAIC = 911.40087 
MODEL AIC = 74.89792 MODEL CAIC = -240.15674 
CHI-SQUARE = 222.898 BASED ON 74 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS LESS THAN 0.001 
THE NORMAL THEORY RLS CHI-SQUARE FOR THIS ML SOLUTION IS 235.393. 
SATORRA-BENTLER SCALED CHI-SQUARE = 156.0937 
PROBABILITY VALUE FOR THE CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC IS 0.00000 
BENTLER-BONETT NORMED FIT INDEX= 0.849 
BENTLER-BONETT NONNORMED FIT INDEX= 0.868 
COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX (CFI) = 0.893 
ROBUST COMPARATIVE FIT INDEX = 0.920 
ITERATIVE SUMMARY 
PARAMETER 
ITERATION ABS CHANGE ALPHA FUNCTION 
1 0.222968 1.00000 2.25410 
2 0.111388 1.00000 1.48116 
3 0.084031 1.00000 1.39333 
4 0.081677 1.00000 1.20594 
5 0.038574 1.00000 1.16739 
6 0.003156 1.00000 1.16701 
7 0.000564 1.00000 1.16700 
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MEASUREMENT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
(ROBUST STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
LOCI =V1 = 1.000 Fl + 1.000 El 
L0C2 =V2 = 1 . 6 0 1 * F 1 
.322 
4.979 
.572) 
2.797) 
+ 1.000 E2 
L0C3 =V3 = 4 . 3 5 4 * F 1 
.868 
5 . 0 1 8 
1 .485) 
2 . 9 3 2 ) 
+ 1.000 E3 
F27 =V4 = 1.000 F2 + 1.000 E4 
F28 =V5 = 
F29 =V6 = 
F30 =V7 = 
F31 =V8 
F32 =V9 = 
F33 =V10 
1.139*F2 
.093 
12.277 
.076) 
15.033) 
1.346*F2 
.123 
10.915 
.119) 
11.303) 
1.183*F2 
.115 
10.255 
.133) 
8.877) 
.592*F2 
.089 
6.631 
.090) 
6.595) 
1.374*F2 
.140 
9.791 
.157) 
8.738) 
1.227*F2 
.113 
10.858 
.122) 
10.034) 
+ 1.000 E5 
+ 1.000 E6 
+ 1.000 E7 
+ 1.000 E8 
+ 1.000 E9 
+ 1.000 ElO 
Q23 =V11 = 1.000 F3 + 1.000 E l l 
Q24 =V12 = 1.230*F1 
.309 
3.985 
.359) 
3.421) 
+ .847*F3 
.131 
6.477 
( .139) 
( 6.082) 
+ 1.000 E12 
Q25 =V13 = 
( 
1.053*F3 
.109 
9.619 
.102) 
{ 10.324) 
+ 1.000 E13 
Q26 =V14 = 
( 
1.020*F3 
.100 
10.242 
.096) 
( 10.600) 
+ 1.000 E14 
CONSTRqCT EQUATIONS WITH STANDARD ERRORS AND TEST STATISTICS 
(ROBUST STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Fl =F1 = .276*F2 
.065 
4.228 
.101) 
2.741) 
+ 1.000 Dl 
F2 =F2 = .842*F3 
.105 
8.053 
.094) 
8.917) 
+ 1.000 D3 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
V 
F3 - F3 .202*1 
.038 I 
5.294 I 
.036)1 
5.686)1 
I 
VARIANCES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
E D 
El - LOCI .339*1 Dl - Fl .041*1 
.036 I .016 I 
9.501 I 2.556 I 
( .145)1 ( .031)1 
( 2.330)1 ( 1.300)1 
I I 
E2 - L0C2 .127*1 D3 - F2 .096*1 
.018 I .019 I 
7.008 I 5.010 I 
( .028)1 ( .023)1 
( 4.600)1 ( 4.251)1 
I I 
E3 - L0C3 .235*1 I 
.094 I I 
2.495 I I 
( .106)1 I 
( 2.228)1 I 
I I 
E4 - F27 .168*1 I 
.020 I I 
8.426 I I 
( .026)1 I 
( 6.473)1 I 
I I 
E5 - F28 . 1 2 4 * 1 I 
.017 I I 
7 . 3 9 3 I I 
( . . 0 2 0 ) 1 I 
( 6 . 2 6 7 ) 1 I 
I I 
E6 - F29 . 3 0 9 * 1 I 
.037 I I 
8 . 4 4 6 I I 
( . 0 4 2 ) 1 I 
( 7 . 3 6 2 ) 1 I 
I I 
E7 - F30 . 3 0 5 * 1 I 
. 0 3 5 I I 
8 . 7 3 5 I I 
( . 0 4 0 ) 1 I 
( 7 . 6 2 6 ) 1 I 
I I 
E8 - F31 . 2 7 0 * 1 I 
. 029 I I 
9 . 481 I I 
( . 0 5 0 ) 1 I 
( 5 . 4 2 5 ) 1 I 
I I 
E9 - F32 . 4 8 4 * 1 I 
.054 I I 
8 . 8 9 3 I I 
( . 0 7 4 ) 1 I 
( 6 . 5 6 8 ) 1 I 
I I 
E l O - F33 . 2 6 3 * 1 I 
,.031 I I 
8 . 4 7 5 I I 
( . 0 4 0 ) 1 I 
( 6 . 5 0 3 ) 1 I 
I I 
E l l - Q23 . 2 0 2 * 1 I 
. 0 2 5 I I 
8 . 2 5 3 I I 
{ . 0 3 0 ) 1 I 
( 6 . 6 7 3 ) 1 I 
I I 
E12 - Q24 . 2 7 9 * 1 I 
. 033 I I 
8 . 5 8 5 I I 
( . 0 4 0 ) 1 I 
( 6 . 9 6 2 ) 1 I 
I I 
E13 - Q25 . 1 4 9 * 1 I 
. 020 I I 
7 . 4 3 9 I I 
( . 0 2 6 ) 1 I 
( 5 . 7 5 5 ) 1 I 
I I 
E14 - Q26 . 0 8 6 * 1 I 
.014 I I 
5 . 9 8 6 I I 
( . 0 1 4 ) 1 I 
( 5 . 9 7 6 ) 1 I 
I I 
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STANDARDIZED SOLUTION: R-SQUARED 
LOCI =V1 . 3 8 5 F l + . 9 2 3 E l . 148 
L0C2 =V2 = . 7 3 6 * F 1 + . 677 E2 .542 
L0C3 =V3 - . 9 0 9 * F 1 + . 418 E3 . 826 
F27 =V4 = . 7 6 6 F2 + . 6 4 3 E4 .587 
F28 =V5 . 8 4 5 * F 2 + .534 E5 . 7 1 5 
F29 =V6 = . 7 6 4 * F 2 + . 6 4 5 E6 . 5 8 3 
F30 =V7 = . 7 2 4 * F 2 + . 690 E7 .524 
F31 =V8 =• . 4 8 7 * F 2 + .874 E8 .237 
F32 =V9 : - . 6 9 5 * F 2 + . 719 E9 . 4 8 3 
F33 =V10 : .7 6 0 * F 2 + . 6 4 9 E l O .578 
Q23 =V11 = . 707 F3 + . 707 E l l . 499 
Q24 =V12 . 3 8 1 * F 1 + . 4 8 7 * F 3 + . 676 E12 . 5 4 3 
Q25 =V13 = . 7 7 5 * F 3 + . 632 E13 . 6 0 0 
Q26 =V14 = . 8 4 3 * F 3 + . 538 E14 . 711 
F l =F1 - . 5 5 6 * F 2 + . 831 D l . 3 0 9 
F2 =F2 . 7 7 4 * F 3 + . 6 3 3 D3 . 5 9 9 
E N D O F M E T H O D 
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LAGRANGIAN M U L T I P L I E R TEST REQUIRES 14558 WORDS OF MEMORY. 
PROGRAM ALLOCATES 2500000 WORDS. 
LAGRANGE M U L T I P L I E R TEST (FOR ADDING PARAMETERS) 
ORDERED UNIVARIATE TEST S T A T I S T I C S : 
NO CODE PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE PROBABIL ITY PARAMETER CHAl 
1 2 12 V 4 , F 3 2 2 . 0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 6 9 2 
2 2 12 V I , F3 9 .884 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 3 7 4 
3 2 12 V 1 0 , F 3 9 .151 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 5 5 5 
4 2 12 V 8 , F 3 7 . 2 3 0 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 4 6 2 
5 2 20 V 1 2 , F 2 7 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 0 8 0 . 5 0 0 
6 2 12 V 7 , F 3 6 .740 0 . 0 0 9 - 0 . 5 0 1 
7 2 20 V 8 , F 1 6 .277 0 . 0 1 2 - 0 . 5 3 7 
8 2 12 V 9 , F 3 4 . 6 4 6 0 . 0 3 1 - 0 . 5 1 8 
9 2 20 V I , F2 3 .734 0 . 0 5 3 - 0 . 2 2 8 
10 2 12 V 3 , F 3 3 . 4 1 6 0 . 0 6 5 0 . 3 9 9 
11 2 20 V 6 , F 1 3 . 3 9 6 0 . 0 6 5 - 0 . 4 5 1 
12 2 20 V 1 4 , F 2 3 .074 0 . 0 8 0 - 0 . 2 4 8 
13 2 12 V 6 , F 3 1 .786 0 . 1 8 1 0 . 2 6 6 
14 2 20 V 1 1 , F 2 1 .448 0 . 2 2 9 0 . 1 8 8 
15 2 20 V 5 , F 1 1 .149 0 .284 0 . 1 7 9 
16 2 20 V 1 3 , F 2 1 .054 0 . 3 0 5 - 0 . 1 5 5 
17 2 20 V 1 3 , F 1 0 . 8 9 5 0 .344 0 . 1 5 7 
18 2 20 V 1 0 , F 1 0 . 7 0 0 0 . 4 0 3 0 . 1 8 8 
19 2 20 V 1 4 , F 1 0 . 7 0 0 0 . 4 0 3 - 0 . 1 1 8 
20 2 20 V 1 1 , F 1 0 . 5 4 3 0 . 4 6 1 0 . 1 3 5 
21 2 20 V 3 , F 2 0 . 4 0 6 0 .524 - 0 . 1 6 7 
22 2 10 D3,D1 0 .344 0 . 5 5 7 - 0 . 0 0 5 
23 2 16 F 1 , F 3 0 .344 0 . 5 5 7 0 .044 
24 2 22 F 2 , F 1 0 .344 0 . 5 5 7 - 0 . 1 2 3 
25 2 20 V 2 , F 2 0 .334 0 . 5 6 3 0 . 0 5 7 
26 2 12 V 5 , F 3 0 . 2 2 6 0 . 6 3 5 - 0 . 0 6 6 
27 2 20 V 9 , F 1 0 .047 0 . 8 2 9 0 .064 
28 2 20 V 7 , F 1 0 .032 0 . 8 5 8 0 . 0 4 3 
29 2 12 V 2 , F 3 0 .031 0 . 8 6 1 - 0 . 0 1 6 
30 2 20 V 4 , F 1 0 .008 0 . 9 3 0 0 . 0 1 6 
31 2 0 F 2 , D 3 0 .000 1 .000 0 . 0 0 0 
32 2 0 F 1 , D 1 0 .000 1 .000 0 . 0 0 0 
33 2 0 V 1 1 , F 3 0 .000 1 .000 0 . 0 0 0 
34 2 0 V 4 , F 2 0 .000 1 .000 0 . 0 0 0 
35 2 0 V I , F l 0 .000 1 .000 0 . 0 0 0 
MULTIVARIATE LAGRANGE MULTIPL IER TEST BY SIMULTANEOUS PROCESS IN STAGE 1 
PARAMETER SETS (SUBMATRICES) ACT IVE AT THIS STAGE A R E : 
P W PFV P F F PDD G W GVF GFV GFF BVF B F F 
CUMULATIVE MULTIVARIATE STATIST ICS 
STEP PARAMETER CHI-SQUARE D . F . PROBABIL ITY 
1 V 4 , F 3 2 2 . 0 8 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 
2 V I , F 3 3 1 . 8 4 2 2 0 . 0 0 0 
3 V 8 , F 3 4 1 . 2 6 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 
4 V 1 2 , F 2 4 7 . 5 9 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 
5 V 8 , F 1 5 3 . 4 9 6 5 0 . 0 0 0 
6 V 1 0 , F 3 5 7 . 4 4 2 6 0 . 0 0 0 
7 V 7 , F 3 6 1 . 8 4 6 7 0 . 0 0 0 
8 V 9 , F 3 6 6 . 4 4 2 8 0 . 0 0 0 
UNIVARIATE INCREMENT 
CHI -SQUARE PROBABIL ITY 
2 2 . 0 8 0 0 . 0 0 0 
9 . 7 6 2 0 . 0 0 2 
9 . 4 1 9 0 . 0 0 2 
6 . 3 3 8 0 . 0 1 2 
5 . 8 9 7 0 . 0 1 5 
3 . 9 4 6 0 . 0 4 7 
4 . 4 0 4 0 . 0 3 6 
4 . 5 9 6 0 . 0 3 2 
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7.6. Appendix 6 
6a. Complete Questionnaire for Study 3. 
la . A friend takes a coin out of a pocket and is about to flip it into the ah. Would you 
go for Heads or Tails? 
b. How confident would you be? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
2. You have been observing the outcomes at a Roulette table. The outcomes so far on 
the table you've been looking at have been: 
Black, Red, Black, Black, Black, Black, Black, Red, 
a. What do you think the next outcome wil l be? Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident are you that your choice is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
•PAGE BREAK. 
3. A taxi cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the 
Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 
150 of the cabs in the city are Green, 100 are Blue. A wimess identified the cab as 
Blue. The Court tested the reliability of the wimess under the same circumstances 
that existed on the night of the accident, and concluded that the witness correctly 
identified each one of the two coloms 80% of the tune, and failed 20% of the time. 
a. What is the likelihood that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather than 
Green? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
b. How confident are you that your response is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
•PAGE BREAK. 
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4. A new Wheel of Fortune has 50 segments that you can bet on. Half of the numbers 
are even (E), half are odd (O), and they are distributed around the wheel equally. 
a. How random do you think the sequence below is as arising from the spiiming of the 
Wheel? 
O O E E E E E O E O O O E E E E O O E E E O O E O O 
Please Indicate from 0 (Not at all Random) to 100 (Completely Random) 
b. How confident are you of your ratmg? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
c. How random do you think the sequence below is as arising from the spinning of the 
Wheel? 
O O E O E E O E E E E E O O O E E O E O E O O E O E 
Please Indicate from 0 (Not at all Random) to 100 (Completely Random) 
d. How confident are you of yom ratmg? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
e. How random do you think the sequence below is as arising fiom the spinning of the 
Wheel? 
E E O E O E E O E O E O E O E E O E O E O O E E O E 
Please Indicate from 0 (Not at all Random) to 100 (Completely Random) 
f How confident are you of yom rating? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
g. . How random do you think the sequence below is as arising fiom the spiiming of the 
Wheel? 
O O O O O O O O O E E O O O O O E E E E E E E O E E 
Please Indicate from 0 (Not at all Random) to 100 (Completely Random) 
h. How confident are you of yom rating? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
•PAGE BREAK 
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5a. Suppose you sample a word at random from an English text. Is it more likely that 
the word starts with the letter "k" or that "k" is its third letter? 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
6a. In four pages of a novel (about 2000 words), how many words would you expect to 
find have the form i n g (seven letter words that end in "ing")? 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
7a. You turn up at a Casino to play Roulette. You arrive at the table and place a bet. 
What would you choose to go for first? Red or Black? 
Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident would you be? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
8. Imagine everybody in every city in the world was photographed. From studying the 
photos, it appears that 50% of the photos show people with their heads facing to the 
left, whilst the other 50% of the people are looking to the right. 
You are presented with a series of these photos in which the direction of gaze, in 
the order that you receive them, is as follows: 
Left, Left, Right, Left, Right, Right, Left, Left, Right, Left, Right, Right, Right, Left, Left, Right,.. 
a. If presented with another photo, which direction do you think the person's head will 
be facing? 
Please Circle: Right Left 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate fi-om 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
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9. Two countries were at battle against each other. Country A had only 1000 soldiers 
to start with, but had a much stronger technological weapons backing, compared to 
the much stronger army of 2000 soldiers in Country B with a much weaker 
technological backing. Although the battle was fierce and a close-call for both 
countries, one country did finally win the battle. 
a. Which one do you think it was? 
b. How confident are you that your decision is the correct one? 
Please Indicate Irom 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
10. You decide to go to a Casino for the evening. You arrive and watch some of the 
players playing the various games, before making your way to one of the roulette 
tables. You decide to play yourself, and have won the last few trials. You decide 
to stick to betting on Red or Black for the time being. 
a. How confident are you that you will win the next round? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
11. You have been observing the outcomes at a Roulette table. The outcomes so far on 
the table you've been looking at have been: 
Red, Red, Black, Red, Black, Black, Red, Red, Black, Red, Black, Black, Black, Red, Red, Black,. 
a. What do you think the next outcome will be? Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident are you that your choice is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
12. The outcomes of the spin of the Roulette wheel are clearly displayed for you to 
look at. Out of the last 8 outcomes, there was a sequence of four red in a row, 
followed by four black numbers. 
a. What do you think the following outcome was? Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident are you that your choice is the correct one? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
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13. Imagme everybody in every city in the world was photographed. From studying the 
photos, it appears that 50% of the photos show people with their heads facing to the 
left, whilst the other 50% of the people are looking to the right. 
You are presented with a series of these photos in which the direction of gaze, in 
the order that you receive them, is as follows: 
Left, Right, Right, Left, Right, Left, Left, Right,.... 
a. If presented with another photo, which dhection do you think the person's head wil l 
be facing? 
Please Circle: Right Left 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
14a. In four pages of a novel (about 2000 words), how many words would you expect to 
find have the form n _ (seven letter words with "n" as the sixth letter) ? 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK — 
15. How likely do you think the sequence of outcomes below is to occur from flipping a coin: 
(0.6) 
O O t l l l t O » Q O O « » » » 0 0 < g « O O t O O O O « O C t t t t l O O O O O O » t « 0 0 » » » 
16 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
17. How likely do you think the sequence of outcomes below is to occur from flipphig a cohi: 
(0.4) 
18. 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
19. How likely do you think the sequence of outcomes below is to occur from flippmg a coin: 
(0.2) 
20. 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
21. How likely do you think the sequence of outcomes below is to occm from flipping a coin: 
(0.8) 
22. 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlikely) to 100 (Completely Likely) 
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22. Imagine everybody in every city in the world was photographed. From studying the 
photos, it appears that 50% of the photos show people with then heads facing to the 
left, whilst the other 50% of the people are lookmg to the right. 
You are presented with a series of these photos in which the dhection of gaze, in 
the order that you receive them, is as follows: 
Right, Left, Right, Right, Right, Right, Right, Left,.... 
a. If presented v^th another photo, which direction do you think the person's head will 
be facing? 
Please Circle: Right Left 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate fi-om 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
-PAGE BREAK 
23. You have been observing the outcomes at a Roulette table. The outcomes so far on 
the table you've been looking at have been: 
Red, Black, Black, Red, Black, Red, Red, Black 
a. What do you think the next outcome will be? Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident are you that your choice is correct? 
Please Indicate firom 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
_PAGE BREAK 
24. Two countries were at battle against each other. Country A had only 1000 soldiers 
to start with, but had a much stronger technological weapons backing, compared to 
the much stronger army of2000 soldiers m Country B with a much weaker 
technological backing. Although the battle was fierce and a close-call for both 
countries, Country A country did finally win the battle. 
a. How confident would you have been in predicting this? 
Please Indicate fi-om 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
25. Imagine everybody in every city in the world was photographed. From studying the 
photos, it appears that 50% of the photos show people with their heads facing to the 
left, whilst the other 50% of the people are lookmg to the right. 
You are presented with a series of these photos in which the dhection of gaze, in 
the order that you receive them, is as follows: 
Left, Left, Right, Left, Left, Left, Right, Left, Right, Left, Left, Left, Left, Left, Left, Right, 
a. If presented with another photo, which dhection do you think the person's head will 
be facing? 
Please Circle: Right Left 
b. How confident are you that your judgement is correct? 
Please Indicate firom 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
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26. Trainer A enters 15 horses and Trainer B enter 10 horses into the season's races. 
Before entering the paddock before a particular race, a punter points to a horse and 
reports that it comes firom Trainer B . It is known that even fiom a distance, the 
punter can correctly report which Trainer the horse belongs to 80% of the time, and 
fails 20% of the thne. 
a. What is the likelihood that the horse that the pimter points to, comes fiom Trainer 
B? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unlilfely) to 100 (Completely Lilcely) 
27. The outcomes of the spin of the Roulette wheel are clearly displayed for you to 
look at. Out of the last 8 outcomes, there was a sequence of four red in a row, 
followed by four black numbers. 
a. Given that the next outcome that you've just seen was in fact Red, how confident 
would you have been in predicting it? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
28. You have been observing the outcomes at a Roulette table. The outcomes so far on 
the table you've been looking at have been: 
Red, Red, Black, Red, Red, Red, Black, Red, Black, Red, Red, Red, Red, Red, Red, Black, 
a. What do you think the next outcome wil l be? Please Circle: Red Black 
b. How confident are you that yom choice is correct? 
Please Indicate from 0 (Completely Unconfident) to 100 (Completely Confident) 
PAGE BREAK 
1. Do you currently gamble? YES NO 
2. When was the last time you gambled? (Days, Weeks, Months, ago) 
Please answer the fi)llowing questions about the gambling vou have done over the last 12 months, (or 
throughout your previous episode of gambling) 
3. Which of the following activities have you wagered money on? (please circle) 
Horse/Dog racing (Off course) The National Lottery Bingo 
Horse/Dog racing (On course) Scratch Cards Pools 
Gaming machines (fruit machines etc.) Casino games Other: 
Sports betting (Motor sports. Football etc.) 
4. Which is the form of gambling you take part in most often? 
4a. Which is the form that you have spent the most money on? 
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5. Over the last 12 months, on average, how often have you gambled? 
(e.g. 2 per week, every day, once a month ... etc) 
5a. Over the last 12 months, approximately how much money have you spent gambling? 
6. How long is your typical gambling episode? (please circle) 
(e.g. 10 minutes, 1 hour, 6 hours, ...etc) 
7. On average, how much do you spend per session? (please circle) 
8. Do you see your gambling activities as ever having lead to a problem? NO YES 
9. Have you sought or thought of seeking help for your gambling behaviour? YES NO 
10. Was there any time when the amount you were gambling made you nervous?' YES NO 
11. After winning, do you feel you ought to gamble more to increase your winnings? NO YES 
12. Do you gamble until all your spare cash has gone? YES NO 
13. After losing, do you spend more money to try to make up for your losses? NO YES 
14. Do you ever get into debt as a result of your gambling? NO YES 
15. Have you borrowed money to gamble or pay gambling debts? YES NO 
16. Do you find you gamble for longer than you intended? NO YES 
17. Do you need to gamble with more and more money to achieve the desired excitement? YES NO 
18. Do you ever have unsuccessfiil attempts to control, cut back, or stop gambling? NO YES 
19. When you gamble, do you go back another day to win back the money you lost? NO YES 
20. Do you ever gamble more money than you intended to? YES NO 
21. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or about what happens when you gamble? 
YES NO 
22. Have you hidden betting slips, lottery tickets, gambling money, or other signs of gambling form your 
spouse, children, or other important people in you life? NO YES 
Please respond to the following items by circling the option that best describes the wav vou 
feel.(Please only circle one option) 
23. Gambling makes me feel really alive. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
24. Sometimes I forget about the time when I am gambling. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
25.1 get a real buzz that lifts me when I gamble. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
26. Whilst gamblmg I feel I'm free, able to do and choose what I like. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree. Strongly Agree 
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27.1 feel less stressed when I gamble. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
28. Whilst I'm in the gamblmg environment, I usually don't notice what other people are up to. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
29. As soon as I start gambling I feel different to how I did before. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
30. If I were feeling down, gambling would probably pick me up. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
31.1 like gambling because it helps me to forget my everyday problems. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
32. If I have not won any bets for a while, I am probably due for a big win. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
33.1 know when I'm on a streak. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
34. It is important to feel confident when I'm gambling. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
35. No matter what the game is, there are betting strategies that can help you to win. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
36.1 have carried a lucky charm when I gambled. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
37.1 must be familiar with a gambling game if I am going to win. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
38. To be successfiil at gambling, I must be able to identify streaks. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
39.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinking "I feel that I'm going to win this time". 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
40.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinkmg "I knew it was going to be that, I said so". 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
41.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinkmg "How come I didn't win?" 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
42.1 sometimes find myself saying or thinking "This time wasn't very good, I could have played better." 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 

Please indicate bv circling a response as to how much vou agree that each item is relevant 
to vou. 
43. Some people have the experience of drivmg a car and suddenly realising that they don't remember what 
has happened during all or part of the trip. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
44. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how they got there. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
45. Some people have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to themselves or watching 
themselves do something and they actually see themselves as if they were looking at another person. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
46. Some people fmd that they have no memory for some important events in their lives. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
47. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember happening really 
did happen or whether they just dreamed them. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
48. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but fmding it strange and unfamiliar. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
49. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they become so absorbed in the story 
that they are unaware of other events happening around them. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
50. Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it feels as 
though it were really happening to them. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
51. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with another situation that 
they feel almost as if they were two different people. 
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
52. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices that tell them to do things or comment on things that 
they are doing. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
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